

**Arthur Stephen
McGrade (Editor)**

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community (Medieval**

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Richard Hooker AND THE Construction of Christian Community

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Richard Hooker AND THE Construction of Christian Community

edited by Arthur Stephen McGrade coeDievAL & ReKiAissAMce xe^TS
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Abbreviations and Acronyms A.C.L A Christian Letter (1599), volume 4 of the Folger Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker Answer Richard Hooker, Answer to the Supplication (of Walter Travers), volume 5 of the Folger edition Autograph Hooker's Autograph Notes from Trinity College, Dublin, Notes MS 364, fols. 69-84, volumes 3 & 4 of the Folger edition Causes Hooker, The Causes of the Continuance of These Contentions Concerning Church Government, volume 3 of the Folger edition Cert. Hooker, A Learned Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuities of Faith in the Elect, volume 5 of the Folger edition DNB L. Stephen and S. Lee], eds., Dictionary of National Biography (1885-1901) E.P.M. Patrick Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement (1967) FLE The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker I . . . VIII Books I . . . VIII, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie Inst. John Calvin, Institutes of Christian Religion Jude I, 2 Hooker, Two Sermons Upon St. Jude's Epistle, volume 5 of the Folger edition Just. Hooker, A Learned Discourse of Justification, volume 5 of the Folger edition Keble John Keble, ed.. The Works of . . . Mr. Richard Hooker, 7th edn., rev. R.W. Church and F. Paget (Oxford, 1888) Lawes Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie n Commentary note in the Folger edition

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS Pride Hooker, A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride, volume 5 of the Folger edition Remedy Hooker, A Remedy Against Sorrow and Feare, volume 5 of the Folger edition S.R.H. W. Speed Hill, ed., Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of His Works (1972) Supplication A Supplication made to the Privy Counsel (by Walter Travers), volume 5 of the Folger Hooker edition Forms of Reference References to Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie are by book (Pref. and I- VIII), chapter, and section. Keble's chapter and section numbers are given in parenthesis, when they differ from the Folger divisions of the text. Thus, "VIII.3.1 (Keble 2.4)" refers to chapter 3, section 1 of Uwes VIII in FLE, which includes Keble's chapter 2, section 4. Unless reference to

an entire section or chapter is intended, citations of Hooker's works generally include volume, page, and line numbers in the Folger edition. Thus, a reference to the sentence on faith, hope, and charity beginning on page 118, line 31 of FLE volume 1 and ending on page 119, line 15, would be given as: 1.11.5; 1:118.31-119.15.

ARTHUR STEPHEN MCGRADÉ Foreword A SKETCH OF RICHARD HOOKER AS HE APPEARS IN THIS VOLUME AND IN the recently completed Folger Library edition of his works* can be drawn by contrast with two previous views. There is first the traditional portrait. Its legend could be taken from Izaak Walton's declaration that "He who praises Richard Hooker praises God." The hagiographical image has been durable. The community of Hooker's admirers over the last four centuries includes religious, political, and literary figures who were otherwise great antagonists. Pope and presbyterian, king and Leveller, poets of peace and of revolution, have seen merit in Hooker's sermons of the 1580s or in his later account of English church and society in *Of the Lawes of EcclesiasticaU*.¹ The Folger Ubrary Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, W. Speed Hill, General Editor, 6 vols (vols 1-5, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1977-1990; vol. 6, Binghamton, N.Y.: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1993). The studies offered here have been selected from papers given at a conference marking completion of the Folger edition held September 24-26, 1993 at TTie Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington, D.C., and The Washington National Cathedral. Some of the papers included here have been revised substantially in the light of discussion at the conference and with a view to addressing the themes of this volume. I am grateful to the Folger editors, W. Speed Hill, John Booty, Georges Edelen, Lee Gibbs, Egil Grislis, William P. Haugaard, and Paul Stan wood for detailed reviews of papers proposed for this volume and to the authors for their generous cooperation in preparing their studies for publication. Support for publication of this volume has been provided by the University of Connecticut; the University of Toronto; Trinity College, Cambridge; St Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia; Cleveland State University; and the University of the South. I am happily indebted to my wife for boundless aid both personal and scholarly.

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Politie} Among students of English literature, Hooker's canonical status has rested principally on his eloquence in presenting an Elizabethan worldview of harmonious order, a worldview

authoritatively validated for this readership by its concurrent representation in Shakespeare's plays. The primary text here is the serene first book of the Lawes, a synopsis of "lawes and their several kindes in general," including the eternal laws of God's operations and the laws of angels and physical nature, as well as norms of ethics and political life. For students of western culture generally. Hooker has seemed praiseworthy for providing a description of human affairs and the cosmos which any intelligent and civilized reader could respect, if not, necessarily, or still, accept. In sum, Hooker has long and widely been revered as the best model of an Anglican divine.

It has always been recognized, of course, that, setting aside Book I, the Lawes is in some sense a polemic. Its aim is to show, in explicit response to puritan objections and implicit response to Roman Catholic rejection, the legitimacy of Elizabeth I's "settlement" of the English church after its uncertain course through Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the reigns of her father, brother, and sister. Hooker has until recently seemed a reluctant controversialist, however, and to many readers there has seemed to be no controversy at all about the merits of his cause as against those who opposed the Elizabethan order. "Popery," a foreign military threat, and Puritanism, a nasty yet intellectually trivial domestic nuisance, so it seemed, were marginal elements in Elizabeth's golden age. Hooker, it appeared, was not so much making an advocate's case as offering straight-forward description of an establishment needing only to be described in order to elicit loyalty from any right-thinking person. Hooker's description was singularly eloquent, but it was nonetheless a description, not a make-over. No smoke and mirrors were needed. No hidden agenda was imaginable. The self-evident virtues of the Elizabethan establishment were simply more attractively self-evident when framed in reflections from perennial philosophy and Christian tradition.

A different picture of Hooker and his situation is suggested by a considerable body of recent scholarship, which has raised questions about every feature of the view just outlined: questions about the obvious

^ Lord Dacre, then Hugh Trevor-Roper, demonstrated the breadth of Hooker's appeal in an address celebrating publication of the first two volumes of the Folger edition, published as "The Good and Great Works of Richard Hooker," *The New York Review of Books* (24 November 1977), reprinted as "Richard Hooker and the Church of England" in Trevor-Roper, *Renaissance Essays* (Chicago: Univ. of

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Tightness of the Elizabethan settlement Hooker purported to defend and about the sanity of the hierarchically ordered vision of the world underlying it; questions as to whether or in what way the settlement was in fact settled, hence about the extent to which Hooker was only describing or defending something already in place; questions about the purity of Hooker's intentions and even about the non-polemical character of the opening synthesis of past wisdom in Book I of the *Laws*. The English Reformation has lost some of its wholesomeness in comparison with the late medieval church, and this has given mainstream prominence to the positions of English men and women of the period who remained attached, more or less resolutely, to the old religion. On the other hand, Patrick Collinson, John Coolidge, and others have shown that Elizabethan Puritanism had more intellectual and social substance than Anglicans and their cultural sympathizers have typically recognized. Complementing these upward revaluations of Hooker's opposites, scholars such as James Cargill Thompson and Robert Eccleshall have depicted Hooker himself as an ideologue of the powers that were, a man who, in Eccleshall's phrase, provided "window dressing for the command structure of Elizabethan society" and illustrates "a peculiarly English brand of national smugness with regard to the native political system." Peter Lake's controversial thesis that Hooker "invented Anglicanism" might seem to signal a return to hagiography, but in view of the scholarship just referred to, one might wonder whether inventing Anglicanism was a saintly thing to do in the 1590s.

The studies presented here, like the introductions and annotations of the Folger edition, take seriously the deflationary trend in recent Hooker scholarship and take still more seriously the complexity of Hooker's situation as an apologist for the Elizabethan church, "the Church of God established amongst U5," as he refers to it on the opening page of the *Laws*. To be sure, Hooker's work is not read here or in the edition as an ideological defense at all costs of an arbitrarily imposed command structure or as a foundation for national or ecclesiastical self-congratulation, yet neither can the static serenity of the older image be maintained. The gentle dove above all battles has departed. Whatever Hooker's spiritual, moral, or intellectual virtues may have been, they were exercised in more serious and self-conscious engagement with more deeply controversial issues than has

customarily been recognized.

As seen in the new edition, then, and in this volume. Hooker was neither a misrepresenter nor simply an eloquent describer of Elizabethan church and polity, either as the established order operated in legally

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enforced liturgy and structures of authority or as it was expressed in officially approved theological and philosophical assumptions. Rather, in relation to the established powers, practices, and intellectual presuppositions of its time, Hooker's work is best approached as an interpretation — in places a creative interpretation, in other places a surprisingly critical one. In terms of his traditional sobriquet. Hooker attempted to provide a judicious interpretation and application of the diverse normative principles bearing on his situation— the "laws" of God, angels, and nature and of human well-doing, personal and social, natural and supernatural. In some of the following essays his character as a strict constructionist with regard to one or another source of "lawfulness" is salient. In others he provides examples of something like judge-made law. The common element is recognition of the active character of his authorship. The Lawes, continuing the pastoral emphasis of Hooker's sermons, is arguably what it professes to be, an effort to satisfy the desire for Christian community which was so widely professed at the end of the sixteenth century, but Hooker serves this desire with extraordinary alertness to the fact that community is never simply given. Construction — construing, reconstructing, shoring up, new building — is constantly needed.

The Edition and the Man

Hooker's scholarly stature as religious polemicist is accordingly the salient feature of the restored portrait presented in the new edition and in the essay by the edition's general editor which begins this volume. By firmly contextualizing Hooker in the controversies from which his works emerged, the Folger editors' introductions and detailed commentaries make appropriating him more difficult for those less interested in Hooker himself than in arguing their own theses. It is clear that Hooker cannot be reduced to the status of deputized spokesman for the late Elizabethan establishment. Yet the edition does not prescribe easy answers to all the questions currently

and deservedly asked about him, as, for example, whether he invented Anglicanism or English constitutionalism. In whatever way the resources it provides may contribute to further discussion of such questions, the intellectual depth and dimensionality of the edition's approach— missing in earlier views — already yields one clear gain: an opportunity for closer acquaintance with "a defender of his church who was not unlike ourselves: scholar, humanist, truth-seeker."

The possibility of closer acquaintance with Hooker as a person — either

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like or unlike ourselves— greatly attracts Philip B. Secor, who is preparing a new biography of Hooker. In the account of his work in progress printed here, Secor defends the need and the feasibility of a new Life and draws out some of the biographical implications of recent scholarship on Hooker's works.

Sources and Techniques

Following the introductory essays by Hill and Secor, the volume continues with four discussions of Hooker's sources and techniques, where sources are understood as broad intellectual currents rather than as bodies of cited texts. William J. Bouwsma locates Hooker in relation to a perennial tension in western cultural history between tendencies which can usefully be identified with "philosophy" and "rhetoric." Bouwsma's "Hooker in the Context of European Cultural History" notes the stresses involved in being a humanist defender of the church at a time when pressures for confessional orthodoxy and the suppression of dissent were growing everywhere, although still generally countered by a lively creativity. In this ambivalent, eclectic era, Hooker's thought was also ambivalent and eclectic — and tantalizingly rich. Bouwsma's nomination of Hooker as an exemplar of *theologia rhetorica* rather than *theologia philosophica* provoked energetic debate following his paper at the Washington conference. While other sessions gave support to traditional appreciation of Hooker's philosophical depth, this was not at the expense of Bouwsma's contention that for Hooker the gospel is a "persuasive appeal to the heart" and that in Hooker the controversial Anglican via media must indeed be understood as a via, a "way" among powerful and competing alternatives, a path on which "strenuous exertion, adaptation, and improvisation" are constantly required, not as the one

right place to be for all eternity.

While the identification of Hooker as a rhetorician (not, in Bouwsma's view, a demotion) may shock those accustomed to studying Hooker in the context of academic theology or political theory, to students of Renaissance humanism this characterization seems entirely natural. A close context for such an identification is provided in R. J. Schoeck's "From Erasmus to Hooker: an Overview," a first sample from the larger research project on which Schoeck is now engaged. Schoeck's paper places Hooker firmly within a Renaissance network of institutions and individuals in which rhetoric, shaped by the study of Scripture and the church fathers — especially the Greek fathers, the reading of whom was opened up by the

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Study of Greek at Corpus Christi College from its beginning and nourished by their presence in the curriculum— was of central importance.

Yet if rhetoric was one source from which Hooker drew — a source much undervalued in previous scholarship — the sheer volume of philosophical and scholastic theological citations in the Folger commentaries suggests that *theologia philosophica* is more than an undercurrent in his work. In "Hooker on Scripture, Reason, and 'Tradition,'" W. David Neelands discusses, in relation to one important textual source, Thomas Aquinas, the three general principles commonly taken to define Hooker as a systematic thinker. Since a triad or three-legged stool of Scripture, reason, and tradition is sometimes also taken to define "the spirit of Anglicanism," Neelands's is one of the papers in the volume especially relevant to the question of what sort of Anglicanism, if any, Hooker invented.

How do Hooker's affinities with Thomas Aquinas, and the comparable relationships with other systematic thinkers indicated in the Folger commentaries, comport with his character as a humanist rhetorician? Several later papers cast light on this question, including the final essay by Rowan Williams. More immediately, in the concluding contribution to the present section Brian Vickers advances the discussion by first eliciting Hooker's own disparaging view of rhetoric in many of its employments and then examining his practice. In "Public and Private Rhetoric in Hooker's *Litres*," Vickers finds Hooker in frill control of the traditional devices of persuasion but using those

devices to make evident the logic of his argument. His aim is rather to teach than unfairly to move. Nevertheless, while Hooker expressed a conscious disavowal of rhetoric for the purposes of influencing his readers, his own private response to the Bible and the works of Christ was formulated in traditional rhetorical terms, and no less sincerely for that. Hooker does move, therefore, in passages where "reasoned argument yields to the kind of ecstatic identification with a sacred object that we normally associate with the sensibility of a later generation, the Easter sermons of Lancelot Andrewes, the poems of Herbert, Traherne, and Crashaw."

Situation and Aims

Hooker did not use his exceptional scholarly and stylistic resources for display. Remarkable as his works are simply as texts, they must also be read as attempts to achieve extra-textual ends in an extra-textual situation. The next four papers, beginning with Patrick Collinson's "Hooker and the

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Elizabethan Establishment," take up questions pertinent to such a reading. After charting Hooker's career from its apparently mainline Reformed beginning to its conclusion in apparent service to ecclesiastical authorities troubled, diminishingly, by presbyterian Puritanism, CoUinson appraises Peter Lake's thesis that Hooker was not so much defensively recapitulating Anglicanism as inventing it. He concludes that, even when exaggeration of the distinctiveness of Hooker's emphases is avoided and even when allowance is made for the self-serving motives behind contemporary accusations of novelty against him, we may indeed say that Hooker presented the English church with "an original account of its identity" — but an account that was, arguably, disturbing and destabilizing.

In "They Are and Are Not Elymas: The 1641 'Causes' Notes as Post-script to Richard Hooker's *Of the Lawes of EcclesiasticaU Poiitie*," Rudolph P. Almaszy argues that an undated fragment of Hooker's reflections on issues of church government may indicate a change of attitude corresponding in some degree to the career stages traced by CoUinson. From initial hopefrilness that reasoning with the advocates of presbyterianism would convert them to his own position, Hooker moved, Almaszy suggests, to the conviction that his opponents were so driven by passion as to be beyond reasoning.

But who were Hooker's opponents? If he indeed intended to present the English church with an original account of its identity, why did he think this was needed? Arthur P. Monahan and W. J. Torrance Kirby explore different answers to this question in the context of late medieval and sixteenth-century political thought. In "Richard Hooker: Counter- Reformation Political Thinker," Monahan finds a substantially greater affinity of Hooker with scholasticism, both medieval and contemporary, than with the distinctive political ideas of the Reformation. On this view, Hooker must have been aiming at acceptance of principles — at least political principles— which were honored more in Roman Catholic than in Protestant thought. In "Richard Hooker as an Apologist of the Magisterial Reformation in England," Kirby argues to the contrary (although contrary less to Monahan than to depictions of Hooker as the exponent of a distinctively Anglican *via media*), that Hooker stands squarely with Luther and Calvin on key questions of political authority in religious matters. Kirby here adds to the account in his recent *Richard Hooker's Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy*. On Kirby's view, the Christian community Hooker sought to uphold was the one officially in place. His presentation of the establishment was calculated to avoid deflection of the English church from

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its identity as a national Protestant community by presbyterian radicals.

It is clear from these studies that Hooker remains an important resource—as yet unexhausted—for determining Anglican identity in the Tudor-Stuart period. This larger problem should be borne in mind when reading the next set of papers, which consider more particular topics relevant to building or maintaining Christian community.

Confidence, Authority, and the Construction of Christian Community

The first paper in this section concerns a topic which seems, from a modern perspective, to have little to do with community, the theological problem of assurance. In "The Assurance of Faith according to Richard Hooker," Egil Grisli compares Hooker's early preaching on assurance, centered on the individual's adherence to Christ, with his balancing of conscience, probability, and authority in the *Lawes*. Confidence in one's relation to God could not, for Hooker, be simply a product of social reinforcement. Yet the dangers he saw in

a puritan private judgment which seemed to demand exemption from legal control led him to urge zealots for further change in the English church to weigh the validity of even their most intensely held personal convictions in the light of objective, publicly accessible criteria.

The contemporary relevance of the kind of appeal outlined in Grislis's paper is the subject of Don H. Compier's essay, "Hooker on the Authority of Scripture in Matters of Morality." Compier starts from current contentions between Anglican conservatives and liberals, who hold, respectively, that Scripture is the sole authority in morals or, on the other hand, that it constrains Christian moral choices hardly at all. Compier argues that Hooker's complex treatment of scriptural authority may be an improvement on the simpler views of both sides today. In both Grislis's and Compier's papers, Hooker is presented as showing an unusual sensitivity to the variety of grounds for authentic belief.

If religious convictions are regarded as objectively valid or invalid, not simply as peculiarities of individual psychology, who, if anyone, is to declare with public authority what beliefs are acceptable? Lee Gibbs takes up a particular form of this problem in "Richard Hooker and Lancelot Andrewes on Priestly Absolution." Gibbs compares texts of Hooker and his most eminent protege on one of the issues which most sharply divided Christians of their day: who is to represent the community's convictions

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concerning standards of acceptable conduct when it is a matter of judging a sinner's repentance and declaring absolution of the individual's sins? Andrewes is sometimes taken to represent a significant step toward the ecclesiastical authoritarianism of Archbishop Laud. Gibbs does not find essential differences between Andrewes and Hooker. Both agree that penance is not a sacrament, but both also agree that declaring God's forgiveness of sins is an action restricted to clergy.

In the three papers just summarized, individual and community are in one way or another in tension. For Grislis and Compier the question is what weight public authority or rational reflection should have in relation to personal conviction claiming a scriptural foundation. For Gibbs the question is who shall declare the readmission to good standing of individuals who have fallen short of professed communal

norms. The remaining two papers in this group are concerned with forming community anew or reconstituting a community which has broken apart. In "Performing Prayer in Hooker's Lawes: The Efficacy of Set Forms," Ramie Targoff argues that Hooker's apparently conservative defense of prescribed Prayer Book devotional forms was animated by subtle aesthetic and psychological considerations favoring creation of a cohesive national religious community. Targoff's conclusion concerning the particular topic of prescribed forms of prayer has broad implications. Detailed studies of other parts of Hooker's argument, including those not directly concerned with answering puritan complaints, are needed to determine whether or how they are part of an effort to bring about community.

The final paper in this group brings us back, obliquely, to the problem of Hooker's relation to Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. In "Hooker on Ecumenical Relations: Conciliarism in the English Reformation," W.B. Patterson sees Hooker's discussion of the nature and function of general councils as central to an understanding of English thought on this topic in the periods before and after him. To Patterson, Anglican identity, however intentionally forged in a community of English Christians, seems compatible, at least in aspiration, with membership in a communion of communions which extends beyond the national state.

Interpreting the Interpreter

- The final four papers in this volume stand back from the details of sixteenth-century controversy and consider Hooker in a variety of historically or conceptually broader contexts.

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Debora Shuger puts the Reformation debate itself in a setting of religious categories from Augustine's City of God to argue for the distinctively inclusive character of Hooker's idea of Christian community. In "'Societie Supernatural!': The Imagined Community of Hooker's *Laws*," Shuger reads Hooker's account of the English church as his response to a "post-Reformation fissure of Augustinian ecclesiology into either the popular piety of fable and spectacle or the purified devotions of a moral, spiritual, and intellectual elite." Hooker sharply opposed any tendency to define the true church in terms of freedom from Romish ceremony or in terms of its members' godliness. At the same time he is not a crypto-fideist. A major point of his work

is that training in logic and languages and also extensive familiarity with both sacred and profane learning are necessary for framing or judging ecclesiastical practices. The central, uniting vision of the Lawes is of a community of prayer and sacramental worship linking vulgar and learned, rich and poor, prelate and Leveller, in acts expressing a common love and longing for God. If Shuger is right, it is not surprising that both catholic and reformed sensibilities should respond favorably to Hooker.

The context shifts forward in time in Charles Watterson Davis's " 'For conformities sake': How Richard Hooker Used Fuzzy Logic and Legal Rhetoric against Political Extremes." Hooker's role in the rise of modern political ideologies has been under question in recent scholarship. Davis assesses the analytic categories currently used to place Hooker (the oppressive state versus the free individual, absolutist apologetic versus revolutionary dissent, tyrannical laws and abstract reason versus individual, class-based, or ethnic identity and desires) and judges them to be anachronisms. He situates Hooker in a principled central position, between reaction and revolution, which is the direct ancestor of modern constitutionalism. Crucial to this argument is the Renaissance humanist's union of rhetoric and philosophy, which in Hooker leads to distinctive ideas of lawful rule and the conditional character of political discourse.

In "Eric Voegelin's Two Portraits of Hooker and their Relation to the Modern Crisis," Dante Germino presents, first, a scathing indictment of Hooker from Voegelin's unpublished *History of Political Thought*, and then a wholly positive assessment from the same author's influential *New Science of Politics*. The context here is broader than political science as usually understood, embracing nothing less than the history of the human spirit. Germino suggests that Voegelin's two views of Hooker signal an important shift of perspective in Voegelin's own conception of political

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thought in this broader sense. Voegelin's initial perception of Hooker seems to have missed the alertness to circumstance (alertness not only to his own circumstances but to the circumstantial character of communal life in general) which properly kept Hooker from propounding a dogmatic political theology. When he wrote the *New Science of Politics*, Voegelin had come to see Hooker as an exemplary defender of fundamental civilizational values — in Voegelin's terms

the values of the "Mediterranean tradi- tion" as against Gnosticism.

Brian Vickers's striking finding, that rhetoric and reason together led Hooker to ecstatic identification with the sacred, fits well with Rowan Williams's "Hooker: Philosopher, Anglican, Contemp > orary," an account of Hooker as a specifically "sapiential" theologian. Considering Hooker in the broadest systematic contexts, Williams argues that the anchoring of the church's life in the nature and the revealing action of God is no less firm in Hooker's theology of law than in the argument from scriptural revelation and authority mounted by the Elizabethan settlement's oppo- nents. For "law," as Hooker employs this integrative metaphor, embraces both the voluntary actions of God, which are all, frindamentally, aspects of the diffusion and sharing of divine life, and also the principle of limita- tion, which at once allows and historically extends our proper response to God's self-bestowal: discernment and enjoyment of it. All of this is to say that theologia philosophica in Williams's account of Hooker is not so antago- nistic to theologia rhetorica as an overly specialized practice of either style of theology might lead one to suppose. Williams's characterization of Hooker's position as "contemplative pragmatism" suggests a conception of human involvement with God — an involvement contingent yet rich in content— which has much to offer contemporary theology.

The present collection of essays, drawn from a conference marking completion of the Folger edition of Hooker's works, complements a collection published more than two decades ago as a point of departure for the edition. *Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of His Works*, edited by W. Speed Hill, the architect and mover, through three presses and nine contributors, of the six Folger volumes which have indeed emerged. The *Studies* volume concluded with a bibliography of Hooker scholarship prepared by Egil Grislis and Hill. The present volume fittingly ends with a bibliography of more recent scholarship on Hooker, also prepared by Grislis and Hill, many of the entries in which were stimulated by the essays and bibliography in the earlier volume and by the Folger edition itself.

xxii ARTHUR STEPHEN MCGRAD Considered as a whole, the papers offered here suggest that severe criticism of the traditional hagiographical view of Hooker has not dimin- ished his stature as an Elizabethan author. Hooker is surely a more infor- mative figure for us when we see how deeply, deliberately, and personally engaged he was

in controversies of great moment and uncertainty. If Anglicanism is seen as a *via* in Bouwsma's sense, and if sanctity is as compatible with struggle as with serenity, then Hooker's stature as an Anglican saint is also arguably undiminished — perhaps even enhanced — in the accounts offered here. But this is a more complicated question. The presentation of Hooker as a "constructive interpreter" does not settle exactly what his interpretation of "the Church of God established amongst us" was intended to construct. The answers to this question explored in the following essays are not all mutually exclusive, but neither are they all mutually compatible, nor do they exhaust the possibilities. The present volume focuses on community, but for all his concern to continue, defend, foster, or inaugurate a specific form of Christian community, Hooker did not reduce the meaning of personal existence to membership in any humanly identifiable earthly aggregation. Any process for his canonization—or recanonization—would thus require further examination of the candidate not only as Christian political communitarian but also as pastor and theorist of souls. Further still, his account of God and nature needs weighing. If, however, the present volume does not decide whether those who praise Richard Hooker praise God, it amply confirms that those who read him carefully will better understand the English sixteenth century and much else besides.

II

THE EDITION AND THE MAN

W. SPEED HILL Richard Hooker in the Folger Edition: An Editorial Perspective IF ONE WERE TO READ IZAAK WALTON'S *Ufe of Mr. Rkhard Hooker* before reading Richard Hooker's treatise *Of the Lawes of Eccksasticall Politie* — as all readers of Hooker's works were invited to do by every edition from 1666 to 1890 — it would be impossible to believe that a man of such passivity, so unself-assertive, would have been able to conceive of it, much less compose it, so pious is he in Walton's eyes, so humble, so physically frail, so put-upon by his shrewish wife Joan, so conscientious in his religious devotions. Walton's hagiographic bias has been corrected by the work of C. J. Sisson and David Novarr,¹ but it is possible to offer additional correctives to the traditional portrait of Hooker from the perspectives — multiple, and occasionally divergent — of those who have been editing his works for the past two decades. What the introductions and commentary to the *Laujes* supply is, first, an intellectual depth and dimensionality missing in earlier views, and, second, a circumstantial particularity to the man, his arguments, and his sources that firmly situates him in the world of late Elizabethan ecclesiastical and

political debate. Both — depth and detail — are made possible by the scale of our commentary. The salient feature of our restored portrait of Hooker is his scholarly stature as religious polemicist. To readers sensitized by New Historicist ' C. J. Sisson, *The Judicious Marriage of Mr. Hooker and the Birth of "The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity"* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1940), and David Novarr, *The Making of Walton's "Lives"* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1958), 197-298.

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Studies of what is now called Early Modern England, the strength of Hooker's polemical engagement comes as no surprise, and the breadth and fair-mindedness of the "judicious" Hooker's learning has been lauded from Walton's day to ours, so that the phrase "scholarly . . . religious polemi- cist" no longer strikes one as oxymoronic. But to readers who know Hooker only from Book I of the *Lawes*, or who, because they are them- selves unfamiliar with the religious controversies that provoked his trea- tise, read him as being as detached as they are, Hooker's underlying aggression, normally masked by his habitual appeal to reason, his suave and insinuating style, and his frequent recourse to an irony sometimes subtle, sometimes arch, may come as something of a surprise.

The point at which an editor of Hooker engages this debate is Walton's attack, crucial to his essentially irenic view, on the authenticity of the three last books of the *Lawes*. Walton begins his biography with the description of Hooker as "the happy author of five (if not more) of the eight learned books of *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*" (Keble, 1:3). Walton was particularly concerned to discredit Book VII, whose insuffi- ciently resolute defense of episcopacy disappointed the Restoration hierar- chy. All three posthumous books, however, came under his censure, and crucial to that brief was Walton's highly circumstantial story of their being vandalized at Hooker's death (Keble, 1:91-92).

The textual situation is complex. When the Preface and Books I-IV appeared in 1593, the title-page (undated) announced eight books; eight books are listed in the Preface; but Book V did not appear until late 1597, Books VI and VIII not until 1648, and Book VII not until 1662. While these last four books may have been in draft in the 1590s, they were evidently not ready by 1593, when the Preface and first four were urgently put into print as part of a campaign to secure

parliamentary sanctions against the advocates of a presbyterian polity for the Church of England.^ When Book V did appear, it was almost half again as long as the entire

^ The Everyman reprint of 1907 dropped Walton but also omitted the posthumous books. Houk edited Book VIII in 1931 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press), and both the 1975 abridged edition of Vickers and McGrade (London: Sidgwick and Jackson), and McGrade's more recent (1989) Cambridge Univ. Press edition contain all of Book VIII, so that serious students of Hooker will read at least that book undeterred by Walton's skepticism, but many Keble editions (and the Everyman reprint) remain on libraries' and scholars' shelves.

^ William P. Haugaard discusses these issues in FLE 6:37-51; on the publication of the three posthumous books, see P. G. Stanwood, Textual Intro., FLE 3:xiii-lxxv.

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1593 volume. John Booty argues that Book V was revised in response to the suggestions of its readers (FLE 6:187-93). These would have included Edwin Sandys and George Cranmer (Sandys was the second son of the archbishop of York, Cranmer a grand-nephew of the martyred archbishop of Canterbury), John Rainolds (Hooker's colleague at Corpus Christi College, Oxford), and possibly John Whitgift, archbishop of Canterbury. In his annotations on the 1599 A Christian Letter, Hooker notes: "As learned as any this realme hath[,] saw them and red them [i.e., his 'five bookes'] before they ever came to your hands" (FLE 4:69). For Book VI we have extensive readers' reports — they occupy thirty-four pages in our volume 3 — from Sandys and Cranmer on a missing eighty-five-page manuscript. These seem to date from the mid- 1590s, perhaps earlier. As Lee Gibbs and Stephen McGrade argue, the 1648 text of VI, a historically grounded discussion of "the virtue and discipline" of repentance, represents one of Hooker's characteristic exercises in ground-clearing prior to adjudicating the issue of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of lay-elders, which Cranmer and Sandys had insisted was the core issue of the disciplinary dispute. But if the revision of Book VI, for which the present Book VI was preparatory, was complete at Hooker's death, it

has since been lost. Book VII, however, seems quite complete as it stands: Cranmer so refers to it in his notes ("And in the booke of B[ishops] I thinke you have done so" [FLE 3:126]). One interpolation in the text suggests that it too had been read by an outside reader,¹⁶ but no other evidence within the text suggests that it was ever revised. Finally, for Book VIII we have Hooker's working notes, published for the first time in our volume 3, but in no form surviving from the seventeenth century — print or manuscript — is that book complete. This regression — these diminishing degrees of completeness, from the revised and augmented Book V to the incomplete draft of Book VIII — suggests to me that, pace Walton,¹⁷ at no time did fully revised texts ever exist for the three last books. A model of serial composition and/or

* "This answer to Saint Jerom, seemeth dangerous, I have qualified it as I may, by addition of some words of restraint; yet I satisfie not my self, in my judgment it would be altered" (FLE 3.166, textual note).

¹⁶ Georges Edelen, who believes Walton's account to be substantially accurate, points out that the "model of serial composition and/or revision" is "a separate issue from whether the model was completed" (private communication). John Spenser, whose wife was George Cranmer's sister, and William Covell likewise testify to Hooker's completion of all eight books before his death; see Sisson, 80-86.

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revision, anticipated by the title-page of 1593, best fits the surviving texts.¹⁸

The counterargument is that contemporary witnesses (John Spenser and William Covell) testify that such completed texts did exist. Sisson seemed to have disposed of the testimonies of both, but Georges Edelen, who is at work on Hooker's biography, accepts Walton's story as essentially true. The surviving textual evidence is ambiguous: Hooker's notes could just as easily have been saved because they were all that was left once the vandals in Walton's account had done their work, or they were saved because the project lay unfinished on Hooker's work table at his untimely death and they were all that remained.

These issues frame the larger issue of Hooker's status within the Elizabethan ecclesiastical establishment. The questions are: (1) when did Hooker begin work on the *Lawes*? At his appointment to the Temple in 1583, as Sisson argued, or after the debate with Walter Travers three years later, as Walton has it? And (2) was the initial impetus Hooker's own, or was composition a quasi-official commission from the beginning? I am ready to modify my earlier view of a solitary Hooker authoring a substantially complete draft of the *Laives* by 1593, in response to the abrasive and embarrassing dispute with Travers, only to have it co-opted by Sandys's offer to publish a manuscript London booksellers had rejected, and revising it under the tutelage of Cranmer and Sandys, principally because I do not see how Hooker could have read all the authors he cites in the time span available. But I am not ready to accept Sisson's view of Hooker as the deputized spokesman for the establishment, responding to Cartwright's last two books, which had gone unanswered by Whitgift, on the archbishop's behalf. I am intrigued by Hooker's not being elevated to a bishopric (or, as Patrick Collinson suggested, a canonry at Windsor): either the natural reward, one would think, for polemical services rendered. Perhaps he simply didn't like administration, as we academics now say.

^ The Preface was also revised: chapters 8 and 9 are clear additions, as was Book II, which begins with an exordium unaccounted for in the chapter headings as printed.

^ See Hill, "The Evolution of Hooker's *Uws* . . .," in *S.R.H.*, 117-58.

^ The 1593 volume appeared with no preliminaries, apart from Hooker's own Preface. The 1597 volume has a substantial Dedication to Whitgift. If Sisson's view is correct, one would expect that Dedication to have appeared in 1593, not 1597. On the other hand, if the earlier volume was to have its intended effect on readers such as Burghley (who was sent a copy), dedicating it to Whitgift would have been counterproductive and so perhaps was tactfully omitted.

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and declined because the *Lawes* did, in fact, remain unfinished; this is Walton's view. But perhaps he was not wholly the creature of the

establishment that a fully socialized view of authorship would imply; this is Peter Lake's view (and mine). Lake sees Hooker as taking a quite independent line among conformist writers of the late 1580s and early 1590s, and indeed of his patron Whitgift."

Within the literary canon. Hooker has always seemed something of an exception among the ecclesiastical writers of the period.' ' His Works were continuously in print through 1724 in folio, and in octavo from 1793 through 1890.^ John Booty was able to buy a copy of Keble's 1888 edition from Oxford's warehouse stock in 1964, and the 1888 Keble was itself reprinted in 1970, 1977, and 1994. ^ One cannot argue from his later canonical status that Hooker was correspondingly exceptional in his own day, although Ben Jonson, in his *Conversations with William Drummond of Hawthornden* (January 1619), lists "Hookers Ecclesiasticall historie" as authoritative "of their Nation ... for church matters,"^ and Samuel Johnson later cites Hooker as the exemplary theological writer in English.^ Still, that status warrants explanation. We regularly accord Shakespeare exceptional status, historically attributing it to genius, but "genius" may simply be a confession of scholarly ignorance. A more likely

' Georges Edelen tells me that the mastership of the Temple was, in fact, quite lucrative; if so, this would explain why no episcopal or other high preferment was forthcoming.

° Peter Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans! Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), chap. 4.

" See Lee W. Gibbs, Intro, to Lawes 1, FLE 6:82, n. 3, citing Hallam's *The Constitutional History of England from the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of George II*, 5th ed. (London, 1846), 1:214; and H. R. Trevor-Roper, "Richard Hooker and the Church of England," *Reformation Essays* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1985), 103: "[He] himself has always, in some mysterious way, remained an Olympian figure, standing benignly above the battle in which, historically, he had been so deeply engaged."

^ After Locke, Hooker was the second most frequently cited authority in the first volume of Johnson's *Dictionary*. See Lewis Freed, "The Sources of Johnson's Dictionary" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell Univ., 1930, cited by Alvin Kernan, *Samuel Johnson and the Impact of Print* [Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1987], 196).

^ By Burt Franklin (New York), Georg Olms (Hildesheim), and Via Media (EUicott City, Maryland), respectively.

* Notes of Conversations with Ben Jonson made by William Drummond of Hawthornden January 1619, ed. G. B. Hanison (London: Bodley Head, 1923), 7.

^ In the Preface to his Dictionary, Johnson lists Hooker together with Bacon (a scientist), Milton (a poet), and Boyle (another scientist) as exemplary "propagators of knowledge" and "teachers of truth"; Hooker is the only religious writer so to be singled out.

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explanation is that, envisioning his treatise from the outset as a work of political philosophy and not simply an extension of the earlier Cartwright- Whitgift dispute, Hooker quite self-consciously modeled his treatise on Aristotle's Politics, the ancient treatise most nearly resembling his own. Thus Hooker was able to focus on the disciplinarians' "central epistemo- logical lapse or mistake about the right relations between reason and scripture." Lake concludes:

his whole book was designed to set out the necessary epistemo- logical structure within which the frill extent of this mistake could be realized and right relations between reason, scripture and public authority in church and state restored. (147)

In short. Hooker courted the muse of philosophic reason as over against ecclesiastical disputation,^ elevating, in Richard Helgerson's words, "apologetic to the rank of thought."^ This too is the view reported of Pope Clement VIII, speaking to the Roman Catholic apologist Thomas Stapleton, as reported by Walton:

There is no learning that this man hath not searcht into; nothing too hard for his understanding: this man indeed deserves the name of an author; his books will get reverence by age, for there is in them such seeds of eternity, that if the rest li.e.. Books V-VIII, as yet unpublished] be like this, they shall last till the last fire shall consume all learning. (Keble, 1:71)^

Yet, for all his self-constructed philosophic detachment. Hooker took his apologetic responsibilities very seriously. The view of the "judicious"

^ The earliest anticipation of topics he will treat in the *Laives* occurs in the sermon *Of Pride*, which post-dates *Of Justification* and, as Egil Grisliis documents in his commen- tary, is significantly indebted to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. See FLE 5:800-31, *passim*.

^ *Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992), 278. Helgerson cites Brian Vickers's judgement that the *Laives* is "the first coherent large-scale prose treatise in English," in "Authority and Coercion in Elizabethan Thought," *Queen's Quarterly* 87 (1980): 114, a review of the first three volumes of the Folger edition.

'® See Helgerson, 279. Walton is writing in 1665, and the conversation he reports would have taken place after January 1597, when Stapleton accepted a papal appoint- ment as protonotary apostolic, but Stapleton apparently never reached Rome; see DNB; see also Marvin R. O'Connell, *Thomas Stapleton and the Counter Reformation* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1964). Walton's account, then, would seem to be apocryphal, if circumstantial. Walton himself was bom in 1593.

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Hcx)ker as magisterially above the fray, the "Doctor Angelicns of the Church of England" (Trevor-Roper, 103), perpetuated by his excerption in anthologies of only Book I (and only parts of it),^ is quite wrong. Geor- ges Edelen comments: "The myth of the irenic scholar floating loftily above the turmoil of the city will stand up neither to a close reading of his work nor to an examination of his life."^o I have no quarrel with those who would begin their acquaintance with the Hooker they find in Book I, a pellucid account of a divinely created universe of law and lawful order. Reading it is like viewing a painting of Piero della Francesca, where single-point perspective renders the whole space instantly intelligible. But I should hope that the reader would not stop there. Hooker's outline of law ftinctions as simply the outer boundary of that universe, its *primum mobile*. Rereading it as an editor saturated with the specifics of Books V- VIII, I hear the first lecture in *Law and Order* 101, an exemplary exposi- tion of what had come to him to be philosophic and

theological common- places.

Of course, however generalized and abstract. Book I too makes its own polemical point, as Lee Gibbs observes (FLE 6:84-86). The Admonitioners were deemed law-breakers, and an exposition "Concerning Lawes, and their severall kindes in generalV (FLE 1:55) makes that point in its subject matter. Many of the views that the anonymous authors of *A Christian Letter* (the only response to Hooker's treatise appearing in his lifetime) attack Hooker for are either in Book I or based on it. If the later arguments Hooker offers are to gain strength from the earlier, as he explicitly intends (see below, and n. 26), Book I may be said to support later resolutions of some extremely controversial points.^ ^

" In particular, his most quoted period, "Now if nature should intermit her course, and leave altogether, though it were but for a while, the observation of her own lawes: ..." {Lawes 1.3.2; 1:65.20-66.4), excerpted by Tillyard {*Elizabethan World Picture* [New York: Vintage Books, n.d.], 16), and reprinted in the standard Norton Anthology of English Literature (now in its 6th ed.), is an adaptation of a passage from Amobius, a late third-century rhetorician and Christian apologist; see Lee W. Gibbs, "The Source of the Most Famous Quotation From Hooker's *Laws*," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 21 (1990): 77- 86.

^ Georges Edelen, "Hooker and the Puritans," unpublished lecture.

^ I owe this point to A. S. McGrade. Citing the text of his own article on Hooker for the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, McGrade writes: "It is a mark of Hooker's success in constructing a generally acceptable normative context for his later discussion of disputed issues that Book 1 can be read as an extraordinarily eloquent but unoriginal distillation of the wisdom of the ages. There is more to it than that. In addition to the seamlessness of the chapter-length paragraphs in which Hooker weaves together some

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Books II-IV are similarly general in their subject matter, intended to refute three propositions Hooker has distilled from the disciplinarians' writings: the omnicompetence of Scripture as "the onely rule of all things which in this life may be done by men" (FLE 1:143); whether Scripture contained a model church polity, "the lawes whereof vvaay in

no wise be altered" (FLE 1:193); and whether, as a principle, "popish orders rites and ceremonies" remaining in the practices of the English church should be "banished" following the model of "certaine reformed Churches whose example therein we ought to have followed" (FLE 1:271). Only when these key assertions have been answered is Hooker prepared to respond to specific complaints.

Not surprisingly, it is at this point that most readers "turne over the leef and chese another tale." Anglican seminary students, at least those with a professional interest in liturgy, may study Book V,[~] and political historians focus on Book VIII's treatment of the royal supremacy. But just as Hooker is bearing down on his principal targets, the presbyterians' assertions regarding the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of lay-elders, the authority of bishops, and the character of the royal supremacy,[~] most twentieth-century readers lay down the volume. These gritty texts, focused as they are on issues of politico-ecclesiastical turf, neither confirm the claims of "timeless beauty" made by literary editors like Hyder Rollins and Herschel Baker,^{^^} nor set forth "the tranquil beauty of the old philosophy," for which C. S. Lewis was so grateful.^{^^} Because the early theoretical books

quite diverse past wisdoms, his elaboration of at least three particular points has substantive significance. First, in defining law as any rule directing to goodness of action, Hooker emphasizes that this conception does not require imposition by a superior as essential to law. Further, he argues that human beings are naturally equal with respect to political association. Accordingly, he urges the necessity of consent as a basis for governmental authority and, in particular, for human legislative authority."

^{^^} Ronald Bayne's very full edition of that book (1907) signaled its distinct importance, and John S. Marshall Paraphrased and Expanded [it] into a Commentary on the Prayer Book (Sewanee: Univ. Press of the Univ. of the South, 1956).

^{^^} In Hooker's words: "That our Lawes are corrupt and repugnant to the Lawes of God in matter belonging to the power of EcclesiasticaU Jurisdiction, in that wee have not throughout all Churches certayne Lay'elders established for the exercise of that power" (Book VI; 3:1), "That there ought not to be in the Church, Bishops indued with such Authority and Honour as ours are" (Book VII; 3:143), and "That unto no Civill Prince or Govemour there may be given such power of

Ecclesiastical Dominion as by the Lawes of this Land belongeth unto the Supreme Regent thereof" (Book VIII; 3:315).

^* The Renaissance in England (Boston: Ginn, 1954), 150.

^^ English Literature of the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drarrux, Oxford History of English Literature 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), 449.

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lay the foundation for the later practical ones/^ readers who remain ignorant of the latter's "particulars" ignore the teleology of the work as a whole, and that whole, even with the truncation of Book VIII, comprised a long work.^^ The image of Hooker as a sixteenth-century E. M. W. Tillyard or A. O. Lovejoy, based as it is on the synecdoche of substituting the part — the aesthetically pleasing exposition of law in Book I— for the whole of the Laiues is quite as distorted as Walton's portrait of Hooker the saintly, if hen-pecked, scholar.^^

The marginalia Hooker inscribed on his copy of A Christian Letter, which we reprint in volume 4, are a convenient index of Hooker's contro- versial aggression, normally masked in public by his rational manner and

^^ Hooker's own statement of this principle comes early in Book 1: "I have endev- oured throughout the bodie of this whole discourse, that every former part might give strength unto all that folio we, and every later bring some light unto all before. So that if the judgements of men doe but holde themselves in suspence as touching these first more generall meditations, till in order they have perused the rest that ensue: what may seeme darke at the first will afterwarde be founde more plaine, even as the later particular decisions will appeare, I doubt not more strong, when the other have beene read before" (FLE 1:57). He makes the same distinction in his "advertisement to the Reader" that closes the 1593 volume: "Such generalities of the cause in question as here are handled, it will be perhaps not amisse to consider apart, as by way of introduction unto the bookes that are to foUowe concerning particulars" (1:345).

^^ John Bridges's Defence of the Government Established (1587) was ridiculed by Martin Marprelate for its length and — in its quarto

format — its bulk: it is 1428 pages long. But Hooker's *Laws* is not a short book. Had Books VI-VIII been published in folio as were I-IV, they would have occupied 229 folio pages; had the missing draft of Book VI been published, it would have occupied an additional 113. We are up to 821 without considering that the revision of VI was incomplete, that of VII not undertaken (see below), and VIII itself unfinished. 850 folio pages are almost exactly the equivalent of 1428 quarto pages, if we remember that the type size on a quarto page is normally smaller than that on a folio page.

Apropos of the revision of VII, McGrade remarks: "[There is] no evidence I know of that revision was needed. The imperfections I note at the beginning of my Introduction are very minor." I argue in "Commentary on Commentary on Commentary: Three Historicisms Annotating Richard Hooker," *Margins of the Text*, ed. D. C. Greetham (forthcoming, Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press), that the revisions required of Book V, by their setting forth of the texts of Cartwright in Hooker's own notes, were intended to pull Hooker's treatise back into the earlier controversial format exemplified by Whitgift's controversy with the Admonitioners and with Cartwright. Book VII conspicuously lacks these extended quotations.

* Helgerson, for example, comments: "The most obvious effect of Hooker's philosophic manner has been to lift the author, his book, and the cause he defended above the time bound scuffle of Elizabethan ecclesiastical controversy and into the unchanging realm of ideas." He then cites the Stapleton anecdote from Walton. But Hooker's serene "philosophic manner" is largely confined to Book I.

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philosophic method. Some samples; this from the title-page:

It appeareth cleane throughout the corse of his whole booke that this fellow did in noe one poynt of Doctrine understand either what he pretendeth the Church of England to establish, or what he alleageth as sayd by his adversarie [i.e., Hooker], or what he would beare men in hand to be contradicted by the one [Hooker, again], and by the other [the author of *A Christian Letter*] craftily upheld, but sheweth such pitiful! and palpable ignorance even in everie article [i.e., of the Thirty-nine]; as for mine own part I am ashamed that the common Enemy of us both [Rome] shoulde see, being thereby forward ynough to imagin, that great blindnes must needs raigne where such a

Champion as this fighteth without eyes. (FLE 4:1)

Or this:

Sermons are framed by the witt of man: therefore all things framed by mans witt are sermons. If this be your skill in reasoning, let a whelebarrow be a sermon. For it is a thing made by mans witt. {FLE 4:34)

Or this:

You ly sir. He saith not the intention of the Church but of a mortal] man meaning therby the priest. And to the confirmation of that opinion my speech tendeth which if malice had not blinded your eyes is plaine enough to be scene. (FLE 4:41-42)

It is not simply that a sharp-tongued Hooker, in private, was impatient with an unworthy adversary, one "into whome a man must put both truth and witt" (FLE 4:51). Rather, we are to understand that a passion for the truth is the intellectual engine that drives the Lawes. The final note on the title-page of that 1599 quarto reads:

All thinges written in this book I humblie and meekly submitt to the Censure of the grave and reverend prelates within this land, to the judgment of learned men, and the sober consideration of all others. Wherein I maie happilie erre as others before me have done, but an heretike by the help of almighty God I will never be. (4:5)^

Keble used this as the epigraph to his edition (l:iv).

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The rhetoric of this appeal is unassailable: submission to authority, learned judgment, and sober consideration; acknowledgment of possible error; and disavowal of heresy: all sworn to "by the help of almighty God." But if self-fashioning be allowed for More, Tyndale, et al. why not also for Hooker? and why not as scholar, humanist, historian, truth-seeker, defend- er of the historical church?^

The partitioning of the text of the Lawes consequent to its early publishing history likewise raises the issue of the coherence of its argument, attacked by H. F. Kearney and Peter Munz in the early

1950s, but subsequently affirmed by James Cargill Thompson and Stephen McGrade in the 1960s and most recently and comprehensively by Lake.[~] While no single volume editor has had responsibility for pronouncing on this issue, none has questioned the claim to coherence Hooker himself makes in Book I: "I have endeavoured throughout the bodie of this whole discourse,

[~] Matching Hooker up against Stephen Greenblatt's "set of governing conditions to most instances of self-fashioning" is itself an interesting exercise:

1. Hooker u/as middle-class.

1. He did submit himself "to an absolute power or authority . . . outside the self."

3. The Admonitioners were regarded as the "alien, strange, or hostile," but they did not need to be "discovered or invented in order to be attacked and de- stroyed."

4. The point that "[t]he alien is perceived by the authority either as that which is unformed or chaotic (the absence of order) or that which is false or negative (the demonic parody of order)" overstates the case for Hooker but not necessarily for the Admonition controversy as a whole.

5. "One man's authority is another man's alien": true.

6. "When one authority or alien is destroyed, another takes its place": true.

7. "There is always more than one authority and more than one alien in existence at a given time": true.

8. "If both the authority and the alien are located outside the self, they are at the same time experienced as inward necessities, so that both submission and destruc- tion are always already internalized": debatable.

9. "Self-fashioning is always, though not exclusively, in language": true in part. A Christian Letter specifically objected to Hooker's style (chap. 21 [FLE 4:71-77]).

10. "The power generated to attack the alien in the name of authority

is produced in excess and threatens the authority it sets out to defend"; true, though, in the event, more applicable to Laud than to Hooker.

See Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self 'Fashioning* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980; repr. 1985), 8-9.

^ See Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society,' " in S.R.H.; and McGrade, "The Coherence of Hooker's Polity: The Books on Power," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 24 (1963): 163-82, and "The Public and the Religious in Hooker's Polity," *Church History* 37 (1968): 404-22. For Lake, see n. 10, above.

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that every former part might give strength unto all that followe, and every later bring some light unto all before" (FLE 1:57). Book I is not so rationalist as Munz supposed, nor Book VIII so Marsilian. Our intentionalist bias as editors may predispose us to see the order Hooker asserts he put there, but the social and political conflicts the Lawes addresses do seem to us to have been resolved in the treatise,^^ and the substance, coherence, and, indeed, originality of Hooker's grand argument withstands extended and detailed scrutiny.

One feature of our portrait that is conspicuously missing is nationalism, at least of an exclusive or separatist nature. There is nothing of Milton's passionate endorsement of reformation in his tract so named, nor his assumption of England's priority in that process so memorably expressed in *Areopag^tica*:

Now once again by all concurrence of signs, and by the general instinct of holy and devout men, as they daily and solemnly express their thoughts, God is decreeing to begin some new and great period in his Church, even to the reformation of reformation itself. What does he then but reveal himself to his servants, and, as his manner is, first to his Englishmen?^^

And while Hooker accords the English church its autonomy as an "inde- pendent multitude" and accepts as historical fact the break with Rome initiated by Henry VIII, the Reformation seems to have meant less to him than to Milton— or to most later historians. (Christopher Haigh's recent revisionist account supports this view of Hooker's assumptions.^*) Hooker asserts the continuity of the post-Henrician Church with its medieval predecessor in his citations of historical precedents of episcopacy in Book VII.^^ And in Book IV he rejects the

proposition that ceremonies in the

^^ Mark Goldblatt attacks Hooker's consistency on distinctly different grounds; see "Inherited Flaws: The Logical Consistency of Hooker's Thomism," *English Renaissance Prose* [Newsletter] 4.1 (Fall 1990): 1-17.

^^ *Prose Selections*, ed. M. Y. Hughes (New York: Odyssey Press, 1947), 255. The sense of England as an "elect nation" may itself be anachronistic in the 1590s, but, as Helgerson argues (263), Foxe's *Acts and Monuments* "grants England a quite extraordinary place in the universal scheme"; see n. 17.

^^ Christopher Haigh, *English Reformations: ReUgion, Politics, and Society under the Tudors* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

^^ Lawes VII. 1.4; 3:147.14-148.16. McGrade offers the following clarification: "The nation was the theoretically and practically crucial political unit for Hooker. This is

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English church deriving from Roman precedents were, ipso facto, to be "banished." His apparent Romanism had earlier outraged Walter Travers, who famously complained to the Privy Council: "I thinck the like to this, and other such in this sermon, . . . have not ben heard in publick places, with in this land, synce Quene Maries daies" (FLE 5:208). Hooker's sin had been the assertion that even papists might have been saved if they had sinned ignorantly. Travers, as Egil Grislis shows in volume 5, was wrong. It is not that Hooker was a crypto-Romanist— although, as Lake points out. Hooker was more than willing to acknowledge the positive character of the Church of England's relation with Rome— but rather that his model of historical change within the church was one of continuity, not rupture. In Book III, defending against the Romanist charge that Luther had founded a new church ("they aske us where our Church did lurke, in what cave of the earth it slept for so many hundreds of yeeres together before the birth of Martin Luther? As if we were of opinion that Luther did erect a new church of Christ"), Hooker replies: "No the church of Christ which was from the beginning is and continueth unto the end. Of which Church all parts have not been alwaies equallie sincere and sound" (FLE 3:201.6-12).

The Church of England, then, is a body nominally distinct from— but substantively linked to— other churches, historical or contemporary. The "Catholike Church" is the ocean, and national churches are locally denominated seas, or "precincts":

FcM" preservation of Christianitie there is not any thing more needfull, then that such as are of the visible Church have mutuall fellowship and societie one with another. In which consideration

evident in Book III and in other places as well, but it is most manifest in Book VIII, where the argument is that an 'independent multitude' has power to provide for itself. This is directly in line with Aristotle's thesis that self-sufficiency is the mark of the political community. It directly grounds Hooker's famous thesis that since the memberships of English church and commonwealth are identical, there is only one community there. So there is nothing permanently or providentially wonderful about the English nation as English [as there is for Milton], but nations in general are very important. And if the nation is, rather suddenly, the crucial unit in religion as well as in secular affairs, the question of authority in religion becomes: who or what at the national level is to replace the international authority of the papacy? Further, if the nation you happen to be in is England, it behooves you to make what you have to say idiomatic to England. Hence the explicit restriction of most of Book VIII to what holds good for England. Hence what is in my view a significant involvement with specifically English legal questions." Private communication.

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as the maine body of the sea being one, yet within divers precincts hath divers names; so the Catholike Church is in like sort divided into a number of distinct societies, every of which is termed a Church within it selfe. (Lawes III. 1.14; 1:205.20-27)

This sense of his church's continuity with its own past is reinforced by Hooker's reluctance to cite from contemporary English advocates of conformity, such as Thomas Bilson, John Bridges, Matthew Sutcliffe, John Whitgift, and Richard Bancroft, whose treatises he must have been familiar with.^^ John Booty observes that citations of one's allies were not customary in sixteenth-century disputation (FLE 6:208), but there is more to Hooker's omissions than that. The persistent thrust of

Hooker's documentation is a scholarly evaluation of the historical documents that had been offered as precedents, models, or guides to present-day "politic," and these primary documents were necessarily in Latin or Greek.¹¹ Hence most of Hooker's citations are to works in these now inaccessible languages. We translate in our commentary what Hooker does not himself, to accommodate the modern reader with little Latin and less Greek, but the misapprehension of regarding Hooker as somehow peculiarly English because English is the language in which he writes is a subtle but pervasive distortion of his position.¹² For Hooker, the issues of liturgy, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, episcopacy, and royal supremacy were not peculiar to the English church of the 1580s and '90s; they had been addressed before, and the historian in Hooker sets about recontextualizing those debated documents—not excluding the Puritans' fundamental authority. Scripture — to test their relevance to the contemporary English scene.

It is another cliché that the Lawes benefited from Hooker's mastership of the Temple church, serving as it did much of England's legal community. But the pattern of citations tells a somewhat different story. Common

¹¹ He does cite John Jewel, whom he calls "the worthiest Divine that Christendome hath bred for the space of some hundreds of yeres" (1:171.2-4 and n. q), but only because Cartwright had earlier cited him.

¹² For example, he cites Travers's *ExpUcatio* from its original Latin, not from Cartwright's English translation. He was not apparently aware that Travers was its author.

¹³ See Debora Kuller Shuger, *Habits of Thought in the Renaissance: Religion, Politics, and the Dominant Culture* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1990), 3, n. 11. For the view of Hooker — or at least his later readers — as "peculiarly English," see Robert Eccleshall, "Richard Hooker and the Peculiarities of the English: The Reception of the Ecclesiastical PoUty in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *History of Political Thought* 2.1 (Spring 1981): 63-117.

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law, based as it was on local custom and particular precedent and dealing as it does with secular matters, is not directly relevant to the

issues the Latues addresses. ^^ Statute law, of course, is relevant, for the Elizabethan Settlement was the product of acts of parliament as well as of convoca- tion. Various relevant statutes are cited in the Lawes, but not so many as one might expect: I count thirty citations. Hooker does, in addition, cite Henry de Bracton, the thirteenth-century English jurist whose *De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae* is a textbook of common law.^ But the bulk of legal citations are drawn from Roman civil and English canon law: together, I count 119 citations. By this measure, it is primarily to the earlier centuries of the church's institutional life that Hooker tracks down the relevant his-

^ For a different view, see Lawrence Manley, *Convention: 1500-1750* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980), 90-97. In an unpublished lecture, "Hooker and the Rule of Law," Georges Edelen supplies the fullest and most circumstantial account of Hooker's affiliations with the common law, which his experience at the Temple reinforced; he summarizes its point as follows: "I argued . . . not that common law was necessarily a great formative influence on Richard Hooker's thought (after all, he didn't go to the Temple until he was 31), but rather that he found much in it that was thoroughly sympathetic (e.g., its essentially pragmatic character, its emphasis on a developing tradition as a kind of historical process in the *Year Books*, its focus on contexts and details, its love of patterning, etc.);" letter to McGrade. Edelen cites Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society'" (in *S.R.H.*, 46). McGrade himself comments: "TTie details of common law were irrelevant, not because common law was based on local custom and particular precedent, but because common law traditionally governed secular matters, while a whole other body of law governed spiritual matters. There are two issues concerning common law with which Hooker is deeply concerned, however. One is the relation between conamon law and ecclesiastical law, between the secular courts (most but not all using cornmon law) and the church courts. The main thrust of the portion of Hooker's *Autograph Notes* pertaining to Book VI is to revindicate the church courts' jurisdiction against the mounting claims of the common lawyers, and for this purpose

Hooker transcribes Bracton as well as other sources TTiis issue of the relation of

secular to church law is directly relevant to Hooker's (idealizing) claim in VI11.8 that the two jurisdictions do indeed operate in happy distinctness in the England of his day. It is also relevant to the

controversy about the legality of High Commission proceedings.

"The other big issue relating to common law has to do with Hooker's use of it as a source for his extraordinary emphasis on law as an effective restraint on royal power. His use of English common law maxims (Bracton) to support the rule of law is not nearly as traditional as Cargill TTompson thought. Or rather, if there had been a tradition, it was distinctly submerged when Hooker wrote. This is a central point in my account of Book VIII." Private communication; see FLE 6:364-69.

*° Arthur S. McGrade, "Constitutionalism Late Medieval and Early Modern — Lex Facit Regem: Hooker's Use of Bracton." In *Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Bononiensis: Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies*, ed. R. J. Schoeck. *Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies*, vol. 37 (Binghamton: MRTS, 1985), 116-23.

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torical precedents, and he seems more comfortable working among these earlier legal sources than those more nearly contemporary.*°

Another facet of the traditional view largely missing from our portrait is that of Hooker the theologian, the English Aquinas. One could not, I believe, produce a volume like Nicholas Lossky's recent analysis of the "mystical theology" of Lancelot Andrewes based on the Lawes^^ It is not that Hooker was not an innovative theologian; theological issues are salient in our volume 4, where Hooker is formulating his reply to A Christian Letter, and in volume 5, where he wrestles, in the tractate Of Justification, with the implications of that central Reformation concept. And his editors have had continually to clarify the theological issues that lie behind many of the particular points debated by the Admonitioners, Cartwright, and Whitgift. William Haugaard argues that Hooker reconfigured the debate on specifically theological grounds: epistemologically, by stressing the authority of human reason and natural law in issues of church polity, and ecclesiologically, by distinguishing the visible from the mystical

*' McGrade comments: "I agree with this as concerns some of the

citations of Justinian and earlier medieval canon law. And Hooker's use of these sources is certainly not extensive in comparison with his use of the Bible or the church fathers. It is, however, quite extensive in comparison with the use made of the same sources (virtually nil, as I recall from a comparison I made with Whitgift and Bridges some years ago) by contemporary church authors. More important, however, Hooker's use of these sources was definitely not uncontroversial. These two bodies of law, Justinian and medieval canon law, had made up the *jus commune* of (western) medieval Christendom. To suggest that they were relevant to Elizabethan England was to nationalize a body of universal law that not everyone was fond of, albeit the church courts continued to use the old laws, *faute de mieux*, in their tensely coordinate existence with the secular courts. Recusants, Armadas, and Jesuits, on the other hand, were exceedingly fond of this *jus commune*. For them, England's apostasy was a legal one, involving the usurpation by king and parliament of specifically legal authority possessed by the pope alone

"At a time when England was getting more and more autonomous. Hooker tried to gain a secure place in the national legal system(s) for some widely detested formerly international norms, as well as for also detested pre-Reformation, specifically English church-made laws (Lyndwood). And at a time when England and other countries were getting more and more absolutist, he campaigned vigorously (and alone among English ecclesiastical authors) for law as a limitation on royal power. And in all of this he displayed exceptional competence in his use of relevant [legal] sources." Private communication.

*^ Lancelot Andrewes The Preacher (1555-1626): The Origins of the Mystical Theology of the Church of England, trans. Andrew Louth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). William O. Gregg, however, disagrees: see "Sacramental Theology in Hooker's *Laius*: A Structural Perspective," *Anglican Theological Review* 73 (Spring 1991): 155-76, drawn from his dissertation: "Richard Hooker's *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Polity* 1-V: A Theology of Sacramentality" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Notre Dame, 1993).

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church.^ Topics like God's essential nature, the authority of Scripture, the extent to which original sin had impaired human reason, the definition of the church, for example, are implicit throughout the *Lawes*.^ But Hooker is careful not to frame his argument on explicitly

doctrinal grounds, for fear of further provoking a destructive and intransigent sectarianism. As between "doctrine" and "discipline," Hooker's treatise on "politie" is, by definition, about the latter. That the author(s) of *A Christian Letter* should have ignored his circumspect separation of the two is what so annoys Hooker.¹⁶ Eliding the disciplinary points at issue, they attack Hooker for denigrating Calvin (chap. 19), for relying upon "Schoole- men, Philosophie, and Poperie" (chap. 20), for his intricate prose style (chap. 21), and, most reprehensibly, for misconstruing no fewer than seventeen of the Thirty-nine Articles.¹⁷

Lake's interpretation of *A Christian Letter* sees its author(s) as correctly sensing the extent to which Hooker in the *Lawes* is implicitly — and knowingly — undermining the then-prevailing Calvinist consensus and so creating, for the first time, what later ages would describe as "Anglicanism," that is, an inclusive, sacramentally-based piety distinct from the exclusive, word-centered piety characteristic not only of the presbyterians but of conformist writers like Bilson and even Whitgift. The theological pressure point was predestination, a topic skirted in the *Lawes* itself but addressed in the *Tractates* of the 1580s and exposed by *A Christian Letter*. Hence, in the various draft answers to *A Christian Letter*, Hooker is obliged to speak more directly to the issue, and in the private marginalia on his own copy he minces no words as he distances himself from Calvin's all but universal authority among his contemporaries: "You honor Calvin ... as the Father of discipline . . . This is the boile that may not be touched." (FLE 4:67). Again: "Safer to discuss all the saints in heaven then M. Calvin" (FLE 4:57). Hooker not only understood but himself contributed to our later sense that the English church is not defined so much by a set of creedal propositions as by its liturgy, its retention of a traditional diocesan episco-

¹⁶ Intro, to Books II, III, and IV, FLE 6:125-28 and *passim*.

¹⁷ In "Doctrine and Polity in Hooker's *Laws*," *English Literary Renaissance* 2 (1972): 173-93, I wrestled with these issues in an elementary fashion. Lake's discussion super-sedes mine and links the topics I note above most convincingly, see n. 10.

¹⁸ Shuger acutely observes the extent to which "boundaries of thought" were continually being contested in this period; see *Habits of Thought*, 9-13.

^ Chaps. 1-18 compare Hooker's views with Articles 1, 2, 5, 6, 10-15, 17, 19, 23, 25-28; see 4:9-53.

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pace, and its intertwining of secular and religious authority embodied in and symbolized by the royal supremacy. And these are, above all, the topics of Books V, VII, and VIII, "the bookes . . . concerning particulars." An unavoidable inconvenience, then, of our commentary, because it so firmly contextualizes Hooker in minutiae of the controversy from which the Lawes so improbably emerged, is that it renders more difficult his appropriation by scholars less interested in Hooker himself than in arguing their own theses .^{^^} The common monographic procedure of identifying a theme and pursuing it selectively within the oeuvre of one's chosen author (or authors) is more hazardous when the originating context is set forth as extensively and explicitly as ours is. Demystifying Hooker, it reinserts him into a world he claimed to have had little taste for (and we less). In so doing, the wished-for element of transcendence we seek in our cultural heroes is necessarily diminished. In return, we have come to know — and others with the patience to work their way through our commentary will come to know as well — not an idealized "man for all seasons," or a man long dead whom one might "desire to speak with" four hundred years later,^{*^} but a defender of his church not unlike ourselves: scholar, humanist, truth-seeker. The lineaments of that portrait, more circumstantial historically and richer intellectually than any heretofore available, are to be drawn from the words and the works of the man himself, newly made available in our texts and our commentaries on those texts in our edition.

^{^^} See, for example, Stephen L. Collins, *From Divine Cosmos to Sovereign State: An Intellectual History of Consciousness and the Idea of Order in Renaissance England* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), 91-103. Collins sandwiches his discussion of Hooker between discussions of Peter Wentworth, the parliamentary activist, and the Jesuit Robert Parsons, writing under the name of "R. Doleman." Shuger's *Habits of Thought* seems much more sensitive to the context — particularly the religious context — in her analysis of Hooker and Lancelot Andrewes.

^{*^} Stephen Greenblatt, *Shakespearean Negotiations* (Berkeley: Univ. of

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In Search of Richard Hooker: Constructing a New Biography

"Hooker," it might be said, is the name of a book, rather than the name of a man.

(Christopher Morris, Introduction to Hooker, LawSy Everyman edition, 1965, v)

DESPITE THIS ILL OMEN FROM ONE OF HOOKER'S most sympathetic modern readers, I am in the process of constructing a biography of Richard Hooker. The first major effort to chronicle Hooker was undertaken by Bishop John Gauden of Exeter in 1662. Although his work contains some material not otherwise available, it was quickly replaced by Izaak Walton's classic *Life* in 1665.¹ In recent years, much of Walton's account has also been discredited, however, and yet no new biography has appeared. Hooker deserves a new biography, for he deserves a place in the popular consciousness. Although I by no means aspire to match Walton in literary achievement, my aim, like his, is to present Hooker as a person eminently worthy of general attention.[^]

¹ John Gauden, *The Life and Death of Mr. Richard Hooker*, *The Works of Mr. Richard Hooker* (London, 1662); Izaak Walton, *The Life of Mr. Rich. Hooker, The Author of those Learned Books of the Liuis of Ecclesiastical PoUty* (London: Richard Marriott, 1665). Another brief account discredited by Walton had been offered by Thomas Fuller in his *The History of the Worthies of England* (London: J. G., W. L. and W. G., 1662).

[^] The readers I target for my work are not primarily academic professionals. They are adults of intelligence and curiosity who enjoy well-researched "popular" history and

Problems

Readers of the present volume may be startled— not, I hope, aghast— at the thought of Richard Hooker roaming the popular consciousness. To these savants I submit that a leading result of the research cited and presented in these pages is that, pace Christopher Morris, Hooker indeed was a person, not a book. In the main part of this paper, I want to suggest what sort — or what sorts— of person he was, according to the best recent scholarship. My most rewarding problem as a biographer is to concretize in coherent fashion the "personal" implications of this scholarship, but two other problems may be mentioned briefly first: Hooker's apparent irrelevance to the present day and the paucity of hard facts about him in his own day.

The irrelevance is puzzling. We might expect some interest in Hooker among those who cherish the ecumenical traditions of the world-wide Anglican communion. Without being unduly hagiographical, a biography of Hooker can present an authentic founding hero of this tradition— not a book or a doctrine, but a fellow human being who embodied in his life and expressed in his writings the special genius of this powerful current of Christian experience. The ethos of Anglicanism was not born principally of Henry VIII's lust or the greed of a rising class of English gentry and merchants. It grew from the intellectual and spiritual ferment of the Renaissance and Reformation and came to fruition in the life and writings of a few central figures. Hooker is a most attractive specimen of this cultural strain, which has infected the religion, politics, literature, and social fabric of every corner of the earth touched by English language and culture for the past four-and-a-half centuries. Must he not, therefore, be as gripping a figure as Luther or Calvin or Wesley?

Hooker has indeed been regularly cited over the centuries as an authority on a wide range of subjects, including theology, law, government, aesthetics, prayer, liturgy, and personal morality. For at least the last century, however, such credit has been largely perfunctory and nearly always restricted to a small (if hardy and growing) band of theologians,

biography by such writers as Lady Antonia Fraser, Catherine Drinker Bowen, Barbara Tuchman, William Manchester, David McCulloch, and, if he will forgive me, A. L. Rowse. Along with others with a

serious interest in Hooker, I await eagerly the Hooker biography addressed to a more scholarly audience, now in process, by Georges Edelen, a contributing editor to the Folger edition and author of the helpful "A Chronology of Richard Hooker's Life" (FLE 6:xviii-xxv).

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historians, and students of English literature, quite removed from the attention of the general public— removed, even, from the attention of most Anglicans. Why is this so, and what can be done about it?[^]

Hooker's oblivion is due partly to the current disfavor of an aspect of Anglicanism with which he is readily identified:

establishmentarianism. The life of a man who defended an established state religion, linked with the power and privileges of bishops and the ultimate ecclesiological authority of a monarch, is not likely to excite sympathetic interest in today's intelligent layman, much less the wider audience of secular readers. Most of my prospective readers live, after all, in highly pluralistic societies which claim to prize individual freedom, cultural diversity, and the separation of religious practice from public life.

I have been helped in my effort to overcome this obstacle to presenting Hooker effectively by A. S. McGrade, who points toward a new relevance for Hooker in precisely that integration of the religious and the secular for which he has long been discarded. McGrade writes that

the modern division of human affairs into a public secular realm and a multitude of private religious and moral realms no longer passes without question. The Christian churches are less content than previously to worship in isolation from one another and from public life. Discontent with a purely secular social order is still more intense in non-Christian quarters. Religion, whether comforting, liberal, prophetic, or fanatical, is once more a factor in world affairs. No one can sanely doubt the value of toleration, a precious if accidental result of the early modern wars of religion, yet the stresses now felt from the separation of public policy from concern with any spiritual value more specific than personal freedom may

[^] I should say that it is the corruption more than the neglect of Hooker which has driven me to the hard labor of attempting to rescue him

from his tormentors. It is perhaps inevitable that Hooker will be routinely confused in the United States with the Congregationalist founder of Connecticut, Thomas Hooker, or with the Civil War general, Joseph Hooker, or that Exeter guide books will occasionally confuse him with his uncle, John Hooker. But worst of all, for me, was the response of a tour-guide to a question about the impressive statue of Richard Hooker before Exeter Cathedral. Who was he? "Mr. Hooker was one of our great religious men. A slovenly gent. Had a bad marriage, you know. Got her pregnant and her parents made him marry her. I'm not saying his wife was a 'hooker' at first, but she was one after she married him. You Americans know what a hooker is, don't you? That General Hooker of yours who had women following his troops about was a direct relative of our Mr. Hooker here. So, you see, we have a lot in common."

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give new relevance to an author who sought at its outset to avoid precisely such separation.^{1*}

McGrade does not go so far as to suggest acceptance in our era of Hooker's unity of church and state in a single community, at least not in the secular western world. He does suggest, however, that Hooker's attempt to avert the sundering of spiritual and worldly affairs in early modern England challenges us to overcome such compartmentalization in our post-modern lives.[^] Hooker's powerful words at the opening of Book V, under the heading, "True Religion is the roote of all true vertues and the stay of all well ordered common-wealthes," may indeed speak to our day.

For if the coorse of politique affaires cannot in any good sorte goe forward without fitt instrumentes, and that which fitteth them be theire virtues, let politie acknowledge it selfe indebted to religion, godliness beinge the cheifest top and welspringe of all true virtues, even as God is of all good things. So naturall is the union of Religion with Justice, that wee may boldlie denie there is either, where both are not. For how should they be unfainedly just, whom religion doth not cause to be such; or they religious, which are not founde such by the prooffe of theire just actions? (V.1.2; 2:17.6-15)

Hooker's absence from the center of Anglican and Anglophone consciousness is also fostered by the misperception of him (when he is perceived at all) as an essentially reactive defender of an

establishment formed by others. Such scholars as John Marshall and John Booty have done much to modify this image, demonstrating Hooker's creative importance to the sacramental and prayer life of Anglicans,[^] but the writer in whose debt I stand most completely on this point is Peter Lake. In his brilliant *Anglicans and Puritans?*, Lake makes no less a claim than that Hooker invented Anglicanism. Lake shows Hooker's preeminence in the broadest historical and philosophical sense. He argues convincingly that Hooker "resolved contradictions" among and "integrated" aspects of the "available polemical options" to create a "new synthesis at the center of

"• A. S. McGrade, Intro, to the Three Last Books, *FLE* 6:235-36.

' McGrade, Intro, to *Lawes* VIII, 6:336.

[^] See especially: John Booty, "Hooker and Anglicanism," in *S.R.H.*, 207-34; "The Quest for the Historical Hooker," *The Churchman* 80 (1966): 185-93; and his definitive analysis of *Lawes* V in *FLE* 6:183-231.

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which [was] a distinctive and novel vision of what English Protestant religion was or, rather, ought to be." If he had any rival to the title of founder of Anglicanism, it could only be the author of the *Prayer Book* itself.[^]

What Peter Lake does for Hooker's originality with regard to Anglicanism is paralleled by Robert Eccleshall's account of Hooker as the quintessential expositor of that peculiarly English political ideology which has formed the basis for much of modern theory and practice of common law-based constitutional government. Eccleshall sees Hooker as the key figure in the successful transition from natural law to natural rights and from the medieval constitutional theories of Bracton and Fortescue, supporting the authority of king-in-parliament, to the modern theory and practice of parliamentary government rooted in the historic consensus of the people. His influence was determinative in jelling that distinctively English accommodation of public interest and popular consent which assured strong and stable government without the cost of dictatorship. This ambiguous but effective political style is the genius of the English polity and, indirectly, of other modern constitutional forms. If, as Eccleshall contends, it owes more

to Hooker than to anyone else, the biographer's problem of relevance shrinks considerably. Hooker can be presented as "less a precursor of a narrowly doctrinal conservatism than the godfather of England's principal ideology."[^]

[^] Peter Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?*, 146.

* For an excellent account of Hooker's influence in the two centuries after his death, see Robert Eccleshall, "Richard Hooker and the Peculiarities of the English: The Reception of the Ecclesiastical Polity in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *History of Political Thought* 2.1 (Spring 1981): 63-117. Eccleshall demonstrates that throughout this period Hooker's authority was repeatedly sought for every variety of secular and religious position in the fierce struggles which shaped not only the eventual form of the church establishment but the British constitution itself. Roundhead and Cavalier, Arminian and anti-Arminian, Hobbesian and Lockean all sought Hooker's imprimatur. For example, in the early eighteenth-century debate between the pro-royalist Whig Charles Leslie and the "old" Whig Benjamin Hoadly, Bishop Hoadly drew heavily on Locke and Hooker in his *The Original and Institution of Civil Government, Discuss'd. Viz. L An Examination of the Patriarchal Scheme of Government. II. A Defense of Mr. Hooker's Judgement* (1710) to defend the consent of the governed as a source of political legitimacy. Leslie retorted that even "learned men" have "gone wrong," as evidenced by the use of Hooker by such thinkers as John Locke "and most of the republican writers. I have not attacked him," said Leslie, "because of the reputation he has (otherwise) deservedly entertained . . . yet I would not be misled by him." Leslie, Eccleshall concludes, "recognized that he was trespassing on hallowed ground in chastising this particular churchman" (103). This controversy came to a head in the famous trial of Dr.

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But in matters of personal fact, what is there to present? The reader of a popular biography wants to know its subject as a person, to experience the world as he did and feel something of his spirit. In comparison with other major figures of his time, Hooker has left few sharp traces of his thoughts or demeanor in the episodes of daily life. Yet the context of his life, which tends to be ignored by students of

Hooker's ideas and taken for granted by professional historians, can be described in considerable detail. We know much more now than previously about how people of all classes and conditions lived in Hooker's time, how much money they made, what their working conditions were, what they ate, how they built and furnished their houses, what they did for recreation, how they cleaned themselves, cooked their meals, managed their bodily wastes and other refuse, how they made love, how they entered and sustained marital and extra-marital relationships, how they behaved in church, how they bore children and raised and educated them, how they met disease and prepared for death and its aftermath, and so on. This contextual data, augmented by still emerging, directly pertinent archival finds and by inferences drawn from his writings, can serve as the basis for a highly probable Life of Hooker. It would be contrary to Hooker's spirit to scorn probability in the absence of certainty.[^]

Henry Sacheverell, who was impeached for preaching non-resistance to royal authority and by implication suggesting that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was invalid. Hooker was cited at the trial by the Whigs to justify the revolution and condemn the defendant. Sacheverell's Tory defenders cited the 1705 edition of the *Laws* to prove their contention that resistance to royal authority was illicit. The Whig leadership then had the clerk read aloud a section from Book VIII to show that kingship was limited in those communities where constitutional limitations had already been put in place. The Tory response was to read aloud a passage from the same book saying that kings were accountable only to God. Clearly, Hooker was present in the parliamentary forum as a lively "manual for constitutional crisis." He was as relevant to political debate in those centuries of English history as "the intention of the founding fathers" was to become for later generations of American political contestants.

[^] A sampling of works useful for setting the context of Hooker's early years includes: Joyce Youings, *Sixteenth Century England* in the Pelican Social History of England (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1984), and her *Tuckers Hall Exeter* (Exeter: Univ. of Exeter Press, 1968); Martin Ingram, *Church Courts, Sex and Marriage in England, 1570-1640*, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987); Nicholas Orme, *Exeter Cathedral as It Was 1050-1550* (Exeter: Devon Books, Devon County Council, 1986) and *Education in the West of England 1066-1548* (Exeter: Univ. of Exeter Press, 1976); W. G. Hoskins, *Two Thousand Years in Exeter* (Chichester: Phillimore and C. Ltd., 1960); John Hooker, *The Description of the Citie of Excester*,

Exeter City Monuments, vol. 52 (Exeter: Devon Records Office); Walter J. Harte, ed., *John Hooker's Description of the Citie of Excester* (Exeter: Devon and Cornwall Record Society, 1919); Wallace T. MacCaffrey, *Exeter*

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The Life I am writing begins, then, not with Hooker's writings or with his more familiar public career but with his birth and childhood in Heavitree and Exeter. Against the rich tapestry of the social, economic, political, and cultural life of these places in the years preceding his birth and during Hooker's boyhood, I chronicle his family, particularly the life and thought of Richard's uncle John, the eminent parliamentarian, and the ultimately fatal Irish adventures of his father, Roger. I attempt a reconstruction of Richard's early education at the Exeter Cathedral Latin School from a close look at that institution and from what we know of early education in general during this period. The same approach is feasible for Hooker's college experiences, his marriage, and his later, more familiar public career. Where discrete biographical data are absent, as is often the case, an account of the social context and reference to what is known about the persons with whom Hooker had contact allow a close approximation to the truth about his life. We are still left to guess about many facts, especially concerning his early life. But there is a basis for something better than the fanciful conjectures or great silences we have had heretofore.

From Text to Author

Most of what we have had heretofore about Hooker by way of direct evidence is contained either in Walton's *Life* or C. J. Sisson's archival research, which raises grave questions about Walton's account. In these circumstances, a biographer must make heavy use of Hooker's own writings to work out his character. As we shall see, this inferential route, from text to author, was taken by his great nineteenth-century editor, John Keble. The textual premises now available as a basis for such reasoning have been greatly enhanced by recent scholarship. The materials for

"Heavitree," *Discovering Exeter* (Exeter: Exeter Civic Society, 1983); Nicholas Carlisle, *A Concise Description of the Endouied Grammar Schools In England and Wales*, 1 (London: Baldwin, Cradock and Joy, 1818); G. R. Elton, *England Under the Tudors*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1974); A. H. Dodd, *Life in Elizabethan England* (London: B. T. Bratsford Ltd, 1961); Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977); A. L. Rouse, *Court and Country: Studies in Tudor History* (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1987); unpublished research notes at the Devon Institution in the Cathedral Close at Exeter.

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constructive (as well as destructive) amendment of Walton are at hand. Walton cannot be bypassed, however.

Walton completed and published his biography sixty-five years after Hooker's death. His information was drawn largely from memories of conversations he had heard some thirty years earlier among his first wife's mother, Susannah Cranmer Floud, Susannah's sister, Dorothy Cranmer Spenser Field, and their brother, William Cranmer. The Cranmer ladies were linked to Hooker in several ways. According to Walton, they knew him personally as children, and their brother George knew him quite well indeed, as his pupil at Oxford and later as his friend and collaborator. (Unfortunately, George died in Ireland in 1600, too early to be a source for Walton.) In addition, Dorothy's first husband was John Spenser, a colleague of Hooker's at Corpus Christi College, president there after Hooker's death, and close enough to Hooker to be chosen as a trustee of his estate. Dorothy's second husband was the theologian, Richard Field, a friend of Spenser and disciple of Hooker. It is clear from Walton's Epistle "To the Reader" and the "Introduction" to his Life that he relied heavily on these distant family memories. Almost his full attention in describing his sources is focused on what he calls "Little things that I have received by tradition" and "accidental advantages." Apart from negative reference to earlier biographies by Fuller and Gauden, the only other sources Walton mentions derive from "friendship," "discourses," and "informations" of such Hooker admirers as Archbishop James Ussher of Armagh, Bishop Thomas Morton of Durham, and John Hales, famed historian and fellow of Eton, all deceased and likely to share Cranmer family perspectives. Walton admits that he has no record of these

sources and is relying only on partial memory. The "frill harvest" of these sources is "irrecover- ably lost," he says. But perhaps, he writes, "my memory hath preserved some gleanings" (Keble, 1:5).

On the basis of these sources, Walton paints Hooker as a person of almost unbelievably lofty moral rectitude, a saintly soul "of dove-like simplicity" who is long-suffering, other-worldly, and dispassionate (Keble, 1:83). Hooker, Walton tells us, was almost never absent from prayers at college and always kept his "affections ... set on heavenly things," was "never known to be angry or passionate or extreme," and "by a quiet gentle submission and resignation of his will to the wisdom of his Creator, bore the burthen of the day with patience: never heard to utter an

Izaak Walton, "Preface to the First Edition of the Life of Hooker," in Keble, 1:2.

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uncomely word" (Keble, 1:15). He was a loyal son, who despite a recent serious illness, embarked on a long trek home from college to visit his lonely mother. He makes the trip on frx)t, because he is either too poor or too humble to have a horse — Walton lets the reader decide which of these sympathetic conditions pertained— but he is rescued by his kindly patron, Bishop Jewel, who lends him his own horse for the last leg of the journey from Salisbury to Heavitree. Hooker is portrayed as a diligent and pious student at Corpus Christi and then as a self-sacrificing, long-suffering husband tending sheep at his parish of Drayton Beauchamp and helping his wife with children and domestic chores while his own career and tal- ents languish. As the harried Master of the Temple he heroically defends the faith from unfair attacks by one of Puritanism's major gladiators. Finally, he is the tireless pastor, scholar, and writer who drains his failing health and literally gives his life to save the Church of England with his pen, only to have his papers despoiled by Puritans who reached his study at his death before his friends (Keble, 1:12, 15, 25-26, 52, 77-87, 93).

Walton writes that he has been "a diligent inquisitor into many things that concerned IHooker]: as namely, of his person, his nature, the manage- ment of his time, his wife, his family, and the fortune of him and his" (Keble, 1:5). It would be foolish to ignore the results of such

inquiries. It has been clear for some years, however, that Walton's account of Hooker suffers from two serious biases, one most likely due to his family sources, the other due to his own role as apologist for the Restoration Church of England.

The Cranmer sisters had undoubtedly talked within Walton's hearing about the lawsuit brought by Hooker's daughters and their guardians against the custodians of his surviving manuscripts for their failure to publish these works. Since the defendants included John Spenser and others close to the Cranmers, this legal action would have seemed a distasteful, if not reprehensible, act of ingratitude from the perspective of Walton's chief informants and would have formed the basis for negative impressions of Hooker's wife and daughters and, in certain respects, of Hooker himself. In any event, Walton's portrait of Hooker as a henpecked husband whose domestic life was an impediment to his potential greatness and an explanation for his apparently reticent personality has been re-placed, thanks to C. J. Sisson's amazing archival sleuthing," by scenes

" C. J. Sisson, *The Judicious Marriage of Richard Hooker and the Birth of "The Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity"* (Cambridge, 1940).

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from a gcxxl ("judicious") marriage into a supportive family. At least the first five books of Hooker's *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* were written in the London home of the author's father-in-law, the prosperous merchant, John Churchman.

In 1958 David Novarr demonstrated convincingly that Walton was a reluctant biographer, writing within a highly political context. His assignment, explicit or implicit, from the archbishop of Canterbury, Gilbert Sheldon, included rescuing Hooker from Gauden's embarrassing endorsement of the posthumously published later books of the *Lawes*, books which seemed to suggest that episcopacy was not divinely ordained and the monarchy not absolute. ^ It was important to the Restoration church, under Sheldon's leadership, to secure the mantle of Hooker for its own post-Laudian brand of high church polity. This could be done partly by the ad hominem device of discrediting inconvenient aspects of Hooker's life and the Hooker tradition (his puritan-leaning family and supporters); partly by

discrediting those later books which set forth inconvenient views about ecclesiastical and civil authority; and partly by creating an image of Hooker which would appeal to the conservative religious tastes of the ruling party — the image of a long-suffering, judicious, altogether saintly Hooker. Thus began a tradition of Anglican hagiography which has had the odd result of making Hooker uninteresting in our own day even to most Anglicans.

John Keble's intimate acquaintance with Hooker's works, as their editor and first detailed annotator, led him to question Walton's picture of Hooker more than a century before the researches of Sisson and Novarr. In the Preface to his edition of Walton's *Life*, Keble notes the biographer's "peculiar fascination" to "communicate more or less his own tone and character" to his subjects and his proclivity for "putting long speeches," which Keble suggests they never made, "into their mouths." Keble believed that of Walton's several biographies (Hooker, Donne, Wootton, and Herbert), "the case of Hooker is that in which the biographer has on the whole produced the most incorrect impression of his subject" (Keble, l:ii). On the basis of Hooker's own writings and what little was then known about his career, Keble concluded that, far from being "meek," "patient," and "childishly ignorant of human nature and of the ordinary business of life," as Walton would have it, Hooker was "by nature ex-

^ David Novarr, *The Making of Walton's "Lives"* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1958), esp. 226-30.

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tremely sensitive, quick in feeling any sort of unfairness, and thoroughly aware of his power to chastise." He was, Keble believed, a person marked by "uncommon shrewdness and quickness of observation, and a vein of the keenest humor" (Keble, l:ii-iii).

Keble was surely on the right track. Careful reading of Hooker's work and close attention to his circumstances provide a sound, if not infallible, guide to conclusions about his persona. Happily for this biographer, there has been a great deal of such careful reading and close attention in recent years. I find that current research points to a character with at least four facets. The Hooker emerging in my account is polemicist. Christian humanist, tragic hero, and personally

committed — even driven — individual.

The late W. D. J. Cargill Thompson launched the 1972 Studies volume, published as a preliminary to the Folger edition, with a picture of Hooker as a political activist, who, despite the claims of later Anglican hagiography, was not a systematic theologian or a consistent political theorist. Rather, he was a polemicist, "continually arguing to a brief and . . . cannot easily be acquitted of the charge of subordinating his political ideas to the needs of the immediate controversy." The Lawes, for Cargill Thompson, is essentially "a work of apologetic, a defense of the constitution and practices of the Church of England against the attacks of its

puritan critics [It is] primarily a work of polemic" in the tradition of

Whitgift, Bancroft, and Bridges.¹⁶ While I think Cargill Thompson erred in tying Hooker so closely to the theological debate of his time, his emphasis on Hooker's polemical side is the right place to begin any effort to rescue him from Walton.

Further evidence of a polemical side comes from Brian Vickers's analysis of Hooker's style in the 1975 abridgement of the Lawes. Vickers edited with A. S. McGrade. Vickers notes that, "On the important issues Hooker is neither deferential nor diffident: he is tough, uncompromising, controlled." His technique is not one of "gentle, unemotional exposition, but of a challenging assertion which will be backed up by authority and example. He argues from strength to strength." We often see in Hooker "an undignified, uninhibited style: a style which is a weapon." Nor, for Vickers, is it any discredit to Hooker's memory to see him as an engaged polemicist. Such a characterization is a compliment. It is, in fact, a disservice to continue

¹⁶ W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the Tolitic Society': Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker," in S.R.H., 12, 13.

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the myth of his reasonableness, toleration and piety to the stage at which Hooker becomes a figure who is incredibly "reasonable," utterly cool and unmoved even by human depravity or the scurrilities of his opponents. The fact is that Renaissance controversy

was an extremely violent genre Hooker may be relatively

tolerant — he is less violent than Milton, less caustic than Swift— but he shares those virtues and has others of his own. I deliberately call them "virtues" because it seems to me that in defense of one's

ideals the polemicist must attack in order to defend Hooker is

often dignified, and he never descends to the gutters. But he is not a passionless Stoic expounding pure Reason."^{*}

Vickers's emphasis on Hooker's use of rhetorical techniques and his placement of Hooker in the context of "Renaissance controversy" give us a glimpse of a more lively and engaged figure than the traditional judicious logician. My own examination of Hooker's rearing and early education, as well as his career at Corpus Christi, where the influence of Erasmus was very strong,[^] makes the connection with Renaissance humanism a key element in my explanation of who Richard Hooker was. Many of the ambiguities about his persona and his writings are resolved when we come to see him not only as a scholar who felt himself to be, or perhaps actually was, commissioned by his religious superior to write a defense of his church, but also as a Christian humanist who made his own choice to be active in the service of his country and church. On this view, Hooker was motivated as much by the ideals of Cicero and Erasmus (and his Uncle John and his secular compatriots) as he was by the theological imperatives of Whitgift. This is not a novel perspective on Hooker, but it is one which deserves considerable elaboration and substantiation.[^] The value

[^] Brian Vickers, "Hooker's Prose Style," in Hooker, Lauis, ed. McGrade and Vickers, 43.

^{*1} For an analysis of the rhetorical impact of the rich assortment of stylistic forms found in Hooker's writings (especially the use of the long, suspended sentence), see especially Georges Edelen's essay, "Hooker's Style," in S.R.H., 241-76.

[^] See R. J. Schoeck, "From Erasmus to Hooker," this volume, and Hugh Trevor- Roper, *Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987), 43.

[^] Egil Grislis cites a tradition, stretching from Edward Dowden in 1900 to the recent analysis by W. Speed Hill, which sees Hooker as a Christian humanist who combines the rationalism of the Renaissance

with Reformation theology. Dowden wrote that in Hooker, "The spirit of the Renaissance is brought into harmony . . . with the spirit of the

Reformation he is at once humanist and theologian." Hill stresses the personal and

subjective aspects of Hooker's thought and his more secular side while affirming, in

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of this perspective for the biographer is that it allows us to see Hooker's participation in Elizabethan ecclesiastical controversies, the more arcane details of which have come to seem irrelevant in our time, in terms of Christian and secular humanist traditions which continue to inform and enrich modern dialogue and life.

According to H. C. Porter, we find in Hooker, as in his contemporary Edmund Spenser, the "compulsion of the creative artist," which allows us to "think of Hooker as among the heroic poets." Porter finds a clue to Hooker's personality in his comment on Calvin's withdrawal from Geneva in the face of resistance to his ecclesiastical regime: "It sometimes commeth to passe that the readiest way, which a wise man hath to conquer, is to /lie" {Lawes Pref. 2.6; 1:8.26-28). Porter wonders if the key to Hooker may lie in his ambivalence between conformity to the philosophical dictum, that man is not made for a "private kind of solitarie living" but for "civill society" (a.10.12; 1:107.15-16), and the "lure" of the quiet solitary life which his own personality found compelling.

Certainly Hooker would not be the first or the last sensitive intellectual to feel such ambivalence. As seen by Porter, he is squarely in the tradition of Erasmus and More: a scholar by temperament who gave up all that he treasured in the life of contemplation to save the people with his vision of truth. Porter draws support from Hooker's friend John Spenser's characterization of him a few years after his death as a "true humble man" who "always affected a private state, and neither enjoyed, nor expected any the least dignity in our church," a man who was of a "soft and mild disposition, desirous of a quiet, private life." From this perspective we can see Hooker's championing of contemplative values in the Lawes as coming from the depths of his own heart. If he was not Walton's dove, he was intellectually an eagle. He would genuinely have preferred to soar above the wrangles

disturbing the peace of his church — but tragically, this was not permitted him. In duty he gave his mind and life to the resolution of those controversies, seeing the Lawes through to the end.'*

Grislis's words, "that authentic secularity can be a witness to the sacred." Egil Grislis, "The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker," in S.R.H., 163-67, citing Dowden's *Puritan and Anglican: Studies in Literature* (London, 1900), 163, and Hill's 1964 Harvard doctoral dissertation, "The Doctrinal Background of Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical PoUty," 165.

* H. C. Porter, "Hooker, the Tudor Constitution, and the Via Media," in S.R.H., 111-12.

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This heroic model catches part of Hooker's complex persona, but in my view it overdraws his reluctance to rise to the occasion of public service (and fame). I believe that Hooker had ambition both for himself and for his ideas. There are few professional academics who will not recognize striving for place and recognition in Hooker's life: an uncommonly bright child of relatively humble origins gains the notice of his teachers and receives a scholarship at Oxford; he is subsequently appointed to teach there and is then chosen by the crown to occupy a national platform where he can articulate authoritative norms of government and religion; finally, he is offered a commission (or at least granted a position which allows him) to write the definitive explanation and defense of the Christian commonwealth in which he lived. Not a shabby career, given an academic person's likely aspirations and opportunities in Hooker's time, or any time. There is something more at the heart of Hooker's character than the would-be recluse persuaded by duty to accept a call to public service and the spotlight. One has to put oneself in a position to be called. This is not to say that Hooker was an opportunist, or even that he relished the rough and tumble of political competition and conflict, however formidable a campaigner he turned out to be. Quite the contrary, there is every reason to believe that he preferred the contemplative to the public life. But he could not escape the responsibilities of his talent, in part because he did not want to. Richard Hooker managed to be "available" when the calls came and, so far as we know, he never turned down a better post when it was

offered.

The most useful and provocative insights informing my biography of Hooker have come from W. Speed Hill. Hill finds in Hooker that essential connection between discourse and life which he sees sadly lacking in much serious contemporary writing. This is partly a matter of inspiration by the humanist tradition discussed above. ¹⁶ Hill also joins other com-

¹⁶ In this tradition, as Hill puts it, "a responsible concern for men and for society implied a mastery of the skills of discourse and the courage to employ them within the world of men for humane and socially productive ends. It is this tradition, fathered by Cicero . . . that was revived by humanists such as Erasmus in their educational programs throughout the sixteenth century and that allows us justly to link Hooker with the imaginative writers of his day as with his fellow apologists for the church." See W. Speed Hill, "Editor's Preface," in S.R.H., xv. The elements of Renaissance humanism emphasized in Hill's characterization of Hooker are not so much the lofty ideals of that tradition (which could ground as frozen a portrait of Hooker as Walton's) as its more empirical marks: including his apparent lack of originality, his "aversion to innovation," his tendency to look to the past for authority — rather than to credit immediate insight — his

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mentators in accepting as sincere Hooker's expressions of reluctance to enter the political fray.¹⁷ but he adds distinctively to the preceding with his perception of strong personal need as motive in Hooker's work. Hooker may have felt reluctant to enter the political arena, he may have experienced a certain anguish at having his ideas bent for the immediate political needs of his sponsors and friends, but the most revealing fact for Hill is that Hooker, despite his distaste for the task, persisted in the painful ordeal of revising his work. An intellectually-based, stoic sense of duty was not a more important motivator here than his personal love for the church, which had become the source of his security and comfort as a human being. Hooker's passion to articulate her spirit and defend her life was grounded in personal need as well as in abstract conviction. We do not have to speculate about a commission from Archbishop Whitgift in order to explain Hooker's great effort in writing and revising the Lawes. It is quite sufficient to

note his humanist posture, personalized by his love for the church and spurred by his wounded pride over the Travers debate, to explain his efforts. Hill asks, "Could not Hooker, on his own responsi-

support of the Tudor monarchy and the established church, and the obvious difference in his style from the turgid point-by-point debating approach of most of the theological writers, including both Jewel and Whitgift. See also p. xiii.

I also draw from Hill the suggestion that, once we place Hooker among the practicing humanists of his day, we understand that his importance and his character lie not so much in the content of what he had to say, which Hill believes was neither original nor timeless, but in the way he said it. As with all humanists, it is the form, the tone, the style — if you will, the spirit— of life which is important. It is, Hill reminds us, the "spirit of Anglicanism which has always been its genius and it is for that spirit that Anglicans have repaired to Hooker for centuries." *Ibid.*, xiv. See also Henry R. McAdoo, *The Spirit of Anglicanism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965). The bishop of Ossory saw Hooker's genius as the founder of Anglicanism not in his authorship of a doctrine or a church polity. Rather, he expressed a spirit which is the special genius of Anglicanism. "Richard Hooker has some claim to be the greatest Anglican writer, but his work was to

state a method in theology rather than to outline a system The absence of an official

theology in Anglicanism is something deliberate which belongs to its essential nature." Unlike Calvin, who was essentially medieval in his dogmatic Institutes, Hooker was modern and, by implication, more timeless, with his open spirit of toleration and accommodation. Pp. v, 25-26.

~° To this purpose he cites Hooker's Answer to Traver's Supplication: "I take no joye in stryvinge I have not byn noused or trayned up in it I would to Christe they which have att this presente inforced me hereunto had so ruled their handes in any reasonable tyme that I mighte never have byn constreyned to strike asmuch as in myne owne defence" (FLE 5:256.19-23).

bility, have turned inward — to writing — as a way of resolving the issues to his own satisfaction?"[^]

Hill comes closer than any commentator I have read to finding the person behind the works. The connection is a deep compulsion, born of Hooker's background, his education, and his psychological makeup, to make certain that his ideas were heard and that they made a difference in the public arena. His ideas did endure and have an impact, not so much because of their ideological content as because of the spirit which animated them. Hill suggests that his "sketch" of Hooker needs "fleshing out" before there can be a full portrait. He has provided some useful direction for proceeding with the task.

I sympathize with Hill's recent lament that, after laboring for a quarter century to bring forth a text which can rescue Hooker "from the oblivion that has befallen the writers entombed in the Parker Society volumes," he emerges to find that the basic assumptions underlying the usefulness of such a text are lacking. In just the time it took to complete the edition, assumptions about the "ontological status of texts and the recoverable intentions of authors" are gone and in their place is a new generation of English professors who have made a critical world

in which all the seemingly indissoluble assumptions — textual assumptions, contextual assumptions, intertextual assumptions — have been deconstructed and relativized into epiphenomena of other, more primary class, power, economic, and gender relations.^{^^}

Another ill omen from a venerable source! I hope it isn't so, or at least not permanently so. May providence dispose a better result for the text and commentaries that Hill and his colleagues have given us and for the body of scholarship cited and augmented in the present volume. Hooker's text, with all that it affirms about the possibilities of human reason and faith, is too important to be long obscured by a fashionable academic melancholy. This text verifies that Richard Hooker presciently isolated some of the social, intellectual, and moral pathologies being bred into our cultural system at the dawn of the modern era. More importantly, he offered as remedy a broad and tolerant intellectual framework, an optimistic faith in the reasonableness of God, creation, and man, and a spirit

[^] Hill, "The Evolution of Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity," in S.R.H., 130. ^{^^} W. Speed Hill, "Editing Richard Hooker: A

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characteristic of Anglicanism at its best. His insights and generous spirit, if made accessible, can help us see the contemporary terrain more clearly and, perhaps, chart a course between the extremes of excessive cultural relativity and individual freedom on the one side and overly restrictive intellectual, moral, and political order on the other.

All biographers cater to human interest. In my case, there is also an aim to broaden access to a subject who himself promoted human interests nobler than curiosity. I am confident that the Richard Hooker emerging in my biography is closer to the real person than we have known before. He is a lively and believable Elizabethan personality, as capable of writing angry rebukes to his critics^{^^} as he was of caring for others as a teacher and pastor. He is a multi-dimensional personality who exhibits the characteristics of other active and successful men and women in his turbulent and creative era: quick-witted, urbane, ambitious, intellectually acute, politically sophisticated, adventurous, vulnerable — a man to match the style and power of his words.

^{^^} The gentle pastor of Bishopsborne, toward the end of his life, was capable of flaring with such epithets as: "Ignorant asse"; "How this asse runneth kicking up his heeles as if a summerfly had stung him. Great corsing but to no end"; "Would such an idiot be taught or taken and braid in a mortar"; "O brave galant. Thiis martiall spirit of yours doth surely deserve a knighthood." A.C.L., 4:22.10, 42.15-16, 42.21, 73.23-24.

SOURCES

AND

WILLIAM J. BOUWSMA

Hooker in the Context of European Cultural History

I FEEL SOME DIFFIDENCE ABOUT THIS PAPER, ESPECIALLY since it Comes SO early in our conference. England has had little place in my scholarship, and I am very much a beginner in studying Hooker. I was, in fact, introduced to *Of the Laiues of Ecclesiasticall Politie* as an undergraduate by F. O. Matthiessen, whom I was lucky enough to have as my sophomore tutor; and I still remember his sympathy with my perplexity about what Hooker meant in Book I by a "law." But my broader interests have generally kept me on the European continent, so that this paper is based, not on any expertise about Hooker himself, but chiefly on such understanding as I may have developed about the "context" to which the title of this paper refers.

The paper may also be open to the objection that England, always in some respects distinct from Europe, was by the sixteenth century increasingly autonomous. It has recently been argued that Englishmen were now feeling more and more isolated from the continent, which might suggest the irrelevance of continental culture to the understanding of Hooker.¹ England's long-standing spiritual connection with Europe had been broken— or at least severely dislocated— by the Reformation, and the loss of

¹ Cf. Jeffrey Knapp, *An Empire Now/here; England, America, and Literature from 'Utopia' to 'The Tempest'* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1992); Richard Helgersson, *Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992).

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her last possessions on the continent had ended her direct political involvement. The major European powers now presented themselves, for the most part, as alien and unfriendly.

But this is not the whole story. International cultural exchange between England and the continent had never been livelier than in the later sixteenth century. Members of the English upper classes were completing their education with the European Grand Tour, English students attended European universities, and European scholars showed up in English universities. International correspondence networks, facilitated by proficiency in Latin, kept men with common interests in touch with their peers. The printing press and international fairs made books from anywhere available almost everywhere, including translations of classics into the vernaculars and from one vernacular to another. The populace of London included large numbers of foreigners: communities of merchants, ambassadors and their retinues, religious refugees.

Under these conditions it was hardly surprising that cultural developments in England often paralleled and were sometimes touched by cultural developments on the continent, notable among them pressures toward "confessional orthodoxy" that sought to order and control the creative movements of the Renaissance and of both the Catholic and Protestant Reformations. By the later sixteenth century demands for uniformity and the suppression of dissent were growing everywhere. The Counter-Reformation— a phrase as applicable to Protestantism as to Catholicism— was gathering force. Its defining events were, for Catholicism the Council of Trent, for Lutheranism the promulgation of the Book of Concord, and for Calvinism the Synod of Dort, whose international significance is suggested by the attendance of Anglican observers.

Nevertheless, none of these developments was immediately decisive, even where most vigorously implemented, as in Italy and Spain. The result was a kind of ambiguity about the period. During this time efforts to impose order were generally countered by a still lively creativity, in science (however threatening to traditional beliefs) as well as in the arts. The culture of the time was, accordingly, ambivalent and eclectic. This helps explain our difficulty in labeling it; sometimes we call it late Renaissance, sometimes mannerist, sometimes baroque, all terms defying precise definition. This was a precariously balanced period in European cultural history; opposing impulses of spontaneity and order held each other uneasily in check.

I want to suggest in this paper that these developments on the conti-

nent are also helpful to understand— or at least to put in perspective — the English situation in the time of Richard Hooker. The general eclecticism of the age is apparent, for example, in the later sixteenth-century Church of England, with its liturgical, architectural, and theological residues from the medieval past, along with sundry inherited laxities; heterogeneous and often incompatible impulses stemming from continental Protestantism; and the Erasmian latitude of the Renaissance.[^] Thus the English church, like the Roman — and indeed like the Lutheran and Calvinist churches in somewhat different ways — invited authoritarian purification and correction; to use a suggestive phrase often employed by Calvin in this connection, the "promiscuous mixture" of incompatible impulses in the Church of England stimulated obscure but profound anxieties of many kinds in numerous Englishmen, including Hooker.¹ It is not difficult, it seems to me, to understand Hooker's immediate opponents, separatist or conform- ing, and indeed some Jacobean and Caroline divines, as representatives, in antithetical directions, of the ordering and purifying impulses of the Counter-Reformation .

Nor should we be surprised to find hints of a Counter-Reformation mentality in Hooker himself. Pope Clement VIII, if we may believe Walt- on, discerned "seeds of eternity" in the Lawes, as many of Hooker's admir- ers have done ever since: among them his affinities with Aristotle and Thomas, the deductive quality in much (though not all) of his thought, and a universalism that must be balanced against his nationalism.[^] For the tensions and struggles of this period not only found expression in op- posing parties; most individuals were similarly divided and insecure; this helps to explain the savagery of its religious conflicts. Hooker's opponents, too, were often divided within themselves, torn between a narrow bibli- cism and a growing awareness of the help medieval scholasticism could give to their own apologetics, as another of my old teachers. Perry Miller, noted some decades ago. Richard Hooker was not the only English divine who was studying Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.[^]

[^] This eclecticism is, I take it, at least part of what Patrick G.Dllinson had in mind in rejecting, for the sixteenth century, the term "Anglicanism," seeing it as "an invention of the nineteenth century"; it suggests too clear an identity (E.P.M., 13).

[^] Cf. my *John Calvin: A Sixteenth-Century Portrait* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), esp. 32-48.

* Cf. Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood*, 269-94.

^ Cf. Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954).

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Such tensions explain why Hooker's thought — or so it appears to me — is often problematic; it also explains, I think, its tantalizing richness. I am aware that some of Hooker's disciples have admired him as a consistent or even a systematic thinker. These are chiefly people who, for reasons that elude me, tend like Pope Clement to rank consistency and system among the preeminent virtues. And of course, as the famous first book of the *Lawes* shows. Hooker could manage, in limited passages, a degree of systematic coherence. But the sixteenth century was, on the whole, uncongenial to systematic thought; and when we encounter it, it seems chiefly to serve not so much cognitive needs as the need for order and control, as in Robert Bellarmine's *De controversiis Christianae fidei*, a refutation of Protestant theology criticized by Catholics for making the arguments of his opponents too plausible by systematizing even them before proceeding to his refutation.

I have characterized this period as one of precarious balance among conflicting impulses. This, I think, is how we must understand other interesting figures of Hooker's time: Erasmus, for example, whose eclectic richness made him so slippery, so hard to pin down, that Luther called him an eel; the surprisingly equivocal Calvin, whose theology shaped so much of Hooker's; and notably Montaigne, widely read in England soon after Hooker's death in the translation of John Florio (1603). To these quite unpeggable names I am tempted to add that of Shakespeare, the most unpeggable of all. It is in their company that I think we should try to understand Richard Hooker.

The difficulty in pinning Hooker down, it seems to me, suggests nevertheless that it may be helpful to locate him in relation to a perennial and pervasive tension in Western cultural history between tendencies which, for the purposes of this paper, I will identify with philosophy and rhetoric. Plato dramatized their confrontation early on in the persons of Socrates and the Sophist Protagoras, who have been very differently regarded in the many centuries since. As you know, Socrates, representing philosophy, has been almost universally admired as the wisest of men, Christ-like in his martyrdom, and

especially venerated because, according to the old formula, he "sought the universal." Believing that language, itself a divine gift, can communicate ultimate truths, he was thought, as a philosopher, to have made heavenly insights accessible to humanity, and thus to have established the quasi-divinity of philosophy, thereby making it the eternal ally of the gospel. So in the Renaissance one of the benign interlocutors in Erasmus's dialogue, "The Godly Feast," prays, "Sancte

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Socrate, ora pro nobis." Erasmus was often intentionally ironic; in this work, by the most famous Renaissance rhetorician, the irony was probably unintentional.*^

Protagoras, on the other hand, if he is remembered at all, has been scorned. Protagoras was a skeptic. He took a humble view of the human mind; above all he doubted its adequacy in religion. "About the gods," he is reported to have said, "I have no knowledge whether they exist or do not exist. There are many obstacles to such knowledge, for instance, the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life."^ In his view the human mind cannot grasp ultimate truths, nor can human language, being merely conventional, convey them. Both language and what passes for knowledge in human affairs are in this view, as a modern philosopher might say, "for use"; from this perspective, philosophical systems would seem to reflect either misunderstanding or presumption. Protagoras aimed, therefore, to teach, not wisdom, but eloquence, the persuasive power of language, for the practical, merely earthly, and therefore relatively contemptible purposes of social existence.

This judgment has been reflected ever since by the survival, chiefly as a term of contempt, of the word "Sophist," which in antiquity had designated a teacher of rhetoric. Indeed, in a curious reversal. Renaissance humanists, the representatives of rhetoric in their own time, derided Scholastic philosophy as "Sophistry." In Hooker's time rhetoric continued to be distrusted; to have acknowledged that Saint Paul was a "rhetorician" — as of course he was — came close to blasphemy. An English translator of *The City of God*, published in 1610, worried over this. "Augitstine," he wrote, "makes Paul a Rhetorician. Well, it is tolerable, Augustine saith it: Had one of us said so, our eares should ring of heresie presently, heresies are so ready at some mens tongue ends."^ Yet Erasmus, Calvin (as I have tried to show elsewhere), and certainly Montaigne and Shakespeare, along

* For the reputation of Socrates, see "Socrates and the Confusion of the Humanities" in my *A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1990), 385-96.

^ Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*. I cite in the translation of C. D. Yonge (London, 1853), 397. Diogenes Laertius also says that Protagoras was the first person to maintain that there are two sides to every question, eventually a fundamental element in humanist pedagogy.

* Quoted by Debora Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988), 3. Shuger also points out that Puritans accused Anglicans of employing rhetoric, a charge that those so accused felt compelled to deny.

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with most other great Renaissance figures, owed far less to the tradition represented by Socrates, though they may not have realized this, than to that represented by Protagoras.

In fact rhetoric not only flourished during the Renaissance, it profoundly deepened the Renaissance understanding of Christianity. The influence of rhetoric was reflected in a revival of interest in that great ancient rhetorician, Augustine of Hippo. It also found expression in the development of what Charles Trinkaus has called *theologia rhetorica*, which saw the gospel as a persuasive appeal to the heart, certainly not rational demonstration aimed at the mind. Oriented to individual experience and practical piety, *theologia rhetorica* had little resemblance to the theology of the schools; it was more like what we would call spirituality.^ But it was sufficiently attractive among lay Christians to put scholastic theology on the defensive, at least temporarily; and it was still a major element in the culture of Europe in the later sixteenth century. Recent studies of Hooker seem to me increasingly to suggest that he is now best understood as an unusually eloquent and effective humanist of the later Renaissance.

A major shift toward this view came with the interestingly complementary introductions to the McGrade-Vickers selections from the Lawes, published in 1975. A. S. McGrade, a philosopher trained to recognize philosophical competence, led off by noting Hooker's

eclecticism, his "lack of intellectual rigor," and his quite practical and political purposes; Hooker emerged, in McGrade's presentation, *mutatis mutandis*, as a kind of English version of a Florentine civic humanist.¹⁰ And Brian Vickers followed this with an attack on the notion of Hooker's "impartial sweet reasonableness" implied by the familiar description of Hooker as "judicious." Vickers emphasized instead Hooker's vigor and passion, and his mastery of rhetoric.¹¹ These suggestions have now been reinforced by P. E. Forte's discussion, in the fifth volume of the Folger edition, of Hooker's rhetorical

¹ The conception was developed by Charles Trinkaus in "In Our Image and Likeness"; *Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970) and in various essays included in his *The Scope of Renaissance Humanism* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1983). Other historians who have developed the conception include Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle and Salvatore I. Camporeale, as well as myself.

¹⁰ Hooker, *Laws*, ed. McGrade and Vickers (1975), 42-47, 34-38; cf. 18: "the 'oughts' he defended were not abstract or unattainable ideals, but laws actually in operation, as public norms, in England at the time of writing Hooker was a realist."

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 41-59.

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training; Forte also noted that Hooker's Oxford tutor, John Rainolds, was famous for his lectures on rhetoric at Corpus Christi, itself a humanist foundation.¹² Meanwhile Debora Shuger's emphasis on Hooker's "pervasive concern with affective inwardness" and his acquaintance "with the experiences of desire, confusion, and fear," implies his affinities with such earlier representatives of theological rhetoric as Petrarch and Salutati.¹³ And Richard Helgerson not only places the *Laws* in a concrete polemical context that implies the work's persuasive purpose but also suggests that it was not the substance of his thought but only its "philosophic manner" that accounts for Hooker's being taken seriously as a philosopher — "manner" being, I take it, a close equivalent to decorum, the essential virtue of rhetorical discourse."¹⁴

The philosophical element in the *Lawes*, I would suggest, paradoxically supports, rather than undermines, the conception of Hooker as a humanist-rhetorician. For although philosophical discourse has generally sought to maintain its purity by excluding rhetoric, humanists were free to use anything that might serve their purposes, even bits of philosophy; humanism was in principle eclectic. And for certain audiences— or readers — extended philosophical reflection might well be thought to serve a persuasive purpose.¹⁶ Even Hooker's use of Aristotle and Thomas was not unusual among Renaissance humanists. The most distinguished of the Florentine humanist-chancellors, Leonardo Bruni, was also a student and translator of Aristotle.¹⁷ These considerations may help to explain the first book of Hooker's *Lawes*; given traditional esteem for philosophy, it was a brilliant rhetorical move: it insured respectful treatment by an important group of readers.¹⁸ Indeed it still works in this way.

¹⁶ P. E. Forte, "Hooker as Preacher," *FLE* 5:674-82.

¹⁷ Debora Shuger, *Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance: Religion, Politics, and the Dominant Culture* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1990), 83-85. For a general introduction to humanist spirituality, see my article in *Christian Spirituality: High Middle Ages and Reformation*, vol. 17 of *World Spirituality: An Encyclopedic History of the Religious Quest*, ed. Jill Raitt (New York: Crossroad, 1987), 236-51.

¹⁸ Cf. Helgerson, *Forms of Relationhood*, 111, 279.

¹⁹ I do not mean to suggest by this that rhetoricians were merely cynical; a humanist, while denying the value of systematic thought, might sincerely believe in the truth as well as the utility of a piece of philosophy.

²⁰ Cf. Hans Baron, *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1955), 255, 356; cf. 55 on the affinities of the Thomist Ptolemy of Lucca with Florentine civic humanism.

²¹ I must confess — though I know there has been much respectable opinion to the

This interpretation of Hooker can be supported, I think, by an examination of various aspects of his thought. In the remainder of this paper I should like to discuss several of these. They include his conception of the human personality — his anthropology, if you will; what this implies for human knowing; his historicism; and his conception of a "middle way" for the Church of England.

Not being a philosopher, he felt no obligation to make his anthropological assumptions explicit. What he suggests on this fundamental matter, nevertheless, seems to me reasonably clear. Like other humanists, he was moving away from a traditional conception of human being as a hierarchy of discrete faculties in which the will, the passions, and the body are properly subordinated to the mind — a scheme also easily coordinated with soul/body dualism. But beginning with Petrarch, humanists had long shown signs of discomfort with this scheme, their uneasiness stimulated by biblical study, a far more important element in their culture than has been commonly recognized. The difficulty arose in large part from the biblical emphasis on the heart, for which the traditional scheme had no place but which in the Scriptures was represented as somehow determining the quality of the whole person. Thus the biblical focus on the heart pointed to a radically different anthropology whose organization is determined by what is central, rather than what is highest in the self. Scripture represented the self as a mysterious unity rather than a hierarchy of discrete faculties.

In addition, since Scripture was clear that the quality of the heart was decisive for the mind too, this scheme in effect overthrew that supposed sovereignty of reason posited by the traditional system. Thus humanists could no longer treat the will as the obedient servant of reason, a conception basic to the notion that to know the good is to do it; they tended to emphasize the freedom of the will, and even, following Saint Paul, its tendency to defy reason. They were also inclined to treat positively the passions, so close to the biblical heart; they saw the passions not simply as potential rebels against reason but as powerful resources for good, especial-

contrary — that I do not see how it contributes much of substance to the succeeding books. In my understanding of Hooker I have been encouraged, though he may not fully agree with me, by A. S. McGrade, who allowed me to read, among his other works, the

typescript of his "Richard Hooker and the Integrity of Anglicanism." McGrade, noting the diversity among those claiming intellectual descent from Hooker, asks (11) whether this might not suggest "that Hooker's apparent coherence is only apparent, or at best aggregative and eclectic rather than integral." This description of Hooker also generally fits other humanistic thinkers.

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ly in human relationships. On the same grounds they could view the body with respect. This was also extended to the long-mistrusted erotic impulse.

But there was a serious obstacle to an explicit acceptance of this new — though also ancient — anthropology. For the traditional scheme was perceived as objective, scientific truth rather than — as in fact it was — a cultural artifact inherited from the pagan world of thought. Hence it was difficult to attack the old scheme directly; one could only sidle away from it in response to particular experiences that seemed to contradict it. The result was that two antithetical conceptions of the personality existed uneasily side by side in the minds of most Renaissance thinkers.

Hooker often fell back on the old scheme. In an early sermon he expressed it neatly: "The orderly disposition of the mind of man should be this, perturbations and sensuall appetites all kept in aw by a moderate and sober will; will in all things framed by reason; reason directed by the law of god and nature."^{*} From time to time, nevertheless, he also recognized the crucial importance of the heart. So like Calvin — and for that matter Erasmus — he argued that if Christianity is not an inward religion of the heart, it degenerates into externalism and hypocrisy and is tantamount to atheism.¹⁶ He also identified the heart— this had curious if unexplored epistemological implications— with the mind, describing it as the focus, in every human being, of God's awful scrutiny, a reflection that brought him close to the rather technical doctrine— so often misunderstood— of total depravity:

Then seing that the heart of man is not right exactly unlesse it be found in all partes such that god examining and calling it unto accompt with all severitie of rigour be not able once to charge it with declining or swerving aside, which absolute perfection when did god ever find in the sonnes of meet mortall men? doth it not follow that all

flesh must of necessity fall down and confesse. Wee are not dust and ashes but wourse, our mindes from the highest to the lowest are not right?^^

He continued in the Lawes to identify the heart as the organ of human

^{1*} Pride, 1; FLE 5:314.16-20. This is especially telling since, in these early sermons, he is sometimes thought to have been closer to Calvinist orthodoxy than he would be later. But Calvin reveals precisely the same confusion; cf. my Calvin, 78-81, 131-49.

^{1^} Jude 1; Lawes V, esp. chaps. 22-35.

^{1^} Pride, 1; 5:312.19-26; emphasis added.

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thought. "M}? whole endeavor," he declared, 'Hs to resolve the conscience, and to shewe as neere as I can what in this controversie the hart is to thinke, if it will follow the light of sound and sincere judgement, without either clowd of prejudice, or mist of passionate affection" (Pref. 7.1; 1:34.20-23). Here we may also note traces of the old scheme.

In other ways too Hooker suggests the novel anthropology of the Renaissance, sometimes mingling it rather oddly with the traditional faculty hierarchy. Like Pico della Mirandola,^{1^} Hooker emphasized the freedom of the will to ascend from sensual to spiritual existence—though presumably also to descend to lower levels of being—in passages that fit badly with his general orthodoxy on the helplessness of fallen humanity and the necessity of grace. ^{1^} This treatment of the will was accompanied by a relatively benign view of the passions. Although he noted that "it is not altogether in our power, whether we will be stirred with affections or no," he refrained from conventional moralism on this subject, merely noting the existence of tensions between will and appetite. ^{1^} Instead he suggested the intrinsic neutrality of the passions by attacking Stoicism—again like Calvin—for want of feeling, a quality he evidently prized.^{1^} Like Valla and Boccaccio, he also defended the desires traditionally suspect because associated with the body. "It is an axiome of nature," he remarked, "that naturall desire cannot utterly be frustrate." ^{1^} Hooker attached no value to asceticism.

One further hint of a subversive element in Hooker's anthropology may be of even greater interest, though as was typical of humanist thought it is not correlated with his other views. This is his positive conception of what he calls "imagination," traditionally the faculty of "imaging" by the mind and not well regarded. Unless tied by memory to the real world of God's creation, "imaging" was thought, as the misguided activity of a merely human mind, to threaten reverence for the wonderful order God had imposed on the cosmos. ^ The kind of creative imagination now

^ C. S. Lewis noted this parallel in English Literature in the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), 461. Among other relevant passages, cf. Lau/es 1.6.1-7.2 and V.70.4.

^^ For a particularly ponderous example, cf. Lawes II.8.1.

" Cf. Lawes 1.7.3; 1:78.19-21.

^^ Noted by Vickers in the McGrade-Vickers edition of the Lauis, 43.

" Lawes 1.1.4; 1:114.15-16. Cf. Shuger, Habits of Thought, 70-71, for Hooker's interest in the role of the passions in religious experience.

^^ On this subject, with particular attention to the sixteenth century, see William J.

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commonly prized had therefore been traditionally associated with arbitrariness and deception, with the "fantastical." Calvin had attacked it, and even Montaigne usually identified it with belief in what is not true.^ William Perkins denounced its products, being works of men, as "idols."^^

But Hooker refrained altogether from conventional attacks on imagination; indeed, his occasional references to it were positive. There was nothing unconventional, except perhaps in emphasis, in his observation that "the minde while wee are in this present life whether it contemplate, meditate, deliberate, or howsoever exercise it selfe, worketh nothinge without continueall recourse unto imagination the onlie storehowse of witt and peculiar chaire of memorie."^^ But he also recognized the role of imagination, now perhaps in a more modest

sense, in enforcing the significance of such ritual gestures as signing the cross, an act through which the whole mysterious entity that constitutes a person is made to participate in worship:

Seinge . . . that our weakenes while wee are in this present world doth neede towards spirituall duties the helpe even of corporall furtherances, and that by reason of naturall intercourse betwene the highest and the lowest powers of mans minde in all actions, his phancie or imagination carryinge in it that speciall note of remembrance then which there is nothinge more forcible where either too weake or too stronge a concept of infamie and disgrace might do greate harme, standeth allwaies readie to putt forth a kinde of necessarie helpinge hand, wee are in that respect to acknowledg the good and profitable use of this ceremonie. (V.65.11; 2:310.19- 29)

Bouwsma, "The Renaissance Discovery of Human Creativity," in *Humanity and Divinity in Renaissance and Reformation: Essays in Honor of Charles Trinkaus*, ed. John W. O'Malley, Thomas M. Izbicki, and Gerald Christiansen (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 17-34.

~ Cf. "Of the power of the imagination" in the Frame translation of the *Essays* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1957), 68-76.

~® Quoted by Huston Diehl, "Dazzling Theater: Renaissance Drama in the Age of Reform," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 22 (1992): 213-14.

~ Lauies V.65.7; 2:306.32-307.4. Sidney's conception of the imagination may move in the same direction but seems to me more equivocal because of its Platonic overtones; "imaging" the ideal structures of nature still suggests only a variant of the traditional mimetic aesthetic. Cf. Maurice Evans's introduction to the Penguin edition of *Arcadia* (New York: Penguin, 1977), 23.

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Here the imagination emerges as the bond of unity among the previously discrete higher and lower faculties of the personality. Hooker thus made of worship itself a vehicle of the new anthropology.

As I may from time to time have implied, these shifts in the understanding of human being had important implications for what it

means for a human being to know something. They point to limitations in Hooker's celebrated rationalism. He shared Calvin's belief in the total depravity of fallen humanity, which means, of course, not that there is nothing good left in human beings, but that there is no privileged area of the personality left untouched by original sin, notably including the operations of the mind. The doctrine of total depravity was thus closely related to the unity of human being posited by the new holistic anthropology. Hooker insisted in one of his early sermons that "the minds of all men" are darkened "with the foggie damp of originall corruption";¹⁶ and I see little reason to believe that he modified this view in the *Lawes* in any significant way. As an unsystematic thinker, he made no effort to clarify his understanding of "reason," but it seems to me here to be a kind of generalized common sense, the product of a holistic personality as it functions in acts of judgment. Thus, although Hooker may have treated positively what he called "reason," he linked it to other tendencies in his thought not ordinarily identified with rationalism: to his pragmatism and historicism.

He was therefore less inclined to define "reason" than to point to its practical uses. Unlike Aristotelians on the continent he had no interest in metaphysical or physical speculation; and, once the first book of the *Lawes* was out of the way, he made little attempt to link human "rationality" to the rational order of the cosmos. He was chiefly interested in natural law as a source of ethical guidance. "The lawe of nature," he declared, although "an infallible knowledge imprinted in the mindes of all the children of men" consists above all in "principles for directing of humaine actions," particularly "the choise of good and evill in the daylie affaires of this life" (11.8.6; 1:190.11-16). When he argued for social hierarchy, he did so, not on the traditional ground that earthly society ought to mirror the hierarchy of the heavenly hosts, but for practical reasons: because disregard for earthly order and degree "is the mother of confusion, where- upon division of necessitie followeth, and out of division inevitable destruction." Hence, he concluded, "order can have no place in thinges unlesse it be settled amongst the persons that shall by office be conversant

Cert., 1; FLE 5:71.16-17; my emphasis.

about them." Order in society is thus itself a human construct based on consensus; it is not a mandatory derivative from the order of the cosmos.

Characteristically, to be sure, he followed this pronouncement with a bow in the opposite direction, giving a divine mandate to hierarchy by observing that "the very deitie it self both keepeth and requireth for ever this to be kept as a law, that wheresoever there is a coagmentation of many, the lowest be knitt to the highest by that which being interjacent may cause each to cleave unto other and so all to continue one," though Hooker's uncharacteristic retreat into philosophical jargon in this passage may suggest a degree of discomfort with the point. And he immediately canceled the impact of this pious reflection by insisting that the "order of thinges and persons in publike societies is the worke of politic and the proper instrument thereof in every degree is power, power being that abilitie which we have of our selves or receive from others for performance of any action." A celebrated dictum of Pope Gelasius at the end of the fifth century had distinguished *potentia*, a pragmatic instrument, from *auctoritas*, a moral force. We can assume that Hooker knew the significance of this distinction and, choosing his words carefully, employed it deliberately to secularize the social and political order, in response to the sacralizing critics, both puritan and papist, of the Elizabethan settlement.[^]

Hand in hand with Hooker's worldly practicality was a historicism that also reflected his appreciation for the variety in the world God had created. This conception had, of course, a long history. It put Hooker on the side of the Many against the One, and once again in opposition to idealist impulses in Christian thought. "The generall end of Gods external! working," he wrote, "is the exercise of his most glorious and most abundant vertue: Which abundance doth shew it selfe in varietie" (Lawes 1.2 A; 1:61.6-8). He was particularly impressed by the variety of human arrangements in both space and time, especially as it found expression in those "positive laws" that occupy so prominent a place in his thought.

[^] Lawes VIII.2.1 (Keble 2.2); 3:331.12-17. In the traditional view, shaped by the Pseudo-Dionysian Celestial Hierarchy and transmitted by Aquinas, the celestial hierarchies are primarily to be contemplated rather than, as for Hooker, to be used. The author of that work was unconcerned with a possible application to human affairs.

^^ Ibid.; 3:331.21-332.5. For other passages that take the same practical approach to earthly order, cf. Lawes VII. 18.7, 20.2; VIII.3.4 (Keble 2.18). It is of some significance in this respect that both the Henrician and the Elizabethan Acts of Settlement distinguish between power and authority, though without explaining the difference.

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laws, as he put it, that "have the nature of thinges changeable according to the difference of times, places, persons, and other the like circum- stances" (111.11.13; 1:261.9-11).

In this pronouncement, Hooker is expressing the close relation of historicism to rhetorical decorum, i.e., appropriateness to differences in time, place, and audience. Among the consequences of this concern, so important both for the writing of history and for philological scholarship, was a growing sensitivity to anachronism.^^ Their lack of this kind of sensitivity was, of course, a major ground for Hooker's attack on the narrow biblicism of his Protestant adversaries. His historicism also enabled him to defend variety in ecclesiastical polity — albeit in the somewhat limited sense of *ejus regio ejus religio*, the formula of the Peace of Augsburg—and indeed differences of almost every kind. It allowed him, in addition, to defend varieties of secular government and even to associate himself with what Walter Umann has called the "ascending theme" of political authority.^^ Hooker, along with Machiavelli, was thus one of the two most sophisticated sixteenth-century contributors to constitutional theory. This, it is worth noting, was during a time when followers of Aquinas on the continent were arguing, on the analogy of God's rule over the creation, that absolute monarchy is the only legitimate form of govern- ment.^^

Among other expressions of his humanism was, finally. Hooker's idealization of the Church of England as a "middle way" between ecclesi- astical extremes, in which his thought also and even more fundamentally parallels that of Machiavelli. But an ambiguity in the conception of a *via media* — a phrase I am told he did not himself use — has obscured Hooker's use of the conception. The phrase has been understood, I would suggest, in two quite different ways, which might be distinguished as idealist and

~ Cf. Peter Burke, *The Renaissance Sense of the Past* (London: Edward Arnold, 1969), and Nancy Struever, *The Language of History in the Renaissance: Rhetoric and Historical Consciousness in Florentine Humanism* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970). The first serious recognition of Hooker's historicism, to my knowledge, was the article by Arthur B. Ferguson, "The Historical Perspective of Richard Hooker: a Renaissance Paradox," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 3 (1973): 17-49. See also Shuger, *Habits of Thought*, 32-35.

~ Walter Ullmann, *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1961); and *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

~ Cf. my *Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty: Remembrance Values in the Age of the Counter Reformation* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1968), esp. 417-82.

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pragmatic. In the idealist mode, the middle way becomes a kind of universal ethical and ideological stance, a point of stasis situated securely above the fluctuations and vicissitudes of history. This understanding of the middle way is reflected in the notion of the mean as golden; in the symbolic hierarchy of metals, gold is always qualitatively unique, absolutely highest and best. Indeed, from this standpoint the *via media* is not, after all, a "way" but for all eternity the one right place to be. We must ask, then, whether this was Hooker's view.

He applied the trope of the "middle way" variously; he evidently found it congenial. So in biblical translation he favored "a middell course betweene the rigor of literall translators and the libertie of paraphrastes" (Lawes V.19.2; 2:68.22-23). He also contrasted the "more calme and moderate" course of religious change in England with the "extreme alteration" that had occurred on the continent, with its "mutuall combustions bloudsheads and wastes" (IV. 14.6; 1:342.7-30). He believed too that his own teaching on Scripture and tradition avoided the faults both of Rome and of the "daungerous extremitie" into which other churches had fallen (I.8.7; 1:191.21).

These uses of the notion seem concrete and practical: rhetorical or pragmatic rather than idealist. They are also generally fraught with affect, a significant clue to what was on Hooker's mind: the dangers

implicit in extremes terrified him. Hooker's middle way thus assumes the existence of powerful but opposing perils requiring, if they are to be warded off, constant and strenuous exertion, adaptation, and improvisation. The "moderate course" he favored implied energetic control. The point deserves some emphasis since "moderation" {moderatio} has lost most of the active and dynamic significance it had in Hooker's time. The historical world of his experience was a field of dangerous forces. He remembered the "bloudie times" under Mary that made the reformation under Elizabeth "a thing at hir comming to the Crowne even raysed as it were by myracle from the dead."[^] His prescription, like the politique views of Montaigne which it resembles, is rooted in the extraordinary dangers of a particular time in history.

Hooker's "moderation" is also close to Machiavelli's principle of equilibrium, which the great Florentine substituted for that of hierarchy in

[^]* Lawes IV. 14.7; 1:343.32-344.7. Since he was well aware of violent episodes in the earlier Reformation in England, I take it that he had in mind the relative "moderation" of the Henrician and Elizabethan settlements.

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prescribing both for the constitutions of states and for the relations among them. Hooker applied it to English society; he hoped to protect the social order by maintaining a balance between the lay and clerical orders, so that

the chief est of the Prelacy being matched in a kinde of equal yoke, as it were, with the higher, the next with the lower degree of Nobility, the reverend Authority of the one, might be to the other as a courteous bridle, a mean to keep them lovingly in aw that are exorbitant, and to correct such excesses in them, as whereunto their courage, state and dignity maketh them over prone.^{^^}

One suspects in his wording at least a touch of irony.

Hooker's appeal to balance is also based on something like Machiavelli's Augustinian view of the human condition, which Hooker described as a "perpetual warfare with worldly pleasures, lust of concupiscence,

faint- heartedness, with flesh, Satan, with temptations so various, foes so power- ful, that there is always danger of chasms closing over us and of our being swallowed up like a leaden ball in raging waters. "^^ (This passage appears in a letter to his old tutor and friend John Rainolds probably written after 1585; it is therefore hard to dismiss as "mere rhetoric"— a phrase that, in any case, reflects a fear of the power of rhetoric and so means the opposite of what it appears to say.) Given this view of the human condition. Hooker — again like Machiavelli— was too realistic to suppose that "modera- tion," however salutary in principle, could ever insure safety. One could expect in this world at best, "by reason of mans imbecillitie and proneness to elation of minde," and because "the vertue of patience is rare, and the hand of necessitie stronger, theri ordinarie vertue is able to withstand," only some practical modification of the human tendency to oscillate between prosperity and poverty, and between "fuUnes of bread and emptines" (Latues V.76.5; 2:418.15-30). It was, indeed, this human ten- dency to swing wildly between extremes that had evoked the Lawes, for "the world seekinge to procure a remedie" tends to "a meere exchange of the evell which before was felt" (V.8.4; 2:40.12-14). Hooker understood very well why Utopia is nowhere.

^^ Lawes VILIS.IO; 3:261.10-16. This metaphor is followed by another in which nobles and prelates are related as intertwined strands in a cable.

^® Undated Latin Letter, trans. Craig Thompson, FLE 5:434.1-4. The image suggests Calvin's horror of "the abyss."

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In conclusion, I should like to emphasize that my intention, in this interpretation of Hooker, is not to diminish his stature, as the common prejudice against rhetoric might incline some to conclude. Much less is it to encourage those whose ideological agenda requires that Hooker be represented as an apologist for social injustice. I am concerned, rather, to place him where I think he belongs: in a tradition of Christian discourse even more venerable than that of Thomas Aquinas.

R. J. SCHOECK

From Erasmus to Hooker: An Overview

"ERASMUS AND HOOKER" WOULD BE TOO SIMPLISTIC a title, and it might well lead to further over-simplifications in an area already troubled by too many.' "From Erasmus to Hooker" emphasizes the chronological shiftings and calls attention to the monumental changes that took place, not only throughout the sixteenth century, but even between 1536, the year of Erasmus's death, and 1554, the probable year of Richard Hooker's birth. There were political events in the British reign and church that affected academics, and the rigidifying effects of the Council of Trent (still in progress when Hooker was born and not to conclude for another ten years) cast a long shadow on both sides of the Channel. Cultural shifts were profound, and the growth of the lay spirit accelerated. Many scholars have traversed these fields before us, and yet there are possibilities of fresh beginnings. As F. W. Maitland, that grand master of medieval thought and history, wrote nearly a century ago about the Domesday Book: "Above all, by slow degrees the thoughts of our forefathers, their common thoughts about common things, will have become thinkable once more. There are discoveries to be made; but also there are habits to be

' The first title would imply an influence study, and I have remarked on Peter Burke's heuristic cautions against such metaphors as "influence," "spread," "diffusion," "impact." See his essay in *The Impact of Humanism on Western Europe*, ed. A. Goodman and A. Mackay (London: Longman, 1990), and my review in *Renaissance Studies* 6 (1992): 403-9.

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formed."^ Among the habits to be formed we must count the bringing together of evidence from the continent together with native evidence for a fuller intellectual or theological history; and there must be a greater willingness to look at similarities between the Church of Rome before Trent and the Church of England after the accession of Elizabeth. The role of Latin as perhaps the key element in a concept of continuity must be duly recognized,^ and the centrality of rhetoric in the university curriculum and for the shaping of the Renaissance mind has not yet won full acceptance."^ These surely will suffice by way of prolegomenous observations, but others of course can be made.

The springboard for the early part of my paper is this admirably compact sentence in Speed Hill's "Editor's Preface" to *Studies in Richard Hooker*:

His humanism is the logical outgrowth of the patronage of his uncle, John Hooker, Exeter's resident humanist for half a century; of Jewel, whose library at Salisbury Hooker may have used; and of the traditions of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, one of the distinctively Renaissance foundations of Oxford, where Jewel had been Professor of Rhetoric before the Marian exodus and where John Rainolds — a notable Hellenist, who lectured on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and was later active in the preparation of the Authorized Version of the Bible — was Hooker's tutor. (S.R.H., xiii-xiv)

But we must expand that statement and begin to illuminate some of the dark corners of those intervening years between Erasmus and Hooker. Institutions, characters, and ideas (the phrase is Beryl Smalley's): these

^ F. W. Maitland, *Domesday Book and Beyond* (Cambridge, 1897), 596.

^ See my address on "The Great Continuity of Latin," given at the Academia Latinitati Fovendae, Leuven 1993 (to be published in the proceedings of the Academia, ed. J. IJsewijn).

^ I have attempted to establish this in a number of studies: " 'Going for the Throat': Erasmus's Rhetorical Theory and Practice," in *Renaissance-Rhetorik*, ed. H. F. Plett (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1993), 43-58; "Intertextuality and the Renaissance Canon," in *Criticism, History, and Intertextuality*, ed. Richard Fleming and Michael Payne (Lewisburg: Bucknell Univ. Press, 1988), 98-112; "The Practical Tradition of Classical Rhetoric," in *Rhetoric and Praxis — The Contribution of Classical Rhetoric to Practical Reasoning*, ed. Jean D. Moss (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1986), 23-41; and " 'Lighting a Candle to the Place': On the Dimensions and Implications of Imitatio in the Renaissance," *Italian Culture* 4 (1983): 123-43. The rhetoric of Rainolds and Hooker needs to be set against such an international background, which was fundamentally Latin.

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provide the links between Erasmus and Hooker, and they established a living tradition which I wish now to present in summary form. The details are to be articulated in a monograph on this movement or development, and it will be the first in a series of volumes. In that series and here, I would speak of the twinning of Erasmian humanism and Christian theology, and by this I mean first the Erasmian program of fusing the Christian study and teaching of the Bible and the church fathers with a deep classical wisdom, both built upon a solid foundation in the liberal arts and especially of rhetoric. Education always mattered in this Erasmian humanism, and from the time of John Colet there was an outpouring of endowment for education. Witness St. Paul's School (London), initiated in 1508 and completed in 1514, with its indebtedness to Erasmus for its curriculum and life of prayer: several prayers (including the *Concio de puero Jesu*) were written for the school, and *De copia* was written for the school and dedicated to Colet when published in 1512; and there were other connections. ^ Witness too the Collegium Trilingue at Louvain, founded by the learned Jerome de Busleyden (c. 1470- 1517), friend of Erasmus. This college was devoted to teaching the three languages (Greek, Latin, and Hebrew), and Erasmus gave constant support after Busleyden's death to enlisting the best teachers. Witness most especially Corpus Christi College, Oxford, endowed by Bishop Richard Foxe and uniquely designed by Foxe to offer a humanistic

curriculum, in which enterprise much was owing to the ideas of Erasmus. All three of these institutions were established to combine natural or classical wisdom with Christian piety, to the end of bringing forth Christian scholars and theologians as well as lay leaders in church and society. The movement from Erasmus to Hooker did not begin with Erasmus, to be sure, and I have tried to give an account of the currents and crosscurrents of Erasmian humanism in the two volumes of my biography *Erasmus of Europe*.[^]

Let us first speak of Richard Foxe (1488?- 1528), well characterized by J. B. Trapp as a notable builder, and we can turn to his brief biography in

[^] A fuller account of the relations between Erasmus and Colet is given in vol. 2 of my *Erasmus of Europe: The Prince of Humanists, 1501-1536* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1993), 55-59 and *passim*.

[^] See further my forthcoming essays: "Diverting Medieval Learning: Bishop Foxe's College and Library" (delivered to the Medieval Society, Univ. of Kansas, February 1994); and "The Collegium Trilingue: The Flowering and Seeding of Northern Humanism" (given at the International Association for Neo-Latin Studies Congress in Bari, August 1994).

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Contemporaries of Erasmus for a recent overview of his impressive buildings, as well as foundations and rebuildings. Trapp writes that "Foxe had at first intended his 'beehive' to be an Oxford college for the student monks of Worcester (his diocese), but he broadened its scope," perhaps (as suggested by Allen, Trapp, and others) under the influence of his friend Hugh Oldham, bishop of Exeter, founder of Manchester Grammar School, and an important early benefactor of Foxe's college; or perhaps we must look to the influence of John Fisher, who had experienced the problems of establishing a humanist college in the foundation of Christ's and St. John's Colleges, Cambridge, along similar but less developed humanist lines.[^] To these two names of Oldham and Fisher we must surely add that of Erasmus. For Erasmus and Foxe doubtless met in 1499-1500 during Erasmus's first visit to England, and it appears from Erasmus's *Epistles* 185 and 186 that Foxe

likely hosted Erasmus in 1505. A patron later of Erasmus, Foxe publicly declared, according to Thomas More (Ep. 502), that Erasmus's translation of the New Testament was worth ten commentaries; and the choice of Erasmus's translation for certain texts in the windows of King's College, Cambridge, was doubtless made by Foxe. Among the books given by Foxe to Corpus Christi College after his death we find a notable list of humanist texts and several authors celebrated by Erasmus: Valla, George of Trebizond, Ficino, Euripides, Cicero, Terence, and Plato.[^] Holinshed represents Oldham as saying that, "it is more meet a great deal that we should have care to provide for the increase of learning, and for such as who by their learning shall do good in the church and commonwealth": this set of principles Oldham or Foxe could have learned from an hour of conversation with Erasmus, or an evening of

[^] The metaphor of the "beehive" is an active metaphor that runs through many of the more than two hundred pages of Foxe's Statutes for the college.

® On the library of the college in large, see J. R. Liddell, "The Library of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, in the Sixteenth Century," *The Library*, N.s. 17 (1938-39): 385-416; and on the donations or bequests by Bishop Foxe, see A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of Oxford University To A.D. 1500*, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957-59), 2:717-19. Of the library Liddell writes tellingly (386): "The Library of Corpus has a peculiar interest as a representative library of the Renaissance: as the library used by the humanists Vives and Lupset, by Jewel and Hooker and Rainolds, three of the greatest churchmen of the Elizabethan church, and by Nicholas Udall and Richard Edwards, early writers of English comedy." I offer a study of the 1499 and 1528 donations of books and manuscripts by Foxe in my forthcoming "Diverting Medieval Learning." For the older colleges there was indeed — as M. H. Curtis notes (*Oxford and Cambridge in Transition*, 1558-1642 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959], 104)— now an opportunity to divert some of their revenues to the new learning.

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reading his writings, and it sets forth the guiding principles of Tudor humanism for the ultimate goal of the good of God and the commonwealth.

As for the college that Foxe founded in 1517, Fowler has noted in his history of Corpus Christi that the first appointments were made by the founder himself: a Spaniard, Juan Luis Vives, and a Bavarian, Nicholas Kratzer, the first to lecture on Greek and the second on mathematics. Much has been made of the international thrust of these initial appointments— and rightly, for they parallel Erasmus's nominations for the lectureships in the Collegium Trilingue, and like them they contributed to a breaking down of parochialism— but the salient point is that Foxe wanted the best possible professors for his new college. As president Foxe chose John Claymond, persuading him to move from Magdalen College (known for its classical studies), of which he had been president since 1507. Two years after the establishment of the college Erasmus wrote to Claymond, whom he appears to have known only slightly, or perhaps even only indirectly, and the Dutchman spoke, in language which seems to reflect that of the founder, of the "magnificent college which he [Foxe] has set up at his own expense expressly to the three tongues, to humane literature, and to classical studies" {Collected Works of Erasmus, 6:405.7-8, hereafter cited as CWE }.¹ One is struck by Erasmus's verb, *consecravit*, for it gives a theological, or at least ecclesiastic, thrust to the founding of the college. In this rather formal, or formally rhetorical, letter, Erasmus added,

I foresee that in days to come this college, like some most holy temple sacred to all that is best in literature, will be reckoned all over the world to be one of the chief glories of Britain, and [alluding to Foxe's later endowing his own collection of books, doubtless envisaged in 1517] that more men will be drawn to Oxford by the spectacle of that library rich in the three tongues, where no good author is lacking and no bad one [presumably, scholastic] finds a place, than ever were attracted to Rome in olden days by the prospect of so many marvels. {CWE, 6:406.22-28}

As well as stressing Greek by establishing a public lectureship in the language (for lectures open to the entire university, thus making it the first permanent foundation in Greek), Foxe's curriculum for his college greatly broadened the canon of classical authors.¹⁰ During vacations, the Hu-

¹ Collected Works of Erasmus (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1974-).

¹⁰ The concept of the canon is important (as I have intimated in my essay on

inaneities Reader was to give special instruction in two of Erasmus's favorite Latin books, the classical *Noctes Atticae* of Aulus Gellius and the Neo-Latin *Elegantiae linguae latinae* of Lorenzo Valla, together with a third Renaissance work, the *Miscellanea* (1489) of Poliziano.

This broadening of the literature canon was paralleled in theology by Foxe's choice of patristic authors to replace long-established medieval authorities like Peter Lombard: thus Jerome, Augustine, Origen, and Chrysostom were named as college authors. The hand of Erasmus is firmly present in this reshaping of the curriculum, for in the course of his career he edited the four church fathers, as well as Valla's *Elegantiae* in 1504." The model of Corpus Christi College was followed by other colleges: new foundations provided for college lecturers, and most of the older colleges made arrangements for them, to the extent that by the beginning of Elizabeth's reign (as Curtis has noted), "it would appear from a contemporary account of the universities that all the colleges had sufficient lecturers to assume the whole burden of instruction and that the universities, despite their statutes, had little to do but to grant degrees" (104)—yet the Elizabethan university was more than just the sum of its parts. Still, Foxe's seemingly modest provision for three lecturers in Greek, Latin, and patristic theology had in fact achieved a revolution at Oxford, and other benefactors made provisions for lecturers in other subjects. There is in the 1564 edition of Lady Anne Bacon's translation of Jewel's *Apology* into English a summary description which can set the collegiate changes in a university context:

Every one of the colleges have their professors of the tongues and of the liberal sciences . . . which do train up youth privately within their halls, to the end they may afterward be able to go forth thence into the common schools [of the university] as to open disputation, as it were into plain battle, there to try themselves [sic]."

rhetoric and the canon, 1988); and for the broadening of the college canon by the inclusion of Valla, see my essay "Erasmus and Valla: The Dynamics of a Relationship," *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook* 12 (1992): 45-63.

"The relation between college and university requirements is studied

by J. M. Fletcher in his chapter on "The Faculty of Arts," in *The Collegiate University*, vol. 3 of the *History of The University of Oxford*, ed. J. K. McConica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 157-99. The subordinate role of the arts faculty, however, changed slowly during the century.

^ The Works of John Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury, ed. John Ayre, Parker Society, 23-26 (Cambridge, 1845-50), 25:1 1, quoted by Curtis, *Oxford and Cambridge in Transition*, 104, n. 62.

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A notable tribute to the lectures at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, is to be found in one of Anthony a Wood's little excursions:

As Jewel's fame grew from the rhetoric lecture, which he read with singular applause, and Hooker's from the logic, so Rainolds' from the Greek in Corpus Christi College. The author that he read was Aristotle, whose three incomparable books of rhetoric he illustrated with so excellent a commentary so richly fraught with all polite literature, that as well in the commentary as in the text, a man may find a golden river of things and words. ^

A number of promising younger men made their appearance at Corpus during the 1520s, as McConica has noted: ^ at this college alone, he writes, we find "John Helyard, John Sepreve (a *friture regius* professor of Hebrew), Nicholas Udall [the schoolmaster, Latinist, and playwright], George Ederich (a *friture regius* professor of Greek), and John Morwent, reader in Greek and secretary to Bonner" (84), all of whom began their careers at this time. To these names others must be added, including those of students and fellows from Cambridge and from the continental universities, for the mobility of students and scholars added much to the intellectual and religious fervor at Corpus Christi. However, we who have traversed in academe know that permanent sweetness and light are rare, and Richard Coxe (1500-81) is a fine example both of the tensions during the swings of the doctrinal pendulum in the middle decades of the sixteenth century and of the sometimes violent reactions: *corruptio optimi pessima*. Coxe, a canon of Christ Church in 1524, became dean of Christ Church in 1547 and worked with Cranmer on the first prayer book of 1549; he was one of the translators of the Bishops' Bible, which is of interest as a prime and early example of team scholarship. ^ Yet during the Edwardian period this scholar, now chancellor of the university,

exercised such

¹⁶ Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses*, ed. Philip Bliss (London, 1815), 2:13 (quoted by Curtis, *Oxford and Cambridge in Transition*, 106).

¹⁷ J. K. McConica, *English Humanists and Reformation Politics under Henry VIII and Edward VI* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 84; see also "The Rise of the Undergraduate College," in McConica, *The Collegiate University*, 25ff.

¹⁸ See S. L. Greenslade, "English Versions of the Bible, 1525-1611," in *The Cambridge History of the Bible: The West from the Reformation to the Present Day*, ed. S. L. Greenslade (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1963), 159-61; A. W. Pollard, *Records of the English Bible* (London, 1911); and David Daiches, *The King James Version of the English Bible* (Chicago, 1941).

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destructive zeal in destroying books and manuscripts and in altering statutes that he won the nickname cancellor of the university (DNB).

Let us now give some attention to John Jewel (1522-1571), who was a fellow of Corpus Christi but first had been a student at Merton College, where John Parkhurst (then a fellow of Merton, later a bishop of Norwich) trained him in biblical criticism by having him compare translations of the New Testament made by Tyndale and Coverdale, an assignment which not many undergraduates in any period could perform with adequacy. To further his career. Jewel was advised to leave Merton for Corpus Christi, where he was chosen scholar in 1539 and proceeded B.A. in 1540; elected fellow in 1542, he then proceeded M.A. in 1545. Jewel was an outstandingly successful teacher and preacher, and he was appointed praelector in humanity and rhetoric by his college. But with the accession of Queen Mary in 1553, Corpus Christi set about purging itself of all suspected of Protestantism. Jewel left his college for Broadgate Hall (now Pembroke College), then fled to Frankfurt. From Frankfurt he was invited by Peter Martyr to Strasbourg, and he followed Martyr to Zurich, where he joined a small but greatly influential group of Marian exiles. Returning to England after the death of Mary, Jewel was marked for leadership in making the transition from the old religion to the new, and in 1559 he was nominated bishop of

Salisbury. The first fruit of his studies was written in Latin, for it was also intended for circulation on the continent; the learning of the *Apologia pro Ecclesia Anglicana* was recognized at once, and the book was quickly translated into English. Much of the controversy that ensued, especially with the Roman Catholic Thomas Harding (a fellow and later warden of New College, Oxford) is now tedious to read, but Jewel's argument with Harding is marked, as Creighton noted, by his "willingness to admit the appeal to the first six centuries of Christian literature" (DNB), a disposition doubtless instilled by the strength of the patristic curriculum at Corpus. A second characteristic of Jewel was his appeal to reason, which contributed greatly to the emerging Anglican concept of reason as an essential element in its tradition, as A. S. McGrade has carefully expounded.^{1*} Indeed, in a century that was so addicted to *ad hominem* argumentation. Jewel's writing is notable for its relative good temper and avoidance of personalities: one may surely see the influence of Erasmus's general good temper and civility, as I have

¹ A. S. McGrade, "Reason," in Stephen Sykes and John Booty, eds., *The Study of Anglicanism* (London: S.P.C.K., 1988), 105-17.

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commented in my article on traditions of civility and tolerance in Erasmus and Postel (1988). Having begun his episcopate with the enthusiasm of his Zurich years and with strong leanings toward Calvinism, Jewel modified his theological and ecclesiological positions in the process of arguing with Marian adherents and other extremists.

Not enough attention has been given to Jewel's close reading of Erasmus, whom he frequently cites, not only from the scriptural works (which are to be expected in a century that kept at very least Erasmus's *Paraphrases* at its elbow), but also his letters, and even the *Praise of Folly*. Along with Erasmus, Jewel also cites quite frequently Vives and Beatus Rhenanus, fellow humanists who shared most of Erasmus's educational ideals and moderate theological views. At one point, quoting from the *Enchiridion*, that model of a simple, Christocentric piety. Jewel speaks of Erasmus as "a man of singular learning and judgment."

Not least in the chain of characters (in the sense of important and

influential persons) connecting Erasmus and Richard Hooker was John Rainolds, whom Jennifer Loach has perceptively called "for three decades the radical conscience of the University."^^ In virtue of his own importance and his role in linking two other Devon and Corpus men, Jewel and Hooker, Rainolds commands our attention in several areas of learning and church polity. A student and fellow of Corpus, Rainolds in 1572-1573 was appointed to the important readership in Greek, which he held until 1578. In this capacity he lectured (as Anthony a Wood observed, in the college but with a university-wide audience) on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, these important lectures have recently been edited by Lawrence D. Green.^ The period following 1578 was a stormy one in the history of the college, and order and a temperate atmosphere were restored only in 1598 with Rainolds's election to the presidency.^ Soon after Rainolds's death in

^ Jennifer Loach, "Reformation Controversies," in McConica, *The Collegiate Library*, 363-96, 392-93.

^* Lawrence D. Green, ed. and trans., *John Rainolds's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's "Rhetoric"* (Newark, Del.: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1986). In a perceptive review of this edition (*Renaissance Quarterly* 41 [1988]: 169-72), Kathy Eden has observed: "it is also true, as Rainolds contends, that Aristotle sometimes fails to account for the first of the three official intentions of rhetoric, namely teaching" (171). Here, surely, one may see the influence of Rainolds's years of teaching in Corpus, with its emphasis on the teaching functions of rhetoric.

" Rainolds had left Corpus, largely because of differences during the stormy presidency of William Cole (DNB), and had retired to Queen's College; Rainolds was elected to the presidency of Corpus in December 1598, after very difficult negotiations that led to Cole's resignation in November or December of that year.

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1607 and his leaving his library to be distributed among various colleges and friends, Bishop Hall wrote that, "he alone was a well-furnished library, frill of all friculties, of all studies, of all learning; the memory, the reading of that man were near to a miracle" (DNB). Rainolds played a key role in the development of both Greek and

rhetoric studies in Oxford in the 1560s and 1570s. It must be added that in the Hampton Court conference of 1604 it was Rainolds who accepted the notion of episcopacy, and that it was in his lodgings at Corpus that much of the translation of the Authorized Version of the Bible was completed.[^] Thus in conspicuous achievements Rainolds worked for the twinning of Erasmian humanism (especially rhetoric) and patristic theology, and he personally exemplified the fruitful fusion of the several faculties of learning into a scholar of shining conscience and commitment.

We turn now to Richard Hooker, whose connections with the Erasmian traditions of which we have been speaking were several. Bishops often maintained schools and boarded boys in their households, and one such boy was Richard Hooker, whom Jewel took a great interest in, sending him back to Exeter for training. Here we must look to the rather obscure role of Richard's uncle, John Hooker (alias Vowel, 1526?- 1601), who is thought to have been a member of Corpus Christi College and was active both as chamberlain of Exeter and M.P. and as a reviser of Holinshed's Chronicles. Perhaps through John Hooker, Jewel became interested in the boy and saw to his training for university, obtaining a place for him at Corpus and making William Cole (one of the Zurich exiles) aware of the unusual attainments of the young student, who was admitted to the college at the advanced age of nearly twenty. After Jewel's death in September 1571, Edwin Sandys (1562?- 1588), then bishop of London, became Hooker's patron. A product of St. John's College, Cambridge, another of the humanistic foundations of the Henrician period, Sandys also was involved in preparing the Bishops' Bible. His son, also named Edwin (and later Sir Edwin, 1561-1629), was to be a student of Hooker's at Corpus Christi College. Sir Edwin became a lawyer and an M.P. . He is described in the "Publishing History" of volume one of the Folger Hooker

[^] See Thomas Fowler, *The History of Corpus Christi College with Lists of its Members*, Oxford Historical Society, 25 (Oxford, 1893), 163, for the contribution of Corpus scholars in translating the Bible — Rainolds, Miles Smith (bishop of Gloucester), and perhaps one or two others — and the use of Rainolds's lodgings in Corpus for much of the work, especially of revision, and see n. 15 above.

edition as "a lay leader in the defense of the Established Church" (xv). When we speak of the traditions of Corpus Christi College we must not limit too strictly those traditions. For not only did the sense of vocation reach into society and to the study of law, but there are women who figure in the pages of James McConica's *English Humanists and Reformation Politics under Henry VIII and Edward VI*: women who were not permitted to study at the universities yet achieved distinction in the classical languages. One such was Anne, Lady Bacon, who translated Jewel's *Apologia* from Latin into English in 1564.

In a fuller study there are other Corpus men to be considered and their influence weighed. John Spenser (1559-1614), a fellow of the college like Hooker, and president from 1607 to 1614, succeeding John Rainolds, was a close friend of and collaborator with Hooker. Spenser had been Greek reader at the college, and he was on the New Testament committee for the Authorized Version of 1611. Another significant figure was Henry Parry (1561-1616), who became chaplain to Queen Elizabeth and from 1607 was successively bishop of Gloucester and of Worcester. Tribute is due Sandys, Spenser, Parry, and Lancelot Andrewes for preserving the sermons of Richard Hooker.[^]

We cannot as yet speak definitively of the impact of Erasmus upon individuals of Hooker's generation, for the scholarly analyses have simply not been done. Yet Erasmus is cited often, despite strong hostility from Lutherans and fierce censuring by Roman Catholics (especially after the Council of Trent). It is well-nigh inconceivable that he passed unread by any scholar in Hooker's generation, for institutional libraries possessed copies of the collected works of 1540 as well as copies of his New Testament, the *Adagia*, *CoUoquia*, and other works. We know, too, that there were many copies of Erasmus in the private libraries of Oxford dons and that parishes were required to have copies of Erasmus's Paraphrases on the New Testament. How much, then, of Hooker's citation from Scripture was filtered through Erasmian scholarship? Bearing in mind what Egil Grisliis has so aptly called "the unobtrusiveness of Hooker's erudition" (FLE 5:667), I suggest that this unobtrusiveness extended not only to his handling of patristic texts but also to his use of the scholarly contributions of the preceding century.^{^^} To offer a single example: in the sermon

[^] See Textual Intro, to Hooker's *Tractates and Sermons*, FLE 5:xiii. ^{^^} It is a pity that no marginal notes were permitted by the king in the

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fragment on Hebrews 2:14-15 Hooker speaks of death as *omnium terribilium maxime terribile* (FLE 5:411-25; the original source is the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 3:6.6, 1115²⁵-26), and Grislis annotates: "Hooker uses the Latin with which Erasmus opens his *Liber quomodo se quisque debeat praeparare ad mortem*," which had been translated into English in 1538 (FLE 5:846)— such was the popularity of this work in Latin first, and then later in English. One needs closer study of Hooker's scriptural citations and allusions to be certain whether Hooker had used Erasmus's New Testament, either for text or paraphrase or commentary. It is a study as yet undone, and I would feel rewarded if my observation opened the way for younger scholars to take up these and other questions raised in this paper. If some of the *Adagia* and *Colloquia* may not have suited Hooker's taste, there was much that did. Hooker surely echoed *Adagia*, 3.5.13, *Canis reversus ad vomitum*, in quoting Proverbs 26:11, and 2 Peter 22. Certainly, to think more generally, Hooker, like Jewel — like Rainolds and John Claymond— would have applauded *Adagia*, 1.8.60, *Senesco semper multa addiscens*.

Rhetoric, as we have seen, was very much in the center of the humanistic concept of *Corpus Christi* College, and it was central to the structure of Rainolds's thought. To trace this line one would begin with Erasmus: for rhetoric figures most prominently in the thought and writings of Erasmus, and in Erasmus of Europe I have argued for its centrality. For Hooker rhetoric becomes, as it was for Erasmus, an enabling power to order and relate, then to persuade. Hooker, one feels certain, must have applauded Erasmus's concept of *lingua*, with its celebration of the judicious use of language for the good of the commonweal and God, and its condemnation of the improper use of language as destructive of order, civility, and even humanity.²²

What has gone before is well grounded in texts of the authors cited (Erasmus, Jewel, Rainolds, Hooker), and my footnotes support my *summa*-

'moved his Majestic, that there might be a new translation of the Bible' " (ibid.).

~ I have discussed the theory and practice of Erasmus's rhetoric in "Going for the Throat" (n. 4 above). In chap. 40 of *The Prince of Humanists* (n. 5 above), I have called attention to the implications of the theory of *lingua* here adumbrated: "the right use of language is the source of good order and civility, and it is the path to concord." On civility, see my essay on the lines of development from Erasmus to Postel (and Hooker), in "Erasme et Postel: les traditions de la civilite et de la tolerance," repr. in my *Erasmus Grandescens* (Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1988), 144-45.

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ries and generalizations. What follows is my conclusion, support for which will appear in my monographic study of the movement from Erasmus to Richard Hooker. In future volumes I plan to carry the investigation still further: into the Oxford Movement, and then to certain figures of the twentieth century, like P. S. Allen, the learned editor of Erasmus's letters who was president of Corpus Christi College until his death in 1933. From a sermon of Allen's in Chapel on Commemoration Sunday, 21 October 1928, we take these words that speak of Chrysostom and connect not only the church fathers but also the scholars in the tradition of Erasmus (who edited Chrysostom) and also himself:

He turned — as others have turned before him — to man's imperishable part, his only property and all his treasure: the soul which this life ended he must render up to God— not merely unspotted from the world, but worn and weary after a life of service, yet looking forward to new service beyond the gate of death.^{1*}

Institutions, characters and ideas: these constituted the tradition that runs very deeply from Erasmus to Hooker. The special nature of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, which was founded by Bishop Richard Foxe to further the Erasmian program of education and learning, followed the notion attributed above to Bishop Hugh Oldham, that provision should be made for the increase of learning, and for those who by their learning shall do good in the church and in the commonwealth.

The generation of John Jewel was shaped by the learning and piety of

men like John Parkhurst, in whose charge Jewel had first been put. Next, Richard Hooker and fellow scholars like Edwin Sandys, John Spenser, John Rainolds, Henry Parry, and Lancelot Andrewes established most firmly the continuity of ideas and ideals nurtured by Jewel's generation, a generation that went into exile under Mary and returned to contribute to establishing the Church of England under Elizabeth. These men all shared fundamental ideas or principles that were far stronger than their theological or pedagogical differences, for all believed fervently in the centrality of Christ in the Christian religion, and in the centrality of Scriptures in the Christian life, and as fervently in the study of Scriptures in the life of the Christian scholar.^^

^^ Utters of PS. Allen, ed. H. M. Allen (Oxford, 1939), 298.

^^ In returning to the words of Bishop Hugh Oldham we emphasize the thrust of his notion that the aim of the college should be the increase of learning, and that the end

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The presence of Erasmus is felt in many areas and exercised in many categories, not least in his bringing together of literature and theology.^^ But in still further ways Erasmus was perhaps the greatest single intellectual force in the post-Tridentine period: by virtue of the example of his tolerance, and by his endless endeavors to mediate; through his Christocentric theology expounded with great clarity and simplicity for the lay-person in the *Enchiridion*, which announced the launching of a new lay theology; and, even more than these two areas, though still unappreciated despite a century and a half of prodigious Bible scholarship, there is the importance of Erasmus for fresh study of Scriptures in the sixteenth century, incorporating the heritage of humanism. ^^

To speak of Hooker as perhaps the greatest of Erasmus's disciples (though one must be aware of the claim of others, like Grotius or Lipsius, to that distinction) requires a making clear that Erasmus was at home in England and that much of his thought and writing had been made English through translations, adaptations, and borrowings by the end of the century — though this is to address the question of a wider literacy — but there

of that learning is not knowledge for its own sake but the good of the church and the commonwealth. To be sure, Oldham died in 1519, and it would be leaning on a slender reed, perhaps, to argue too vehemently for the influence of Oldham too widely after his death; but it must be noted that he was the bishop of Exeter, the home of John Hooker, and also that although Oldham was not a learned man himself he was a great supporter of learning and was in fact a principal benefactor of Foxe's new foundation of Corpus Christi College. See further Alfred A. Mumford, *Hugh Otham* (London, 1936), esp. 101, 106-109.

^^ The question of the relations between literature and theology is one raised by a number of the speakers and commentators at the conference from which this volume is drawn. In few writers is this vital connection so evident as it is in Erasmus, and there are several characteristics to be noted. First, there is his heightening of the conversational mode not only in his letters but even in his theological writings, and this is yoked with his emerging sense of the dramatic (especially in the seminal *Colloquium*): both provided models for the next century. Still more, Erasmus (as I have written elsewhere, see n. 4 above), was the master-rhetorician of his age, and in his making more widely available the resources of rhetoric— notably of *prosopopoeia* (a trope that fascinates many modern readers) — Erasmus was an incomparable resource. His fondness for the *theatrum mundi* topos (although it has been glanced at by a number of scholars) needs still further study, for the generations of Hooker and Shakespeare and of Donne were richly aware of this topos.

^^ The volumes of *CWE* on Erasmus's scriptural scholarship have already begun to establish this importance: see esp. vol. 42, ed. Robert D. Sider (1984), with its presentation of the importance of the *Paraphrases*; and vol. 61, ed. James F. Brady and John C. Olin (1992), on Erasmus's edition of St. Jerome.

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can be no questioning the complete availability of Erasmus's Latin writings to scholars of the calibre of Jewel, Rainolds, and Hooker.

Yet Erasmus was also, perhaps the final telling point for an age in which the republic of letters was a reality, a model of the

cosmopolitan, a caution to the provincial and the monolingual; and he bore witness in a unique way to the European sweep of thought and letters in the sixteenth century.

The principles that we find running steadily and vigorously through this tradition from Erasmus to Hooker — and beyond— were reason and tolerance, combined with learning and piety, always respecting the authority of the church fathers. Thus we may rightly speak of the twinning of Erasmian humanism and Christian (or patristic) theology in our continuing discussions of Richard Hooker.^{^^}

[^] Greenslade observes that Foxe's "beehive" of Corpus Christi College, "however humanistic, was founded 'solely or principally for the sake of theology.' " See his essay on "The Faculty of Theology" in McConica, *The Collegiate University*, 295-334. The emphasis of Greenslade upon theology is heuristic, but it must not be allowed to minimize the importance of Erasmian humanism. That is why I have spoken of the twinning of Erasmian humanism and patristic theology.

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Hooker on Scripture, Reason, and "Tradition"

IT IS A COMMONPLACE OF ANGLICAN SELF-UNDERSTANDING to refer to the triple authority of Scripture, reason, and tradition. For at least one hundred years, Richard Hooker has been identified as a principal and original source of this position.¹ The purpose of this paper is to suggest first that Anglican theology could benefit from considering Hooker's account of the interrelationship of the first two elements of this triad,[^] Scripture and reason, since there has been no single definitive Anglican account of how these principles are related to each other, leaving the suggestion that they are to be considered somewhat independently and perhaps on an equal footing. This paper will attempt secondly to look again at "tradition," with a view to being more cautious in implicating Hooker in the development of the triad.

¹ To let a few stand for many, the following authors might be noted: Francis Paget, *Introduction to the fifth Book* (Oxford, 1899), 226;

Horton Davies, *Worship and Theology in England from Cranmer to Hooker*, 1534-1603 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970), xv; H. R. McAdoo, *The Spirit of Anglicanism* (London: A. and C. Black, 1965), 152.

^ For consideration of views that Hooker offers an inconsistent or inappropriate account of the relationship between reason and Scripture, see Peter Munz, *The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), 61-62; Gunnar Hillerdal, *Reason and Revelation in Richard Hooker* (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1962), 148-50. See also Egil Grislis, "Hooker's Image of Man," in *Renaissance Papers J 963* (Durham, N.C.: Southeastern Renaissance Conference, 1964), 82-83; W. David Neelands, *The Theology of Grace of Richard Hooker* (Th.D. diss., Trinity College, Toronto, 1988), 120-33.

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I. Scripture and reason: a Thomistic clue to their interrelationship

1. Scripture does not destroy nature, it perfects it. For Hooker, Scripture and reason are not in conflict, since both have their source in God. Hooker makes this consonance visible in the high value he places on secular wisdom and pagan philosophy, even in theological matters, on the reasonableness of law, and on the integrity of nature.

Most English theological writers of the sixteenth century displayed their humanist heritage without shame and quoted freely from Greek and Latin pagan authors. Hooker went further and explicitly gave a value to this appeal to pagan authority by noting what "spiritual" knowledge the pagans could and did arrive at. The "wise and learned among the verie Heathens" acknowledge a first cause, an agent that "observeth in working a most exact order or lawe" (Lawes 1.2.3; 1:59.33-60.4). Hooker's examples include Homer and the Stoic philosophers. Sometimes the ancients made estimates that were a near miss, as in the identification of providence and destiny (1.3.4; 1:68.2-12).

The "Painims" caught a vision of the angels (1.4.1; 1:70.16-22). And, like those whom God instructed through revelation, some, like Plato, aspired to a greater conformity with God through knowledge and virtue. ^ The heathens witness to law built into the structure of the universe: Hesiod made Themis (Justice, "Law" or "Right") to be a daughter

of heaven and earth (1.8.5; 1:86.21-23), and Hooker quotes Sophocles to illustrate his claim that one mark of the laws of reason is that they have always been known. ^

More daring still is Hooker's claim that Jesus's two precepts of charity in his summary of the law as love of God and love of neighbor as self have been found out "by discourse" like other "grand mandates." Further, that

^ 1.5.3; 1:73.32-74.6. But the heathens never really escaped a polytheism of natural operation, though their philosophy pointed beyond polytheism. It is Christians who insist on a monotheism (1.3.4; 1:68.25-69.6).

^ 1.8.9; 1:90.6-11. Hooker's use of the Corpus Hermeticum is an interesting case in point. Without indicating a commitment to the authenticity of this early Christian forgery, Hooker cites Hermes in proof of general points. Compare Pref. 3.14; 1:20.2-3. 1.2.3; 1:60.6-7. 1.6.3; 1:75.v. 1.11.3; 1:112.t(; V.72.6; 2:389.n.l. VII.24.16; 3:301.23-33 and h. For a discussion of Hermeticism in the Renaissance, see Wayne Shumaker, *The Occult Sciences in the Renaissance* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, Calif., 1972), 201-51. Shumaker discusses Hooker at 238-39.

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all depends on these two laws is corroborated by nature. "Wherefore the natural! measure wherby to judge our doings, is the sentence of reason" (1.8.8; 1:88.28-89.1). Hooker, of course, like Thomas and the patristic consensus, combined a high evaluation of classical pagan wisdom with a recognition that revelation was also necessary. What is apparent here, nonetheless, is Hooker's conviction that, in the hands of the best, whether Christian or not, reason has a genuine value in the natural discovery of what is also given in revelation.^

Law was a consistent topic of discussion in the Reformation period. Especially after Calvin, it was recognized as having three uses. Two of these were for the time being, waiting for the eschaton: the first use of law in this interim was to educate; the second was to restrain evil. A third use of law had continuing relevance, but without coerciveness, now and in the kingdom to come, "for believers in whose hearts the Spirit . . . already lives and reigns."^ This analysis owed much to the

New Testament and to Augustine. Hooker, in one way or another, recognizes all three uses, but the organization of his system of laws owes little to Calvin's,[^] and his treatment of law was a clear departure from these Reformation themes, although it did not oppose them. Hooker borrowed much from Thomas's treatise on law — and acknowledged the debt.[^] Law was not to be considered negative in the historical present and positive in the eschatological future, as it was for the Reformers after Calvin; for Hooker, law is always

[^] John E. Booty gives a long list of Hooker's use of classical authors in the more "doctrinal" Book V at FLE 6:213.

* John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. J. T. McNeill and trans. F. L. Battles, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), 2.7.6-15; 1:354-64.

[^] "Lawes do not only teach what is good but they injoyne it" Lawes 1.10.7; 1:102.1; "Lawes politique . . . are never framed as they should be, unlesse presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience unto the sacred lawes of his nature; in a word, unlesse presuming man to be in regard of his depraved minde little better then a wild beast" 0-10.1; 1:96.24-29). For a discussion of Hooker's view of human depravity, see Neelands, *Theology of Grace*, 160-71.

* Aquinas, S.T. Ia2ae.90-108. Hooker cites Thomas at 1.3.1; 1:64.s.1 (paraphrase of Thomas in lines 7-12 of this note). Hooker ignores Thomas's treatment of the old and new law and adds a section on angelic law not dependent on this treatise in Thomas. In addition, his category of the second law eternal is not found in Thomas. It may derive from Thomas's Neoplatonist sources, in the distinction between "the One" and "Mind," the first emanation from the One. Lee W. Gibbs, following A. S. McGrade, suggests (FLE 6:98.n.30) that the distinction may reflect the scholastic distinction between God's absolute power (*potentia absoluta*) and God's ordained power (*potentia ordinata*). These suggestions are not incompatible.

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primarily of positive value, and it is eminently reasonable, or ought to be. In the first place, laws of reason "are investigable by reason without the helpe of revelation supernaturall and divine" (1.8.9;

1:90.5-6). But, conversely, the data of revelation are reasonable; religion and virtue are reasonable; to think otherwise, that religion and virtue are "only as men will accompt of them," that is, relative and arbitrary, is "brutish." This remark is an indirect challenge to a view, such as that which Hooker attributes to the Puritans, that would make secular laws arbitrary, and therefore, to any extension of that view that would make divine positive law arbitrary (1. 10.1; 1:95.27-96.3). This "positivistic" view would be shared by Libertines and Puritans, Hooker suggests. But the truth is rather that "the generall . . . law of nature and the morall law of scripture are in the substance of law all one" (III.9.2; 1:237.10-12).

Other authors of the reformed English church had identified similarities between human positive law and the law promulgated in Scripture, but there seems no hint in such authors of Hooker's view that all laws, natural or positive, come from God and are therefore reasonable and divine.⁶ Conversely, Hooker finds it easy to use scriptural illustrations for "philosophical" points. This is clearly more than the biblicism of the age, being based on his conviction that Scripture displays the paths of reason. Thus, for instance, the distinction between mandatory, permissive, and admonitory laws is illustrated from the Bible (1.8.8; 1:89.5-19). Hooker uses 1 Timothy 6:8 to illustrate Aristotle's dictum that happiness is the end of the individual life, and happiness in this world at that (1.10.2; 1:97.3-10). The story of Cain and Abel is used to show the need for law to restrain deep-rooted malice (1.10.3; 1:98.5-9).

In the Preface to the Lawes, Hooker boldly uses a principle of nature, in this case a general psychological principle, to illuminate a spiritual problem: the individual discretion that is the beginning of the development of mature judgment leads (improperly) to the scruples that make otherwise indifferent matters seem sinful to the scrupulous (Pref. 3.1). This same principle is used in Book IV to help establish Hooker's thesis that "subjective persuasion" is not a hallmark of truth. Confrision on this score

⁶ Henry BuUinger, whose *Decades* were an authorized text from 1586 on for the clergy of the Province of Canturbury who were not licensed to preach, had given an account of human law that suggests consonances with Scripture, but BuUinger, unlike Hooker, gives no account of any substantial reason for these similarities. *Decades*, 5 vols, in 4, ed. for the Parker Society by Thomas Harding (Cambridge, 1849-52), 3.8; 2:280- 81.

is behind the puritan mistake, that will eventually "oppose their Me t/iinket/i unto the orders of the Church of England" (TV .4.2; 1:286.4-5).

A theme that will become prominent in Hooker's response to the Christian Letter is addressed already in the Preface to the Lawes: the reasonable person proportions the degree of subjective credence to the degree of objective credibility. This is true both in matters of reason and in matters of revelation, since both reason and revelation have a single divine source, as two ways the "spirit leadeth men into all truth." Reason is offered universally to the human race, revelation to "some few," but the basic principle of reasonable behavior is the same in both (Pref. 3.10; 1:17.15-27). This rather bold proposition is also related to the controversial tack Hooker took on the question of Christian assurance in A Learned and Comfortable Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuities of Faith in the Elect and in the Dublin Fragments. ^°

For Hooker, human nature has a natural integrity: through knowledge it may grow to glory (with the help of grace). The human being begins with no knowledge and proceeds toward full and complete knowledge of God such as the angels now possess (1.6.1; 1:74.20-25). Human nature shares various faculties with lower forms of life, but "the soule of man . . . [is] capable of a more divine perfection" than those of plants or animals, since the human being has intellectual capacity (1.6.3; 1:75.16-20). There is a long way to go; in this. Ramus was very naive and Aristotle more sound, for the human intellect requires a long process of "right helps of true art and learning" (I 6.3; 1:75.27-76.3). But the natural process of learning to judge between "truth and error, good and evil" (1.6.5; 1:76.23) is on the path to the knowledge of God, and in this there is a real continuity between the (apparently secular) knowledge of virtue and the blissful knowledge of God.

The systematic consonance of grace and nature, Scripture and reason, is apparent throughout Hooker's work and links him to Thomas and the medieval tradition that rejected the views of some thirteenth-century philosophers, like Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, that there are "two truths," one from reason, and another from faith, truths that do not threaten each other, because they have no real relationship.^^ For Thom-

¹⁰ Cert., 1; FLE 5:69.24-70.6. In the Dublin Fragments, note especially the silence surrounding the sixth Lambeth article, which dealt with assurance (46, FLE 4:167.7). For a discussion of Hooker's views on assurance and security, see Neelands, *Theology of Grace*, 185-203, 223, and Egil Grislis, "Hooker on Assurance," in this volume.

" James Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas D'Aquino* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974),

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as, as for Hooker, this is impossible. God is the source of nature and of grace; God's wisdom is the source of Scripture as much as it is the source of human reason.

But Hooker shares much more with Thomas than this conviction of the consonance between nature and grace, reason and Scripture. For Hooker, as for Thomas, grace does not destroy but perfects nature, and Scripture does not obliterate but perfects reason.¹¹ "Supernaturall endow- mentes are an advancement, they are no extinguishment of that nature whereto they are given." ¹² Grace being the beginning of glory in us, the same pattern is also claimed, by Thomas, for the relation of nature and glory: "nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory."¹³ Hooker frequently adopts the thesis that grace perfects nature. Less frequently, but equally clearly, he extends this to the stronger thesis, that glory is a perfection of nature.¹⁴ This thesis that nature is perfected by grace or glory, not destroyed by either, appears throughout Hooker's writings. "The evidence of Gods owne testimonie added unto the naturall assent of reason" confirms that assent with regard to the many laws of nature included in Scripture (1.12.1; 1:120.13-15); by Scripture, the human "light of natural understanding" is perfected:

There is in scripture therefore no defect, but that any man what

274-75. Compare: "now no truth can contradict any truth" {Lawes II. 7.7; 1:183.31). See also Pref. 3.10; 1.17.10-23.

¹¹ Aquinas, S.T. 1.1.8. This view, although perhaps never denied by the English reformers, was certainly not in sympathy with other elements

of their position. Compare this recent assessment of Calvin: "God [for Calvin] does not co-operate with nature. He supplants nature with a new will and does this by effacing nature. God does not aid the will already in nature; he gives man a new will outside nature. It is not nature, or flesh, or the will, that is merely 'strengthened'; conversion means a new will altogether. Our natural will is abolished 'effaced.'" R. T. Kendall, *Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979), 21. Calvin referred to the passages from Ezekiel 11:19 and 36:26, on replacing a "heart of stone" v/ith a "heart of flesh," at Inst. 2.3.6; 1:297. This text, and this thought, had also been expressed in the Forry-ctfo Articles of 1553, in Article 10, "Of Grace." This article was omitted from the Thirty-nine Articles.

^ Lawes V.55.6; 2:230.28-29. In the Dublin Fragments, Hooker cites a version of the principle from the Pseudo-Dionysius: "for to destroy nature is not the part of Providence" (Dublin Fragments, 13; 4:113.12-13).

* Aquinas, S.T. 2a2ae.26.13, sed contra.

^ "Our sovereign good or hlessednes [is] that wherin the highest degree of al our perfection consisteth, that which being once attained unto there can rest nothing further to be desired, and therfore with it our souls are fully content and satisfied, in that they have they rejoyce and thirst for no more" (1. 11.1; 1:111.2-6).

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place or calling soever hee holde in the Church of God, may have thereby the Ught of his naturall understanding so perfected, that the one being reUeved by the other, there can want no part of needfiill instruction unto any good worke which God himselfe requireth. (LA4.5; 1:129.3-8)

Scripture often states a law of nature.^ Against Cartwright's denial of the authority of human testimony. Hooker affirms that this authority, within proper limits, is not destroyed but perfected by being recognized in Scripture (II.7.2; 1:175.20-30). If the Puritan view were accepted. Scripture would have to be seen as destroying nature, but in giving Scripture God does not abrogate the law of nature, "which is an infallible knowledge imprinted in the mindes of all the children of men" (II.8.6; 1:190.9-16).

In one passage, the thesis of grace presupposing nature and perfecting

it is linked to the related theses of (1) the need for revelation because of the difficulty and importance of spiritual topics and (2) the elusiveness of some necessary truths from rational inquiry:

What the Church of God standeth bound to knowe or doe, the same in part nature teacheth. And because nature can teach them but onely in part, neyther so fully, as is requisite for mans salva- tion; nor so easily, as to make the way playne and expedite enough, that many may come to the knowledge of it, and so be saved; therefore in scripture hath God both collected the most necessarie thinges, that the Schoole of nature teacheth unto that ende, and revealeth also, whatsoever we neyther could with safetie be ignorant of, nor at all be instructed in, but by supernaturall revelation from him. an.3.3; 1:210.20-29)

So Paul's preaching to the pagan Festus is an emblem of the principle that nature needs grace for its perfection, but this is not to deny the principle that grace, when given, does not bypass nature: "Which example maketh manifest what elsewhere the same Apostle teacheth, namely that nature hath need of grace, whereunto I hope, we are not opposite, by holding that grace hath use of nature" (III.8.6; 1:223.26-29).

When Hooker comes to defend the prayer in the Book of Common Prayer for deliverance from all adversity against the charge that it goes firther than any promise in Scripture, he uses the principle that Scripture

11.1.2; 1:145.24-29. See also 1.12-13. III.9.1-2; 1:236.8-237.29.

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does not make void what is found in nature: we may pray for things not promised in Scripture, so long as they are not impossible in nature (V.48.4; 2:191.24-192.3).

For Hooker, many of the customs of the English church have their ground in nature. Temporalities are defended by "a principle cleere in nature, an axiome," that "men are eternallie bound to honor God with their substance" (V.79.1; 2:449.4-8). Similarly, temporalities are justified because nature teaches all men to wish to perpetuate good things (V.79.3; 2:450.16-24). Nature, God, and Christ all teach the appropriateness and principles of rest and festival solemnities (V.70.5;

2:365.27-366.4). These are based on "the verie law of nature it selfe" (V.70.9; 2:368.28-369.2). As well, public days of fasting have their ground in the law of nature (V.72.1; 2:384.13-20), for nature is the general ground of both fasts and feasts (V.72.15; 2:397.7-18). The office of the burial of the dead is commended "to show that love towards the partie deceased which nature requireth" (V.75.2; 2:409.17-19). In fact, in all church hierarchy and order, there is a mutual assistance of the hierarchy of nature in means and ends (V.76.9; 2:423.19-23).

In the Dublin Fragments, even God's gratuitous election of the predestined falls under this scholastic principle:

Predestination to life, although it be infinitlie ancients then the actual worke of creation, doth notwithstanding presuppose the purpose of creation Whatsoever the purpos of creation therefore doeth establish, the same by the purpos of predestination may be perfected, butt in noe case disannulled and taken away. Seing then that the naturall freedome of mans will was contained in the purpos of creating man (for this freedome is a part of mans nature:) grace conteyned under the purpose of predestinating man may perfect and doeth, butt cannot possiblie destroye the libertie of mans will [that is, as human beings are considered abstracted from their current state of sin; but now that we live unavoidably under the aspect of the Fall,] predestination in us alsoe which are now sinfiill, doth not implie the bestowing of other natures, then creation att the first gave, butt the bestowing of gifts, to take away those impediments which are growne into Nature through

17 sinne.

¹⁶ Dublin Fragments, 2; 4:102.26-103.9. For another treatment of Hooker on the

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2. The natural desire for an end beyond nature. In addition to adopting the principle that grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, Hooker also clearly adopted the rather daring Thomistic proposition that human nature was so related to grace that, through desire, it naturally identified as its end a state that was beyond nature altogether and thus dependent upon grace. Thomas insisted on a

natural capacity to desire and identify an end, the attainment of which was, however, beyond any natural capacity, and he held that this was independent of the actual fallen condition of the human race.¹⁶ Like Thomas, Hooker adopts the "eudaimonistic" principle common to Greek ethical thought generally, but most prominent in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*: all human desires point to one end, human happiness. Following Augustine and patristic tradition, Hooker explains this end of happiness in Christian terms, as "union with God," a divinization or glorification which is the end of a process that begins in time, for each individual on the way to salvation, with (first) justification and continues with sanctification, or growth in grace. What is striking about Hooker's account is that this pattern of God's gracious action in the individual on the way to salvation is the fulfillment of a natural desire.¹⁷

principle of the perfection of nature by grace, see Olivier Loyer, *L'Anacisme de Richard Hooker* (Lille: Atelier des presses, 1979), 1:363-66.

¹⁶ See, for example, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, 3.17-25.

"Now that which man doth desire with reference to a further end, the same he desireth in such measure as is unto that end convenient: but what he coveteth as good in it selfe, towards that his desire is ever infinite. So that unlesse the last good of all, which is desired altogether for it selfe, be also infinite: we doe evill in making it our ende even as they who placed their felicitie in wealth or honour or pleasure or any thing here attained, because in desiring any thing as our finall perfection which is not so, we do amisse. Nothing may be infinitely desired but that good which in deed is infinite, for the better the more desirable, that therefore most desirable wherein ther is infinitie of goodnes, so that if any thing desirable may be infinite, that must needs be the highest of all things that are desired. No good is infinite but only God: therefore he our felicitie and blisse. Moreover desire tendeth unto union with that it desireth. If then

in him we be blessed, it is by force of participation and conjunction with him Then

are we happie therfore when fully we injoy God, as an object wherein the powers of our soules are satisfied even with everlasting delight: so that although we be men, yet by being unto God united we live as it were the life of God" {Lawes 1.11.2; 1:111.33- 1 12.20). Compare:

"sith there can bee no goodnesse desired which proceedeth not from God himselfe, ... all things in the worlde are saide in some sort to seeke the highest, and to covet more or lesse the participation of God" G-5.2; 1:73.5-10). See John S. Marshall, *Hooker and the Anglican Tradition* (Sewanee: Univ. Press at the University of the South, 1963), 111-12.

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This proposition, crucial for the development of Hooker's argument about the force and nature of laws in Book I of the *Lawes*, is amplified by the sequel. The happiness, or bliss, of the individual on the way to salvation is a formative principle accounting for and defining the nature and use of laws in commonwealth and church. But the perfection which human beings desire always remains unattained in this life, where complete union is never achieved (though some forms of participation are), in part because we cannot persist toward that perfection, in part because the infinity of it eludes the creature.[~]

Hooker insists on the natural capacity of desire, which yet cannot attain its object of happiness in this life, because of the nature of that object. Stability in perseverance is denied in this life; there are temporary lapses, and mistakes are made on account of natural weakness. But that natural desire will be perfected finally into full-fledged love, through the grace of God, and be fully satisfied in the world to come. For, Hooker insists, as the older scholastics, following their patristic sources,[~] had insisted, that the human being is naturally capable of God, *capax Dei*: 'Capable we are of

[~] "Happines therefore is that estate wherby we attaine, so far as possiblie may be attained, the full possession of that which simply for it selfe is to be desired, and containeth in it after an eminent sorte the contentation of our desires, the highest degree of all our perfection. Of such perfection capable we are not in this life. For while we are in the world, subject we are unto sundry imperfections, griefs of body, defectes of minde, yea the best thinges we do are painefuU, and the exercise of them greivous being continued, without intermission, so as in those very actions, whereby we are especially perfected in this life, wee are not able to persist: forced we are with very wearines and that often to interrupt them: which tediousnes cannot fall into those operations that are in the state of blisse, when our union with God is

complete. Complete union with him must be according unto every power and facultie of our mindes apt to receave so glorious an object. Capable we are of God both by understanding and will, by understanding as hee is that soveraigne truth, which comprehendeth the rich treasures of all wisdom; by will, as he is that sea of goodnes, whereof who so tasteth shall thirst no more. As the will doth now worke upon that object by desire, which is as it were a motion towards the end as yet unobtained, so likewise upon the same hereafter received it shall worke also by love" (Lawes 1.11.3; 1:112.21-113.15).

^ "For although the human mind is not of the same nature with God, yet the image of that nature than which none is better, is to be sought and found in us, in that than which our nature also has nothing better. But the mind must first be considered as it is in itself, before it becomes partaker of God; and His image must be found in it. For, as we have said, although worn out and defaced by losing the participation of God, yet the image of God still remains. For it is His image in this very point, that it is capable of Him and can be partaker of Him; which so great good is only made possible by its being His image" (Augustine, *On the Trinity*, 14.8; *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, First series [New York, 1887-92][NPNF.I], 3:189). See Aquinas, *S.T. 1 a2ae. 11 3. resp.*

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God both by understanding and will."^^ Hooker at once cites Augustine on this natural disposition toward something beyond nature. And he goes on to link the propositions derived from reason with those derived from Scripture, indicating both that there is a three-fold aspect to the natural desire for perfection, as Aristotle claimed, and that it is particularly in the spiritual aspect, beyond the sensual and the moral, that perfection continues to elude human beings:

Man doth seeke a triple perfection, first, a sensuall . . . then an intellectuall, . . . lastly a spirituall and divine, consisting in those things wherunto we tend by supernatural meanes here, but cannot

here attaine unto them So that nature even in this life doth

plainly claime and call for a more divine perfection, then eyther of these two that have bene mentioned. (1.11.4; 1:114.18-115.25)

3. Grace presupposes nature. For Hooker, as for Thomas, grace not

only perfects nature, it presupposes nature, and Scripture presupposes reason. This principle comes to the fore particularly in the second book of the *Laives*, where the scope of Scripture, and its relation to reason, are addressed. Thus Hooker will insist that divine wisdom was available to the pagans, to Adam, and to those who lived before the law was promulgated through Moses. Wisdom has two manners of teaching wherewith to instruct the human race, "the sacred bookes of Scripture" and "the glorious works of nature" (II.1.4; 1:147.25-148.6). As he had pointed out in Book 1, the will of God is known in laws apart from Scripture (11.2.2; 1:149.15-30). Heathens, who do not know Scripture, can discuss good actions. In fact, apostolic exhortation in the New Testament to good behavior in the Christian community, so that the non-Christian neighbors may be impressed by the morality of Christians, implies that heathens can recognize naturally the morality Scripture codifies.

In Book I, this principle of grace presupposing nature is exhibited in the context of political theory. The first goal of a political organization, on Hooker's account, is to provide for the necessities of life, even though the kingdom of God is a higher kind of priority. But "righteous life

" Lawes 1.11.3; 1:113.9, italics added. See also: "Wee are not dust and ashes but wourse, our mindes from the highest to the lowest are not right? If not right then undoubtedly not capable of that blessednes which wee naturallie seek" {Pride, 1; FLE 5:312.24-27}.

" 11.2.3; 1:149.30-150.17. See also Pride. 1; 5:312.15-18.

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presupposeth life," so poverty must be dealt with before the celebration of religion. An illustration is taken from the scriptural narrative of Adam in paradise: God gave Adam maintenance before giving the law; similarly, after the expulsion from Eden, the human race is given tilling and herding before religion is mentioned (1.10.2; 1:97.3-20).

Hooker quotes at least twice Romans 1:21, the Pauline verse that was accepted generally as scriptural warrant for the view that the heathen "had the law written in their hearts." Hooker went beyond interpreting this verse as evidence that the heathen shared some knowledge of

revealed law: for Hooker the verse indicated that natural law, as well as positive divine law, is required of Christians themselves (1.16.5, 1:139.10-26. III.8.6, 1:223.9-14).

Most significantly, in terms of Hooker's attempt to undermine the puritan position as he defined it. Scripture presupposes reason for its interpretation. Chapter 14 of the first book addresses this thesis. There Hooker deals with the "sufficiencie of scripture unto the end for which it was instituted." He argues that the intent of Scripture is to deliver the laws of "duties supernaturall." But Scripture incidentally makes all truths more apparent, even those that may be derived independently by reason from nature, that is. Scripture aids the frailty of human reason even in those things that reason can attain to.^ But Scripture presupposes prior knowledge of certain principles, especially the principles of the authority of Scripture and the scope of the canon. These principles come by means other than Scripture:

In the number of these principles one is the sacred authoritie of scripture. Being therefore perswaded by other meanes that these scriptures are the oracles of God, them selves do then teach us the rest, and laye before us all the duties which God requireth at our hands as necessary unto salvation. (1.14.1; 1:126.9-13)

In this daring claim. Hooker has clearly identified the acceptance of the authority of Scripture (as, for that matter, its interpretation) as taking place within the otherwise natural process of coming to conviction or belief.

Hooker's interpretation of the use of authorities is also related to the presupposition of nature by grace. The authors of the Christian Letter

^^ See 1.12.1-2.

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objected to Hooker's use of reason in matters of faith.^ Hooker's reply refers to the behavior of the Puritans themselves, who, like all theologians, cite authorities; he notes that this behavior recognizes that, in the words of the objection, there must be some "naturall light teaching knowledge of thinges necessarie to salvation, which knowledge is not containd in holy Scripture."^^

And in the Dublin Fragments, when attempting to defend his use of the term "aptness" for human nature under the Fall, Hooker points out that healing grace would be useless if it could not presuppose natural aptness, even aptness infested with the effects of sin. Precisely because grace must presuppose nature, aptness cannot be lost in the Fall: "had aptnes beene alsoe lost las well as ableness], it is not grace that could worke in us more then it doeth in brute creatures."^

Hooker argues that Scripture cannot teach its own sufficiency, which therefore must be taught by something else, since it is not self-evident.^® He rejects, however, as inadequate the view attributed to Roman Catho- lics, that tradition is therefore the only way to come to the knowledge of the sufficiency of Scripture. Nevertheless, Hooker does recognize the importance of experience, which teaches us that the (current) authority of the church inclines people to give Scripture this place of honor:

The question then being by what meanes we are taught this, some answeare that to leame it we have no other way then onely tradi- tion, as namely that so we believe because both we from our predecessors and they from theirs have so received. But is this enough? That which al mens experience teacheth them may not in any wise be denied. And by experience we all know, that the first outward motive leading men so to esteeme of the scripture is the authority of Gods Church.^

"A.C.L., 3; FLE 4:11.20-32.

^* "They are matters of salvation I think which you handle in this booke. If therefore determinable only by scripture, why presse you me so often with humane authorities? Why alleage you the Articles of religion as the voice of the Church aganst me? Why cite you so many cormmentaries bookes and sermons partly of Bishops partly of others?" (A.C.L., 3; 4:13.1-6).

" Dublin Fragments. 1; 4:101.30-31.

^* Laxves III.8.13; 1:230.29-231.15; compare 11.4.2; 1:153.17-18.

" III.8.14; 1:231.15-22. In this, Hooker was adding his echo to Augustine's famous dictum: "But should you meet with a person not believing the gospel, how would you reply to him were he to say, I do not believe? For my part, I should not believe the

4. Reason criticizes Scripture. Hooker relates this thesis, that Scripture presupposes nature, to his view that human reason (at least within the church) stands above Scripture to criticize it and to qualify laws given in it. This view must have appeared rather shocking in the sixteenth century. The reformers had treated parts of the Hebrew law as abrogated by Christ. For instance, they held that Christ had abrogated the ceremonial law, including the commandment on the Sabbath.^{^^} But Hooker held that, because of the relationship of Scripture and reason, some positive laws of God not explicitly abrogated by Christ are mutable in the light of reason. And his account of the dependence of Scripture in some way on reason is a basis for a rejection of the view that Scripture gives an unalterable code of conduct. This thesis is of particular importance for undermining the puritan platform as Hooker has defined it: even if church polity is defined in Scripture, the church may be required and entitled to alter such definitions.[^]

In Book III, Hooker describes certain (positive) divine laws as mutable because the end for which they were created has been fulfilled. The ceremonial law was of this kind (III. 10.2; 1:240.31-241.26). But there are cases where, even though the end of the law is permanent, the law must be altered, as, for instance, the judicial law of theft (III. 10.3; 1:242.16- 243.6). In both cases, the alteration of a divine positive law is not only allowable but required and is accomplished by human and rational means.

Reason and Scripture are not precisely co-equal, as the formula of Scripture, reason, and tradition might suggest. Rather, reason and Scripture are related precisely as nature and grace, not co-equal, but consonant, both having validity and neither being in conflict with the other. Hooker

gospel except as moved by the catholic church." Against the Epistle of Manichaeus 1.4; NPNF.1, 4:131. This dictum was quoted by Luther, Werke (Weimar, 1906-), 6:561; 10.2:216; by Henry VIII, "the hearts of the faithful more ancient than the books," *Assertio Septem Sacramentorum*, ed. Louis O'Donovan (New York, 1908), 356; and by Calvin, *Inst.*, 1.7.3; 1:76.

^{^^} Henry BuUinger, for instance, although holding for a solemn observance of the fourth commandment, clearly acknowledges the church's mandate to move the observance of the sabbath to the first

day of the week and the Christian's liberty to dispense with the rigors of the sabbath, based on Christ's logion about the sabbath being made for man. Decades, 2.4; 1:264-66.

^ "Positive lawes are either permanent or else changeable, according as the matter it selfe is concerning which they were first made. Whether God or man be the maker of them, alteration they so far forth admit, as the matter doth exact." Lowes 1.15.1; 1:130.26-29.

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can claim reason as an authority alongside Scripture and compatible with it because he adopts a view like the Thomistic view, that there are not "two truths": God is the source both of reason and of revelation, and therefore they do not contradict each other. Scripture contains general laws that reason can discover, for good cause. And in this it simply perfects nature without negating it. But reason can criticize Scripture, both to give it initial credibility and to determine the meaning of obscure or difficult passages. Thus, Scripture is above reason, in the sense that it delivers saving knowledge that reason is not competent to consider, but this priority does not mean that Scripture is opposed to or inimical to human reason.

Recognition of the relationship between Scripture and reason which Hooker identified preserves an important priority for Scripture, as that to whose plain deliverances "the first place both of credit and obedience is due" (V.8.2; 2:39.8-9), without making this priority absolute. This relationship was fundamental for his criticism of the puritan position on polity and may also be a permanent contribution to Anglican self-understanding, which still revolves around the terms Scripture and reason.

II. Hooker on "tradition"

The view that Hooker was a witness for the authority of tradition was identified at least as early as William Laud's Conference with Fisher the Jesuit.^ Laud rejects the attempts of AUerton and the "Romanists" to claim Hooker's support for their views of "tradition," but he himself identifies Hooker's phrase "authority of man" with tradition, and he thus may be a remote source for the commonplace about Hooker and Scripture, reason, and tradition. At face value. Hooker could never have accepted this triad as a foundation for the Church of England. For him, "tradition" is a word with negative connotation, usually

associated with what is taken to be the Roman Catholic attempt to erect something "merely human" as an authority independent of and alongside Scripture and reason.^

" William Laud, Conference with Fisher, 6th ed. (Oxford, 1849), 101-3.

" 1.13.2; 1:123.3-8. 1.14.5; 1:129.14-16. 11.8.7; 1:191.16-20. III.8.14; 1:231.15-18. Compare the "unwrytten verities" to which the Church of Rome gives "the same creditt and reverence which we gyve to the scriptures of god." Just, 11; FLE 5:119.24-26. Compare also the series of incompatible compromises ending with "traditions and Scriptures," Jude I, 7; FLE 5:21.4-5.

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In one passage, Hooker redefines "tradition" as custom deriving from the earliest ages of Christianity, and in this sense, it is acceptable and valuable:

Least therefore the name of tradition should be offensive to any, considering how farre by some it hath bene and is abused, wee meane by traditions ordinances made in the prime of Christian religion, established with that authoritie which Christ hath left to his Church for matters indifferent, and in that consideration requisite to be observed till like authoritie see just and reasonable cause to alter them. So that traditions Ecclesiasticall are not rudlie and in grosse to be shaken of, because the inventors of them were men. (V.65.2; 2:302.3-11)

This shows that "tradition" as rightly understood is one part of what is included under those matters which are binding "by the authority of the church."

In "matters indifferent," Hooker does recognize that long usage and custom are important, but he does not call these "tradition" (II.5.7; 1:165.24-166.4). He also commends "the waight of that long experience, which the world hath had thereof with consent and good liking" (IV. 14.1; 1:337.18-19).

Hooker does recognize three principles relevant to decisions in spiritual matters. He describes them fully only once, in Book V of the Lawes:

What scripture doth plainelie deliver, to that the first place both of credit and obedience is due; the next whereunto is whatsoever anie man can necessarilie conclude by force of reason; after these the voice of the Church succeedeth. That which the Church by her ecclesiasticall authoritie shall probablie thinke and define to be true or good, must in congruities of reason overrule all other inferi- or judgmentes whatsoever. (V.8.2; 2:39.8-14)

This passage, the only one in which such a formulation occurs,^{^*} is the sole possible source for the view that Hooker held the Scripture-reason-

^{^*} The phrase "voice of the church" seems to be related to what Hooker calls "man's authority" in the second book: "By a mans authoritie we here understand, the force which his word hath for the assurance of an others mind that buildeth upon it. . . . The strength of mans authoritie is affirmatively such that the weightiest affaires in the world depend thereon. In judgement and justice are not hereupon proceedings grounded?" ai.7.2; 1:175.18-27).

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tradition view. The first two of these three principles, the "plain deliverance of Scripture" and "the force of reason," are familiar from this examination; the third principle is of a very different order. Though rarely listed with Scripture and reason, it was clearly important for Hooker's arguments about the particular disputed customs of the Church of England. Human decision is appropriate in those areas where Scripture and reason do not order human religious affairs. And "tradition" may be understood properly in this way, although, according to Hooker, it was not commonly so understood. And in this sphere, human "experience" is important. For "nature, scripture, and experience" are usually consonant in what they teach, for instance, the wisdom of seeking an end of contentions by a binding adjudication (Pref. 6.1; 1:29:24-27). In this case, "the equity of reason, the law of nature, God, and man" all favor the same course. And human decision, at whatever level, is appropriate in the area of "matters accessory," the adiaphora, and not in the area of "matters necessary." These "matters accessory" to those things that are necessary to salvation or civil order as Scripture and reason have defined them include certain ceremonial matters, such as the sign of the Cross

at

35 "We teach that whatsoever is unto salvation termed necessarie by waye of excellencie, whatsoever it standeth all men uppon to knowe or doe that they may be saved . . . of which sort the articles of Christian fayth, and the sacramentes of the Church of Christ are, all such thinges if scripture did not comprehende, the Church of God should not be able to measure out the length and the breadth of that waye wherein for ever she is to walke, Heretiques and Schismatiques never ceasing some to abridge, some to enlarge, all to pervert and obscure the same. But as for those thinges that are acces- sorie hereunto, those thinges that so belong to the way of salvation, as to alter them is no otherwise to chaunge that way, then a path is chaunged by altering onely the uppermost face thereof ... we holde not the Church further tyed herein unto scripture, then that against scripture nothing be admitted in the Church" (III.3.3; 1:211. 2-21). See 11.4.4 for another description of "the necessary" and "the indifferent." For a high estimation of the importance of the concept as "a fundamental concept in Anglican theology," see Loyer, *L'Anglicanisme* de Richard Hooker, 126.

^^ That the realm of the "indifferent" was not limited to those things "neither cormnanded nor forbidden" in Scripture, but included those things neither required nor prohibited by reason, is clear from Hooker's use of the term "a thing arbitrary" in his general consideration of the origin of government in Book 1: "The case of mans nature standing therfore as it doth, some kind of regiment the law of nature doth require; yet the kinds therof being many, nature tieth not to any one, but leaveth the choice as a thing arbitrarie" {Lawes 1.10.5; 1:100.16-19). That is, there are adiaphora in the area of Scripture, and there are adiaphora in the area of reason: for instance, while the precise form of polity is not dictated by either Scripture or reason, reason requires that there be a political system of some kind. See also 111.4.1; 1:213.4-7.

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Baptism, which Hooker explicitly called "matters indifferent" (V.65.2,11; 2:302.7-8,311.22).

The category of "the indifferent," in between the required and prohib-

ited, was one derived originally from the Stoics. Paul of Tarsus had made use of the idea.^{^^} Thomas Aquinas had recognized the notion and had used it in his scriptural commentaries.^{^*} It had entered the logic of the Reformation at least as early as Luther and Melancthon. It was used by Calvin and was well developed to support various positions within the English Reformation.^{^^}

But Hooker generally uses the concept of adiaphora in a way opposite to Calvin's. Calvin argues "indifference" in order either to allow Christian liberty or to avoid certain practices, lest consciences^{!*} ensnare themselves. Hooker uses the notion so that Christians can observe such practices freely, or rather, so that the church can require them freely. Hooker argues that matters indifferent may be regulated by the church, and he speaks primarily of ceremonies, with no emphasis on the question of consciences. Calvin argues that matters indifferent must remain indiffer- ent, that is, should not be regulated by the church,^{!*} but he is not talk- ing primarily of ceremonies. He does, however, explicitly exclude papist services because they offend the weak.^{!*}[^]

For Hooker, puritan arguments from the Pauline dictum to the conclusion that whatever is not commanded in Scripture is sin would include all indifferent matters (II.4.3; 1:154.1-5). These arguments would even forbid those things which are considered "expedient" in Scripture, the expedient being a part of the group of things indifferent (II.4.4; 1:155.2-4).

^{^^} A. G. Dickens, *The English Reformation* (New York: Schocken Books, 1974), 78-79.

^{^*} Deuteronomy 4:2. See *Commentary on Saint Paul's Epistle to the Galatians by St Thomas Aquinas* (Albany: Magi Books, 1966), 22.

^{^^} Calvin, *Inst.* 3.19.7; 1:838-39. See also 19.4; 1:836. At 19.8 (1:840) Calvin cites Romans 14:22 in a fashion opposite to that of the English Puritans. See Bernard Ver- kamp, *The Indifferent Mean* (Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 1977), 149-51. Verkamp notes that in the English Reformation, adiaphorism was first used in debates about ceremonies, then in matters of action, and finally in relation to doctrinal matters, 36, 38, 94.

^{^^} Calvin, *Inst.* 3.19.10; 1:842. See the discussion of both the offence of the weak and the offence of the Pharisees, 3.19.11; 1:843-44.

* Calvin, Inst. 3.19.9; 1:841-42. Calvin does later recognize that the church may regulate and enforce the determination of ceremonies otherwise indifferent. Inst. 4.10.30, 17.43; 2:208, 1420. Verkamp, Indifferent Mean, 65-66.

^ Calvin, Inst. 3.19.12; 1:849-50.

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It would be an error to assume that, for Hooker, because something is indifferent, it is inessential or unimportant.^^ That this would be a misconstruction of Hooker is clear, when one takes into account those things which turn out to be "indifferent" but ordained by the church. For Hooker these matters include almost everything in debate between him and the Puritans. Even episcopacy was such a matter — though it probably had a dominical, and therefore divine, origin— since some communities Hooker recognizes as churches have deliberately, and some accidentally, abolished bishops. But, for Hooker, as he writes in Book VIII, these are matters that are to be decided definitively by "the authority of the church" — in the case of the Church of England, by the sovereign in parliament, which included church convocations — and they are to be so decided precisely because they are not inessential or unimportant.

With respect to "tradition," then. Hooker did not generally use the word in a positive sense. For this reason, it may be misleading to describe him as an author of the Scripture-reason-tradition formula. Nevertheless, the word may not be totally inept to describe his views, as a study of his veneration of "long usage and custom" and as a recognition of the authority of the "voice of the church" in matters indifferent will show.

More significantly, however, the substitution of "tradition" for Hooker's "voice of the church" may underrate what Hooker had in mind, for episcopacy itself is involved, and the institution of bishops is usually considered to be "more than tradition."

I close with a speculative suggestion. Hooker provides two extended passages showing the church, through its teachers and councils, as in the process of finding the correct explanation of a critical doctrinal principle in the midst of dispute. The first is in the fifth book of the Lawes, where he succinctly and accurately summarizes the Christological controversies of the third and fourth centuries.^^ The

second passage I have in mind is his even more extended summary of the debates about grace and nature from Pelagius and Augustine through to the Second Council of Orange, which he gives in the Dublin Fragments. ^^ In these passages he describes

*^ S. W. Sykes, *The Integrity of Anglicanism* (London: Mowbrays, 1978), 53-54, on the Anglican use of adiaphora generally, as leading to indifference in doctrinal matters.

V.52. Note that Hooker clearly identifies some central doctrines, "the necessitie wherof is by none denied [as] ... in scripture no where to be found by expresse literall mention" (\A4.1; 1:126.18-23).

*' Dublin Fragments, 10-12; 4:109.4-111.33.

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a church process that goes beyond the vocabulary of Scripture's treatment of the person of Christ and the operation of grace. In both passages, he describes the church at work with the result that doctrinal decisions, effectively declaring "the voice of the church" are the outcome. To describe these outcomes as "traditions" might fail to do justice to their significance.

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Public and Private Rhetoric in Hooker's *Lawes*

[In memory of Basil Hall, 1915-1994]

TRADITIONALLY, RICHARD HOOKER'S *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* has been celebrated as an outstanding work of political philosophy, a synthesis of Aristotelian, Thomist, and Calvinist thought effectively adapted to the unique situation of the Church of England in the 1590s, besieged from two sides. It will continue to be celebrated as a work of philosophy, but recently students of Hooker have begun to link it with rhetoric, the great confederate of philosophy according

to Renaissance humanists, or its bitter rival according to followers of Plato. The rhetorical element in Hooker's *Lawes* has been seen at various levels: primarily, at the level of style, where tropes and figures, the tools of *elocutio*, can be found abundantly;¹ secondly, at the level of overall strategy;² and thirdly, in the specific mode of polemic, the rhetorical techniques of *vituperatio*, sarcasm, irony, and other ways in which Hooker enacted his part in the bitter controversies surrounding ecclesiastical government.³ The various

¹ See, e.g., D. C. Boughner, "Notes on Hooker's Prose," *Review of English Studies* 15 (1939): 194-200; Brian Vickers, "Introduction 2: Hooker's Prose Style," in A. S. McGrade and Brian Vickers, eds., *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. An Abridged Edition* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1975), 41-59.

² See, e.g., John N. Wall, "Hooker's 'Faire Speeches'. Rhetorical Strategies in the *Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Polity*," in Donald S. Armentrout, ed., *This Sacred History. Anglican Reflections for John Booty* (Cambridge: Cowley Publications, 1990), 125-43.

³ See, e.g., Vickers in McGrade and Vickers, *Abridged Edition*, 42-55; W. J. D.

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Studies so far published mark a welcome shift of emphasis in Hooker studies, which can be seen, perhaps, as part of a wider movement in the human sciences over the last twenty years or so, the recognition that all works of historical narrative or philosophical exposition must be ordered in some form and according to some principles, and that such theories of organization reveal, whether consciously or not, the influence of rhetoric. This vaguer awareness of rhetoric has been diffused to the point where Robert Faulkner, for instance, can hail the *Lawes* as "a great work of Christian rhetoric"⁴ (though he does not attempt to justify the claim).

Although marking a welcome change of direction, which will undoubtedly yield a fuller and more coherent appreciation of Hooker's writings, this "rhetorical turn" has not yet provided answers to some central questions, such as: what is Hooker's attitude to rhetoric? Does he share the almost unbounded enthusiasm of the Italian humanists in the Cicero- nian tradition, with its high

evaluation of rhetoric's role in the vita activa? Or does he share the Platonic distrust of rhetoric as an immoral art, a distrust revived by some Christian writers in the Renaissance? Does the author of the Lawes see himself as a Christian orator, for instance? What attitude does he have toward his audience? — indeed, what audience does he see himself writing for? Finally, what effect does his view of these issues — insofar as we can determine it — have on the form of the work as a whole? Is it structured on the model of a classical oration, like Sidney's *Apology for Poetry*? Or does it follow the epideictic genre, mingling praise

Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the Tolitic Society': Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker," in *S.R.H.*, 3-76; Rudolph Almas, "The Purpose of Richard Hooker's Polemic," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 39 (1978): 251-70, and "Richard Hooker's Address to the Presbyterians," *Anglican Theological Review* 61 (1979): 462-74; David Manuszak, "Richard Hooker as Controversialist," *Renaissance Papers* 1979 (Durham, N.C.: Southeastern Renaissance Conference, 1980), 9-17.

* Robert Faulkner, *Richard Hooker and the Politics of a Christian England* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1981), 29. Faulkner has only a few general references to Hooker's use of rhetoric, pp. 128-30.

^ See, e.g., Eugenio Garin, *Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance*, trans. P. Munz (New York: Harper and Row, 1965) from *L'Umanesimo italiano: filosofia e vita civile nel Rinascimento*, rev. ed. (Bari: G. Laterza, 1958); Hanna H. Gray, "Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence," in *Renaissance Essays*, ed. P. O. Kristeller and P. P. Wiener (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 199-216, from *Journal of the History of Ideas* 24 (1963): 497-514.

^ See, e.g., Brian Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 83-196.

^ See K. O. Myrick, *Sir Philip Sidney as a Literary Craftsman* (Cambridge, Mass.,

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and blame, as Bacon does in the *Advancement of Learning* or Galileo

The essay that follows will attempt to answer these questions — not definitively, of course, given the limitations of space, but at any rate in a preliminary fashion.

I

That Hooker was familiar with classical rhetoric is indisputable. He attended Exeter Grammar School, probably from about 1562 to 1569, when he went up to Corpus Christi College, Oxford, where he took his Bachelor's degree in 1574, his Master's in 1577.² Throughout these years he would have been exposed to a highly efficient training in rhetoric, the mature Renaissance synthesis of the classical tradition prepared by those influential humanist pedagogues Erasmus, Vives, and Melancthon.³ Pupils were taught up to a hundred figures and tropes by rote, learning their names and definitions, memorizing examples of each, and identifying them in the margins of all the classical texts that they studied. They were trained to keep notebooks, into which they copied metaphors, similes, figures of speech, phrases for the openings, transitions, and conclusions of a composition, refutations, and celebrations." In the higher forms they

1935), 46-83, and G. K. Shepherd, ed., *Sidney's Apology of Poetry* (London: T. Nelson, 1965), 11-16. In his annotation to the Folger edition W. P. Haugaard argues that Hooker's Preface conforms to the structure of a classical oration (FLE 6:74). I am unconvinced.

² See Brian Vickers, ed., Francis Bacon in "The Oxford Authors" series (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), 579-80, and "Epideictic Rhetoric in Galileo's *Dialogo*," *AnnaU deU'Istituto e Museo della Scienze dz Firenze* 8 (1983): 69-102.

³ For Hooker's biography see Izaak Walton, *Lives*, ed. G. Saintsbury (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1927, 1956: World's Classics edition); C. J. Sisson, *The Judicious Marriage of Mr. Hooker and the Birth of the "Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity"* (Cambridge, 1940); Georges Edelen, "A Chronology of Richard Hooker's Life," FLE 6:xvii-xxv; and Philip Secor, "In Search of Richard Hooker: Constructing a New Biography," in this volume.

⁴ See, e.g., T. W. Baldwin, *William Shakspeare's Small Latine & Lesse Greeke*, 1 vols. (Urbana, 111., 1944); Sister M. Joseph, *Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1947);

R. Tuve, *Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery: Remittance Poetic* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947); B. Vickers, *Classical Rhetoric in English Poetry* (London: Macmillan, 1970; 2nd ed. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1989).

' ' For a short collection of phrases and retorts made by Hooker, recorded in a Trinity College, Dublin MS., see FLE 3:462-66.

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were regularly exercised in composing themes, often arguing an issue in *utramque partem*, on both sides, praising or blaming a given topic, such as night, day; richness, poverty; war, peace. This essentially rhetorical mode of disputation recurred at University for the key examinations leading to the award of the B.A. and M.A. Hooker's teachers at Corpus included the outstanding humanist John Rainolds, whose academic orations are still extant (and were incorporated into his lectures on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*!), including one "In praise of injustice," and another "In praise of astronomy." The central place given in University proceedings to the epideictic genre, using the complementary techniques of *laus* and *vituperatio*, affected even academic correspondence, this in turn reflecting the dominance of the epideictic mode in Renaissance literature as a whole. ^

As an ordained Church of England priest Hooker was confronted with rhetoric not only as a mode of reading and composing secular literature, but as an aid to reading the Bible and as a central discipline in preaching. In Book 4 of *De doctrina Christiana* St Augustine had legitimized the use of classical rhetoric both as a hermeneutical aid and as an essential resource for the preacher. Augustine's prestige helped to inspire a vast literature on sacred rhetoric in the Renaissance, Catholic and Protestant, the two dispensations indeed sharing many assumptions, methods, and goals. In addition to the major works on classical rhetoric (Aristotle, Cicero, the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Quintilian), Hooker is likely to have known the leading Renaissance authors. These included Erasmus, both his enormously popular pedagogic rhetorical works (*De duplici copia rerum ac verborum*, *Paraboliae*, *Adagia*) and the treatise on preaching (*Ecclesiastes*); Melancthon, who produced the most influential work of Protestant rhetoric, *Elementorum rhetorices libri duo* (Wittenberg, 1531); and Andre-

^ See Lawrence D. Green, ed. and trans., John Rainolds's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's "Rhetoric" (Newark, Del: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1986), 27-28.

^ Ibid., 54. See also B. Vickers, "Epideictic and Epic in the Renaissance," *New/ Literary History* 14 (1982): 497-537.

^ See Debora K. Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988), an excellent study, subject to a few reservations: see my review in *Arion* 1 (1990): 225-28.

^ Shuger's treatment of this text (pp. 63-64) is brief. For a fuller study see Jacques Chomarat, *Grammaire et Rhetorique chez Erasme*, 1 vols. (Paris: Belles lettres, 1981), 2:1053-1155.

* The Latin text can be found in the *Corpus Reformatorum*, ed. C. F. Bretschneider, 28 vols. (Brunswick and Halle, 1834-60), vol. 13. For a useful English translation see the edition by Sister Mary Joan LaFontaine, "A Critical Translation of Philip Melancthon's

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as Hyperius, whose treatise *De formandis concionibus sacris* (1553) appeared in English as *The Practice of Preaching* (London, 1577)."

Hooker's knowledge of the rhetorical tradition is indisputable, but his attitude toward it is harder to establish. It seems natural to begin with his activity as a preacher and priest, a vocation which must have for long seemed to be his whole life's work (he cannot have known that he would become celebrated as an apologist). Here the invaluable evidence comes from Thomas Fuller's *Church-History* (1655):

M^ Hooker his voice was low, stature little, gesture none at all, standing stone-still in the Pulpit, as if the posture of his body were the emblem of his minde, unmoveable in his opinions. Where his eye was left fixed at the beginning, it was found fixed at the end of his Sermon: In a word, the doctrine he delivered had nothing but it self to garnish it. His stile was long and pithy, driving on a whole flock of several Clauses before he came to the close of a sentence. So that when the copiousness of his stile met not with a proportionable capacity in his auditors, it was unjustly censured, for perplex, tedious, and obscure. His sermons followed the inclination of his studies, and were for the most part on controversies, and deep points of School Divinity.'®

That is a remarkably coherent portrait of an intellectual preacher, appealing to the mind via "the doctrine" he transmitted, which has "nothing but it self to garnish it"—that is, lacking any form of ornament. Hooker seems to have deliberately eschewed appealing to the emotions, not using the great resource of the classical or Christian orator, the art of gesture, *pronuntiatio* or *actio*, to which much power was attributed.¹⁶ In the anecdote made familiar from Bacon's essay "Of Boldness," "Question was asked of Demosthenes, what was the chief part of an orator? he answered action: what next? action: what next again? action." Bacon found this "a strange thing," and therefore "worthy a wise man's consideration," why

Elementorum Rhetorices Ubri Duo (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Michigan, 1968).

¹⁶ See Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric*, 64-65, 69, 71-72.

¹⁷ Cited by Paul E. Forte, "Richard Hooker as Preacher," *FLE* 5:657-82, at 658.

" See, e.g., Cicero, *De oratore*, 3.56.213-15; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 11.3.1- 184; B. Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric*, 65-67 and index p. 500. Forte, *FLE* 5:658-59, quotes some of the many recommendations in sixteenth-century treatises that preachers should use gestures in connection with passionate language in order to arouse the congregation's repentance for sin, and love toward God.

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"that part of an orator which is but superficial, and rather the virtue of a player [actor], should be placed so high, above those other noble parts of invention, elocution, and the rest; nay almost alone, as if it were all in all."¹⁸ But it was indeed ranked so highly, and Hooker's refusal to use the resources of gesture seems to represent a deliberate avoidance of emotional appeal.

A comparable testimony to his reliance on rational and doctrinal rather than emotional appeal is given by Izaak Walton's recollection that

the design of his Sermons . . . was to shew Reasons for what he spake; and with these Reasons such a kind of Rhetorick as did rather

convince and persuade, than frighten men into Piety; Studying not so much for matter (which he never wanted) as for apt Illustrations to inform and teach his unlearned hearers by familiar Examples, and then make them better by Convincing Applications; never labouring by hard words, and then by needless Distinctions and subdistinctions to amuse his hearers, and get glory to himself: But glory only to God.[^]

Walton's use of the word "amuse"— truly, not a goal one associates with Hooker — shows that he was consciously evaluating Hooker's preaching by reference to the three offices canonically allocated to the orator since Cicero first formulated them, *movere*, *docere*, *delectare*. In Cicero's own words: "the orator is bound in duty to instruct; giving pleasure will win him the audience's favour; to move them is indispensable." Or again: "to prove is the first necessity, to please is to charm, to sway is victory; for it is the one thing of all that avails most in winning verdicts." ^{^^} The rhetorical tradition in antiquity attached the greatest emphasis to *movere*, an evaluation largely endorsed by Renaissance rhetoric, which also set *elocutio* over the other processes of rhetorical composition {*inventio*, *dispositio*, *pronuntiatio*, *memoria*), and indeed conceded value to the others largely insofar as they contributed to the power of moving the emotions. ^{^^} Here again, on Walton's testimony as on Fuller's, Hooker stands

[^] Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James Spedding et al., 14 vols. (London, 1857-74), 6:401-2.

[^] Cited by Forte, FLE 5:663.

^{^^} De opt. gen. 1.3; Orator 21.69. See also Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, 74, 37, 50, 57, *passim*.

" See, e.g., Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, 31-32, 74-76, 345-47, 357-58, and index p. 500. On the importance of *movere* in sacred eloquence see, e.g., Augustine, De

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outside, or against the rhetoricians' scale of values, abandoning *delectare* altogether, minimizing *movere*, and giving all his attention to *docere*, wishing to "rather convince and persuade, than frighten men into Piety; Studying ... for apt Illustrations to inform and teach his unlearned hearers by familiar Examples."

This evidence of Hooker's practice as a preacher can be checked against his theory of preaching, expounded in the *Lawes*, Book V, chapters 18 to 22 (FLE 2:65-110). Chapter 18 discusses "publique teachinge or preaching, and the first kind thereof, catechising," rooting the whole discussion in the primacy of *docere*:

Because therefore want of the knowledg of God is the cause of all iniquitie amongst men, as contrariwise the verie ground of all our happines and the seed of whatsoever perfect vertue groweth from us is a right opinion touchinge thinges divine, this kinde of knowledg we maie justlie set downe for the first and cheifest thinge which God imparteth unto his people. (2:65)

It follows that, for "the instruction ... of all sortes of men to eternall life it is necessarie, that the sacred and saving truth of God be openlie published unto them," this notion of "publication," Hooker claims, forming the root meaning of "preaching" (*ibid.*). The catechism constitutes "the first deliverie of the elementes" of the knowledge of God, and is "framed accordinge to the weake and slender capacitie of younge beginners," this "maner of teaching principles in Christianitie" being authorized by Scripture (2:66). Other forms of preaching in this wider sense of publishing Christian beliefs include "Weadinge publiquellie the bookes of holie Scripture" (ch.19) and "the publique readinge of other profitable instructions" (ch. 20), including the Apocrypha, rejected by the reformers. Throughout these chapters Hooker's emphasis is on the process of understanding "Gods truth," a process having a long history, for "Moses and the Prophetes, Christ and his Apostles were in their times all ... carefrill expounders, teachers, perswaders thereof" (2:67), where the word "perswaders" introduces the first reference to rhetoric (if, that is, it means any more than "explain, communicate"). Otherwise the key terms are "understand,"

doctrina Christiana, 4.12.27-13.28; trans. D. W. Robertson, *On Christian Doctrine* (Indianapolis: Liberal Arts Press, 1958), 136-38; Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric*, 63-64, 72, 76, 86, 88, 97, 107, 109, 120ff., 138, 226ff., 236-37; Chomarat, *Grammaire et Rhetorique*, 2:1066-67, 1081, 1103-4.

"make knowne," "doctrine," "meaning," "expounding," "understanding," "instruction."

After this account of preaching in the broader sense of the term, itemizing the various ways of publishing the knowledge of God's "revealed truth," Hooker discusses the reformers' much narrower concept of "preach' ing by Sermons, and whether Sermons be the only ordinarie way of teachinge whereby men are brought to the saving knowledg of Gods truth" (2:83). Hooker's target here is the exclusive role attributed by the reformers to "the word of God . . . onlie as the same is preached that is to saie explained by livelie voice and applied to the peoples use as the speaker in his wisdom thinketh meete" (ibid.). As Paul Forte has commented, in his valuable study of Hooker as a preacher, "those familiar with his irony will recognize the deflation implied by the embedded quotation, 'as . . . wisdom thinketh meete,' where the favorite terms of the reformers serve to undermine their own credibility" (FLE 5:661). Hooker dislikes the arrogance implied by the reformers setting up the preacher as a man equal to God, as if the word of God could only be known through the voice of man, whereas for the Church of England "the word of God is his heavenlie truth touchinge matters of eternall life revealed and uttered unto men" (2:84). Since "speech is the verie image whereby the minde and soule of the speaker conveieth it selfe into the bosome of him which heareth," the word "that proceedeth from God" is, as St Paul put it, "livelie and mightie in operation, sharper then anie two edged sworde." Sermons, by contrast, derive from "the witt of man," and often "tast too much of that over corrupt fountaine from which they come," revealing all too clearly "our most fraile affections" (2:98-99). Here again, in this polemical sequence, Hooker's emphasis is on teaching and knowing, for "the waie for all men to be saved is by the knowledg of that truth which the worde hath taught," God's word serving primarily as "a doctrinall instrument" (2:84). All that is involved in this process can be summoned up in two italicized words, Scripture being "the instrument which God hath purposelie framed ... to leave an apprehension of thinges divine in our understandinge, and in the minde an assent thereunto" (2:85). The intention of the evangelist was "to instruct and to save by writinge" (2:92), for "in beliefe there beinge but these two operations apprehension and assent" (2:94), *docere* alone suffices. In this cognitive, rational process there is no room, and no need for emotional appeal.

At the beginning of the long chapter 22 discussing "What they attribute to Sermons only, and what we to readinge also," Hooker writes that "we

should greatly wronge" so worthy a part of divine service

if we did not esteeme preachinge as the blessed ordinance of God, sermons as keyes to the kingdom of heaven, as winges to the soule, as spurres to the good affections of man, unto the sound and healthie as foode, as phisicke unto diseased mindes. (2:87)

This piece of encomium is unusual in a discussion which otherwise focuses loyally on the points at issue between Anglicans and reformers, and we must return to it. Within this chapter, also, the dominant concern is with instruction, communication of the word of God being the prime means toward salvation. The significance of Hooker's qualification, sermons being "spurres to the good affections," should not escape us. As Paul Forte comments, this panegyric applies only to "preaching that subjects the 'affections' (passions) and unstable human imagination to the control of reason" (5.662). Nowhere does Hooker invoke *movere* or *actio* as essential resources for the preacher. The only place where he grants any emotional power to the minister is in leading his congregation in prayer, representing their supplications to God:

if there be not zeale and fervencie in him ... if he praise not God with all his might; if he power not out his soule in prayer; if he take not their causes to harte . . . how should there be but in them frozen coldnes, when his affections seeme benumbed from whom theirs should take fire? (V.25.3; 2:115)

One place where we might expect Hooker to invoke the traditional justification of the sacred orator using *movere*, in order to arouse the emotions of the hard-hearted to a love of God, concerns the case where people hear the word of God but still do not believe.

Responsibility for unbelievers does not lie in Scripture, of course, but rather in "the wilfull bent of their obstinate hartes against it. With mindes obdurate nothinge prevaieth" (2:91). Hooker evidently places no faith in *movere*, or any other human resource, to overcome such resistance. At one point he concedes that "the weakenes of our wittes and the dulnes of our affections" make us "hard and slowe to beleve what is written. For help whereof expositions and exhortations are needfull, and that in the most effectually maner" (2:104), but he does not discuss what formal teaching or personal qualities would be needed to make such exhortations effective. Strange though it may

seem, Hooker leaves little or no place in his theory of preaching for *move*.

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This fact, seemingly not noticed by those who have discussed Hooker's contribution to sacred rhetoric,^{~*} is rather surprising, given the widespread emphasis in preaching manuals on the importance of persuasion for the Christian orator. Hooker's alignment away from *move* seems to spring from a distrust of emotional appeal, but it also derives from that sixteenth-century tradition (especially strong in the northern Renaissance) in which dialectic and rhetoric interpenetrated. The rhetoricization of dialectic (largely initiated by Rudolph Agricola) has been well documented by modern historians, but the reverse process, in which rhetoric absorbed some of the principles and methods of dialectic, has been less often studied.^{^^} The major Protestant rhetoric, Melancthon's *Elementorum rhetoricæ libri duo*, makes only a token reference to the rhetoricians' need to apply *move*,^{^^} otherwise laying all possible emphasis on *docere*, and frequently invoking dialectic, arguing that "rhetoricians cannot do without a mode of teaching" and have therefore "included Dialectics in their work" (p. 86). Melancthon defined dialectic, rather idiosyncratically, as *ars recte docendi* (pp. 98, 85), and gave so much importance to teaching that he invented a fourth rhetorical genus, which he called "the genus *didascalikoriy* which is concerned with Dialectics" (p. 88). He recommends this genus as of "great use in Church matters,... where men wise in Dialectics can teach the dogmas of religion so that they are better understood" (p. 88). Throughout Book 1 of his rhetoric-book, devoted to the primary process of *inventio*, Melancthon emphasizes this union of *docere* and dialectic to the virtual exclusion of all other resources.^{^^} He gives

^{^^} It is commented on neither by Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric*, nor Forte "Hooker as Preacher," nor in two earlier studies, W. Fraser Mitchell, *English Pulpit Oratory from Andreives to Tillotson* (London, 1932; New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), and J. W. Blench, *Preaching in England in the late Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964).

^{^^} See, e.g., C. Vasoli, *La dialectica e la retorica deU'Urrmnesimo. "Invenzione" e "Metodo" nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo* (Milan:

Feltrinelli, 1968), and T. Heath, "Logical grammar, grammatical logic, and humanism in three German Universities," *Studies in the Renaissance* 18 (1971): 9-64.

^^ All quotations are from the edition by LaFontaine; page-references incorporated into the text. For passing references to arousing the feelings see pp. 149, 176, 200, 202, 300.

" For other references to dialectic see pp. 89, 97-98, 103, 108, 128, 133, 159, 162, 164, etc. See also John W. O'Malley, "Content and Rhetorical Form in Sixteenth-Century Treatises on Preaching," in James J. Murphy, ed., *Renaissance Eloquence: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1983), 238-52, at 241-43, and Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric*, 65-66.

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brief attention to *dispositio*, devotes most of Book 2 to *elocutio*, and dispenses altogether with the two remaining stages in rhetorical composition, *memoria* and *pronuntiatio*.

In both the Sermons and the Lawes Hooker is in basic agreement concerning the importance of these interrelated processes of teaching and comprehending. But he seems, in addition, to have had a distinct distrust of emotional appeal. Indeed, his only two references to the preacher moving the passions include a critical element. In the first Hooker is reacting against the *laudatio* of the sermon form made by the reformers, their "verie large and plentifull discourses, how Christ is by sermons lifted up higher and made more apparent to the eye of faith; how the savor of the worde is more sweet being brayed, and more able to nourish beinge devided by preachinge, then by onlie readinge proposed" (2:100)—where the pejorative connotations of "brayed" are inescapable. Arguing that both readings and sermons have "sundrie peculiar and proper vertues," Hooker rather grudgingly grants sermons some virtues:

Aptnes to followe particular occasions presentlie growinge, to put life into wordes by countenance voice and gesture, to prevaile mightelie in the suddaine affections of men, this sermons may challenge. Wherein notwithstandinge so eminent properties where- of lessons are happelie destitute, yeat lessons beinge free from some inconveniences whereunto sermons are more subject,

they do not yield "preeminence" (*ibid.*). The irony of the phrasing —

"so eminent properties . . . happelie Ihaply? happily?! destitute" suggests that readings actually lack several dubious commodities associated with rhetoric. Coming after Hooker's description of "the witt of man" as deriving from "that overcorrupt fountaine" of "our most fraile affections," this account of a preacher being able to "prevaile mightelie in the suddaine [fickle, changeable] affections of men" is hardly an ability to be celebrated. Indeed, the fuller context of this passage makes that ability seem even less welcome, for as Paul Forte has observed, "it follows a comparison of the reformers to 'Alcidamas the Sophister' who taught that 'voluntarie and extemporall farre excelleth premeditated speech,' " a juxtaposition that, as Forte judges, "betrays Hooker's almost Platonic uneasiness concerning the uses to which language may be put" (5.661-62).

Hooker's other reference to sermon rhetoric also involves the reformers' valuation of extempore preaching over sermons that are "premeditated," that is, delivered from notes and subsequently written up in

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coherent form. Believing, as he puts it in a fragment known as *The Causes of the continuance of these Contentions concerning Church'gouernment*, that "In disputations . . . extemporalitie doth exclude mature and ripe advise without which the truth cannot soundly and thoroughly be demonstrated" (3.459), Hooker is hardly disposed to accept the reformers' claims for the primacy— or rather, sole authenticity— of extemporaneous preaching. He gets to the heart of the issue by asking "what that is in a good sermon which doth make it the worde of life unto such as heare," answering this question with another:

If substance of matter, evidence of thinges, strength and validitie of argumentes and proofes, or if anie other vertue els which wordes and sentences maie containe, of all this what is there in the best sermons beinge uttered, which they loose by beinge readd? (2:107)

There Hooker invokes the ancient distinction in classical rhetoric between *res* or subject-matter and *verba*, adding some terms from logic ("argumentes and proofes") to describe what evidently constitutes his ideal of discourse, one having substance and inner coherence, but not appealing to the emotions. If the reformers "utterlie denie that the readinge either of scriptures or homilies and sermons"

can ever save a soul, he reasons, then

it must of necessitie followe, that the vigor and vitall efficacie of sermons doth grow from certaine accidentes which are not in them but in their maker; his virtue, his gesture, his countenance, his zeale, the motion of his bodie, and the inflection of his voice who first uttereth them as his own, is that which giveth them the forme, the nature, the verie essence of instrumentes availeable to eternall life. (2:107-8; my italics)

I have italicized that final clause to bring out Hooker's withering irony at the reformers' expense. It would be grotesque if the eternal salvation of our souls rested not on the essence (in Aristotelian terms), the word of God as delivered in Scripture and properly interpreted, but on such accidental qualities as the preacher's energy, his face, bodily motion, and vocal inflection. — So much for pronuntiatio!

More light can be shed on Hooker's conception of the sermon as being essentially a didactic genre, instructing the mind rather than arousing the emotions, by considering the sequence in Book III, chapter 8, where he attacks the reformers' reliance on the words of Scripture literally interpreted, with their corresponding disvaluation of "the starre of Reason and

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learning." The reformers attribute so much power to "the word of God," he alleges, that they deny "any force to mans reason. For which cause they never use reason so willinglie as to disgrace reason" (II.8.4; 1:221). Hooker lists six of their "usuall and common discourses" on this topic (1:221-23), several of them based on the words of St Paul. The fifth of their positions is based on 1 Corinthians 2:4, applied by them in order to disparage "the weapons of naturall reason" as being "rather cumbersome" than necessary: "My preaching, therefore sayth Paule, hath not bene in the intising speech of mans wisdom, but in playne evidence of the spirit and of power, that your faith might not be in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God" (1.222). Hooker dismisses these "discourses," now relegating them to the lower and ignobly rhetorical category of "declamations" (ibid.), as proofs of human delusion, based on specious equivocation. Then he sets out to clarify the points at issue by re-creating the full biblical context in which Paul's words occur, and by deducing his actual intentions, in each case justifying reason as essential to faith. Taking up the fifth

point, Hooker argues that reason is needed in interpreting the word of God, not "as a supplement of any maime or defect therin, but as a necessary instrument, without which we could not reape by the scriptures perfection, that fruite and benefit which it yeeldeth" (1:227).

The performance of St. Paul as a preacher, and his relation to the apostles, now becomes the center of controversy. The reformers had elevated the apostles to a supreme position, as having been inspired by "the power of the holie Ghost" (1:222). Hooker concedes that God gave the apostles "such power for miraculous confirmation of that which they taught, [and] indued them also with wisdom from above to teach that which they so did confirme" (1:227). (Here we note in passing that *docere* is again the sole activity conceived of for the preacher, and that Hooker has used a series of rhetorical figures—*antimetabole*, inverting the sequence "confirmation . . . taught . . . teach . . . confirm," and *polyptoton*, varying the form of those words from their etymon—once again for intellectual clarification, not emotional arousal.) Hooker also points out that whereas "the spirit gave [the apostles] speech and eloquent utterance," Paul had "never conversed with Christ upon earth, as they did, and his education had bin scholasticall altogether"—that is, as Hooker mentioned earlier, that rational "and oratoriall wisdom of the Graecians, which [he] brought from Tarsus" (1:226). But, Hooker insists, this does not mean that Paul was "so able to perswade" the gentiles merely because of "the learning and skill which he had by being conversant in their books,"

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those of pagan philosophy and rhetoric, as if this had been enough to bring about conversions.

To make this central point clear, Hooker quotes again that passage from 1 Corinthians, re-translates it in two key instances, and puts it back into its historical context. He recalls Paul's own "earnest protestations to them of Corinth" that, "whatsoever time he had spent in the studie of humane learning," his preaching was not inspired by pagan sources, and that

the Gospell which hee had preached amongst them, did not by other meanes prevaile with them, then with others the same Gospel taught by the rest of the Apostles of Christ. M^yf preaching, saith he, hath not bene in the perswasive speeches of humane wisdom, but in

demonstration of the spirit and of power, that your faith may not be in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. What is it which the Apostle doth here deny? Is it denied that his speech amongst them had bene perswasivel

No, for the Acts of the Apostles (18:4) record that Paul had preached in the synagogue for eighteen months, "and perswaded both Jewes and Graecians" (1:228). When he quoted that text first. Hooker had used the Geneva Bible version, the dominant version throughout Elizabeth's reign.® This second time, however, as the Folger editor (William P. Haugaard) notes, Hooker offers two re-translations which "are closer to the root meanings" than the Genevan reading, and also "serve Hooker's argument." Where the Geneva scholars translated *nsiyoic*, as "entising speache" Hooker gives "perswasive speeches"; and where they rendered *dTioSEi^ei* as "plaine evidence" he prefers "demonstration" (FLE 6:578; n to 1:228. ll-14.c). This latter term is frequently found in logical texts since Aristotle to refer to a form of proof. By making human persuasion the lower category, divine demonstration the higher. Hooker once again subordinates rhetoric to logic.

The reason why this biblical verse took on such importance concerns the nature of the human faculties appealed to by the arts of rhetoric and logic. As Hooker continues, raising another fundamental issue:

How then is the speech of men made perswasive? Surely there can

^* See C. D. Cremeans, *The Reception of Calvinistk Thought in England* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1949), 82, 120.

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be but two waies to bring this to passe, the one humaine, the other divine. Either S.Paul did onely by arte and naturall industrie cause his owne speech to be credited, or els God by myracle did author- ize it, and so bring credit thereunto, as to the speech of the rest of the Apostles. Of which two the former he utterly denieth. For why? (1:228)

Here is the nub: if Paul had preached to the people as effectually as the other apostles "onely by force of his owne learning," this would have been "enough to subvert their faith." For

Might not a great parte of them being simple happily have feared, least their assent had bene cunningly gotten unto his doctrine, rather through the weaknes of their owne wits, then the certaintie of that truth which he had taught them? (ibid.)

Without elaborating the point. Hooker has made a damning judgment on rhetoric, namely that the success of an orator, while a tribute to his strength, is also proof of his listeners' weakness. Classical rhetoric can indeed be faulted for its instruction to the orator to arouse ignoble emotions, such as fear and hatred, in order to blacken the opponents' case while recommending their own. It would be "unequall," as Hooker writes with some understatement, if the other apostles should be said to have converted heathens "upon the evidence of Gods owne miraculous approbation," whereas those whom Paul "had converted should have had their perswasion built only upon his skill and wisdom who perswaded them" (1.229). Rhetoric is no match for divinity.

That sequence, addressed primarily to vindicating Paul as having equal spiritual authority with the other apostles, indirectly proves my point that Hooker attaches little credit to persuasion by moving the emotions. Throughout this chapter references to emotional appeal are strikingly absent, the only accepted role of preaching being "to teach" the proper Christian "doctrine" (ibid.), the recurring terms being once again "wisdom," "teaching," "reason," and "instruction." As Hooker puts it in Book V, chapter 81, discussing "the leaminge that should be in ministers" and taking issue once more with those who "bringe all religion in a manner to the onlie office of hearing sermons" (2:488), ability in preach-

" See Brian Vickers, "Adversarial Rhetoric and the Problem of Ethics," in *In Pursuit of Eloquence: Rhetoric and its Fortunes, Good and Bad* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming).

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ing is not so much a matter of having studied the "oratorially wisdom of the Graecians" as a gift of grace:

Wee saie as much of the minister of God, puhliquely to teache and instruct the church is necessarie in everie ecclesiasticall minister, but abilitie to teach by sermons is a grace which God doth bestow on

them whome he maketh sufficient for the commendable discharge of their dutye. (2:490)

That is the priest's special gift, "to teach by sermons," where divine grace rather than human art is called for.

This brief account of Hooker's views on preaching certainly confirms the historical testimony of Fuller and Walton, showing the same despising of such superficial effects as gesture and emotional appeal, compared to sound doctrine, logically organized, and clearly expounded. Hooker evidently practised what he preached. In his own extant sermons he expresses an overt suspicion of rhetoric, yet makes some use of its resources. His distrust of eloquence takes two forms, one of which invokes the ancient opposition between words and deeds. In his Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride Hooker abjures rhetorical display: "To declaime of the swarmes of evils issuing out of pride is an easie labour. I rather wish that I could exactly prescribe and perswade effectually the remedies" (FLE 5:320). In a rhetorical education the declamatio was a display speech, sometimes associated with irony and paradox, but by very definition not addressing actual political or legal conflicts: so Hooker's dichotomy between the unreal and ineffectual nature of such language and actual beneficial action is accurate. The other form in which he expresses a distrust of eloquence concerns the over-elaboration of language, which, he believes, can give it a persuasive power disproportionate to the value of the subject-matter in hand. Later in this sermon Hooker attacks the "perplexitie" caused when people confuse natural law, given by God and immutable, with positive law, given by man, and subject to change. The result of this confusion is that human authority abrogates the laws given by God, so that

men take upon them to be wiser then god him selfe, that unto their devises his ordinances are constrained to give place: which popular discourses when they are polished with such art and cunning as some mens wits are well acquainted with it is no hard matter with such tunes to inchant most religiously affected soules. (5:335)

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Hooker goes on to identify the "misconceit" forming "the root of which error," but by using the term "inchant" he has revived one of the traditional dismissals of eloquence as an art comparable with magic.[^]
° Similarly, in the Sermon Found in the Study of Bishop Andrews,

recreating the biblical scene when the Israelites, escaping from Egypt, are blocked by mountains on one hand and the Red Sea before them, he imagines them exclaiming, "Is this the milk and honey that have been so spoken of? this the paradise in description wherof so much glozing and deceiving eloquence hath been spent?" (5:390). The more words, so to speak, the more deceit.

Hooker's own sermons, however, use some traditional resources of rhetoric, as well they might. Lest anyone should object that Hooker contradicts himself, it can be said at once that he is not guilty of either empty declamations or over-polished eloquence. Paul Forte has itemized some of the rhetorical devices Hooker used,[^] but he has not commented on the fact that, measured in terms of frequency on the page, say, or compared with other preachers, Hooker uses such resources relatively sparingly. And although Forte has pointed out that most of Hooker's sermons were not intended for oral delivery (5:657), he does not see that this crucial point may explain the relative infrequency of rhetorical schemes and tropes. He does, however, record that "only the Two sermons on part of S. Jude's Epistle and the funeral sermon A Remedy against Sorrow and Feare seem to have been delivered from the pulpit as sermons," and he rightly takes issue with Keble's judgment that "the former's frequent 'sharpness and quickness' of tone and occasional 'vagueness of phraseology' " make their authenticity doubtful, arguing that these qualities actually "characterize oral delivery" (5:664). Forte points out that these three sermons make greater use of direct address, colloquial diction, and an immediate form of rhetoric (the figure interrogatio, using questions to make assertions or denials), which distinguish them from his other "more polished compositions," written to be read (5:665).

The distinction that we must make is not between written and oral delivery as using rhetoric or not, but between different kinds of rhetoric. Some of the written-out sermons, as Forte shows, are more carefully

^{^^} This tradition began with Plato's travesty of rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, and was regularly revived by its detractors.

[^] Forte, "Hooker's Rhetoric," FLE 5:674-82.

Structured on the form of a classical oration as adapted to the sermon: exordium, division, definition, confirmation, confutation, peroration (5:669-71). But in addition, I would argue, they have a much more complex intellectual structure, a tissue of logical argument, abounding in definitions and distinctions. Travers, indeed, objected to this ratiocinative style, but Hooker justified using the "distinctions and helpes of schooles" as being sanctioned by those "most approved for learninge and judgemente" (cit. Forte, 5:665). We need to realize that the organizing principles of Hooker's sermons are taken from logic or dialectic, rather than rhetoric. The Learned Discourse of Justification, for instance, argues the Church of England's position, as against the Catholics', with a close tissue of ratiocination, distinguishing essence, manner, and means, a structure of propositions, deductions, antecedents, and consequents (5:110ff).

These logical structures are so important that they sometimes obtrude themselves into the argument, as in a sequence where Hooker uses the technique of *reductio ad absurdum* to ridicule the argument that, since heathens acknowledged the providence of God, "the foundation of our faith concerning Christe lieth secretly wrapped up and is virtually con- teyned" in some heathen utterances. Hooker's withering response is: "Might we not with as good colour of reason defend that every ploughman hath all the sciences wherein philosophers have exceld?" Or that to plant three acorns is to produce three oak-trees — "for virtually an acorne is an oke"? The conclusion to this section of argument follows, and leads on to the one that grows out of it:

To avoid suche paradoxes we teache playnly that to hold the foundation is in expresse termes to acknowledge it.

25. Nowe because the foundation is an affirmatyve proposition they all overthrowe it who denye it; they directly overthrowe it who denye it directly and they overthrowe it by consequente or indirectly which hold any one assertion whatsoever whereupon the directe deniall thereof male be necessarily concluded. (5.135)

In such sequences of rigorous argument, *logos* rules, *ethos*, and *pathos*, the other principal modes of persuasion, are not called on. The operative words so often in the sermons are "prove," "demonstrate," a process in which *docere* holds the attention throughout, occasionally reinforced by *movere*. Reason on its own does most of the work, calling in emotion sometimes to express compassion, or indignation, or (occasionally) to

arouse more feeling at the end of the sermon. In his preaching Hooker practised what he advocated, "a restrained style of preaching," as Forte calls it, "one that delimited rather than generated rhetorical effects" (5:662-63).

II

The conclusions of this preamble inquiring into Hooker's attitude to sacred eloquence apply, I believe, to *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politic*. Here, too, we find a restrained use of rhetoric and a distrust of verbal effects, seen either as having been bought at the expense of the subject-matter, or as being deliberately designed to confuse and deceive. Here, also, I shall argue. Hooker's use of rhetoric is ultimately subordinate to, and dependent on, logical argument. But, most interestingly, the cautions expressed toward rhetoric, especially the branch known as epideictic, while continuing to govern Hooker's attitude toward public rhetoric, seem to be suspended as concerning himself. Here we find what I should like to call his "private rhetoric" — though that may seem a paradox, almost an oxymoron, given that rhetoric is by definition an art with which we persuade others.

For the classic exposition of the three types of rhetoric, we turn, as Hooker may have done, to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, with its challenging argument that it is not the speaker but the hearer who in effect "determines the speech's end and object" (1358^a 36-38).^{^^} Aristotle assigned three roles to the hearer, each defining a distinct genus of rhetoric. The hearer is "either a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer." As judge, member of the jury in a law-court, the hearer decides about things that have already happened, giving the category of forensic (legal, judicial) oratory; as member of a political assembly, responding to political (or deliberative) oratory, he decides on what must be done; and as "observer" or onlooker he listens to a set speech on ceremonial occasions, demonstrative or epideictic oratory, on which no formal judgment depends (1358^a 1-13). Epideictic rhetoric, however, is already associated with ethics, for this form of oratory "either

^{^^} Quotations are from the translation by W. R. Roberts, in *The Works of Aristotle*, ed. W. D. Ross, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1924), corrected in Jonathan Barnes, ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, 2 vols., BoUingen Series 71 (Princeton: Princeton

Univ. Press, 1984). For a general discussion of Aristotle's Rhetoric, and further reading, see, e.g., Brian Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric*, 18-26 and *passim*.

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praises or censures somebody," and aims at "proving him worthy of honour or the reverse" (1358^{*} 13, 27-28), the qualities worthy of honor being subsumed under arete, virtue (or "excellence"), "a faculty of providing and preserving good things" or "a faculty of beneficence," of which "the highest kinds . . . must be those which are most useful to others, and for this reason men honour most the just and courageous, since courage is useful to others in war, justice both in war and in peace" (1366[^] 36-1366 6). As it took on greater importance in Roman oratory, and acquired an independent existence in the Renaissance, epideictic became essentially an exercise in ethics, for it was axiomatic that good deeds were to be praised, and followed, bad ones denounced, and shunned.[^] (But of course what constitutes good or bad is open to definition, and in situations involving controversy "virtue" itself becomes the property of one side, the other being denied it.) Epideictic reinforcing aims either to strengthen a right attitude, or change a wrong one, according to the values of its users, but seldom results in a formal vote. In the other two forms, however, the hearer-judge must take part in a collective decision. "Deliberative speaking urges us either to do or not to do something," involving political action in the future, while forensic speaking invites us to decide about things that have already happened. In a law-case it is essential to "establish the justice or injustice of some action" that has taken place, all other issues being subsidiary to justice. The political orator, by contrast, "aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action," as bringing either good or harm to the community (1358 8-12, 21-26).

If we evaluate Hooker's *Lawes* against this background, it seems to me that, given its emphasis on justice and law, it obviously comes within judicial oratory. If we consider it from the perspective of time, as defined by Aristotle, we must also classify it as judicial oratory, since it refers to an action which has indeed taken place, namely the 1559 Act of Supremacy and the establishment of the Church of England with its prayer book, liturgy, and other visible forms and practices. As far as the reformers are concerned, since they are pleading for many changes yet to be carried out, all of their writings belong to deliberative oratory, and William P. Haugard has suggested that

Hooker's work is also an instance of deliberative rhetoric." My view is that Hooker would have rejected that classifica-

^ See, e.g., Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric*, 28, 38, 49, 54-62, and passim; also "Epideictic and Epic in the Renaissance," *hJeu Literary History* 14 (1982): 497-537. ^* In his Intro, to *Lau)es Pref.*, FLE 1:73. I should like to take this opportunity to

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tion, since he did not feel that the refomiers had produced any case for reform. They might see the issue as deliberative, a course of action yet open, but he did not. His book is intended to reject the proposed reforms, and "maintaine thinges that are established" (I.IA; 1:56). If we shift from the time perspective to the nature of the issues debated, here again the Lawes is essentially a work of judicial oratory, since it concerns the inherent justice of the Church of England's system, rather than consider- ing, as a political speech would, whether a proposed course of action is expedient or harmfril. Hooker, I argue, is more concerned with the under- lying principles involved than with any short-term pragmatic consider- ations. True, chapter 8 of the Preface is entitled "How just cause there is to feare the manifold dangerous events likely to ensue upon this intended reforma- tion, if it did take place" (1:36), and Hooker occasionally considers the chaos likely to ensue if specific reforms were adopted, such as the reform- ers' repressive attitude toward church festivals (V.71.4). But otherwise Hooker shows no interest in discussing the consequences of action in terms of expediency or practicalities. In the "excellent letter . . . Ck)ru:eming the new church discipline" which Cranmer wrote to Hooker, probably in 1593, W. Speed Hill sees Cranmer "urging upon him a role Hooker was reluctant to assume"— that is, as William Haugaard summarizes it, "to criticize his opponents not only for convictions they had openly owned, but also for possible consequences of their program" (FLE 6:45-46). Hooker's reluctance to assume that role may confirm my argument that his interests concerned law and justice rather than politics.

This is not an empty terminological dispute, for in the Renaissance, as in antiquity, judicial oratory specifically implied settling controversy and giving judgment on the basis of arguments and proofs. According to Melanchthon's understanding of the genus *judiciale*, "almost the

whole of rhetoric is concerned with these precepts for handling forensic disputes," precepts which are equally relevant to sixteenth-century Protestants, for

we teach these principles ... to instruct young men in the handling of controversies in the Epistles and for ecclesiastical problems as well. Now ecclesiastical disputes have in large part a certain resemblance to forensic debates. They expound laws, reprove antino-

correct a slip of the pen in my "Introduction 2" to McGrade and Vickers, Abridged Edition, where I described the oratory of praise and blame as "deliberative" (42) rather than demonstrative (epideictic). As Dr. Johnson once said, "knowledge is not always present."

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mies, that is, rules that seem to contradict each other; clear up ambiguities, argue at times *de jure*, at times *de facto*; and seek an understanding of the facts.^^

In his *Arte of Rhetorique* (1560), the most influential exposition of classical doctrine in the English Renaissance, Thomas Wilson attributes great importance to the judicial oration, whose function is to decide "whether the matter be right or wrong," while the deliberative (political) oration discusses "whether the cause be profitable, or unprofitable."^^ In the deliberative oration, he explains later, "we do persuade or dissuade, entreat or rebuke, exhort or dehort," using all possible emotional resources in trying to move a group or individual to an action,^^ but "we do not purpose ... to determine any matter in controversy" (p. 70). The "Oration Judicial," by contrast, "is an earnest debating in open assembly, of some weighty matter before a judge," for "the whole burden of weighty matters and the earnest trial of all controversies rest only upon judgment" (p. 120). In this kind of oration, Wilson states, it is important to always define the main point at issue, and to focus on it:

Not only is it needful in causes of judgment to consider the scope whereunto we must level our reasons and direct our invention, but also we ought in every case to have a respect unto some one especial point and chief article, that the rather the whole drift of our doings may seem to agree with our first-devised purpose, (pp. 120-21)

For this reason wise orators, "both in writing and speaking at large upon any matter, should ever have an eye to the chief title and principal ground of their whole intent," such a "chief ground of a matter" being known as

^^ Trans. LaFontaine, 113-14.

^* Thomas Wilson, *The Art of Rhetorique* (1553, 1560), ed. Peter E. Medine (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1994), 54. Further page references incorporated into the text.

^^ Wilson's account of arousing the emotions as being characteristic of deliberative oratory derives from classical rhetoric: see, e.g., Quintilian: "As regards appeals to the emotions, these are especially necessary in deliberative oratory. Anger has frequently to be excited or assuaged and the minds of the audience have to be swayed to fear, ambition, hatred, reconciliation. At times again it is necessary to awaken pity" (*Institutes of Oratory*, 3.8.12). "In forensic speeches (*judiciis*) the orator may, according to the generally received opinion, indulge his passions to some extent" (13), but not as much as in political oratory. For further remarks "*de judiciali genere*" see 3.9.1-3.1 1.28. Quoted from the Loeb Library translation by H. E. Butler, 4 vols. (London, 1920-22; 1963).

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a "state" or issue (88) -the so-called "status" doctrine, which Wilson then treats in the manner of Cicero's *De inventione* or the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (pp. 122-26).

One of the states Wilson discusses is "The Oration of Right or Wrong, Called Otherwise the State Juridical"^^ which considers whether a deed is "right or wrong," in which "the manner of doing is examined, and the matter tried through reasoning and much debating whether it be wrongfully done or otherwise." If the matter is "defended to be right" by its "own nature" (not appealing to external criteria), this is called "the state absolute," and Wilson, summarizing the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, outlines seven *topoi* or "Places of Confirmation" which may be used to settle the issue:

i. Nature itself.

ii. God's law and man's law.

ill. Custom.

iv. Equity.

V. True dealing.

vi. Ancient examples.

vii. Covenants and deeds authentic. (131) This sequence of topics, from Nature down through divine and human law, is one that Wilson had used earlier, appropriately enough, to define justice as "a virtue . . . giving everyone his own, minding in all things the common profit of our country" (73). Natural law, he argues, is reinforced by God's will, and becomes at first "ordinary custom," which is then codified as law, both secular and religious (ibid.). Hooker's *Of the Lawes of EcclesiasticaU Politic*, I suggest, constitutes just such an "Oration of Right or Wrong," an "earnest trial" of a controversy, a "Juridical" oration concerning a "state absolute," namely the English Church as it was established in 1559. While not excluding emotional appeal, the emphasis in Wilson's discussion of judicial oratory falls more upon reason and judgment than on persuasion, discussion, or exhortation. This emphasis pushes it more toward the domain of logic and those sciences that are

^* One of Wilson's main sources throughout this section is the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which emphasizes the need to "fix upon . . . the point to which the complete economy of the entire speech should be directed" (1.16.25), and which sets out the "Absolute Juridical Issue" as having the following "constituent departments. . . : Nature, Statute, Custom, Previous Judgements, Equity, and Agreement," which are then defined (2:13.19-20). Quoted from the Loeb Library translation by H. Caplan (London, 1954).

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"rather learned by demonstration, than taught by any great utterance" (1). Whereas the rhetorician reveals his skills "by large amplification, and beautifying of his cause," the logician does so "by plain teaching" (65), and Wilson recommends "that every man should desire and seek to have his logic perfect before he look to profit in rhetoric,

considering the ground and confirmation of causes is for the most part gathered out of logic" (145). It seems to me that the Lawes is addressed above all to "the ground and confirmation of causes," an example of judicial oratory, in which, as Aristotle observed, the enthymeme has a special value (1368[^] 31-32; 1418[^] 1).

If we learn to see the Lawes as a work of judicial rather than political oratory, a work which proceeds by "plain teaching" rather than "great utterance," we can also better evaluate Hooker's preferences in the mode of persuasion to be used. Whichever genus the orator chose he could apply any of the three kinds of "modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word," as Aristotle defined them, namely ethos, pathos, and logos. "The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on the putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof ... provided by the words of the speech itself (1356[^] 2-4). In practical terms, ethos involves presenting the speaker's own character, or that of his client, in a favorable light (1356[^] 4-13; 1377[^] 21-32). Pathos, as we might expect, involves arousing the audience's good will toward oneself (1358[^] 13ff.), while every opportunity should be seized of making them ill-disposed toward one's opponent (1415[^] 27-28, 1418[^] 28, 1418[^] 5ff., 1419[^] 10-28). It seems to me that in the Lawes, as in the sermons, Hooker was primarily interested in using logos, rational proof, rather than either ethos or pathos. The parts of Aristotle's Rhetoric most germane to his purpose and method are those dealing with the resources of argument available in rhetoric, which resemble those used in dialectic, with certain differences. Where dialectic uses induction, rhetoric uses example; where dialectic uses deduction, rhetoric uses the enthymeme (1356[^] 1-1358[^] 35). I shall argue later that Hooker did in fact use dialectic, but not in the highly schematic mode of the schools. He seems to have noted Aristotle's caveat that rhetoric, unlike logic, is not a specialized form of argument, but deals with "such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning" (1357[^] 1-3). The orator wishing to produce persuasion by means of rational argument will avoid forming long chains of deductions, for such kind of reasonings

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"will necessarily be hard to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of untrained thinkers" (1357[^] 7-13). The orator who wishes to convince a popular audience, then, must use the

enthymeme, which consists "of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up a primary deduction," or syllogism (1357" 16-17), and is based on propositions that "hold for the most part," that is, probabilities, not necessities (25ff.)- "For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character" (25-26). The enthymeme, Aristotle adds later, is "a deduction dealing with . . . questions of practical conduct, courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided" (1394' 25-27). Although a more simplified form of reasoning than the syllogism, the enthymeme can be effective in achieving the goal of arguments in rhetoric, which "is to attempt demonstrative proofs" (1417^ 20-21). The process of rational, demonstrative argument, as Aristotle conceives it, seems to exclude appeal to the emotions, for he advises the orator to "avoid the enthymeme form when you are trying to rouse feeling" (1418'

13).

As a work of judicial rhetoric, "an earnest debating in open assembly, of some weighty matter before a judge," in Wilson's words, and using argumentative reasoning in a non-specialist manner, the Lawes is fundamentally concerned to win the assent of its audience that the arguments and proofs available to the Church of England are superior to those of the reformers. In the opening section of the Preface Hooker records that, having considered the whole matter, he could see no alternative but

to set doivne this as my finaU resolute persuasion, Surely the present forme of Churchgovemment which the lawes of this land have established, is such, as no lawe of God, nor reason of man hath hitherto bene alleaged of force sufficient to prove they do ill, who to the uttermost of their power withstand the alteration thereof. Contrariwise, The other which in stead of it we are required to accept, is only by error and misconception named the ordinance of Jesus Christ, no one prooffe as yet brought forth whereby it may cleerely appear e to be so in very deede. (Pref. 1.2; 1:2)

Here Hooker fulfils the injunctions of the rhetoric-books to make a clear statement of "the status of the case" at issue. As Melanchthon phrases it, "in relation to every problem or controversial question we consider what the status is, that is, what is the chief subject of inquiry, the proposition that contains the gist of the matter toward which all arguments are aimed,

in Other words, the main conclusion. No matter of debate can be comprehended, nothing can be explained, stated or grasped in an orderly fashion, except some proposition be formulated which includes the sum total of the case."^^ In accordance with the principles of rational argument, Hooker's Lawes will depend solely on "reason" and "proof," to distinguish "contrariwise" truth from falsehood, good from evil. Calvin, Beza, and their followers believe that "they in this cause had the truth. We being as fully perswaded otherwise, it resteth that some kinde of triall be used to finde out which part is in error" (Pref. 2.10; 1:12). As he explains in Book II, "this whole question which hath beene mooved about the kinde of Church regiment, we could not but for our owne resolutions sake, endeavour to unrip and sift; following therein, as neare as we might, the conduct of that judiciall method which serveth best for invention [discovery] of truth" (II.1.3; 1:146).

That explicit reference confirms my argument that Hooker is consciously modelling his work on the genus *judiciale* of classical rhetoric, engaging the reader in a "trial" which will in part resemble a law-court action, in part a philosophical enquiry, in both cases involving the search for truth by a process of rational argument. This double process of discrimination that Hooker is about to set in motion will appeal to innate human faculties, above all judgment: "The first meane whereby nature teacheth men to judge good from evill as well in lawes as in other things, is the force of their owne discretion" (Pref. 3.1; 1:12). This faculty of judgment, he holds, is common to the whole human race, without special education, for "Some things are so familier and plaine, that truth from falshood, and good from evill is most easily discerned in them, even by men of no deepe capacitie" (Pref. 3.2; 1:13). As a written document, then, the Lawes exists on two planes. It is primarily an argument addressed to the reformers, which hopes to persuade them to change their minds. But it is also written for a general public, setting out the opposing cases fully, and inviting the reader, like a real jury, to judge between them. To give one instance only of this invitation to judge, consider his concluding argument against the reformers' belief that "the word of God" is only properly expounded by sermons, and not by reading Scripture:

The worde which saveth our soules is neere us, we need for knowledge but to read and live. The man which readeth the word of

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God the word it selfe doth pronounce blessed, if he also observe the same. Now all these thinges beinge well considered, it shalbe no intricate matter for any man to judge with indifferencie, on which parte the good of the Church is most convenientlie sought; whether on oures whose opinion is such as hath bene showed, or els on theires. (V.22.15-16; 2.103)

In appealing to a general reading public, Hooker fulfils all of Aristotle's injunctions about addressing "an audience of untrained thinkers" (1357' 11-12), the need to work a stage at a time, arguing "from common knowledge [to] draw obvious conclusions" (1395" 30-31), constructing clearly-defined sequences of proof and demonstration. As Hooker puts it in a revealing passage in Book V, discussing the place of sermons within the liturgy.

Our desire is in this present controversie, as in the rest, not to be carried up and downe with the waves of uncertaine argumentes, but rather positivelie to lead on the mindes of the simpler sorte by plaine and easie degrees, till the verie nature of the thinge it selfe doe make manifest what is truth. (V.21.2; 2:84)

By his reference to "the simpler sort" Hooker is not writing, as Richard Helgerson claims, from the position of a self-appointed elite distancing itself from popular religion. ¹⁰⁰ The church he represents is actually a popular church, open to the whole people of England, and is not the property of some elite (the very terms seem anachronistic and misplaced). It is perfectly realistic, however, in an age where illiteracy was common, to distinguish those who could only absorb the word of God by ear and voice from those who could, in addition, read. Hooker is essentially concerned with "leading on" the mind or reason of the general reading public, the community of Christian believers, "positivelie" — that is, through a series of positions, set out and argued according to correct procedure.

III

Hooker's attitude to his readership is one of transparent honesty. By

^ Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992), 272, 279. Cf. Debora Shuger's rejoinder in this volume, p. 307- 29.

invoking the framework of judicial oratory, the "earnest debating in open assembly of some weighty matter before a judge," he is setting up a fair trial in an open court, with all the evidence properly cited, and a scrupu' lous observance of legal proceeding. The appeal will be to our judgment, so that we can "judge with indifference," not swayed by emotion. As in his theory and practice of preaching. Hooker seems consciously to eschew emotional appeal, preferring logos over pathos. He chooses the judicial genus because it depends on rational argument, unlike epideictic, which moves its hearers or readers to love or hate by working on their emotions. Hooker's distrust of pathos emerges explicitly in his disapproving narrative of how Calvin's Genevan followers misused epideictic rhetoric, a deterrent instance of how a religious community should not propagate its beliefs. The second chapter of the Preface recounts "The first establishment of new discipline by M. Calvins industry in the Church of Geneva, and the beginning of strife about it amongst our selves" (1:3-12), while the third chapter draws the main lesson to be learned from that brief history, "By what meanes so many of the people are trained into the liking of that discipline" (1:12-21). This chapter is extremely important for understanding Hooker's choices and avoidances within rhetoric, for it analyzes the psychology of collective religious belief which was exploited in the reformers' polemical campaign to "train" or form the minds of their congregation. The "meanes" that they so successfully employed made great use of epideictic rhetoric, with its complementary practices of vituperatio and laus, blame and praise. The factors which moved "the common sort so much to favour this innovation" Hooker tells his interlocutors, were not "the force of particular reasons" but "certaine generall inducements . . . used to make saleable your Cause ingrosse" which had the intended effect on "inclinable and prepared miruies" (Pref. 3.5; 1:15). Rather than a philosophical or rational argument, the reformers mounted a sales-campaign, using a debased form of rhetoric on easily susceptible customers.

The reformers' "method of winning the peoples affection unto a generall liking of the Cause (for so ye terme it)," Hooker records, was to arouse their followers' feelings by the "exceeding severity ar\nd sharpnes ofreprooffe" with which they "ripped up" "the faults especially of higher callings," winning for themselves "a great good opinion of integritie, zeale and holines" (Pref. 3.6; 1:15). Then they went on "to impute all faults and corruptions wherewith the worlde. aboundeth, unto the kind of Ecclesiasticall govemement established," so gaining

the added reputation of wisdom (Pref. 3.7; 1:15). Having used vituperatio to get "thus much sway in the hearts of men," Calvin's puritan

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followers then used the matching technique of laus "to propose their owne forme of Church govemement, as the only soveraigne remedy of all evils; and to adome it with aU the ^xrrious titles that may be" (Pref. 3.8; 1:16). The reformers' next "degree of inducement" involved "fashioning the very notions and conceipts of mens minds in such sort, that when they read the Scripture, they may thinke that every thing soundeth towards the advancement of that disci' pline, and to the utter disgrace of the contrary" (Pref. 3.9; 1:16). Hooker alleges that they performed a kind of brain-washing, comparable to that by which Pythagoras communicated to his students the "misfashioned preconceipt" that "the elementes of number gave essence and being to the workes of nature" (ibid.).

Hooker reconstructs with fascinated disapproval the method by which the reformers achieved a still more remarkable triumph of rhetoric, "t/ie perswading of men credulous and over capable of such pleasing errors, that it is the spedaU illumination of the holy Ghost, whereby they disceme those things in the word, which others reading yet disceme them not" (Pref. 3.10; 1:17). Their belief in the sole tightness of their biblical interpretation is so dangerous that Hooker goes out of his way to attack it, arguing that there are only two ways that the Spirit can lead men to truth, "the one that which we call by a special! divine excellency Revelation, the other Reason" (ibid.). The second being "common" to mankind, the first extraordinary, those who claim to possess it. Hooker wryly remarks, must be prophets. If they have been guided by reason, however, since "perswasions grounded upon reason are either weaker or stronger according to the force of those reasons whereupon the same are grounded," then their claims can be rationally evaluated, without using emotional pressure. Throughout this sequence Hooker presents rhetorical persuasion, which appeals to the emotions and imagination, as a dangerous deviation from logic and reason. He ends it by pxDinting to the baser human faculties that are being manipulated, declaring "that when mens affections doe frame their opinions, they are in defense of error more earnest" (ibid.), the passions having by definition in classical psychology no access to the processes of rational judgment. Also opposed to reason is "fancy" or fantasy, easily affected by the passions:

After that the phancie of the common sort hath once throu'lie apprehended the Spirit to be author of their perswasion concerning discipline, then is instilled into their hearts, that the same Spirit leading men into this opinion, doth thereby seale them to be Gods children. (Pref. 3.11; 1:18)

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This conviction of their being set apart gave rise to "high tearmes of separation" being used "betweene such and the rest of the world, whereby the one sort are named The brethren, The godlie, and so forth, the other worldlings, timeservers, pleasers of men not of God, with such like" (ibid.)- This rhetorical self-elevation, down-grading all outside their group, means in turn that "they are easilie drawne on to thinke it exceeding necessarie, for feare of quenching that good Spirit, to use all meanes whereby the same may be both strengthned in themselves, and made manifest unto others" (Pref. 3.12; 1:18). As a group apart, any means are legitimate that will preserve their identity.

Hooker's reconstruction of the method by which the leading zealots gained such control over their followers attributes much success, and considerable moral responsibility, to epideictic rhetoric. The complementary techniques of blame and praise, he claims, were used to discredit the established government and legitimize their own. By a series of calculated appeals to people's "affections" and "phancie" the reformers managed to instil in them a conviction that their way of interpreting Scripture was directly given by the Holy Spirit, a gift which set them apart from all lesser mortals and justified them in whatever means they might use to advance their cause. Having accredited rhetoric with such dubious powers. Hooker is surely not about to use the same methods himself. Faced with the reformers' constant demand to be able to take part in open disputation with the established church, a demand to which he attributes many dangerous consequences, Hooker is at the most willing to conceive of a "solemne conference" taking place, provided that the reformers agree to take on "the plaintiffs or opponents part, which must consist altogether in proofe and confirmation of two things, the one, that our orders by you condemned we ought to abolish, the other that yours, we are bound to accept in the stead thereof" (Pref. 5.3; 1:28). Such a meeting would be like a scholastic disputation, involving "proofe and confirmation" according to the conventions of logic, with the parties involved directing their arguments against each other, not using rhetoric toward the public. It would not at all resemble an epideictic

contest, in which the audience's emotions are aroused for one side, and against the other.

Sharply aware of the power of rhetoric over "the unlearned sort," Hooker scorns to use the same weapons as the reformers. He frequently affirms his belief in discussion, and his hope to achieve consensus and a peaceful settlement to the controversy. He wishes to convince both the reformers and the general reader by rational argument, and he is certainly

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not lacking for either a cheap victory or the destruction of his opponents. Setting out "The matter conteyned in these eyg/it bookes" he disclaims any other

intent ... in these severall bookes of discourse, then to make it appeare unto you, that for the ecclesiastical lawes of this land, we are led by great reason to observe them, and yee by no necessitie bound to impugne them. It is no part of my secret meaning to draw you hereby into hatred or to set upon the face of this cause any fairer aspect, then the naked truth doth afford: but my whole endeavor is to resolve the conscience, and to shewe as neere as I can what in this controversie the hart is to thinke, if it will follow the iug/it of sound and sincere judgement, without either cloud of prejudice, or mist of passionate affection. (Pref. 7.1; 1:34)

Those derogatory terms — "mist of passionate affection"— describe the working of rhetoric as seen by a critic of rhetoric. That statement is an instance of Hooker using the orator's ethos, his belief in the importance of integrity and upright dealing, which — as so often in rhetoric — abjures the use of unfair or manipulative rhetoric, either appealing to baser instincts or reinforcing malice and prejudice. A similar affirmation of his wish to convince us by the use of argument, not persuasion, by the coherence of the *res* he will expound rather than by his skill with *verba*, comes at the end of Book I. Having "endeavourd in part to open, of what nature and force lawes are, according unto their severall kindes" (1.16.1; 1:134), Hooker comments on those methods which he has been using, and those which he has deliberately avoided:

It might peradventure have beene more popular and more plausible to vulgar eares, if this first discourse had beene spent in extolling the

force of lawes, in shewing the great necessitie of them when they are good, and in aggravating their offence by whom publique lawes are injuriously traduced. But for as much as with such kind of matter the passions of men are rather stirred one way or other, then their knowledge any way set forward unto the tryall of that whereof there is doubt made; I have therefore turned aside from that beaten path and chosen though a lesse easie, yet a more profitable way in regard of the end we propose. (1:134-35)

Again disclaiming epideictic rhetoric ("extolling the force of laws . . . aggravating their offence"), and with it stirring up "the passions of men" rather than setting forward "their knowledge," Hooker places his work

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firmly in the genre of judicial rhetoric ("the tryall of that wherof there is doubt made"). The dichotomy between persuasion (negative) and instruction (positive) seems total.

Hooker's explicit abjuring of move in the Lawes, as in his preaching theory, means that his rhetoric will be that of docere, of teaching, instructing, informing. Thus, in the passage from which I have been quoting, he goes on to declare that

Least therefore any man should mervayle whereunto all these thinges tend, the drift and purpose of all is this, even to show in what maner . . . this very gift of good and perfect lawes is derived from the father of lightes; to teach men a reason why just and reasonable lawes are of so great force, of so great use in the world; and to enforme their mindes with some methode of reducing the lawes wherof there is present controversie unto their first originall causes, that so it may be in every particular ordinance thereby the better discerned, whether the same be reasonable just and righteous or no. (ibid.; 1:35)

Those verbs are instructive, his main "drift and purpose" (terms also used by Wilson in describing the "oration judicial") being "to show ... to teach ... to enforme," so that "it may be ... better discerned." The qualities that we expect from good instruction are clarity of exposition and coherence of argument. Hooker frequently demonstrates his awareness of this requirement, often using the technique (quite common in rhetoric) of a distributio or partitio to separate or distinguish the various parts of his argument, a process which

achieves coherence and also openly declares where each particular argument is to be placed within the general structure. Concluding chapter 7 of the Preface, where he has set out the design of the whole work, he writes:

Thus have I layd before you the brief e of these my travailes, and presented under your view the limmes of that cause litigious betweene us: the whole intier bodie whereof being thus compact, it shall be no troublesome thing for any man to find ech particular controversies resting place, and the coherence it hath with those things, either on which it dependeth, or which depend on it. (Pref. 7.7; 1:36)

Hooker has also consciously mediated between erecting his own structures and considering the reader's needs, taking care lest his argument "in this present cause" — "cause" being a technical term in legal rhetoric— might

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"seeme to a number [of readers] ... darke, and intricate" (1.1.2; 1:56). Aware of this danger, he has "endeavourd throughout the bodie of this whole discourse, that every former part might give strength unto all that followe, and every later bring some Ught unto all before" (ibid.; 1:57). If readers will suspend judgment until they have read further, he asserts, what seemed dark will become clear, and "the later particular decisions will appeare ... more strong" from the arguments that have preceded them.

Yet, although Hooker can use such an essentially oratorical device as *partitio* to organize his overall structure, for the execution of the argument he is primarily indebted to logic or dialectic. Melancthon, in his dialectic-dominated rhetoric-book, lays down that the writer or speaker must start by asking "What is the thing? What are its parts or species? What are its causes? What are its effects? What things are related to it and what things are opposed to it?," always offering a definition to establish "the exact meaning and definition of terms" (99-100). As every reader notices, the Lawes abounds in definitions, regularly laying down fundamental principles, deriving supporting arguments from the consequences, refuting false premisses and false deductions. Here again Hooker is perfectly clear and open about his method. He announces that first principles must be established before one can proceed to generalities (e.g., Pref. 5.3, 1:28; 1.1.3, 1:58),

otherwise no argument will be strongly formed:

In all parts of knowledge rightly so termed things most generall are most strong: Thus it must be, in as much as the certaintie of our perswasion touching particulars dependeth altogether upon the credite of those generalities out of which they growe. (II. 1.3; 1:146)

From that indisputable premise Hooker acknowledges that certainty is not always possible, for "every cause admit not such infallible evidence of profe, as leaveth no possibilitie of doubt or scruple behind it" (an admission which, in Aristotelian terms, makes him reliant on enthymeme rather than syllogism). All the same, he concludes that those "who claime the generall assent of the whole world unto that which they teach . . . must have speciall regard that their first foundations and grounds be more then slender probabilities" (ibid.). Beginning his refutation of the reformers' position on "matters of outtward forme in the exercise of true religion," in a

~ Cf., e.g., Cicero, *De inventione*, 1.22.31; Quintilian, 4.5.1-25; and Brian Vickers, *Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968), 30-60.

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chapter which is wholly cast into logical form, offering "Power generall propositions . . . which maie resonahly be graunted. . . . And fildie of a rule not safe nor reasonable in these cases" (V.5.1; 2:31), Hooker declares that

It is with teachers of Mathematicall sciences usuall, for us in this present question necessarie, to laye downe first certaine reasonable demaundes which in most particulars foUowinge are to serve as principles whereby to worke, and therefore must be before hande considered, (ibid.)

The reformers follow the same logical method, but not correctly, for they "propose . . . generall axiomes, some of them subject unto just exceptions," some "rules ... too generall" and other "principles ... too farre from truth" (V.5.1.1; 2:32). It behooves Hooker, then, to fulfill the conditions for satisfactory arguments by propounding solid principles, with appropriate qualifications, all addressed to the specific issues, general or particular.

Hooker's concern to follow "that judiciall method which serveth best for invention of truth" makes him observe the injunction of Thomas Wilson that in such a cause speakers should always "have an eye to the chief title and principal ground of their whole intent." This is why the Lawes abounds in axioms and general principles, consciously offered at every turn. Hooker is well aware of the methodological status of the axiom as a ground or rule beyond dispute. So he writes:

In every kind of knowledge some such grounds there are, as that being proposed the mind doth presently embrace them as free from all possibilitie of error, cleare and manifest without prooffe. (1.8.5; 1:85)²

The majority of these axioms occur at the opening of chapters, and many of them begin with the words "all" or "none." Such propositions are known to sixteenth-century logicians as "general, or universall proposi- clones," and in a typical logic treatise, Thomas Wilson's Rule of Reason (1551)³ we read that the main rule to be observed "for makynge of a

² Similarly in a later passage: "No science doth make knowne the first principles whereon it buildeth, but they are alwaies either taken as plaine and manifest in them selves, or as proved and graunted already, some former knowledge having made them evident" (III.8.13; 1:230-31).

³ Thomas Wilson, *The Rule of Reason*, ed. Richard S. Sprague (Northridge, Calif.: San Fernando Valley State College, 1972), 47, 60. This logic-book, first published in

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perfecte argument called Syllogismus" is that "the first proposition be universal," containing the words "omnis, that is to saie, all: or els Nullus, that is to saie, none." Hooker makes particularly intense use of such universal propositions in the crucial opening phases of his argument in Book 1, on law. Chapter 2, "Of that lawe which God from before the beginning hath set for himselfe to do all things by," begins:

All things that are have some operation not violent or casuall. Neither doth any thing ever begin to exercise the same without some foreconceaved ende for which it worketh. And the ende which it

worketh for is not obtained, imlesse the worke be also fit to obtaine it by. For unto every ende every operation will not serve. That which doth assigne unto each thing the kinde, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth ap- point the forme and measure of working, the same we tearme a Lawe. a.2.1; 1:58)

It is with reluctance that I break off my quotation of that superbly organ- ized sequence of argument, but just to illustrate my point about Hooker's reliance on universal propositions I need to quote the beginning of the next section:

All things therefore do worke after a sort according to lawe: all other things according to a lawe, whereof some superiours, unto whome they are subject, is author; only the workes and operations of God have him both for their worker, and for the lawe whereby they are wrought. (1.2.2; 1:58-59)

Many other imiversal propositions are affirmed with equal conviction: "Al things (God only excepted) besides the nature which they have in them selves receive externally some perfection from other things" (1. 11.1; 1:110); "For sith all good lawes are the voyces of right reason, which is the instrument wherewith God will have the world guided" (V.9.3; 2:45). It is abundantly clear that Hooker has structured his work using the terms and techniques of formal logic. In Book V, chapter 60 he confident- ly announces:

The true necessitie of baptisme a fewe propositions considered will soone decide. All thinges which either are knowne causes or sett

1551, with at least six editions by 1580, is a good example of the Renaissance fusion of classical and medieval dialectic.

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meanes, whereby anie greate good is usually procured, or men delivered from greivous evell, the same wee must needes confesse necessarie. And if regeneration were not in this verie sense a thinge necessarie to eternall life

— and so the argument concludes, with appropriate reference to biblical texts (V.60.1; 2:254; author's italics). The logical tradition behind Hooker is explicitly acknowledged here, for at the word

"causes" a marginal note refers us to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* [5].5 (1015^a 20-23), but it is equally visible elsewhere. In Chapter 63 of Book V Hooker argues that

All pointes of Christian doctrine are either demonstrable conclusions or demonstrative principles. Conclusions have stronge and invincible proofes as well in the schoole of Jesus Christ as elsewhere. And principles be groundes which require no prooffe in any kinde of science, because it sufficeth if either their certaintie be evident in it selfe, or evident by the light of some higher knowledge, and in it selfe such as no mans knowledge is ever able to overthrowe. Now the principles whereupon wee doe build our soules have their evidence where they had their originall. (V.63.1; 2:290)

Hooker may start an argument from first principles or from analogy, but whatever the starting point, it soon develops strands or filaments that reach out to make other connections.

I am not arguing that there is no rhetoric in the *Lawes*: rather, that it is subordinated to logic, and, in the process, deprived of some of its normal attributes. Although the overall genus comes from rhetoric, namely the judicial oration, that is of all the rhetorical forms the one least dependent on emotional appeal. This delimitation of rhetoric and alignment toward logic, with its techniques of enunciating first principles and deducing consequences, has a marked effect on Hooker's style.^{1*} In general his style is characterized, as we have seen, by the frequent use of interlocking, overlapping syntactical and grammatical patterns. In these sequences several figures of rhetoric frequently occur, such as plosche, paronomasia, or polyptoton, but with this difference, that they are used more for clarificatory than for emotional effect. Renaissance rhetoric-

^{1*} For an admirable account of the stylistic consequences of this method see Georges Edelen, "Hooker's Style," in *S.R.H.*, 241-77, especially 243-48.

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books, like their classical predecessors, often distinguished two broad functions for verbal devices, either to clarify the point being made or to arouse the audience's emotions (as Henry Peacham put it, "to give more light or better note"). Hooker's use of the figures of repetition

seem to me to belong more to the former category, *docere* rather than *move*, as in this sequence describing the emergence of a need for the enforcement of law and order in society:

Men alwayes knew that when force and injurie was offered, they might be defendors of themselves; they knew that howsoever men may seeke their owne commoditie, yet if this were done with injurie unto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men and by all good means to be withstood; finally they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his owne right, and according to his owne determination proceede in maintenance therof. a- 10.4; 1:98-99)

We find in that sequence the rhetorical figures anaphora, repetition of a word at the beginning of a sequence of clauses ("Men alwayes knew . . . they knew. . ."), parison, or symmetrical grammatical structure throughout, paronomasia, repeating words derived from different roots having similar sounds ("all men ... all good means"), and polyptoton, repeating words derived from the same root but with different endings ("determine . . . determination"). Yet we experience no increase in the emotional level by using such figures.

In the great majority of instances Hooker's use of rhetorical repetition is what I would describe as non-emotive, designed to clarify the intellectual or doctrinal point at issue. Repetition seems in fact to be the automatic consequence of his overall structure of argument, in which particular points are deliberately interlinked so as to bring clarity and strength to the *res* or matter being expounded. Hooker uses the repetition of sounds not for emotional emphasis but to make basic distinctions in meaning, as in describing the behavior of "the common sort," who "are led by the swaye of their sensuall desires, and therefore do more shun sinne for the sensible evils" it produces than for "any kinde of sentence which reason doth pronounce against it" (1.10.10; 1:105; my italics). Or in discussing the link between "the name of fayth," which "must needes have reference unto some uttered worde, as the object of beliefe," Hooker urges that nevertheless, "sith the ground of credite is the credibilitie of thinges credited; and things are made credible, eyther by the knowne condition and qualitie of

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the utterer, or by. . ." (II.4.1; 1:151; my italics). Paronomasia and polyptoton in those two quotations may have a more biting effect than elsewhere, but their function is still to clear up the point being made

rather than arouse the reader's emotions toward love or hate. Those examples also show the other main rationale of such repetitions, to carry over the sense from one clause or sentence to the next, a sense which is either modified or reinforced in the process. So, beginning his refutation of the reformers in Book II, Hooker attacks the evil consequences of their erroneous desire to "enlarge the . . . word of God . . . further then . . . soundnes of truth will beare," inviting them in future

not to exact at our hands for every action the knowledge of some place of scripture out of which we stand bound to deduce it . . . [but] to acknowledge, that it sufficeth if such actions be framed according to the lawe of reason; the generall axiomes, rules, and principles of which law being so frequent in holy scripture, there is no let but in that regard, even out of scripture such duties may be deduced by some kinde of consequence (as by long circuit of deduction it may be that even all truth out of anie truth may be concluded); howbeit no man bound in such sort to deduce all his actions out of scripture, as if eyther the place be to him unknowne, whereon they may be concluded, or the reference unto that place not presently considered of, the action shall in that respect be condemned as unlawful!. (II.1.2; 1:145; my italics)

There the key terms (which I have italicized) are repeated, intertwined, discriminated, bobbing up and down at the appropriate moments in the argument.

Over and over Hooker repeats the key, meaning-bearing elements in the position he is either refuting or maintaining. So, for instance, the terms "wisdom" and "way," "well-doing" and "teach" echo and re-echo all the way through one long section of argument (II. 1.4; 1:146-48). There they occur throughout, elsewhere the key terms are repeated most densely at the beginning or the end, points of transition at which Hooker inter- weaves the parts of his argument as closely as can be, ties the whole down most firmly. He begins the next chapter of Book II by quoting Paul's injunction that "all things be done to the glorie of God," picking out the phrase "glorie of God," which is repeated and varied as "glorified . . . glory . . . glorifie." He continues by resuming, so to speak, the key terms of the preceding passage before moving on to introduce new ideas, a backward

movement which yields to a forward movement at the word "yet":

But be it a thing which requireth no more then onely our generall presupposed willingnesse to please God in all thinges; or be it a matter wherein we can not so glorifie the name of God as we should without an actuall intent to doe him in that particular some speciall obedience: yet for any thing there is in this sentence alleaged to the contrarie, God may be glorified by obedience, and obeyed by performance of his will, and his will be performed with an actuall intelligent desire to fulfill that lawe which maketh knowne what his will is . . . (II. 2. 2; 1:149; my italics)

the next link in the chain being the word "lawe." One section begins by drawing out the findings of the preceding argument — "Seinge therefore that grace is a consequent of Sacramentes" —before redefining the sacraments as

not physicall but morall instrumentes of salvation, duties of service and worship, which unlesse wee performe as the author of grace requireth, they are unprofitable. For all receyve not the grace of God which receive the sacramentes of his grace. Neither is it ordinarilie his will to bestowe the grace of sacramentes on anie, but by the sacramentes. Which grace also they that receive by sacramentes or with sacramentes, receive it from him and not from them. (V.57.4; 2:246-47; author's italics)

At times such repetitions may just strike the modern reader as neither eloquent nor euphonious, indeed at times rather clumsy.

This absence of literary polish is a sign that Hooker's eye is wholly on his subject, making the necessary discriminations and exceptions which will differentiate general from particular, ordinary from special. We never feel that he is writing for effect, but rather following out the logic of his argument in appealing to his readers' intellect. The fact that he seldom considers the claims of euphony suggests that, to him, polishing language too carefrilly might result in insincerity or deceit. We can see this concern with sense rather than sensuality in his use of the figure antimetabole, which repeats two terms while interchanging them. Hooker frequently chooses to focus on the finer shades of discrimination needed, unconcerned to create an impressive symmetry. For instance, discussing the role of the sacraments allowing believers to partake of God through Christ, who combines both human and divine nature, he writes that "whatsoever is naturall to deitie the same remayneth in Christ uncommunicated unto

his manhood, and whatsoever naturall to manhood his deitie thereof is incapable" (V.53.1; 2:216). A more self-conscious stylist might have polished that rather abrupt inversion; Hooker prefers to enlarge it with two sequences of repetition and interchange, one defining the "properties and operations" of Christ's deity, the other of his manhood (ibid.; 2:217). There is rhetoric, but it has been deprived of its cutting edge, addressed to the *res* not the *verba*.

IV

We can gain a further insight into Hooker's attitude to rhetoric if we consider the three audiences for whom he is writing. Two of them have already been mentioned, the general reading public, and the reformers as a group. As far as we readers are concerned. Hooker wants to reason us into agreement, not move us by any kind of emotional appeal. As regards his opponents, however, he had no hesitation in using rhetoric for polemical purposes. As I have observed elsewhere, "the traditional image of the "judicious Mr Hooker" exuding sweet reasonableness overlooks the pithy, sarcastic, or indignant stylistic resources he employed against the reformers. But it should be noted that these are for the most part pointed, often brief outbursts, which give the impression of spontaneous impatience rather than calculated detraction. Compared with Martin Marprelate, whose extended sequences of sarcasm, mockery, and raillery turn polemic into satire, or with less intelligent controversialists' use of abuse and indignation, Hooker's overriding seriousness, his concentration on the argument at hand, *ad rem* not *ad hominem*, makes his occasional outbursts all the more significant. Their appearance is a sign that the reformers' arguments have reached a special degree of incoherence, or perhaps danger.

One of the few extended satiric passages occurs in the Preface, chapter 8, entitled "Hoiv just cause there is to feare the manifold dangerous events likely to ensue upon this intended reformation, if it did take place" (1:36). In the first section Hooker summarizes some of the reformers' arguments by synthesizing various of their publications. Elsewhere he offers a formal summary, prefaced by "they think" or "they claim," but here he imagines one of the reformers making his case in *propria persona*. So Hooker writes a speech for him, using the figure of rhetoric known as *prosopopeia*. It is

*^ In McGrade and Vickers, Abridged Edition, 42-46, 54-56.

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a rather feeble speech, full of plaintive rhetorical devices, such as exclama- tion ("A/as what would ye have us to doe?" [1:37]) and repetition {"Whereat our hearts being fearefully troubled, we durst not, we durst not continue" [1:38]}, and ending with a travesty of logic to argue that if discipline be "an EcclesiasticaU matter. ...it must of necessitie belong to the dutie of the Minister" (ibid.). Having summarized the reformers' case in this prosopopoeia, Hooker curtly dismisses it: "Thus the foolish Barrowist deriveth his schisme by way of corudusion, as to him it seemeth, Srectly and plainely out of your principles. Him therefore we leave to be satisfied by you from whom he hath sproong" (1:19). There is no anger in these passages, just a cool, or sarcastically dismissive tone, as in the ending of a passage refuting the reformers' use of negative arguments from the Bible: "there is in all this lesse then nothing" (II.6.3; 1:170). Or again, concluding an earlier part of this discussion: "I wonder that a cause so weake and feeble hath bene so much persisted in" (II.5.5; 1:162). For most of the time, however, and very unusually for sixteenth-century controversy. Hooker preserves a serious tone, considers the reformers' arguments in scrupulous detail, and looks forward to a final peace and reconciliation which will welcome them back into the fold.

Hooker's most biting denunciations are reserved for groups or classes of people who either pervert the Christian community or destroy it altogeth- er. His account of the Anabaptists in chapter 8 of the Preface (Pref. 8.6- 13; 1:42-49) is a masterly exposure of perverse religious beliefs and practic- es that leaves us in no doubt as to the danger they represent. As for atheists. Hooker delivers a blistering denunciation, protesting that

towardses these so forlome creatures wee are (it must be confest) too patient the fiirie of this wicked broode hath the reines too

much at libertie, their tongues walke at large, the spitt venime of their poisoned hartes breaketh out to thannoyance of others, what their untamed lust suggesteth the same cheire licentious mouthes doe everie where sett abroch. (V.2.2; 2:24-25)

After two more pages expressing his deep revulsion. Hooker abandons them: "let goe this execrable crue" (V.3.1; 2:27). Almost as vitriolic is Hooker's denunciation of the impious, "whome God doth hate," as he shows by a cento of violent passages from the Old Testament (V.76.4; 2:416), and whom he dismisses as unable to

injoy that they have, . . . partlie because through error placinge it above thinges of farre more price and worth they turn that to

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poyson which might be food, ... in the nest of theire highest growth they lay foolishUe those egges out of which their wofuU

overthrowe is afterwarde hatcht So that in verie truth no

impious or wicked man doth prosper on earth, (ibid.; 2:416-17)

Such vituperative passages show that Hooker's deepest beliefs have been outraged, and that he possesses the resources of invective to deal with them."^{*} But once again, as with those figures of rhetoric involving repetition. Hooker is concerned with the subject matter, not with the reader. We never feel that he is trying to overwhelm us with passionate eloquence in order to change our minds or reinforce beliefs which we already have. Yet, of course, there are emotionally intense passages in the *Lawes*. These occur, I believe, when Hooker is writing for the third audience I mentioned, namely himself. They come not as the result of an attack on the reformers, nor out of any design on the reader, but of Hooker's own response to the thing described. He is himself moved by contemplating what he called "things of farre more price and worth," and the warmth of his feelings results in encomium. These celebrations of things precious use such tropes as metaphor and hyperbole, various rhetorical figures of symmetry and repetition, in order to express, and so to channel his own feelings of joy, reverence, awe. In so doing they yield passages of explicit praise. There is an element of inconsistency here, we must admit. After all. Hooker had disclaimed any intention to use epideictic rhetoric toward his readers, preferring to argue in "the light of sound and sincere judgement, without either cloud of prejudice, or mist of passionate affection" (Pref. 7.1; 1:34). He sarcastically exposed the Calvinists' use of epideictic rhetoric to impress their followers (Pref. 3.8; 1:16), and he concluded Book I by explaining that he had deliberately chosen not to adapt his discourse to "vulgar eares" by

"extolling the force of lawes . . . and in aggravating their offence by whom publique lawes are injuriously traduced" (1.16.1; 1:134- 35). Nonetheless, immediately afterwards. Hooker cannot resist adding an

^^ In his introduction to the Tractates and Sermons, discussing "The Opposition to Rome," Egil Grislis rejects Walton's "plaster saint's image of a 'meek and patient Mr. Hooker'. Patient he must have been, meek he certainly was not; angered, his prose became a formidable weapon, fully equal to the controversial demands of the occasion." Grislis appositely cites Keble's verdict, that " 'Like Moses, to whom Walton compares him, [Hooker] was by nature extremely sensitive, quick in feeling any sort of unfairness, and thoroughly aware of his own power to chastise it: so that his forbearance . . . must have been the result of strong principle, and unwearied self-control' " (FLE 5:634-35).

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encomium to law, expressing his own feelings and, in addition, providing a fitting conclusion to Book I:

Wherefore that here we may briefly end, of lawe there can be no lesse acknowledged, then that her seate is the bosome of God, her voyce the harmony of the world, all thinges in heaven and earth doe her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power, but Angels and men and creatures of what condition so ever, though ech in different sort and maner, yet all with uniforme consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy. (1.16.8; 1:142)

The contradiction, however, is only apparent. I suggest that when Hooker uses encomium it is not to influence his readers, but because he has been moved to express his own feelings about major aspects of Christian belief. So, in Book I, chapter 4, expounding "The law which Angels doe worhe by" in order "that we may lift up our eyes (as it were) from the footstoolle to the throne of God," he invites us to "consider a little the state of heavenly and divine creatures":

touching Angels which are spirits immateriall and intellectuall, the glorious inhabitants of those sacred palaces, where nothing but light and blessed immortalitie, no shadow of matter for teares, discontentments, greifes, and uncomfortable passions to worke upon, but all joy, tranquillitie, and peace, even for ever and ever doth dwell,

This whole chapter is imbued with celebration, hyperbole, responding to the unique status of angels in their proximity to God, and in their benevolence toward mankind:

For beholding the face of God, in admiration of so great excellencie they all adore him; and being rapt with the love of his beautie, they cleave inseparably for ever unto him. Desire to resemble him in goodness maketh them unweariable, and even unsatiable in their longing to doe by all meanes all manner good unto all the creatures of God, but especially unto the children of men; in the countenance of whose nature looking downward they behold themselves beneath themselves, even as upward in God, beneath whom themselves are, they see that character which is no where but in themselves and us resembled, (ibid.; 1:70)

As Hooker moves from describing the angels' attitude to God to their

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feelings toward man, he shifts from the trope of hyperbole ("inseparably . . . unweariable . . . unsatiable") to figures of repetition ("all . . . all . . . all"), producing his characteristic overlapping of key words. Here, though, there is an additional dimension, for the overlapping expresses a vertical relationship in the "Great Chain of Being," for they, "looking downward . . . behold . . . themselves beneath themselves" —that is, mankind; while "upward in God, beneath whom themselves are" they see the divine character, which is only "in themselves and us resembled." The closing paronomasia expresses in its verbal form the resemblance stated in the word's meaning, highlighting the new term: "and us."

Hooker is moved to praise, appropriately enough, by the major attributes of Christianity, in particular those involving grace and salvation. Such is the intricately woven passage meditating on "the tender compassion of God" in redeeming man "by the precious death" of Christ, and laying down a "supernaturall way" "that leadeth us from miserie unto blisse," and which forms a "way of supernaturall dutie," since it depends on our acceptance of belief, "the ground of those other divine virtues." The kernel of this meditation is formed by the three Christian virtues, faith, hope, and charity:

Concerning faith the principall object whereof is that eternall veritie

which hath discovered the treasures of hidden wisdom in Christ; concerning hope the highest object whereof is that everlasting goodnes which in Christ doth quicken the dead; concerning charitie the finall object whereof is that incomprehensible bewtie which shineth in the countenance of Christ the sonne of the living God; concerning these vertues, the first of which beginning here with a weake apprehension of things not sene, endeth with the intuitive vision of God in the world to come; the second beginning here with a trembling expectation of thinges far removed and as yet but onely heard of, endeth with reall and actual! fruition of that which no tongue can expresse; the third beginning here with a weake inclynation of heart towardes him unto whome wee are not able to aproch, endeth with endlesse union, the misterie wherof is higher then the reach of the thoughts of men; concerning that faith hope and charitie without which there can be no salvation; was there ever any mention made saving only in that lawe which God him selfe hath from heaven revealed? (1.11.6; 1:118-19)

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That enormous and carefully structured sweep of argument well illustrates the dynamics of the periodic sentence, which, rather than holding the reader at a distance, keeps her closely absorbed with all the intermediate stages until the sense (and tension) is finally resolved. It would be idle to deny Hooker's consummate eloquence, when he chooses to draw on it.

While the most expressive passages, appropriately enough, deal with God's grace and Christ's redemptive power, Hooker can be moved to encomium by many aspects of Christian belief and practice, beginning with religion itself:

For if religion did possesse sincerely and sufficiently the hartes of all men, there would neede no other restraunte from evell. This doth not onlie give life and perfection to all endeavours wherewith it concurreth; but what event soever ensue, it breedeth, if not joye and gladnes allwaies, yeat allwaies patience, satisfaction, and reasonable contentment of minde. (V.1.2; 2:19)

Within this Christian version of the *vita activa*, Hooker praises the benefits produced by the ministers' ordinary activities of preaching and praying. Preaching, we recall, is to be esteemed

as the blessed ordinance of God, sermons as keyes to the kingdom of heaven, as winges to the soule, as spurres to the good affections of man, unto the sound and healthie as foode, as phisicke unto diseased mindes. (V.22.1; 2:87)

Such passages of encomium often fall into short phrases arranged in parallel and linked together, as if the attributes described were automatically associated. The next chapter sums up the "continuall intercourse" of angels between God and man "in these two ghostlie exercises, the one 'Doctrine', the other 'Prayer' " (V.23.1; 2:110). Just as the one received its encomium, so does the other, in a cento of Biblical quotations:

Prayers are those caulves of mens lippes; those most gracious and sweet odors; those rich presentes and guiftes which beinge carry ed up into heaven doe best testifie our dutifull affection, (ibid.)

Here, as in other encomiastic passages, the reader is reminded of George Herbert's poems, which also use this device of heaping up attributes in parallel clauses, the rhetorical figure *systophe*.^{^^}

^{*^} See Salomon Hegnauer, "The Rhetorical Figure of *Systophe*," in Brian Vickers,

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One part of the Church of England's liturgy subjected to fierce controversy at this time was the prominence given to psalms, which were sung or chanted by the minister and congregation. Hooker has plenty of rational and historical arguments, of course, to justify the place of the psalter in the worship of English Protestants, but here too his own feelings are expressed naturally in encomium. For one thing, as he observes, "the booke of psalmes" itself is a work of epideictic: it "doth of purpose sett forth and celebrate all the considerations and operations which belonge to God, it magnifieth the holie meditations and actions of divine men" (V.37.2; 2:150). So Hooker can easily celebrate the universal benefits that the psalms offer, in another sequence of short clauses arranged in parallel:

They are to beginners an easie and familiar introduction, a mightie augmentation of all vertue and knowledge in such as are entered before, a stronge confirmation to the most perfect amongst others.

Heroicall magnanimitie, exquisite justice, grave moderation, exacte wisdom, repentance unfained, unwearied patience, the mysteries of God, the sufferinges of Christ, the terrors of wrath, the comfortes of grace, the workes of providence over this world and the promised joyes of that world which is to come, all good necessarilie to be either knowne or don or had, this one coelestiall fountaine yeldeth. (ibid.)

As for the "musique with psalmes," discussed in the following chapter (V.38; 2:151-54) Hooker is moved to write a *laus musicae* which can rank with any in that long tradition, so well described by James Hutton.⁶ Hooker has a rational defence too, needless to say, for the Anglican practice of the minister and congregation singing the psalms antiphonally, which the reformers violently disapproved of, a defence which also turns into encomium. Just as Hooker could defend the Psalms for their power in move, "workinge in them whose hartes God inspireth ... an habit or disposition of minde" which makes them receptive to "spirituall perfection" (V.37.2; 2:150), so he can describe in terms of rhetoric what happens

ed., *Rhetoric Revalued. Papers from the International Society for the History of Rhetoric. Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies*, vol. 19 (Binghamton, N.Y.: MRTS, 1982), 179-86, and Hegnauer, *Systrophe. The Background of Herbert's Sonnet "Prayer"* (Berne: Peter Lang, 1981).

⁶ James Hutton, "Some English Poems in Praise of Music," *English Miscellany* 2 (1951): 1-63.

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when the pastor . . . joyfiillie beginneth and they with like alacritie foUowe, dividinge betwene them the sentences wherewith they strive which shall most shewe his own and stirre up others zeale to the glorie of that God whose name they magnifie; ... or when he by exhortation raiseth them up and they by protestation of their readines declare he speaketh not in vaine unto them; these interlocutorie formes of speech what are they els but most effectuall partlie testifications and partlie inflammations of all pietie? (V.38.1; 2:154-55)

There Hooker for once concedes that the priest may legitimately arouse the congregation's feelings: but once again the concession

applies not to preaching but to another part of "divine service."

Many of the most intense sequences of encomium occur in the central sections of Book V, where Hooker expresses his Christocentric theology, expounding "the maner how God and man are united in one Christ" (V.52; 2:211); "That by the union of the one with the other nature in Christ there groweth neither gaine nor losse of essentiall properties to either" (V.53; 2:216); "What Christ hath obtained accordinge to the flesh, by the union of his flesh with deitie" (V.54; 2:220); "Of the personall presence of Christ every where, and in what sense it may be graunted he is every where present accordinge to the flesh" (V.55; 2:227); "The union or mutuall participation which is betweene Christ and the Church of Christ in this present worlde" (V.56; 2:234); and "The necessitie of Sacraments unto the participation of Christ" (V.57; 2:244). These fifty pages or so constitute the essence of Hooker's beliefs, and at many points his declaration of faith turns naturally into epideictic. These passages show again Hooker's tendency to use lists of attributes arranged in parallel clauses (the figure *sy strophe*), symmetry being achieved with the rhetorical figures *parison* (corresponding position or structure), *isocolon* (equal length of clause) and *anaphora*. So he praises Christ's purpose

to be the way, the truth and the life; to be the wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, resurrection; to be the peace of the whole world, the hope of the righteous, the heire of all things; to be that supreme head . . . these are not honors common unto Christ with other men. (V.54.5; 2:224)

Or of God, having "exalted" the "glorified bodie of Christ" —

that bodie which it hath pleased him to make his own, that bodie wherewith he hath saved the world, that bodie which hath bene

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and is the roote of eternall life, the instrument wherewith deitie worketh, the sacrifice which taketh away synne, the price which hath ransomed soules from death, the leader of the whole armie of bodies that shall rise againe — Notwithstandinge a bodie still it continueth, a bodie consubstantiall with our bodies, a bodie of the same both nature and measure which it had on earth. (V.54.9; 2:226)

In all these passages Hooker observes the injunctions of Renaissance

rhetoricians to make sure that the word chosen for emphasis be the one carrying the most meaning.

In these sequences of encomium Hooker, well aware of the rhetoricians' teachings, uses those schemes and figures most appropriate to his argument. The figure antithesis, opposing contrary states, is used throughout one long section dealing with the crucifixion, where Christ's descent into the flesh and into death, a double "humiliation," is set against his "exaltation" and "ascension into heaven," "an exaltation of that which was humbled," "from the lower to the higher parts of the world," "farre above all principalitie and power," having "all thinges under his feet" (V.55.8; 2:232-34). For a theological argument which depends not on opposition but on reciprocity, Hooker will employ a different rhetorical resource. So he uses the figure antimetabole, which repeats two or more words in inverted sequence ("eat to live, not live to eat"), throughout chapter 56, which discusses the "mutuall participation . . . betweene Christ and the Church of Christ in this present worlde." Hooker defines such "participation" as "that mutuall inward hold which Christ hath of us and wee of him" (V.56.1; 2:234), itself an instance of the figure. The Latin term for antimetabole was *commutatio*,¹⁰ and in chapter 53, commenting on the patristic tradition of "crosse and circulatorie speeches, wherein there are attributed to God such thinges as belonge to manhood and to man such as properlie concerne the deitie of Christ Jesus," Hooker anglicizes this figure in a stylistically self-aware comment: "A kinde of mutuall commutation there is whereby those concrete names God and Man when wee speake of Christ doe take interchangable one an others roome." (V.53.4; 2:219). Developing his account of "mutuall participa-

¹⁰ See, e.g., L. A. Sonnino, *A Handbook to Sixteenth-Century Rhetoric* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 42.

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tion" in chapter 56, Hooker uses antimetabole over and over to illuminate the paradoxes of the Trinity, the fact that

The persons of the Godhead, by reason of the unitie of their substance, doe as necessarilie remaine one within an other as they are of necessitie to be distinguished one from an other, because two are the

issue of one, and one the ofspringe of the other two, onlie of three one not growinge out of any other. And sith they all are but one God in number, one indivisible essence or substance,

theire distinction can not possiblief admitt separation The

father therefore is in the Sonne, and the Sonne in him, they both in the Spirit, and the Spirit in both them. (V.56.2; 2:235)

These inter-identifications are repeated and varied, in all their theological shades of meaning, with a density that defies excerpting. The chapter is to be read entire, if possible aloud, and slowly. If that is done, with feeling, then we can appreciate how the concluding passage, like the coda to one of Bruckner's vast symphonic movements, both sums up and transcends the materials out of which it has been made:

Thus therefore wee see how the father is in the Sonne and the Sonne in the father, how they both are in all thinges and all thinges in them, what communion Christ hath with his Church, how his Church and everie member thereof is in him by originall derivation, and he personallie in them by way of mysticall associa- tion wrought through the guift of the holie Ghost, which they that are his receive from him, and together with the same what benefit soever the vitall force of his bodie and blood may yeeld, yea by steppes and degrees they receive the complete measure of all such divine grace, as doth sanctifie and save throughout, till the daie of theire finall exaltation to a state of fellowship in glorie, with him whose pertakers they are now in those thinges that tende to glorie. (V.56.13; 2:244)

These passages of praise are the counterpart of those attacking the enemies of the Church of England, or of religion itself. The two impulses, of laus and vituperatio respectively, mark the opposed ends of the evaluative spectrum in human affairs. A suitable place to end my contribu- tion to this celebration of Hooker might be his second use of the rhetori- cal figure prosopopoeia, by which a writer introduces the speech of an imagined character. Hooker had used this device in the Preface to show

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how "t/ie foolish Barrowist deriveth his schisme' out of the reformers' principles (Pref. 8.1; 1:39), and he uses it again to very different effect in Book V, chapter 67, "Of the sacrament of the body and blood of

Christ" (2:330). To conclude this long and crucial chapter on the complexities of such "mysticall communion" he asks himself a question which shifts the emphasis from the high level of theological discussion to the needs of the ordinary Christian:

These things considered, how should that minde which lovinge truth and seekinge comfort out of holie mysteries hath not per- hapes the leasure, perhapes not the witt nor capacitie to tread out so endles mazes, as the intricate disputes of this cause have led men into, how should a vertuouslie disposed minde better resolve with it selfe then thus? (V.67.12; 2:340)

Hooker answers with a speech rehearsing, in a notably simple, spoken style, some of the main conclusions of the argument so far. His imagined "minde ... lovinge truth" rejects both "the Lutherans interpretation" and "the popish construction" of the sacraments, choosing that given by the Church of England, which contains "nothing but" the truth, "nothing but that which [is] ... necessarie ... sufficient," and so on through five symmetrical clauses (2:340-41).

The speaker of this exemplary discourse on the significance of the eucharist then juxtaposes the "perplexities" which men experience "touching that whereof there is controversie": "their discourses are hungrie and unpleasant, full of tedious and irksome labour, harteles and hetherto without fruite" (2:341). Once this sacrament, however, is considered— "Eat and live" — the opposite condition applies: "their discourses are heavenlie, their wordes sweete as the honie comb, their tounes melodiouslie tuned instrumentes, their sentences meere consolation and joy" (2:341-42). Hooker's language here draws on a stylistic register which he reserves for encomium, appealing to the senses (taste, hearing), and moving from affirmation into hyperbole with an uncommon emotional intensity. These qualities are all strikingly visible in the conclusion, when this "vertuouslie disposed minde," having set aside the sin of curiosity, prying into God's "darke and hidden workes," reassures itself that

"the verie letter of the worde of Christ giveth plaine securitie that these mysteries doe as nailes fasten us to his verie crosse, that by them wee draw out, as touchinge efficacie force and vertue, even the blood of his goared side, in the woundes of our redemer wee

there dip our tongues, wee are died redd both within and without, our hunger is satisfied and our thirst for ever quenched, they are thinges wonderfiill which hee feeleth, greate which hee seeth and unhard of which he uttereth whose soule is possest of this pascall lamb and made joyfuU in the strength of this new wine, this bread hath in it more then the substance which our eyes behold, this cup hallowed with soUemne benediction avaieth to the endles life and wellfare both of soule and bodie, in that it serveth as well for a medicine to heale our infirmities and purge our sinnes as for a sacrifice of thanksgiving, with touching it sanctifieth, it enlight- neth with beliefe, it trulie conformeth us unto the image of Jesus Christ; what these elementes are in them selves it skilleth not, it is enough that to me which take them they are the bodie and blood of Christ, his promise in witnes hereof sufficeth, his word he knoweth which way to accomplish, why should any cogitation possesse the minde of a faithfuU communicant but this, O my God thou art true, O my soule thou art happieV (2:343)

In such moments Hooker's reasoned argument yields to the kind of ecstatic identification with a sacred object that we normally associate with the sensibility of a later generation, the Easter sermons of Lancelot An- drewes, the poems of Herbert, Traheme, and Crashaw.[^] Although abjuring any explicit use of rhetoric on his readers, Hooker has in fact fulfilled the basic rhetorical principle laid down by Cicero and others, that the orator cannot move others unless he is moved himself. Without any conscious design, we may conclude. Hooker has correctly applied the resources of rhetoric to make the Lauies not just a coherent structure of argument but one in which the singling out of the precious elements of Christian belief invites the reader to share in the writer's celebration.

[^] Ttiis said, I must record that Hooker's source in this concluding passage of his long prosopopoeia is the work *De coemi Domini*, fonnerly ascribed to Cyprian, but now attributed to Arnold, abbot of Bonneval (fl. 1144?): cf. FLE 6:217 and n to 2:343.6-26.

SITUATION

AND

PATRICK COLLINSON

Hooker and the Elizabethan Establishment

BEN JONSON WROTE MEMORABLY OF SHAKESPEARE: "He was not of an age but for all time." New historicists and cultural materialists, together with some of us who are neither, now turn that around: not so much for all time as for an age. So too with Richard Hooker, the Shakespeare of Anglican divinity. It is high time that he too should be extracted from the noble vacuity of all time and restored to the materiality of his own age, where he belongs. Not that the task will be easy. The early seventeenth century Chancery files unearthed by C. J. Sisson tell us a great deal about Hooker's great book and the circumstances of its publication (we know more about that book in production, than about any other Elizabethan book), about what we now know to have been his fortunate marriage, his helpful in-laws, his dealings with Edwin Sandys. Everything once known about those things turned out, with the publication in 1940 of Sisson's *Judicious Marriage*, to have been just plain wrong.'

And yet how ignorant we still are and always will be of Hooker himself. If Izaak Walton could be so mistaken (or deliberately misleading)

' C. J. Sisson, *The Judicious Marriage of Mr Hooker and the Birth of the "Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity"* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1940). See also W. Speed Hill's essay on "Publishing History: the First Five Books of the Lawes," in *FLE* lxiii-xxvii. Speed Hill suggests, very plausibly, that the response to Hooker from the book trade about "books of that argument and on that part" as not being saleable, referred not, as Sisson thought, to Henry Smith's sermons, but to the bulky tome of John Bridges, *A Defence of the Government Established in the Church of England* (London, 1587).

about so much, is there anything that we can trust in his affecting and ever memorable *Lifel Did Edwin Sandys and George Cranmer really seek Hooker out in Draiton Beauchamp in 1585, and was it their shocked discovery of their old tutor's rusticated and henpecked condition, alter- nately playing the shepherd with Horace in his hand and rocking the cradle, which led Sandys to talk to his father, and Archbishop Sandys to set in motion the wheels of patronage which brought Hooker to the Temple?* I suspect that Hooker was in London all the time and may never have kept the sheep at Draiton Beauchamp, whether four-legged or two-legged. Was it really in Hooker's nature to avoid all eye contact, never looking others in the face? If it was, then that constitutes the single most important fact that we know about Hooker, the man. But it is used by Walton for the purpose of creating what may well have been an invented and even spurious persona. Do such things matter? According to one school of literary criticism, not a scrap. Like Winnie the Pooh, living in the forest under the name of Saunders, "Hooker" could have been someone else and it would not signify. But Anthony Trollope, in his life of Thackeray, spoke for the rest of us: "The desire is common to all readers to know not only what a great writer has written, but also of what nature has been the man who produced such a great work."[^]

Of course Hooker is inseparable from his book (like the martyrologist, John Foxe) and without the book he would be a figure of very minor importance, absent from even the "Missing Persons" volume of the *Dictionary ofNational Biography*. And yet (in spite of Sisson) how little we know of what generated the book, about the writing of it, about Hooker's connections with those unnamed "great personages" who reportedly had an interest in the matter,[^] about the kind of impact which the book not only had (or failed to have) but was intended to have!

[^] Izaak Walton, *The Life of Mr. Richard Hooker* (London, 1670). The suggestion that Walton might have been "deliberately misleading" is an implied reference to David Novarr, *The Making of Walton's Lives* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1958). In a recent and sensitive study of the *Lives*, Dr. Jessica Martin concedes that Walton's Hooker was constrained by its commission at the hands of the Restoration ecclesiastical establish- ment, but she finds Novarr's account anachronistic insofar as it ignores not only Walton's personal motivation, which may have included an intention to be accurate, but

the impress of the generic and ethical tradition within which he wrote. See "Izaak Walton and his Precursors: A Literary Study of the Emergence of the Ecclesiastical Life," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1993. TroUope's observation is used as a motto by Victoria Glendinning in TroUope (London: Hutchinson, 1992).

^ Sisson, 52.

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It is now almost a quarter of a century since the late James Cargill Thompson reviewed the small revolution in Hooker studies which began his re-insertion into the intellectual history of late Elizabethan England, a revolution brought to full fruition in the meticulous scholarship of the Folger edition and its apparatus. In 1972, Cargill Thompson insisted that the *Laives* was not an essay in political philosophy and not a latter-day theological summa, but a work of apologetic and even polemic. So understood, Hooker's temperate moderation was "a conscious literary device." In 1993, William Haugaard and Lee Gibbs confirmed that verdict. Professor Gibbs assessing what Brian Vickers calls Hooker's rhetorical decorum as a tactic, designed to lay claim to the high ground within the controversy. Stephen McGrade has written of those whose perception of the Lawes is of "a partisan polemic of doubtful moral or theoretical integrity-

That Hooker was primarily an apologist for the Elizabethan establishment, the successor to John Whitgift who had contended with Thomas Cartwright in the Admonition Controversy, was not in itself an earth-shattering discovery, since Hooker himself announced, on the first page of the book, that he was writing it against those "pretended reformers" who favored a more or less drastically modified settlement. (However, we can now appreciate that his business was to plant landmines while appearing to build bridges.) Moreover, much modern criticism is not fundamentally at odds with the traditional wisdom that Hooker was one of the first writers to impart meaning to a political term of art yet to be invented: conservatism. But now Professor Peter Lake has gone some way beyond this reading, believing that Hooker had a more ambitious agenda which one might call a hidden agenda, except that it is not successfully hidden at all. Hooker's deeper purpose was to find new footings for the English church (while not admitting their novelty), and on that new foundation to erect a substantially modified superstructure. He was

not so much defensively recapitulating Anglicanism as inventing it. So Lake wrote in 1988. One year later. Professor McGrade appeared to endorse this audacious claim. Hooker "in effect created Anglicanism as a self-consciously distinctive form of religious life."

* W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Political Society': Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker," in S.R.H., 13-14; William P. Haugaard, Intro, to Lawes Pref.; FLE 6:72-80; Lee W. Gibbs, Intro, to Lawes I; FLE 6:81-86.

' Peter Lake, Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought

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A preliminary point to be made before we follow Hooker back into his own times is that just as William Camden persuaded us for four centuries that the headline story of the reign of Elizabeth I was Mary Queen of Scots, and for reasons embedded in the gestation of his *Annals of Elizabeth*,[^] so it was the conformist apologists of the 1590s, including Hooker but more conspicuously Richard Bancroft, who determined for all time to come the shape of Elizabethan ecclesiastical history. When in 1967 I wrote a book called *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement*, I was merely following the lead of these controversialists, an almost symphonic lead: the overture of the Marian exile with those "Troubles of Frankfurt"; the first movement of the Vestiarian Controversy; the long second movement of the Presbyterianism of the seventies and eighties (which, as with Brahms's Second Piano Concerto, was not a slow movement—Bancroft and Hooker chose to overlook the quiet slow movement of the Grindal interlude, which it was my small contribution to discover); the mounting climax of the finale, through the Marprelate Tracts, Bancroft's hard-hitting Paul's Cross sermon of 1589, the trial of the classis movement, separatism, the tragi-comedy of the Copinger-Hacket conspiracy; nemesis. As Bancroft and Hooker told it, in their very different ways, this was a story of progressive radicalization, its extreme end proleptically implicit in the principles of its beginning, which were to be found not so much in England as in Geneva and Scotland, but which were also latent in the disaffected spirits of natural sectaries: psychology added to polemical history. I might add that the interpretation which my book placed on these events, the reciprocal interplay of moderation

and extremism in both camps, I could have derived from another contemporary commentator, Francis Bacon, to whom we shall return.

The remainder of this essay, like Caesar's Gaul, will fall into three parts. In the first, I shall try to discover what can be said about the prehistory of the Lawes in Hooker's progressive detachment from his Oxford roots, and from the mainstream of Elizabethan academic church- manship. I shall then focus on the years of almost hysterical excitement

from Whitgift to Hooker (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 145-250; A. S. McGrade in his Intro, to Richard Hooker, *Of the Lams of Ecclesiastical Polity*: Preface. Book I. Book VIII, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), xix.

* H. R. Trevor-Roper, "Queen Elizabeth's First Historian: William Camden and the Beginnings of English 'Civil History,' " in his *Renaissance Essays* (London: M. Seeker and Warburg, 1985), 121-48.

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which effectively ended the history of the Elizabethan church (according to this traditional scenario) about ten years before the reign itself ended, the years 1588-93. Hooker must have been writing all through those five years, especially if, as appears possible, all eight books existed at least in draft by early 1593. The question will be, not how such a calm, reflective book could have been written against such a backcloth, but how calm and reflective it really was. Finally I shall discuss the implications of Professor Lake's reading of Hooker.

In tracing the origins of what, however anachronistically, we are more or less obliged to call Anglicanism, it is necessary to decide whether what we are handling is some kind of deviance from a Reformed (or, in vulgar language, Calvinist) mainstream, or a different genetic strain altogether, less dependent upon the emergent Reformed tradition, less clearly differentiated from Catholicism, indeed, something not easily distinguishable from that closet Catholicism which contemporaries were beginning to call "church papistry"; and this must be investigated with respect to cases. Thus it is reasonably clear that Lancelot

Andrewes had, putting it crudely, a "puritan" past, whereas, across the street from Andrewes's college, Pembroke Hall, Andrew Perne, master of Peterhouse for more than thirty years and a very potent figure in Elizabethan Cambridge, was either not a Protestant at all, or only just. It is possible that Perne represented a stock on which "Arminianism" and "Laudianism" were later grafted, a matter meriting further investigation. But the high churchly principles of Andrewes and, as Nicholas Tyacke has suggested, of Archbishop Laud himself, appear to have had different and reactive origins.[^]

In all probability, Hooker never met Perne and knew little about him, unless occasion took him to Cambridge and to Perne's vast library. But Andrewes was a close friend and urgently concerned with the perpetuation

[^] M. M. Knappen, "The Early Puritanism of Lancelot Andrewes," *Church History* 2 (1933): 95-104; Patrick Collinson, "The Beginnings of English Sabbatarianism," in Collinson, *Godly People: Essays on English Protestantism and Puritanism* (London: Hambleton Press, 1983), 438-39; Patrick Collinson, "Perne the Turncoat: An Elizabethan Reputation," in Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays* (London: Hambledon Press, 1994), 179-218. For what little we know of the young(ish) Laud, see Nicholas Tyacke, "Archbishop Laud," in *The Early Stuart Church 1603-1642*, ed. Kenneth Fincham (London: Macmillan, 1993), 51-70.

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of Hooker's intellectual labors. On the news of Hooker's death, he wrote to his Corpus contemporary, Henry Parry (the future bishop of Gloucester and Worcester), of "this heavy news"; "alas for our great loss," which he implied was actively felt by only a few, although it touched the church at large. Andrewes urged Parry and Sandys to see to the preservation of Hooker's papers and the later books of the Lawes.[^]

Peter White has recently dismissed the notion of a Calvinist Elizabethan mainstream, insisting that a more conservative tradition, "steeped in the ancient Patristic and medieval past," was as securely ensconced in the Elizabethan church as more progressive tendencies. White suggests that Hooker grew up in just such an environment,

although he does not tell us what that environment may have consisted of, beyond vague gestures toward the commitment of his patron, Bishop Jewel, to patristic learning.[^]

The evidence of Hooker's early sermons may seem to confirm White's account of his intellectual pedigree, more especially since Walter Travers, from whatever motive, chose to dramatize his rival's conservatism, claiming that Hooker had uttered matter which "hath not been heard in public places within this land since Queen Mary's days," a perspective which, on second thoughts, is actually not at all helpful to White's thesis.[°] But the evidence, outside the texts of Hooker's sermons and the Travers-Hooker controversy before the Privy Council, slender though it is, suggests that Hooker started off in the mainstream and subsequently deviated from it; that he was not the dyed-in-the-wool Anglican presented to us by White, and indeed canonically enshrined, from Walton onwards. He says as much of himself, referring to opinions "which my self did sometimes judge a

[^] The Works of Lancelot Andreuies, 1 1 vols., ed. J. P. Wilson and James Bliss (Oxford, 1841-54; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1967), 11 (Tu/o Answers to Cardinal Perron and Other Miscellaneous Works): xl-xli. I owe this reference to Dr. Kenneth Fincham. The letter as printed exists in an eighteenth-century transcription in the Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson D 404, fol. II 2r. As printed it omits this enigmatic note after Andrewes's signature: "Amisimus insigne ornamentum Ecclesiae et Collegii nostri, virum insigniter eruditum: sed Deus numerabit dies nostros. Dr Raynoldes." For the (enigmatic) Hooker-Rainolds relationship, see 155-59 below.

[^] Peter White, *Predestination, Policy and Polemic: Conflict and Consensus in the English Church from the Reformation to the Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), 124-26 and *passim*.

[°] "A Supplication made to the Privy Counsel by Master Walter Travers," FLE 5:187-210.

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great deal more probable than now I do."^{^^} There is also the evidence of his book, of its deep and sustained indebtedness to Calvin's divinity.

Outside the Lawes, the key to unlocking some of the secrets of the

maturing Hooker seems to be Dr. John Rainolds (or Reynolds) (1549-1607), chosen by Jewel as the tutor of his fellow-Devonian at Corpus Christi College and the closest of colleagues. Hooker's "familiar" letters to Rainolds are very familiar indeed.¹⁶ Rainolds has enjoyed a persistent reputation as simply the most learned Englishman of his generation, Milton's "our famous Dr Rainolds" and it would be hard indeed to exaggerate the influence which he must have exerted over the young Hooker, not least in the formation of his style, Rainolds having pioneered the study and application of Aristotle's Rhetoric. There was, we learn, "a Corpus prose style," which Hooker owed to Rainolds and transmitted to his own pupils, Cranmer and Sandys.¹⁷ It will not do to place the Rainolds-Hooker relationship on the merely academic basis of a shared appreciation of Aristotle, or to invoke Hooker's charitable capacity to remain on good terms with opponents, as he did in some degree even with Travers, a relative by marriage. There was a religious and doctrinal affinity too. It must be significant that both Rainolds and Hooker were supported in their careers by the earl of Leicester and Sir Francis Walsingham.¹⁸ And it is probable that both were seen as potential champions of the English Protestant establishment against the only enemy these magnates took seriously: Rome.

In 1579, Rainolds engaged with a seminary priest called John Hart in a conference which addressed some of the fundamental points at issue. The Summe of the Conference made a book of 750 pages, dedicated to Leicester, which ran through several editions. In 1586, Walsingham created a special lectureship in Oxford for the purpose of combatting Catholicism. This post was tailor-made for Rainolds, who was now to be engaged for the rest of

¹⁶ Laertes VII.1 1.8; 3:208.18-19.

¹⁷ Keble (1888), 1:109-14. However, anything but "familiar" is the undated Latin letter (BL, MS. Add. 34744, fols. 19-24) discovered in the course of preparing the Folger edition, and printed FLE 5:420-34. How to characterize this letter, and where to locate it in the careers of either writer or recipient, remain inscrutable mysteries.

¹⁸ John Rainolds's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's "Rhetoric," ed. and trans. Lawrence D. Green (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1986), especially 83-88.

¹⁹ That the patterns of patronage for Rainolds were rather more

complex than this statement allows (with significant implications for the trajectory of his career) is demonstrated in Rainolds's Oxford Lectures, 30-31.

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his life with bigger game than poor Hart: no less a quarry than Cardinal Bellarmine.^^ As for Hooker, Leicester backed him as a substitute and deputy for the regius professor of Hebrew, while the Chapter of Canterbury Cathedral was persuaded by letters from Leicester and Walsingham to grant him an annual bursary of £5.6.8.^ There can be no doubt what tune Hooker was expected to sing for his supper: not disinterested Old Testament scholarship, not, above all not, anti-puritan polemic, but the sturdy work of an anti-Catholic controversialist. In Hooker's earliest known public utterances, the Oxford sermons of 1582-1583 on the Epistle of Jude, Jude's warnings about "mockers in the last time" and "makers of sects" was applied to papists, not Puritans. In these sermons, the pope was still Antichrist, "the Man of Sin."" So far, his patrons were not sold short. But although the Temple sermons which followed in 1586, to which Travers took such extreme exception, were still formally anti-Catholic, Hooker would never undertake a major work of anti-Catholic polemic. That in itself may have been enough to arouse the suspicions of some contemporaries, and it should alert the antennae of historians too.

1584 seems to have been a watershed. On December 4th of that year, Rainolds heard from the London printer George Bishop that there was some difficulty in proceeding with the latest work from his pen. The manuscript was in the hands of Archbishop Whitgift, who had told Bishop that "he cold not a low it bicause of some glansinge at matters in this tyme." Bishop added that "Mr Hooker wolde neds have it goe unto my Lord of Canterbury," whereas the printer's instinct would have been to publish and be damned.^^

^ John Rainolds, *The Summe of the Conference Betwene John Rainoldes and John Hart Touching the Head and the Faith of the Church* (London, 1584). Rainolds's dedicatory epistle speaks of Leicester's beneficence to the university (as its chancellor) "and privately to me ward, a member thereof." For accounts of the career of Rainolds, described by Jennifer Loach as "the radical conscience of the university," see C. M. Dent, *Protestant Reformers in Elizabethan Oxford* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983), passim; Loach in *The Collegiate University*, vol. 3 of *The History of the University of*

Oxford, ed. J. McConica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 392-93; and Green's introduction to Rainolds's Oxford Lectures.

* Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS. 302, fol. 183; Canterbury Chapter Acts, 15 January 1583, Cathedral Archives and Library, Canterbury, MS. Y.11.4, fols. 42v-43r.

^ Jude I, 2; FLE 5:1-57. The authenticity of these sermons, questioned by Keble, is no longer in doubt. I agree with Laetitia Yeandle and Richard Bauckham that Hooker's reference to the actions of the English papists "by the space of four and twenty years" dates the sermons to 1582-83. (Richard Bauckham, "Hooker, Travers and the Church of Rome in the 1580s," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 29 [1978]: 37-39.)

'« Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS. 318, fol. 139. Without using the duke of

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Matters in this time! 1584 was the first year of Whitgift's archiepiscopate, the year of subscription, a time of extreme confrontation between the principles and organized forces of conformity and non-conformity. That Hooker should have snuggled up to Whitgift at this moment, when the archbishop was in a politically weak and exposed position, is significant; and all the more so if the book which Rainolds had entrusted to his colleague to see through the press was what it seems to have been, a course of lectures on the prophet Haggai, recently delivered in Oxford.

Whitgift's intervention killed Rainolds's Haggai stone dead, but it was resurrected and published in 1648. This posthumous edition is problematical, in its maverick dating of the sermons, and because of hints of editorial interference with the text.¹⁶ But if these sermons were preached in 1584, and in anything like their published form, it is not hard to see why the archbishop took advantage of the opportunity which Hooker had given him to suppress them. One could not look for a better exposition of what John Coolidge identified as the essence of puritan ecclesiology, the Pauline metaphor of a building composed of lively stones, ever in a process of edification, but far from perfected.¹⁷ In particular, the temple of the English church still lacked its roof, which Rainolds defined as that ecclesiastical discipline which "Christ commanded, his Apostles constituted, the

Wellington's actual words, Bishop wrote: "I was in mynde for to doe it first, which I wold I had done, that the world might have judged of it. There wold have bin no falte fownde then, yf it had bin extant."

^ The Prophetie of Haggai. Interpreted and applyed in sundry Sermons by that Famous and Judicious Divine, John Rainolds, D.D. Never before printed. Beeing very usefuUfor these Times, ed. Edward Leigh (London, 1648). Leigh had acquired the work from a son of the Cheshire minister William Hinde, by whom it had been "reviewed and perfected." He remarks: "The learned and religious Author of this Book seems to favour the Presbiterian way." In the context of the late 1640s, this alerts us to the possibility of editorial interference. In the printed text, six of the fifteen sermons are dated, but in a way which makes no sense, the dates ranging from 11 June 1584 through 1585, 1586, and 1589 to 1599. Green dates one of them, for reasons which are not clear but which may be stylistic, to 1590 {Rainolds's Oxford Lectures, 64). They must surely have been delivered in sequence, in the same year, most probably 1584. The problem is exacerbated by references in the fourteenth sermon (152-53) to the memory of Queen Elizabeth, and to a proclamation by His Majesty. The passages cited here are on 3-5, 12-16, 49, 73-74, 86. I have benefited from discussing this enigmatic text with Dr. Nicholas Tyacke. A similar, intensely puritanical tone pervades Rainolds's lectures posthumously published by William Hinde as *The discovery of the man of sinne* (London, 1614), which the internal evidence of Hinde's Preface dates to about 1584.

^ John S. Coolidge, *The Pauline Renaissance in England: Puritanism and the Bible* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).

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Primitive Church observed, the Reformed Churches have restored," notably the Genevan church. Rainolds looked eagerly for "the increase of true godlinesse by preaching of wholesome doctrine and establishing godly discipline through all the Churches in the Realme according to the prescription of the Lord revealed in his word." This was the encoded language of Elizabethan presbyterianism. Rainolds, in these lectures at least, made no overt attack on the bishops and appears to have found the (abortive) Edwardian *Reformatio legum ecclesiasticarum* a tolerable "roof" for the Church of England, which

Cartwright and more polemical critics of the establishment did not. However, the appeal to the Henrician-Edwardian scheme to revise the laws of the church was a familiar forensic ploy of the Puritans, exploited by Robert Beale and Nicholas Fuller in their defense of Cartwright and other "classical" ministers in the Star Chamber.ⁱ

Rainolds was presently implicated in a small radical puritan cell in Oxford, and was examined by a committee of the Vice-Chancellor's court. But as with his counterparts in Cambridge, Laurence Chaderton and William Whitaker, Rainolds's seniority, his ivory tower status, and his commitment to anti-Catholic controversy protected him from further interference. In any event, presbyterianism for Rainolds (as for Chaderton) may have been an intellectual conviction which was carefully distanced from the realities of the Elizabethan and, even more, Jacobean ecclesiastical scene. In his funeral oration for Rainolds in 1607, Daniel Featley (the translator and adaptor of Laurence Humphrey's *Life of Bishop Jewel*) attached this great Oxford luminary firmly to the Anglican establishment, and specifically to Jewel and Hooker, making up "*Devonienses triumviros literatos*."^{^^}

ⁱ CoUinson, E.P.M., 421-23.

^{^^} Dent, *Protestant Reformers*, 128-45. Peter Lake, *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982); Daniel Featley, "*Oratio funebris in obitum Doctiss. et Sanctiss. viri et mihi amicissimi Jo. Rainold*," Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson D 47 I, fols. 129-37. Some murky light is shed on Rainolds's relation to the establishment, and on the motives governing Featley's funeral oration, by the letter which Featley attached to the MS. of his *Life of Jewel* in sending it to (the future bishop) Thomas Morton. Featley chose to explain that he regarded the *Life* as essentially a timely defense of the episcopal office more than of the man, and referred both to his desire to defend Rainolds's posthumous reputation and to distance himself from Rainolds's views, evidently on episcopacy. Rainolds's friends (enemies?) had, against the express words of his will, set forth "his imperfect treatises" opposed to "a noble sermon" of Archbishop Bancroft (his Paul's Cross sermon of 1589? [MS. Rawlinson D 47, fol. 209, a reference

The letter to Rainolds from his publisher of December 1584 sits in a Corpus Christi MS next to a letter dated September 5th but without a year, a letter to Rainolds from Hooker. It begins: "Your lectures 1 should be marvelous glad to see published." It is tempting to place this letter in 1584, and to suspect Hooker of playing a double game, but the Folger editors are no doubt correct in assigning it to 1591, which puts Hooker in a much better light, underlining his fabled irenicism.^{^^} In the Lawes, and especially in the Fifth Book, Hooker refers incessantly to the opposition as "them," and "they" almost always turns out to be Thomas Cartwright. But given the approximate affinity of Cartwright's views to those of Rainolds, whom was he really addressing? If Hooker had closed his eyes to envisage "them," whose face would he have seen? I am not sure that he knew Cartwright in the flesh. But he knew Rainolds. And yet, in the very year that Hooker published the first portion of the Lawes, Rainolds was made respectable by the deanery of Lincoln, a dignity which had not long since adorned John Whitgift, and a sinecure which enabled him to remain in Oxford. There is no evidence that renunciation of Rainolds's somewhat academically presbyterian principles was a condition of this preferment. Was the church really as polarized as Hooker, like other conformist controversialists, represented it? Rainolds looks like a figure of some latitude in his own right.

If in the event a gulf opened up, or was seen to open up, between Hooker and many of the great and the good of Oxford and Cambridge, where do we locate the original fault line? It appears that the alert religious public detected it in that sermon which Hooker preached at Paul's Cross, not, as Walton thought, in 1581, but, as we are by now inclined to

I owe to Dr. Kenneth Fincham]). Rainolds's views on the origins and status of episcopacy had been actively canvassed by Sir Francis Knollys in 1589, and were brought to public attention in 1641, in the context of the Root and Branch debates. (See James Cargill Thompson, "Sir Francis Knollys's Campaign Against the Jure Divino theory of Episcopacy," in Cargill Thompson, *Studies in the Reformation: Luther to Hooker*, ed. C. W. Dugmore [London: Adilone Press, 1980], 118-19.)

^{^^} Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS. 318, fol. 137'. Georges Edelen, *Chronology*, FLE 6:xxiii. Hooker writes of "Mr Parryes departure out of London" causing Rainolds's business to be forgotten. This must refer not to Dr. Parry, the traitor of 1584-85, who had not made his fatal

move in September 1584, but to a fellow Corpus man, Henry Parry, the future bishop (and Lancelot Andrewes's correspondent of 1600). Moreover, Hooker's commendations to "Mr Provost" make it clear that Rainolds was at Queen's College when he received this letter. He had migrated there from Corpus Christi in 1586, returning to Corpus in 1598.

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suspect, in 1584.¹⁶⁰ In this sermon (no longer extant but reported by Travers and abstracted by Walton), there were signs of departure from "orthodoxy" on the matter of predestinate grace. Unsoundness on that article was the first step on a slippery slide leading to Pelagianism and popery, and so invited a morbid diagnosis. Travers commented: "He had taught certen things concerning predestination, otherwise then the word of god doeth, as it is understood by all the churches professing the gos- pell, and not unlike that wherewith Coranus sometime troubled this Church."

The opinions of the Spaniard Antonio del Corro, tending to a kind of Pelagianism and universalism, had made a great stink not only in Oxford and London but in the foreign Reformed communities on both sides of the North Sea, where the complacency of the English bishops in tolerating what Rainolds called these "verie great heresies" was a scandal.¹⁶¹ The Corro affair had been running for fifteen years, so Hooker was naturally assimilated to that long-running cause celebre, just as people in Germany at first thought that Luther was only the latest episode in the great Reuch- lin affair which had generated *Epistolae obscurorum virorum*. All heresy hunts pursue their quarry into holes shaped by the last great heretic.

As for the specifics of the dispute between Hooker and Travers, Fuller's aphorism about the pulpit speaking pure Canterbury in the morning and Geneva in the afternoon could hardly be less helpful. Far from a stark confrontation between two confessional incompatibles, this controversy, like almost all debates among Protestants in this period, arose from the exploitation of initially small differences of emphasis within shared as- sumptions. As one commentator put it, Travers and Hooker were like "two excellent Archers shooting at one mark though distant one from an other." The "mark" was popery, and when Hooker suggested, at one point in a sermon which was mostly "against popery," that thousands of

^^ Edelen, Chronology, FLE 6:xxii.

^^ Supplication; FLE 5:198. "This Churche" is often read as referring specifically to the Temple Church, where Corro had preached, rather than more generally to the Church of England.

^* The literature on Corro is extensive. See Dent, Protestant Reformers, 106-25, and Patrick CoUinson, "Calvinism with an Anglican Face: the Stranger Churches in Elizabethan London and their Superintendent," in CoUinson, *Godly People*, 237-43. Both supply references to the more specialized literature. A complicating factor is that the earl of Leicester was one of Corro's admirers, backing him for the degree of D.D. against strong opposition from within the university, led by Rainolds. This has puzzled both biographers of Leicester and historians of Oxford University.

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forefathers who lived in popish superstition were saved in that they sinned ignorantly, he was not deviating very far from a standard line, unless, as Travers alleged, what he actually said was "lived and died in the supersti- tions of that church." Such were the small, or not so small, differences which were to redraw the groundplans of English Protestant Christianity. But by now Hooker in Travers's perception could do no right. Tra- vers 's representations to the Privy Council magnified their differences, partly in the interests of his own career, since it was Travers, after all, who stood suspended, his ordination called in question. But the various docu- ments surviving and detailing the controversy suggest that not just Travers but the entire "godly" community was alerted by telltale signs of Hooker's apostasy, through its inimitable jungle telegraph. William Haugaard reminds us that to ventilate such matters in the Temple, inhabited by "dedicated Puritans, secret Roman Catholics, and both pious and indiffer- ent conformists," was ventilation indeed. The experience may have been a precipitant to Hooker's own developing thought. The account he would give of the Roman church in the Lawes, as an essentially true if defective church, was a distinct advance on the message of 1586.^^

We shall now leave Hooker in peace to write *Of the Lawes of EcclesiasticaU. Politie* in the calm of the study in his father-in-law's

London mansion, and we will move forward to 1593, the year of publication, and to the polemical significance of its publication. Rather than traverse the five-year sequence of events from the appearance of the first of the Marprelate Tracts, we will take stock of some remarkable circumstances which were crammed into the early months of 1593, circumstances indicative of a new level of top-down repressiveness in the Elizabethan state. Professor John Guy detects in the 1590s an ideological shift, away from notions of a mixed polity, and toward imperial, *jure divino* principles. It matters, of course, that Hooker was not himself in sympathy with this ideological trend. In Guy's opinion, the early nineties find us in the second reign of

^^ Bauckham, "Hooker, Travers and the Church of Rome." The essential documentation, with an accompanying essay by William P. Haugaard, is in FLE 5:170-297. Hooker's prodigious "semi-popery," implicit in his early Discourse of justification, is discussed by Anthony Milton in *Catholic and Reformed: the Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought, 1600-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995), 68- 69, 146-47.

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Elizabeth, so different was the climate, even in the first decade of the Stuart political epoch.^^ Hooker scholarship has always had to address the problem of how it was that their man wrote such unfashionable stories about church and state, stories to which John Locke, amongst others, would in due course listen.

We may remind ourselves of the headlines of early 1593. Cartwright, together with the other "classical" ministers, had been released from prison, but they were still under bond to surrender themselves to the High Commission at any time. In February, Parliament met, and in the House of Commons the Attorney of the Court of Wards, James Morice, launched a bold attack on the legality of the proceedings of the High Commission, and in particular attacked the notorious *ex officio* oath. It was high time for the bishops to declare to the world "by what authority they do these things"; and perhaps for the queen to do some explaining too (not that Morice suggested that), since a recent test case brought by the minister Robert Cawdrey before the Queen's Bench (in which Morice had represented the plaintiff) had elicited from the judges the ruling that the queen empowered the High

Commission by virtue of the ineluctable fact that England was "an absolute empire and monarchy." By the end of the month, Morice was under house arrest. The civil lawyer Richard Cosin, who had been a leading counsel in the trial of Cartwright and the other ministers, promptly brought out a new edition of his *Apology for Sundrie Proceedings by Jurisdiction Ecclesiastical*^

In mid-March, "Mr Sandys" (perhaps not Hooker's friend Edwin, although Edwin sat in this parliament, but Edwin's Uncle Miles, the

^^ John Guy, "The Elizabethan Establishment and the Ecclesiastical Polity," in John Guy, ed., *The Reign of Elizabeth I: Court and Culture in the Last Decade*, 126-49 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995).

^ J. E. Neale, *Elizabeth I and her Parliaments 1584-1601* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1957), 267-79; Patrick Collinson, "Puritans, Men of Business and Elizabethan Parliaments," *Parliamentary History* 7 (1988): 194-95; Guy, "The Elizabethan Establishment and the Ecclesiastical Polity." Per contra to the ruling of the judges, which must have been deeply disappointing to all but the members of the High Commission, Sir Francis KnoUys, privy councillor and treasurer of the household, had recently told Archbishop Whitgift: "And withall it is very strange that the Byshoppes should have commysyon to govern by hir Majesties absolute power, synce hir Majesties clemencye is sotch, even toward trayterous papistes. That she hir selfe, in tyme of peace and qwyate, doth governe by order of lawe, and not by hir Majesties absolute power." (Northamptonshire Record Office, MS. F. (M), 68.) I am grateful to the Trustees of the estate of the late Lord Fitzwilliam of Milton for permission to quote from this piece of paper, which is in Knollys's own hand.

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archbishop's brother) proposed that new penal legislation being contemplated against popish recusants should be extended to cover puritan sectaries, the Brownists and Barrowists. That complicated the progress of the bill. Not only were many in the House of Commons uneasy about the ostensible terms of the Sandys motion. They seem to have detected an implicit threat to non-separatist Puritans; indeed to those very ministers who stood in bond to the High Commission.

Would Miles Sandys have been glad to see Cartwright hang? Would Richard Hooker? And what about Hooker's close friend, John Rainolds? In early April, the trials of a large number of Barrowists were proceeding in London. On April 6th, the two separatist leaders, Barrow and Greenwood, were hanged, a politically motivated act of judicial murder by Archbishop Whitgift, or so some thought. On May 29th, the Welsh preacher, John Penry, Martin Mar-prelate's alter ego, suffered the same fate. By then "An Act to retain the Queen's subjects in obedience" had gained the royal assent. This was in one respect a more draconian law than those against Catholic recusants, since it provided, as the latter did not, for banishment from the realm.[^]

It was a further indication of a panicky as well as repressive atmosphere that this moment should have been chosen to create a special watchdog committee called "the new committee for spyes, recusantes, coyners and such lyke about London or x miles of yt," a body which encroached on the work of the High Commission and prompted a protest from that quarter. This new commission was to seek out not only "popish malefac-tors" (no doubt its prime task) but "all depravers, contemners, or impugn-ers of lawe and statutes in causes Ecclesiasticall. And all keepers of con-venticles under pretence of any exercise of Religion."[^]

It may have been this investigatory body which generated those strange documents to which much attention was devoted in 1993, the fourth centenary not only of Hooker's prime publication but of the violent death of Christopher Marlowe: the papers which have formed the basis of the charge of atheism against Marlowe, including the so-called "Baines Note." As it happens, these papers are preserved in the British Library in MSS. Harley 6848 and 6849, consisting otherwise of the files of the lord keeper, Sir John Puckering, relating to the various processes involving Puritans,

[^] Neale, Elizabeth 1 and her Parliaments 1584-1601, 280-97; Haugaard, Intro, to Lawes Pref.; FLE 6:34 n. 69. 59-60. BL, MS. Harl. 6848, fols. 32-36; MS. Harl. 6849, fols. 181-82; Huntington Library, MSS. EL 2101-16, 2158.

[^] BL, MS. Harl. 6849, fols. 241-44.

Martinists, and separatists.^^ May 1593 saw the fear of serious disorders in London, the close examination of the dramatist Thomas Kyd, evidence uncovered of atheism, a powder trail leading to Kyd's old chamber fellow, Marlowe. On May 30th, Marlowe was killed in Deptford, perhaps thirty- six hours after Penry had been hanged, a stone's throw away, in South- wark. The mood of conspiracy (among contemporaries and 1993 authors alike) is reflected in reports concerning Marlowe's shadowy associate Richard Cholmley and his "damnable crue," who were said to be plotting an atheistical commonwealth. The magistrates were warned not to attempt to arrest Cholmley except with adequate force, since there were sixty of his company, all "resolute murdering myndes." Cholmley was taken on June 28th and we hear no more of him.^^

The name of Sir Walter Raleigh (Hooker's fellow Devonian) was linked to these allegedly atheistical networks, and a year later rumors of atheism and blasphemy surfacing around Raleigh's home in Dorset were investiga- ted by the High Commission. Who, those taking evidence in Dorset asked, had been heard to speak of God, "if there be a god"? "The soul, what is that?" asked Raleigh's brother at a dinner party, and in the ensuing discussion Raleigh said, in scholastically sportive mood, that he could never hitherto learn what God is. "Ens entium," said a minister who was present. And what is ens entium, asked Raleigh. "God," said the clergy- man. The minister of Sherborne had been pulled into a shoemaker's shop and warned about a company in the town who held that Hell was nothing but poverty and Heaven prosperity, "and that we die like beastes."^* This is as fascinating as any trivial historical detritus, and it provides the background for George Cranmer's (abortive) plea to Hooker to say some- thing in his Preface about "the cursed crew of Atheism," which he believed (implausibly) to be a spin-off from the discrediting of the church and its ministers by puritan critics.^

" BL, MS. Harl. 6848, fols. 154, 185-86, 187-89; MS. Had. 6849, fol. 218. There is, to be sure, no internal evidence in MSS. Harl. 6848 and 6849 that Puckering, rather than some later collector or collator (Humphrey Wanley?), was responsible for filing these papers in close proximity. The "Baines Note" and the material relating to Kyd are printed in C. F. Tucker Brooke, *The Life of Marlowe and the Tragedy of Dido Queen of Carthage* (London, 1930), 98-108. See most recently Charles NichoU, *The Reckoning: the Murder of Christopher Marlowe* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992) and references therein.

" BL, MS. Harl. 6848, fol. 190; NichoU, *The Reckoning*, 280-81.

^^ BL, MS. Harl. 6849, fols. 183-90.

^^ FLE 6:442-49, atheism at 446-47. That Cranmer's admonitory letter prompted

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Such was the scene into which the first four books of the *Lawes* were bom, in the early weeks of 1593. No wonder Hooker suggested, in bring- ing his Preface to a conclusion, that contentions might be, at that very moment, "at their highest float." The book was registered with the Stationers on January 29th, three weeks before parliament assembled, and Hooker sent a presentation copy to Lxjrd Burghley on March 13th, the very day that Miles Sandys took that initiative in the Commons which would lead directly to the execution of Barrow and Greenwood and the passage of the Elizabethan Conventicle Act.

What interests were actively involved in the publication can only be a matter of surmise. Many years later, the Court of Chancery would be told about the "eminent persons whom the cause did most especially concern," who allegedly "hastened" the enterprise. Yet, as the Chancery files otherwise reveal, it was hard for Hooker to find a willing publisher, while the substantial subvention which alone made publication possible came not from those "eminent persons" but from the son of an archbishop of York, a man of promise but not as yet of any great account.^^ It does not appear that he was simply the agent for his father. Such evidence as there is hints at some kind of understanding, or benign literary conspiracy, at a level somewhat below "eminence," involving Hooker's erstwhile pupils, Sandys and Cranmer, and the household of his father-in-law, the city man John Churchman.^^ One is remotely reminded of the cryptic understanding between St. Cyran and Jansen which led to Jansen's *Augustinus* and the birth of Jansenism. Even at the time of Hooker's death, there are hints of a limited and somewhat conspiratorial circle of support in Lancelot Andrewes's letter to Henry Parry. ® 1 know of no better example of the intervention of private persons, intellectual "men-of-business" of middling rank, in the formulation of Elizabethan policy. And yet it remains a knotty problem. Professor Richard Bauckham believed it "highly unlikely" that Archbishop Whitgift had in any sense commis- sioned the *Lawes*}^ Yet the dedication of the Fifth Book makes it hard

the insertion of the overtly polemical chapter 8 in Hooker's Preface, substantially modifying its rhetorical structure and tone, is persuasively argued by William Haugaard in his Intro, to Lawes Pref.; FLE 6:44-51. The Preface itself will be found at FLE 1:1- 53.

^* Sisson, 49-60.

^^ On Hooker-Sandys-Cranmer, see especially "Notes on the Sixth Book by George Cranmer and Edwin Sandys," FLE 3:105-40.

^* Works of Lancelot Andrewes, 1 1 :xl-xli.

^ Bauckham, "Hooker, Travers and the Church of Rome," 50. Professor Conrad

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to believe that he had no knowledge of, or interest in, the project. Is it significant that Hooker received no great preferment, not so much as a canonry of Windsor? Did his private (marital) fortune put him above vulgar careerism — a neglected possibility, and not only in the case of Hooker? That the bishops were not entirely pleased with the kind of defense of the church which Hooker offered, leading to the effective suppression of Books VI, VII, and VIII, is certainly part of this problem, as it was for his biographer, Walton.

C. J. Sisson was wrong to suppose that the Lawes constituted the riposte to radical Puritanism, carefully timed to coincide with the parliamentary maneuvers of March 1593. That function was performed by Richard Bancroft, as Whitgift himself acknowledged in the extraordinary testimonial he later wrote for Bancroft as a candidate for the bishopric of London, a reference for the CIA or the KGB rather than for the C of E: "He hath been an especiall Man of his calling, that the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury hath used for the space of 9 or ten years, in all the stirs which have been made of the factious, against the good of the Church." More specifically he wrote: "The last Parliament, he did sett out two Books in defence of the State of the Church, and against the pretended Holy Discipline. ""^ The direction of "eminent persons" in respect of these publications is explicit, Bancroft explaining in one of them that his treatise was "required" by "some persons of honor, who might dispose of him and his labours." This points to Lord Chancellor Hatton, whose chaplain

and speech-writer Bancroft was, as well as to Whitgift and perhaps other members of what was later called "the little faction" of markedly anti-puritanical politicians and civil lawyers.^{1*}

Nevertheless, these two books, *A Survey of the Pretended Holy Discipline*

Russell points out that in (that critical year) 1584, Archbishop Adamson of St. Andrews, who was promoting a "prelatical" policy in Scotland, asked Whitgift for a work setting out English ideas on "ecclesiastical polity." (Conrad Russell, *The Causes of the English Civil War: the Ford Lectures 1987-1988* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990], 37.) I am grateful to Dr George Bernard for bringing this reference to my attention.

¹ Original in Cambridge Univ. Library, MS. Mm. 1.47, most recently printed in *Tracts Ascribed to Richard Bancroft*, ed. Albert Peel (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1953), xvii-xx. The two books were *A Survey of the Pretended Holy Discipline* and *Daungerous Positions and Proceedings, Published and Practised Within this Iland of Brytaine, Under Pretence of Reformation, and for the Presbiteriall Discipline*. Both were printed by John Wolfe.

* "Advertisement," *Daungerous Positions*. For the Bancroft-Hatton connection and the "little faction" more generally, see Collinson, *E.P.M.*, 313-14, 387-88.

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and *Daungerous Positions and Proceedings*, both printed in 1593, are not without their own problems. Why two books covering very similar ground, both providing highly tendentious and richly documented accounts of Puritanism? Both were published anonymously, without the conventional protection of a patron. Without Whitgift's fortuitously preserved testimony, we should not know for certain that Bancroft was their author. And yet the *Survey* consists of strongly authorial, first-person rhetoric. With due respect to Peter Lake, it was these rather nasty books, not Hooker's

Lau)es, which were "the conformist equivalent of the Marprelate Tracts."²

Bancroft's voice was the railing voice of an anti-Martin, as far removed from Hooker's reasonable tone as one could get. In earlier writings, not published, Bancroft had revealed a satirical gift not much inferior to Martin's.⁵ And more recently, as Whitgift's testimonial informs us, it was Bancroft who had hit upon the device of having Martin answered "in his own vein," in the pamphlets and theatrical satires turned out to order by Lyly (a pupil of John Rainolds!), Nashe, and other literary hacks.⁶ And now, in *A Survey of the Pretended Holy Discipline*, Bancroft wrote scornfully of "their bastardly Discipline, that secretlie and seditiouslie eight or nine yeares since, they have agreed uppon (after their fashion like dogges and cattles) in manie of their assemblies," "these caterbraules and pitiful distractions." "But doe I call it a schisme? the worde is too milde."⁷ In *Daungerous Positions* there is less abuse. The book consists of little more than an anthology of puritan writings and documents, the

⁵ Lake, *AngUcans and Puritans?*, 160.

⁶ Examples in *Tracts Ascribed to Bancroft* include the highly entertaining account of a typical "precisian's" sennon at Bury St Edmunds, 71-73.

⁷ Ibid., xviii. Patrick CoUinson, "Ecclesiastical Vitriol: Religious Satire in the 1590s and the Invention of Puritanism," in *The Reign of EUzabeth I*, ed. John Guy, 1995), 150- 70; and Patrick CoUinson, "Ben Jonson's Bartholomew Fair: The Theatre Constructs Puritanism," in *The Theatrical City: Culture, Theatre and Politics in London, 1576-1649*, ed. David Bevington, David Smith, and Richard Strier, 157-69 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995). That John Lyly (and the anti-theatrical writer Stephen Gosson) were taught by John Rainolds is noted by Green in *Rainolds's Oxford Lectures*, 9-10, 62, 76- 77. The late Professor William Ringler went so far as to attribute Lyly's Euphuism to Rainolds's impact as a teacher of academic rhetoric. ("The Immediate Source of Euphu- ism," *PMLA* 53 [1938]: 678-86; Stephen Gosson: *A Biographical and Critical Study* [Princeton, 1941], 7-17). Professor Green finds the origins of Euphuism in a more generalized "excitement about rhetoric" in Rainolds's (and Hooker's) college.

⁸ Bancroft, *Survey*, 345, 414, 434.

Strategy being to allow the enemy to condemn itself out of its own mouth and record.

Hooker's polemic was of a different kind, but it was applied to a similar end. For one thing, Bancroft may have had a puny intellect in comparison with Hooker, but on this subject he was immensely better informed and more widely read, with a knowledge of the writings of the Elizabethan Puritans which any modern historian of the subject might envy. His books grew out of the fat dossier of incriminating materials which he himself had accumulated with loving care to fuel the prosecutions of Cartwright and the other ministers, together with the correspondence between the principal organizer of the classis movement, John Field, and his country agents.^{1*} Among these letters were some which sought casuistical advice for women, and these were given the typical Martinist treatment. Bancroft wished that he could have seen the resolution of such urgent questions as "whether the godly sisters that sigh for discipline may lay out their hayre: wear dublets: little hats with feathers: great french gownes: great ruffles."²

By contrast. Hooker's more disciplined and economical mind found virtually all the material he required in Cartwright's exchanges with Whitgift, the Admonition Controversy. Much of the Lawes, especially the Fifth Book, is little more than a paraphrase of that earlier controversy, albeit an architectonic paraphrase, always referred downwards to what Hooker understood to be the great underlying principles. As Professor Lake has put it, presbyterianism was a particular example of an epistemo- logical lapse which could only be dealt with effectively by a reconstruction of the proper relations of Scripture, reason, and political and ecclesiastical

^{1*} Collinson, E.P.M., 403-31. This dossier may correspond to material listed in Archbishop Laud's "paper study" in 1634: "In Bundell D in the shelf no. 8: Three bookes conteyning the originalls of all Hacketts and Copingers busines, of the letters mencioned in the dangerous posicions, of the examinaciones in the Starr Chamber and elsewhere" (Bodleian Library, MS. Tanner 88, fol. 8). The contents of a MS. volume of exhibits, apparently prepared by Bancroft and Richard Cosin for use in the Star Chamber, can be inferred in part by collation of material in a brief headed "The proceedings of certayne undutifull ministers tending to innovation, soe farr as is hetherto disclosed by certain papers and letters founde amongst them" (copies

in BL, MS. Harl. 6866, fols. 316-27, MS. Lansdowne 120, fols. 70-77), the notes of the queen's counsel, John Puckering, (BL, MS. Harl. 6849, fols. 220-23, 227-30), together with the Star Chamber interrogatories and depositions (PRO, St. Ch. 5 A 56/1). These were some of the sources for Bancroft's books, and especially for *Daungerous Positions*.

*^ Bancroft, *Survey*, 369-70.

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authority. Such a reconstruction Hooker attempted, and, according to his admirers, achieved.^®

But within this intellectually ambitious and even noble enterprise, Hooker's polemic was occasionally as wounding as Bancroft's, and, given its icy and refined tone, perhaps more so: just as Martin Luther in a famous letter to Erasmus suggested that Erasmus could do more damage with his rapier than he with his bludgeon. The opening passage of Hooker's Preface, in itself the most polemical portion of the *Lawes*, is very deceptive in the sweet reasonableness of its second-person address to his opponents. "T/iinke not that ye reade the words of one, who hendeth him selfe as an adversarie against the truth which ye have alreadie embraced; hut the words of one, who desireth even to embrace together with you the selfe same truth, if it be the truth" (Pref. 1.3; 1:3.1-4). But the persuasive second-person address alternates with the more aggressive "they" and "them," which later takes over almost entirely in Book V.

Both Hooker and Bancroft insist that the "discipline," far from being biblical and apostolic, was a very recent invention, originating in the Calvinist revolution in Geneva. The only difference is that Bancroft represents Calvin's takeover of the city as a cunning conspiracy, where Hooker emphasizes the circumstantial, unpredictable nature of these events. "Marke I pray you Maister Calvins pollicy," writes Bancroft in the *Survey*. Hooker in the Preface to the *Lawes* thought that Calvin could hardly have done better in the circumstances, the bishop and his clergy being departed from Geneva by moonlight, "or howsoever, being departed," a good example of Hooker's deflationary irony on the subject of the Calvinist discipline. Like Bancroft, Hooker's purpose was to construct a progressively degenerative scenario, in which the Puritans, having once gone off the rails, necessarily ran into extreme and even lunatic courses. Bancroft (and Richard Cosin) made the crazy Copinger-Hacket "conspir- acy" their terminus ad quern, using grossly

unfair arguments to incriminate the mainstream Puritans in this lunatic-fringe episode by association: the intention being to make the essentially political point that presbyterianism was a subversive threat to the body politic as well as to the church and its bishops and clergy, a seditious endeavor "to disturb the land." In

** Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society,' " 16; Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans*^, 159.

*" Bancroft. *Survey*, 28; Lawes *Pref.* 2.4; 1:6.26-27.

*° Much of Book 3 of *Dangerous ?osiur\s*, "The practises of certaine English

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chapter 8 of the Preface, Hooker made ritual play of the gruesome story of the Anabaptists at Miinster, which within a few months Thomas Nashe would retail more colorfully in his *Unfortunate Traveller*. But Hooker was primarily interested in the more purely religious extremism of the Barrow- ist separatists, as the inevitable ecclesiological destination of those who cut themselves loose, if only intellectually, from the rationally based law and order of the church.

Hooker had been urged to sound an alarmist note by George Cranmer, and he duly responded in the intensely polemical chapter 8 of the Preface, which, in the topos of a prosopopoeia, exploited the puritan-separatist connection and spoke of the separatists sucking their principles from the breasts of their puritan mentors. "Thus the foolish Barrowist deriveth his schisme by way of conclusion" (*Pref.* 8.1; 1:39.2-3). As it happens, this was by no means an unfair argument. Within weeks of the printing of Hook- er's Preface, one Barrowist after another was telling the High Commission that they owed the schismatic principles which they had put into separa- tist practice to the doctrine of the leading puritan preachers in London. For example, the young goldsmith Christopher Bowman, who as deacon held the purse-strings of the separatist congregation, told the court that "the forward preachers caused him to fall into those assemblies," naming Laurence Chaderton, the master of Emmanuel College and the Cambridge counterpart of John Rainolds.^^ But Hooker was no less capable than Bancroft of dirty tricks. Usually his "they" and "them" refers to Cart- wright, but sometimes it stands without differentiation

for Barrow as if (Book V, chapters 11 and 17) "they" (by implication all Puritans) favored the razing of all churches to the ground, as places where idols had been worshipped, a very extreme doctrine. These are superficial points, which Hooker's argument generally transcends. But Hooker was in deadly earnest as to the general transcendental contention. If the assimilation of the

reformers for Discipline" is given up to the Copinger-Hacket affair, with much emphasis on "the cunning dealing of certaine ministers in London" (177), their cunning having consisted in having as little to do with these lunatic-fringe fanatics as possible, which Bancroft professed to find very suspicious. See also Richard Cosin, *Conspiracie for Pretended Reformation* (London, 1592), more than 50,000 words on this "conspiracy."

5' BL, MS. Harl. 6848, fols. 32-36, 45-80; printed Champlin Bunage, *Early English Dissenters* (Cambridge, 1912), 2:38-54. The examinations of Bowman are at fols. 33 and 70 (and Burrage, 40-41, 54). Bowman was referring not to Chaderton's preaching in general but to a sermon on Romans 12, often attributed to Chaderton: *A Fruitfull Sermon upon the 3.4.5.6.7. arui 8. verses, of the 12. Chapter of the Epistle of S. Paul to the Romanes* (editions in 1584, 1586, 1589, and 1618).

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lunatic fringe to Puritanism was for Bancroft a mere polemical ploy, for Hooker it provided a map of the whole Christian world. The Church of England was for the first time placed on that map somewhere between Rome and Geneva. While the English church shared some common ground with Rome, there were compromising connections between Geneva and the out-of-control sectarianism to the left, of which Barrow served as a symbol.

I add three final comments on Hooker as anti-Puritan polemicist. He revealed what he really thought of his opponents in the privacy of his marginal comments on that unfavorable review of his book, *A Christian Letter*, although it must be admitted that anyone is entitled to react waspishly to a bad review: "ignorant asse!" he scribbled, "you ly sir," "such an idiot!" "My second point: Hooker's single-minded target was Puritanism, "them that seeke (as they tearme it) the

reformation of Lawes, and orders EcclesiasticaU in the Church o/
 ENGLAND" (Lawes Pref. 1.1; 1:1.2-5). He ignored George Cranmer's
 invitation to bring papists and atheists within the scope of his Preface,
 even though Cranmer's point was that these other dangers could be
 conveniently blamed on Puritanism.^^ The third point is that only here
 and there in such an exhaustive treatment of his subject did Hooker
 suggest that the ecclesiastical establishment, which is to say the
 bishops, might be at fault and in need of reformation. This was mainly
 in chapter 24 of Book VII, which frankly acknowledges and en- gages
 with what might be objected against the Elizabethan bishops. This
 may have done Hooker, or rather these later portions of his book, no
 good at all, for it must be admitted that in a grudging age, little use
 was made of the rhetorical art of corwessio (less than Sir Thomas
 More had used against William Tyndale, and More dropped concessio
 altogether in his Confutation), and no other apologist for the
 Elizabethan status quo chose to be as critical as Hooker of the
 institution he was supposed to be defend- ing.5^

" Hooker's Autograph Notes on A Christian Letter (1599), FLE 4:22,
 41, 42.

^ FLE 6:446-47. Cranmer's perception of the importance of the
 atheistical issue and its connection with the puritan controversies was
 shared by the lapsed Wiltshire separatist, Thomas White. He wrote
 that two extremes threatened the church of God, "Atheistical
 prophanenesse and hipocriticall contention." "And these howsoever
 they seem to differ the one from the other, yet the one is strengthened
 and hardened by the other, and this with a mutuall reciprocation"
 (Thomas White, A Discoverie ofBroumisme [London, 1605], sig. A2).

^* Chapter 24 of Book VII begins: "Be it that Bishops were all
 unworthy, not onely of living, but even of life" (FLE 3:290.6-7), an
 excellent example of concessio.

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But for a genuinely detached, truly irenical critique of the troubles of
 the late Elizabethan church, we must turn to Francis Bacon and his
 unpublished "An Advertisement Touching the Controversies of the
 Church of England," dated by Spedding to 1589.^^ From whatever
 motives (which need not detain us). Bacon adopted the forensically

equitable rhetoric of a just adjudication between two sides, both of which were found to be at fault. Bacon deplored the Martinist and anti-Martinist episode, "this immodest and deformed manner of writing lately entertained, whereby matters of religion are handled in the style of the stage."

^ Printed from Bodleian Library, MS. E.Mus.55 by James Spedding et al. in *The Works of Francis Bacon*, 14 vols. (London, 1857-74), 8:74-95. I have been tempted to redate Bacon's "Advertisement" to our annus mirabilis of 1593 on the internal evidence of Bacon's complaint (p. 89) that "they have ever sorted and coupled them with the Family of love, whose heresies they have laboured to descry and confute." This might be read as referring to Bancroft's comparison of "H. N.," the founding prophet of the Family of Love, with Thomas Cartwright ("T. C.") on the first page of *A Survey of the Pretended Holy Discipline* (1593): "T. C, a man I confesse not to be sorted with H. N. (were it not upon this occasion) wil needs take upon him likewise the person of the Prophet." But equally, this may have been Bancroft's response to Bacon's criticism, assuming that he had seen the (unpublished) "Advertisement." In addition to some ten contemporary or near-contemporary copies listed in Beal's *Index of English Literary Manuscripts*, the Fitzwilliam of Milton papers on deposit in the Northamptonshire Record Office contain a copy (F.(M).P.61) which is likely to have belonged to Sir Walter Mildmay, who died on 31 May 1589. Julian Martin, who dates the "Advertisement" in "the latter part" of 1589, and who assumes that it was intended for circulation, detects a reference to it in the anonymous *A petition directed to her most excellent majestie* (Middelburg, 1591), which must exclude a date as late as 1593 {Francis Bacon, *the State, and the Reform of Natural Philosophy* [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992], 38-42, 103). I have benefited from discussing this problem with Professor Brian Vickers, who is currently editing the "Advertisement." Bacon's attitude to the disputes in the late Elizabethan church matches exactly the views of Thomas Norton, the London lawyer and great "Parliament man," translator of Calvin's *Institutes*, who writing to the future Archbishop Whitgift in 1572, and attempting to dissuade him from writing his *Answer to the puritan Admonition to the Parliament*, warned him: "Sir, you know that not he that giveth the first blow, as they have done, but he that giveth the second, as you shall do, maketh the fray." (Michael A. R. Graves, *Thomas Norton; The Parliament Man* [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994], 302.) That Hooker, at least in private, shared similar views about the second blow is suggested by the unpublished (in Hooker's lifetime) Dublin fragment to which

Archbishop Ussher would give the title. The Causes of the continuance of these Contentions concerning Church'govemment, where he contends that, "want of sound proceeding in Church controversies hath made manie more stiffe in error now then before," citing the precedent of Arianism having been provoked by the lack of moderation on the part of its opponents (FLE 3:457.8-12). I am indebted to Professor A. S. McGrade for bringing this to my attention.

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But he reserved his harsher criticism for those who had used these kinds of weapons against Martin. "The second blow makes the fray." And he selected for particular censure the individual who had had the bright idea of dealing with the Martinists with their own weapons. Bancroft was not named but Bancroft was meant, and Bacon went on (again without naming names) to complain about other Bancroftian tactics: his censure of foreign Reformed churches; his lumping the puritan party with sectaries such as the Family of Love to which they were in fact implacably opposed; and his insinuation that the Puritans constituted a threat to the very sinews of the state. "I grant there is a sympathy between the states; but no such matter in the civil policy, as deserveth so dishonourable a taxation." There were no reds under the bed.

It is typical of Bacon's even-handedness that he blamed the controversy on both the "occasion," which he frankly spelled out as "imperfections in the conversation and government of those which have the chief place in the Church," which "have ever been the principal causes and motives of schisms and divisions"; and on "the inconsidered and ungrounded taking of occasion" by the other side. Both had their extremists, both had been guilty of "unbrotherly proceeding." When push came to shove. Bacon was bound to defend the existing constitution of the church, and he did so. He was well aware of the genuine dangers posed by sectarianism and divisiveness. But he also acknowledged the need for reforms; reform of the ministry, recommending the revival of the suppressed prophesyings, together with ministerial conferences; reform of the abuse of excommunication in the courts. Why had the bishops failed to act on their own initiative in such matters? "We have heard of no offer

of the bishops of bills in parliament Is nothing amiss?" Bacon too

discussed the topic of atheism, and attributed it to a vicious cocktail of

"curious controversies" and "profane scoffing," for which not one but both parties were to be held to account. But the implication is clear. If the bishops had done their job, there would have been no "curious controversies," no "profane scoffing."

But of course Bacon, unlike Hooker, was not a proctor for the ecclesiastical status quo. In a similar memorandum drawn up for James I in 1603, he suggested that while formally disqualified by his lay profession from commenting on such matters, "a man that standeth off, and somewhat removed from a plot of ground, doth better survey it and discover it than

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those which are upon it."^^ His analysis was entirely secular, the work of a statesman's mind which was learning from Tacitus how to account for the vagaries of human affairs in the manner of "politic history."

So far it has been assumed that Hooker's intention was not different from that of earlier Elizabethan conformist apologists, including the unreadable ones, such as John Bridges: to defend the church against a challenge to its constitution and liturgy, a challenge which we may conveniently if somewhat anachronistically refer to in shorthand as presbyterianism. In the conventional assessment of such controversies, doctrine had never been in question. In Bacon's reassuring words, they were "not of the highest nature, for they are not touching the high mysteries of faith."

As Peter Lake has observed, Hooker's unprecedented profundity consisted in going beyond assertions that presbyterianism was wrong to the question why, epistemologically and psychologically, it was wrong, and that turned out to be a question if not of the highest nature then at least of the deepest nature. However, Lake has also suggested that presbyterianism was never Hooker's real or ultimate objective. While appearing to fight old battles all over again, Whitgift versus Cartwright, he was in fact using that as a smoke-screen under which to construct an original synthesis of old arguments, amounting to a novel vision not so much of what the English version of the Protestant religion was as of what it ought to be; of its foundations in reason as well as in Scripture, the reason of the church being actually anterior to Scripture, and so perhaps prior; of the location of the

English church, vertically in time and horizontally in its contemporary relations within the universal and visible catholic church of which it was a part, but of which the Roman church was also a part, if defective.

These were some of the salient features of the divinity which Hooker erected on these broad and newly excavated foundations. The preaching of the gospel was no longer regarded as the church's indispensable activity, as if salvation could be imparted and the church edified in no other way.

^^ "Certain Considerations Touching the Better Pacification and Edification of the Church of England," printed from PRO, S.P. 14/5/51 by James Spedding in *The Works of Francis Bacon*, 10:103.

^ Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?*, 145-230.

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Besides asking searching questions about what preaching was, for not all "preaching" bore close examination, Hooker asserted, and was the first Elizabethan Protestant apologist to do so, that the church was primarily a house of prayer, with worship and sacraments its prime business. This was different from the old conformist defence of ceremonies which was, in Lake's phrase, that "they were there because they were there."^^ Sacraments were not bare signs but the actual means of incorporation into the mystical body of Christ. An enhanced estimation of the sacraments and of the church as a praying community was accompanied by an ecclesiology which replaced Whitgift's somewhat impoverished Erastianism with an enriched, more churchly ecclesiology, and one that was inclusive of all baptized, communicating Christians. To insist on what Lake calls "a broad-bottomed view of the Christian community" was to pull away from the exclusivism of the prevalent doctrine of grace which laid stress on election and predestination, and toward an at least hypothetical universalism. It was in no way wrong to offer the prayer that all men might be saved. Given these premises, there was bound to be a reappraisal of the English church in its relation to antiquity (from which this divinity was in large measure derived) and to its more immediate, pre-Reformation past. It was no longer safe to deny the Roman church the status of a true church in which true prayers were

offered and salvation could be found. The conformist apologetics of Whitgift and of others between Whitgift and Hooker had been weakened by internal contradictions arising from assumptions shared with nonconformists. A Calvinist like Whitgift could hardly deny that a preaching ministry was essential, and so Whitgift could only find somewhat feeble arguments with which to defend a church in which sermons were still caviare to the general. Hooker's intellectual system underwrote the kind of church that the late Elizabethan Church of England actually was, or most properly aspired to be.

It is not and cannot be my purpose toward the end of an essay of acceptable length to discuss how far Hooker's theology of grace and sacraments, together with his ecclesiology, were an innovation. In comparison with his fellow conformist apologists, Whitgift, Bridges, Cooper, and even Bancroft, Saravia, and Bilson, he was an original, his originality accurately pinpointed in Lake's work. But it remains uncertain how far Hooker may have travelled out of the consensualities of Elizabethan Protestantism. The complementarity of preaching and prayer was an old

58 Ibid., 164.

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commonplace, although Hooker struck a different and somewhat original balance on this issue. How divergent from prevailing orthodoxy was Hooker's doctrine of grace, a matter on which he was distinctly elusive, except in the Dublin Fragments? We should probably think of Hooker reworking the position of the Lambeth Articles from within a fundamentally Reformed position, rather than stating the criticism of a total outsider to the tradition. Conventional dichotomies do not always take sufficient account of the rich depth of eucharistic devotion nurtured within the Reformed mainstream itself. Nevertheless, Professor Lake is surely correct not only to make Hooker coincident with what he calls the Anglican moment, but to insist that he had a unique sense and vision of that moment.

Did Hooker actually intend what Lake thinks that he intended, namely to break the Calvinist stranglehold on the Church of England? Lake suggests that if Hooker wanted, in effect, to announce that the church was in danger, he chose almost the last moment when it was plausible

to claim that it was in danger from presbyterianism. Presbyterianism was, if not a paper tiger, a great bugbear, to borrow the word once used of such things by Archbishop Laud himself.[°] After all, the publishing history of the *Latues* suggests that it took ingenuity in the 1590s to maintain public interest in something which was becoming, for all the political pseudo- excitement accompanying it, a dead issue. It was deadlier still by 1597, when the Fifth Book was published.

Lake is also correct to identify a number of surrogate bugbears which in the 1590s filled the blank spaces left by the "discipline," and which provided that adversarial factor with which aggressively reactive conform- ism could not dispense, rather like the United States, looking for substi- tutes for the old Cold War enemy, in the Islamic world and elsewhere. These new bugbears included the controversy over Christ's descent into Hell,[^] Sabbatarianism,^{^^} and the use of prayer and fasting, well-estab-

*' I owe this point to Mr Arnold Hunt, in a fellowship dissertation submitted to Trinity College, Cambridge.

*° Laud is quoted on "the great bugbear called Arminianism" by J. Sears McGee, "William Laud and the Outward Face of Religion" in R. L. DeMolen, ed., *Leaders of the Reformation* (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna Univ. Press, 1984), 341.

^ Dewey D. Wallace, "Puritan and Anglican: The Interpretation of Christ's Descent into Hell in Elizabethan Theology," *Archiv fur Reformationsgeschichte* 69 (1978): 248-87.

^^ CoUinson, "The Beginnings of English Sabbatarianism"; Kenneth L. Parker, "Thomas Rogers and the English Sabbath: the Case for a Reappraisal," *Church History*

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lished elements in the Reformed religious economy all over western Europe, for the special purpose of exorcism.^{^^} A fascinating story could be told of Bancroft's behind-the-scenes manipulation of this last issue, in the sensational case of the allegedly bewitched and possessed Mary Glover, in the London of 1602-3.[^] Bancroft, who was by now a bishop and above street-fighting, used lesser fry to fight these skirmishes: Thomas Rogers, the Suffolk clergyman who discovered the new

menace of Sabbatarianism in his own backyard, and who invented the word "Sabbatarian"; Samuel Harsnet, a future bishop and archbishop who redeemed a disastrous error as a licenser of books^{^^} by making the running against the puritan exorcists.

The argument is not necessarily that hardline conformists invented and pursued these issues for reasons of self-advancement or even self-protection, although it is a naive ecclesiastical historian who makes no allowance for such factors. It is likely that they perceived (with good reason) a continuing danger from that puritan self-selectiveness to which both Bancroft and Hooker drew attention, when they noted that Puritans who spoke of "the godly churches" meant something other than the Church of England, and that "brethren" was a word with a special and encoded meaning. But while puritan "godliness" may indeed have been the nub, it presented a diffuse, elusive target which needed "bugbears" to be brought into focus and within range. That is how, with considerable indebtedness to Peter Lake, I read Bancroft in this evolving situation.

But is Richard Hooker to be included in this strategy? There is no evidence that he played any part in Bancroft's essentially superficial and skirmishing maneuvers. Nothing nasty in the woodwork was discovered in

53 (1984): 332-47; Kenneth Parker, *The English Sabbath: A Study of Doctrine and Discipline from the Reformation to the Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988). Thomas Rogers may have been the very first to use the term "Sabbatarian," in a sermon preached at Bury St Edmunds on 10 December 1599. (BL, MS. Add, 38492, fol. 104.)

^{^^} In particular, the case of the virtually professional exorcist John Darrell. See CoUinson, E.P.M., 437-38; Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 483-86 (and references supplied by Thomas); and D. P. Walker, *Unclean Spirits* (London: Scholar Press, 1981).

[^] *Witchcraft and Hysteria in Elizabethan London*: Edward Jorden and the Mary Glover Case, ed. Michael Macdonald (London: Tavistock/Routledge, 1991).

^{*1} Harsnet had blotted his copy book by licensing the first part of John Hayward's *The Life and Raigne of King Henrie III*. See W. W. Greg,

"Samuel Harsnet and Hay-ward's Henry IV," *The Library*, 5th ser., 11 (1956): 1-10; and John Manning's edition of this text, *Camden 4di ser.* 43 (1991):17-19.

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Bishopsbourne, unless there was substance and a background to Walton's story about the deliberate destruction of parts of the Lawes after Hooker's death. But on the other hand, in the unique profundity of Hooker's analysis, presbyterianism itself had been only a superficial symptom of a more general malaise, which was a mistaken view of the relations of Scripture, reason, and church. It is not likely that Hooker thought that the malaise had been cured, or that the church was no longer in danger. His bugbear was the big one, the ultimate epistemological bugbear.

But more than one party was maneuvering to find firm, high ground as the Elizabethan church prepared to turn itself into the Jacobean church. The old "disciplinarians" were themselves changing old bugbears for new ones. They now increasingly threw their energies into the issues that really mattered. Bacon's "high mysteries of faith," which is to say, the doctrines of grace and salvation and the issues which made a fundamental division from the Romish Antichrist and which Rainolds was strenuously debating with Cardinal Bellarmine. These English Calvinists, or moderate Puritans, as we may choose to call them, cared about these things and sincerely believed them to be at risk from within the English church establishment itself. But as Professor Lake suggested in an earlier book, moderate Puritans in Elizabethan Cambridge, figures such as Whitaker, Chaderton, and Robert Some, had more private and less disinterested motives. To relinquish what one Elizabethan commentator had called "civil wars of the Church of God" in order to mount expeditions against the Antichristian errors of Rome and in assertion of the sovereign doctrines of grace was the way to secure a position of safety within an established, episcopal church, without surrendering the essential kernel of evangelical Protestantism. It also made a career.

The most prolific of the coming generation of Calvinist and anti-Catholic controversialists was Andrew Willet, author among many other tomes of *Tetrastylon Papisticum: The Four Principall Pillars of Papistrie* (yet another publication of 1593) and the immense *Synopsis Papismi: A General View of the Papistry* (editions in 1592, 1594, 1600, 1613, 1634). That was where all the running was now to be

made. Traditional Hooker scholarship believed that with the failure of the Spanish Armada, Puritanism replaced Catholicism as the greater threat to the Elizabethan church and state: hence Hooker's life work. This is the exact reverse of the true

** Lake, *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church*. "Collinson, E.P.M., 165-66.

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situation, certainly of any perception of the situation in 1593. No one in 1593 can have supposed that popery, or the international forces of the Counter-Reformation, were so many paper tigers. Among all the other conspiracies of 1593, real and imagined, there was a plot to poison the queen, involving the royal physician, Rodrigo Lopez, and his Spanish paymasters; or, alternatively, a plot of the earl of Essex to frame Lopez for a political purpose. Either way, the Lopez affair will have strengthened the public perception that Spanish popery, not Puritanism, was the most likely source of treacherous subversion. And since Lopez was by race a Jew, a dose of anti-semitism was now added to the conspiratorial brew, to receive a notable distillation in *The Merchant of Venice*. Amid these excitements, there is no evidence that Mr. Hooker's book had any widespread impact.

So the issues addressed by Hooker were, if not dead, dying, suggesting to Lake that his intellectual achievement exceeded his political achievement, or, one might say, his relevance. In the third, 1600, edition of *Synopsis Papiami*, Andrew Willet inserted a new dedicatory epistle, addressed to Archbishop Whitgift and Bishop Bancroft. In this epistle, Willet threw in the towel, acknowledging that the bishops had won the war of the discipline. The Puritans "were once troublesome, but have now become quiet, either won over by your humanity, or becalmed by your prudence, or confirmed by your sounder judgement." Willet suggested that it was now the common duty of all members of the Church of England to unite against the common Roman enemy.®

Bancroft was not deaf to such advances. Like the rising sun whom he would now serve, James I, he was happy to pick off the odd puritan extremist with sniper fire, or better still to persuade renegade radicals and separatists to change sides and work for him, a policy which he

had applied with success to the divided forces of English Catholicism.^^ Bancroft, as Nicholas Tyacke and Kenneth Fincham have shown us, was some kind of Calvinist,¹⁰ for all his animus against Geneva and Scotland,

^ Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*, 13-15.

*' For example, it is possible to tease out some details of the story of how Bancroft attracted the extreme separatist Henech Clapham back into the conformist fold, eventually finding him a living in Kent, as it happens Sir Edwin Sandys's parish of Northbourne. It was no accident that Clapham preached against the puritan exorcists in the context of the Mary Glover case. (*Witchcraft and Hysteria*, xxiii.)

^^ Nicholas Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists: the Rise of English Arminianism c. 1590- 1640* (2nd pbck. ed., Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1990), 3, 17; Kenneth Fincham, *Prelate as Pastor: the Episcopate of James I* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 291-92. Bancroft was also a

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and he was by no means averse to a peaceable, broad-bottomed church. But perhaps he did not feel altogether comfortable with Willet's advances, suspecting that the intention was to outflank him.

Other apologists for conformity were publicly suspicious, and hostile, as well they might be. With the advent of James, Willet suppressed his irenic preface and sent a copy of his *Synopsis* to the king, accompanied by an epistle which, in effect, aligned him with the signatories of the Millenary Petition, calling afresh for moderate ecclesiastical reform.~ Was Willet a shameless opportunist? With the defeat of moderate reform-ism at the Hampton Court Conference, he renewed his overtures to the bishops. In the dedication to his *Hexapla* in Genesis ("safe" biblical scholarship on which he was now encouraged to concentrate), Archbishop Bancroft (as he now was) and Bishop Vaughan of London were addressed as "*vos vigilantissimi Episcopi*," "*indulgentissimi patres*," "*sacerdotes Domini*," "*humanissimi patres*."^^ Hardline conformists were not deceived, nor was Willet drawing a line which would hold for years to come. Ultimately, the future would not belong to the Willets of that ecclesiastical world, professional moderates. However, Willet was unwavering in his attacks on Hooker's (as he saw them) dangerously novel

formulations.^^

In all his successive demarches, Willet warned his patrons, from the crown downwards, of the dangerous new crypto-popish doctrines threaten- ing the church, and these were veiled reference to Hooker.^^^ Willet probably had a hand in that hostile review of the Lawes, the Christian Letter of certaine English Protestantes (1599), in which for the first time since his brush with Travers at the Temple, Hooker was challenged as to his real opinions and motives. "And may wee not trulie say, that under the shewe of inveighing against Puritanes, the chiefeest pointes of popish blasphemie, are many times and in many places, by divers men not obscurelie broached, both in Sermons and in Writing. . . ?" "Shall wee doe you wronge to suspect you as a privie and subtill enemie to the whole state of the Englishe Church?"

friend, even (as tradition would have it) lifelong friend, not only of Willet but of Laurence Chaderton. So did Bancroft too have an early background at odds with his later career? (I owe this suggestion to Dr. Anthony Milton.)

^ Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 19-21.

^^ Andrew Willet, Hexapla in Genesin (Cambridge, 1605), Preface.

" Milton, Catholic and Reformed, 21-27, 531-46.

^^ Ibid., 15-22.

^ FLE 4:7.24-27, 67.21-23. It is ironic that the "divers men" include the author of

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The polemical motive of creating bugbears for an essentially political purpose is transparent, and readings of Professor Lake's reading of Hook- er's mind, and even more of his intentions, must take account of the motives of Willet and his friends. Nevertheless, Lake is justified in his perception that Hooker confronted the English church with an original and disturbing and destabilizing account of its identity: a bugbear, yes, but much more than a bugbear.

A Survey of the Pretended Holy Discipline who of course was (unknown to Willet) Richard Bancroft. I owe this point and some other insights of these final paragraphs to Anthony Milton.

RUDOLPH P. ALMASY

They Are and Are Not Ely mas:

The 1641 "Causes" Notes as Postscript

to Richard Hooker's

Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie

AMONG THE PAPERS WHICH ARCHBISHOP USSHER received from Lancelot Andrewes was a short manuscript of Richard Hooker's. The manuscript is actually a series of notes— untitled. Ussher prepared these notes for a printer who in 1641 issued, under Ussher's authority, a work called *Certain Briefe Treatises*, written by diverse learned men, concerning the ancient and Modeme government of the Church. *Certain Briefe Treatises* begins with a work by Lancelot Andrewes which vindicates the episcopal form of government, but as a preface to Andrewes's treatise, as well as to the entire volume, Ussher prefixed the notes of Richard Hooker and titled them *The Causes of the continuance of these Contentions concerning Church- government*. By this placement, Ussher privileges Hooker in 1641 as a speaker for the established church (which was about to be destroyed) and defines the *Causes* statement as a weapon for those clinging to power as they react to their challengers. Accordingly, Hooker— praising the church for having done what it could in the face of those who would subvert the good order of episcopacy— could be read as categorizing all ecclesiastical opponents as subversives. His warning to them— submit. Whenever we are dealing with Richard Hooker, however, so straightforward a reading is questionable.

Hooker's notes begin with a classic statement of Renaissance passionate psychology, pitting judgment against affections, reason against the irrational. "Contention ariseth," Hooker writes, "eyther through error in mens judgements or else disorder in their affections" (FLE 3:455.3-4). The notes

are then divided into two parts: the first discusses "error in judgement," the second (and much shorter part) disorder in affections. The first part suggests that the only way to remove contention is through educating the presbyterians, Hooker's and the established church's opponents; the second part then dismisses that strategy as a failure. Prayer becomes the one hope which remains. About the only thing we know for sure about Hooker's statement, based on manuscript history and publishing history, is its association with "the tradition of Hooker's last three books."*

Saying that *Causes* is associated with the last three books of the *Lawes* does not, however, persuade everyone that it belongs to any of the final books or to the *Lawes* itself. Although John Keble, Hooker's nineteenth-century editor, suggests it "may have been sketched by way of hints for the conclusion of the whole work" (Keble, 3:461), P. G. Stanwood, the most recent editor of Books VI, VII, and VUL, defines it as a "general exhortation for peaceableness in church government and for the avoidance of faction" and suggests that it might belong to that period in Hooker's life, before the writing of the *Lawes*, when Hooker was master of the Temple congregation, 1585-1591.

In this essay, I would like to suggest that *The Causes of the continuance of these Contentions concerning Church government* might be accepted as part of the *Lawes*, perhaps as a concluding statement to the last three books or a statement which would have appeared in a preface to a final publishing event which, as we know, Hooker did not live to see. I suggest this position because it is clear to me that in commenting on how "contention ariseth" Hooker reveals, once again, the different ways he perceives the presbyterians with whom he would have been doing polemical battle for almost ten years. We see throughout the *Lawes* language which defines and redefines his opponents. That Hooker continued to speak about them in different languages, different voices, in *Causes* suggests, at least to me, that *Causes* is somehow related to the *Lawes*.[^]

' FLE 3:453. Stanwood's useful introductory remarks to the *Causes* notes are found at 3:451-55, annotations by A. S. McGrade at 6:1053-54.

[^] Stanwood, FLE 3:453-54.

[^] By the use of the phrases "different languages, different voices," I do

not mean to suggest a Bakhtinian heteroglossia that somehow reflects different consciousnesses in Hooker's treatise. Instead, I am interested in J. G. A. Pocock's notion of a "polyvalent text," that is, a text whose primary component may be a complex of more than one language which requires the historian to detect the complex and to hear the voices, and then to reconstruct the linguistic performances within the texts by paying attention to

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To observe what can be seen as a contestation of voices in the *Causes* notes, and by extension in Hooker's entire treatise, it seems best to begin with some comments about Hooker's overall goals (and they are various) in the *Lawes*, especially as those goals and their accompanying discursive practices came up against the more traditional polemical way of doing business in controversialist tracts. Certainly Hooker was explaining, as had never quite been done before by either Whitgift or Bridges, the established church's position on a variety of specific topics— the prayer book; the episcopacy; the royal supremacy; the use of Scripture, reason, human authority, and tradition; and the position of the Roman church within Christianity. The critical task is to observe, through a study of the various voices which speak in the discourse, exactly what Hooker's purpose or purposes were, who his audience was (and whether there were multiple audiences), how he viewed or spoke to the various listeners who would read his treatise, and how he defined his opponents. In other words, to be quite simple and direct, what was Hooker doing in his treatise? For one thing, even as he was more aggressive than his predecessors in articulating the established church's position on fundamental and definitive issues, his discourse was often enough controlled by the more traditional procedures of religious polemical writing, the language of those procedures, and the accompanying (and inescapable) view of reader and opponent who may or may not be the same. In traditional religious polemic, a writer in arguing his position organized his own words around and in response to an opponent's words. One example from the *Lawes* will both illustrate the standard procedure and alert us to the fact that this procedure captured Hooker's discourse throughout the work.

The final topic in Book VIII (a book whose very title is reactive: "Their Seventh Assertion, That unto no Civill Prince or Governour there may be given such power of Ecclesiastical Dominion as by the *Lawes* of this Land belongeth unto the Supreme Regent thereof") is the freedom of

English monarchs from the discipline of excommunication; that is, "Of their exemption from judicial kinds of punishment by the clergy," as the title of

what a writer does with the languages at his disposal. See Pocock's essay, "Texts as Events: Reflections on the History of Political Thought," in *Politics of Discourse: The Literature and History of Seventeenth-Century England*, ed. Kevin Sharpe and Steven N. Zwicker (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1987), 29, as well as Pocock's "Languages and Their Implications: The Transformation of the Study of Political Thought," in his *Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 3-41.

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chapter 9 reads. I would argue that the discussion in this chapter is not principally controlled by Hooker's desire to explicate the topic objectively, intellectually, and thoroughly. Rather, this short chapter on the king's prerogative royal and excommunication is designed around certain traditional materials of the ongoing debate between the established church defenders and the presbyterians on the nature and extent of spiritual censure clergy may direct to the monarch. These materials, specifically, are certain scriptural citations from Deuteronomy, Matthew, and 1 Corinthians, the patristic materials on the clerical censures imposed on Emperors Theodosius and Phillip, and the more contemporary works of John Jewel and Alexander Nowell. Few scholars have systematically traced these materials to Hooker's controversialist sources, which would contextualize Hooker's polemic, nor asked why Hooker's discourse uses such specific references (and only these), preferring instead to emphasize, as Stanwood appears to emphasize, the irenic, non-combatant nature of the father of Anglicanism, a philosopher fundamentally producing a "general exhortation for peaceableness in church government." In observing Hooker's linguistic performance — or performances — I seek to stress the voice of the polemicist and to study the continuity of Hooker's discourse with that of his predecessors. This is certainly an area for further research, validated by the editors of the Folger edition, who have included discussions of Hooker's polemic as often as appropriate in their commentary. In generalizing about Hooker's entire enterprise, for example, William P. Haugaard writes: "Irenicism

and polemics, constructive theology and rhetoric: each per- vades the Latues."¹* When we trace the specific materials from chapter 9 to the controversialist moments of the 1570s and '80s, we see unequivocally that Hooker, to a large measure, secures much of his controversialist materials directly from Thomas Cartwright's Second replk (1575-77), a work which answered John Whitgift's A Defence of the Answer to the Admonition. Against the Reply of Thomas Cartwright (1573).² Cartwright's massive Second replie (published in two parts) went unanswered, we could say, until Hooker wrote in the 1590s. Standard polemical tracts like those of Whitgift and Cartwright duplicated whole sections of an opponent's

* Intro, to Lawes Pref.; FLE 6:80.

¹ whitgift's Defence answered in turn Cartwright's A Replye to an answere made ofM. Doctor Whitegifte. Agaynste the Admonition to the Parliament (1573) which in turn replied to Whitgift's An answere to a certen Libel intituled. An admonition to the Parliament (1572) which in turned responded to An Admonition to the Parliament, where it all began in 1572.

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text, sentence by sentence, and then attacked the arguments in those specific sections. Although the Lawes has a shape and texture quite different from these standard tracts, Hooker's discourse can be understood, in an important sense, as a systematic and specifically polemical response to the most salient points of the unanswered Second replie. That is. Cart- wright's work served as the generative source of Hooker's own efforts, as I have argued elsewhere.³ There can be no doubt that when Hooker was composing his treatise he had before him on his writing desk Cartwright's Second replie (among other texts, of course). And that part of his effort — and I stress "part"— was the effort of the typical polemicist; that is, isolating specific arguments and proofs from the opposition, exposing error, and condemning the opponent's scholarship and thought— all for the benefit of the indifferent reader.

By the time Hooker would have composed something that came to be called The Causes of the continuance of these Contentions concerning Church- government, he would have spent a great deal of time indeed

reviewing the work of his opponents, planning his own response, identifying his goals, and considering why he was writing and for whom. Remembering his altercations with Walter Travers at the Temple Church and then scrutinizing Thomas Cartwright's materials and arguments, which would have necessitated an intimate examination of Whitgift's texts, would have forced Hooker to confront the mind and temperament of the nonconformist—or, perhaps we should say, to imagine that opposing mind as it was traditionally constructed, which in turn would have helped define and redefine his rhetorical goals. And it seems to me that *Causes* suggests where Hooker ended after nearly a decade of responding to his opponents. That final position suggests that the presbyterians are a hopeless lot, part of Satan's crew. Error in judgment cannot be corrected; the only possible resolution to the ills of church and state is prayer. But if this is, indeed, the case, how do we explain why the *Lawes* seems so often to be written for the benefit of the presbyterians? Or to put it another way, how do we account for the clash of voices and purposes that we so often observe by closely following Hooker's discursive strategies? An answer may lie in studying the language and disputational procedures in the Hookerian text, language and procedures which controlled Hooker as much as he controlled them.

* See Rudolph P. Almasy. "The Purpose of Richard Hooker's Polemic," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 39 (1978): 251-70.

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Although Richard Hooker made expert polemical use of some of Cartwright's controversialist text and although part of his strategy was the traditional one of exposing his opponent's errors as a means of articulating his own position, Hooker made a significant rhetorical decision which separates his work from the work of other polemicists. Whitgift and Cartwright, as well as countless other writers of religious polemic in the Elizabethan period—and earlier, for that matter—followed a procedure straight from the university—the formal academic disputation. In such a disputation, whether in the classroom or the courtroom, two opponents, set on attacking and ridiculing each other, present their arguments before some source of authority who judges the disputants. Each speaker attacks the other, condemning the evidence, the logic, and the arguments but also exposing what are always the dangerous motivations of the opponent and the dangerous

ramifications of the opponent's position. Polemicists present their cases, always in relationship to the case of the other, before some figure of power whose role is to render the verdict, which is fundamentally an act of power, especially in a hierarchically-defined culture such as Elizabethan England. In a sense, the disputants have no real power, for power resides in the constructed figure of the judge — whoever that might specifically be for the disputational exercise. In traditional polemic merely stating one's case was not sufficient to render it as the truth. Truth — truth to be obeyed — could come only from a voice of authority. As Hooker writes in Book VIU: "Equalles cannot impose lawes and statutes upon their equalles" {Lawes VIII.6.1; 3:386.6-7), and so, by extension, equals cannot judge equals.[^] In the typical polemic as practiced by Whitgift and Cart-

[^] The relationships between and among power, authority, judicial decision, and obedience, specifically within the ecclesiastical disputational arena, are made clear in the section from Book VIU, chap. 6, from which this sentence is cited and bears quoting in frill: "Wherefore as they themselves cannot choose but graunt that the naturall subject of power to make lawes civill is the Commonwealth: so we aff[^]irme that in like congruitie the true originall subject of power also to make church lawes is the whole intire body of that church for which they are made. Equalles cannot impose lawes and statutes upon their equalles. Therefore neither may any one man indifferently impose Canons Ecclesiasticall upon an other nor yet one Church upon an other. If they goe about at any time to doe it they must either shewe some Commission sufficient for their warrant or else be justly condemned of presumption in the sight both of God and men. But nature it self doth abundantly authorize the Church to make lawes and orders for her Children that are within her. For every whole thing being naturally of greater power then is any part thereof that which a whole Church will appointe may be with reason exacted indifferent- ly of any within the compasse of the same Church and so binde all unto strict obedience" (Lawes VIII.6.1; 3:386.1-17).

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Wright, their remarks are seldom addressed to the other, mainly because each sees the other as intellectually bankrupt. Instead, in terms of audi- ence, religious polemic always posited some "indifferent reader" before whom the debate transpired and who in the

disputational arena was granted a power to declare a winner— and winning was the only goal.

Hooker, it is true, participated in this traditional polemical arena; he was controlled by the language of religious polemic, and he spoke to an indifferent reader whose task was to judge if Hooker had won the debate against Cartwright (or more generally the presbyterians). For example, to cite again from chapter 9 of Book VU1, that passage on excommunicating the monarch. Hooker's language is the traditional language of disputation:

Lett us therefore sett down first what there is which may induce men so to think, and then consider their severall inventions or wayes, who judg it a thing necessarie even for Kings themselves to be punishable and that by men. The question it self we will not determine. The reasons of each opinion being opened it shalbe best for the wise to judg which of them is likeliest to be true. Our purpose being not to oppugne any save only that which Reformers hold and of the rest rather to enquire then to give sentence. {Uwes VIII.9.2; 3:436.28-437.5)

Here Hooker's task is simply to "sett down" his own and his opponent's words, to "open" or explain the reasons on both sides, to "enquire," not to determine or answer the question (that is, not to settle or decide the dispute as a judge or arbiter would), but to invite the "wise to judg." We recall from the Preface that Hooker defines his work as "t/ie brief e of these my travailes" {Lawes Pref. 7.7; 1:36.10). In this the traditional scheme, power is given principally to those who judge, and, of course, it is assumed that those given such power, the indifferent readers, are capable of judg- ing. The opponents in the disputational arena are almost never described as capable of judging, certainly never capable of judging correctly. In fact, the disputant's principal task is to expose his opponent's inability to judge, his weakness of mind, his confusion, his illogic — always before a source of power and judgment. In this language of disputation ("sett down," "con- sider," "enquire," "determine," "open," "judg," "brief"), there is seldom any respect for the opponent, merely abuse, ridicule, and diatribe. That Hooker speaks in such a language often enough (but not always) is evident from the treatise's first description of the disciplinarians as pouring forth a "sea of ... gall and bittemes" (Pref. 1.1; 1:1.15-16). In the Preface,

Hooker sees them (and so does the reader) as contentious troublemakers, blinded by "zeale and fervour wherewith [they] have withstood the received orders of this C/iurch" (Pref. 1.2; 1:2.1-2; emphasis mine).[^] Hooker laments that his words, words of reconciliation, will fall on deaf ears: "I have no great cause to looke for other then the selvesame portion and lot, which your maner hath bene hitherto to lay on them that concurre not in opinion and sentence with you" (Pref. 1.1; 1:1.16-18).

Although Hooker does often proceed with a traditional polemical display of the controversialist materials, he makes extraordinarily important adjustments in the arena, especially in terms of the language these adjustments require of him, which adjustments, no doubt, account in large measure for the different discursive form and style Hooker produced in comparison to the texts of other polemicists. Despite what we have seen from chapter 9 of Book VIII, Hooker does away, often enough, with the figure of the "indifferent reader," positing something other as the power which renders judgment. And this something other is, on the one hand. Hooker himself, and on the other hand— quite surprisingly — the presbyterians. At times, Hooker positions himself as the indifferent reader, in a genuine sense writing as the judge who has heard the two sides (perhaps quite literally Whitgifr and Cartwright) and is rendering the verdict, the definitive sentence from which in the Renaissance scheme of things there is no appeal. Thus he asks directly of the presbyterians in the voice more of the judge than polemicist: "Are ye able to alleage any just and sufficient cause wherefore absolutely ye should not condescend in this controversie to have your judgements overruled by some such definitive sentence, whether it fall out to be given with or against you, that so these tedious contentions may ceaseV (Pref. 6.2; 1:30.31-31.2). And, in part, the voice of the judge — the overruling judge— forced the treatise to take a shape other than that usually practiced by disputants, whom we should see as positioning themselves as (that is, playing the role of) disputants and not judges. In such a (new)

[^] The importance of the word "withstood" will become evident later in this essay. It is a word that might be seen as linking the Causes notes to the Preface and alerting readers to Hooker's polemical and political concerns with the obstinate presbyterians. We need to recall, furthermore, that the Preface was probably composed after Books 1-IV were written and that critical observations or judgments on the tone, purpose, and language of the Preface should include some sense not

only of Hooker's constructive philosophy but also the polemical enterprise that Hooker would have been engaged in, perhaps for years, before he came to write a preface to the work he was about to publish in 1593.

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signifying arena, Hooker appears to elevate himself above the disputants, exercising the power of judgment and the judgment of power. He gives the "definitive sentence." He sets down, as he says in the seventh chapter of the Preface, "an introduction on both sides needefull to be considered" (Pref. 7.2; 1:34.30; emphasis mine). Indeed, at the very beginning of chapter 1 of the Preface, Hooker — as judge — announces to his reader that he has tried all things and now sets "downe this [final verdict] as [his] finall resolute persuasion" (Pref. 1.2; 1:2.16).[^]

While Causes states concisely why contentions arise— that is, either through errors in judgment or through passion's capture of judgment — the Preface to the Lawes states exactly how contentions cease; that is, both parties must submit "unto some judiciall and definitive sentence" (Pref. 6.1; 1:29.26-27), the decisive Hookerian voice — clear, powerful, inclusive, final— which ought to be "ground sufficient for any reasonable mans conscience to build the dutie of obedience upon" (Pref. 6.3; 1:32.9-10). The key word, of course, is "reasonable," and what is suggested, quite uniquely for religious polemic, is that the opponents just might be "reasonable"- their problem: error in judgment.

Thus, at times — and this is the truly remarkable modification in the disputational arena— Hooker defines the oppositional presbyterians as the

' Hooker's entire sentence is worth contemplating: "But ifhen once, as neere as my slender abilitie uioulde serve, I had with travaile and care performed that part of the Apostles advise and counsel! in such cases whereby he ivUeth to try all things, and was come at the length so farre, that there remained only the other clause to be satisfied, wherein he concludeth that what good is must be held: there was in my poore understanding no remedie, but to set

downe this as my finall resolute persuasion " TTie reference for "try all

things," although

not cited by Hooker, is Paul's first letter to the Thessalonians (5:21, GB): "Trye all things, and kepe that which is good." As the first scriptural citation in the Lawes, the verse links the authority of Scripture, usually associated in disputation with the presbyterians whose "maine pillar . . . [is] that scripture ought to be the only rule of all our actions" (Pref. 7.3; 1:35.5-6) with the polemical enterprise which engages Hooker and suggests that Hooker may be playing Paul, as teacher and judge and disputant, an important notion for the Causes notes as we shall see. It might also be the case that Hooker deliberately echoes 1 Cor. 2:10-12, which links the wisdom of God (and therefore truth in matters of ecclesiastical polity) with the continuous revelations of the Holy Spirit, a position Hooker uses in defense of the established church as an historical entity guided by the spiritual wisdom of the past: "But God bathe reveiled [his secrets] unto us by his Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deepe things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man, which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the Spirit of the worlde, but the Spirit, which is of God, that we might knowe the things that are given to us of God."

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indifferent readers, assuming that the problems in the conference between them are "errors in judgment," giving them the intellectual qualifications to judge, and if not to judge with power at least to embrace the conformist position conscientiously. Hooker's desire to speak directly to the presbyterians, in a voice with something more than merely the nasty asides and ridicule and insults of traditional polemic, is everywhere evident in the treatise. And surely this desire also was a factor in producing a discourse that appears on the surface to be something other than traditional polemic. What is most interesting about Hooker's address to his opponents is that it can be seen as a form of extended disputational presentation normally reserved for the judge in power. As he says in the Preface, the "briefe" he has prepared is "layd" before the presbyterians, presenting "under [their] view the limmes of that cause litigious betweene us" (Pref. 7.7; 1:36.10-11). It is in the treatment of the establishment's opponents as capable brethren (and I use the word "brethren" quite deliberately) that Hooker's non-polemical language, irenic tone, and charitable motives are so often noted and praised. The overall impression we

receive from the Lawes is that Hooker does not delight in condemning the presbyterians, in calling them names, in merely labeling them, as Whitgift for example labeled Cartwright, as dangerous, stupid troublemakers. As A. S. McGrade has put it, "The fraternal tone in which Hooker addresses his opponents has often been noted. It is not a pretense. Hooker is often ironic, sometimes sarcastic and angry, but never self-righteous."¹⁰ At times Hooker affirms the essential rationality of the presbyterians, or at least their potential rationality. They are able, he assumes, to "Wegard not who it is which speaketh" and can "waigh only what is spoken" (Pref. 1.3; 1:2.33-3.1). Such unique faith in the opposition appears, among other places, in the final chapter of the Preface, where Hooker calls for an intellectual endeavor similar to that expected of the judge or the indifferent reader who is positioned, not within the disputational arena, but somehow beyond or above that arena. The opponents are to "reexamine the cause," to "trie it even point by point, argument by argument, with all the diligent exactnes Itheyl can." In the search for truth, they are asked to "sift unpartiallie" their own hearts (Pref. 9.1; 1:51.25-30). In sympathetically inviting the presbyterians to conform and at times suggesting they can and will conform. Hooker's language here suggests genuine interest in reconciliation. In the Preface he

¹⁰ A. S. McGrade, ed., *Richard Hooker: Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, Preface, Book I, Book VIII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), xxx.

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writes, with true concern for the disciplinarians, that his "whole endeavor is to resolve the conscience, and to shewe . . . what in this controversie the hart is to thinke" (Pref. 7.1; hM.IO-IV¹¹)

The problem in the Lawes is that the various voices in which Hooker speaks suggest a kind of contestation or struggle within himself and within his treatise, for often enough, in explicating their arguments he labels the presbyterians as intellectually bankrupt at the same time as, in another voice, he gives them the power to judge. If they are intellectually bankrupt, how can they judge? If they cannot judge, who is positioned as judge in the Lawes? If the presbyterians are not capable of judging, what is their alternative in the face of the judge's pronouncements? For a moment we might assume that their

alternative is that of the powerless — accept, submit, obey, a language reflected in the pages of Book I. After all, Hooker, suggesting that his word is the definitive sentence, writes in the Preface that the "will of God is to have them doe whatsoever the sentence of judiciaU and finail decision shall determine, yea, t/iough it seeme in their private opinion to swarve utterly from that which is rig/it" (Pref. 6.3; 1:31.26-28). Peaceable resolutions to ecclesiastical controversies are possible when men "have determined with them selves to thinke and do as the Church they are of decreeth" (Pref. 6.6; 1:34.11-12). Yet, as *Causes* makes plain, even the alternative of submission is an intellectual act, for only those submit who have been educated, who "have determine with them selves to thinke and do as the Church they are of decreeth." So we ask continually as we progress through Hooker's treatise whether the presbyterians are portrayed as capable of being educated. If a nonconformist, as the second part of *Causes* states unequivocally, is controlled by "unrulie affections" — that is, not able to be informed— what hope is there?"

The first section of *Causes* appears to give the reader a hopeful procedure to bring peace to the church. Hooker admits that neither policy nor punishment will work to bring peace, for the established church cannot legislate obedience nor merely threaten punishment for nonconformists.

" For a contrast between Hooker's novel attempt to speak directly to the adversary in the hope of leading the presbyterians to conscientious conformity and John Whitgift's more typical strategy of silencing his adversaries, see my "Richard Hooker's Address to the Presbyterians," *Anglican Theological Review* 61 (1979): 462-74.

' Of course, such questions by a reader are prompted by varying assumptions as to whether Hooker's text is controlled by a single voice (the presbyterians are either/or) or whether the text is linguistically polyvalent (the presbyterians are either/or and both simultaneously).

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The ultimate goal for discourse must be to teach the opponent. The only hope for church and state is that "men by instruction come to see wherein they erre and what it is that did deceive them" (FLE 3:456.1-2). In discourse there must be a power and a wisdom of instruction directed to a people (like the presbyterians) who must, accordingly, be defined as capable of instruction and willing to be instructed. As I stated above, one of the voices we hear in the *Lawes* is a voice which defines or constructs the presbyterians as capable of instruction and which maneuvers them to the position of indifferent readers, of brothers. Peter Lake in his *Anglicans and Puritans?* understands Hooker's procedure as an attempt "to convert his opponents rationally," and "since Hooker took himself to be explicating the rational structure of the world to rational creatures the conversion of his opponents by means of rational discourse was hardly an unreasonable aim."¹⁴ What ails the presbyterians, according to Lake, is an "epistemological lapse," a lapse which constituted a "fatal tendency to underestimate the importance and autonomy of reason and the public authorities which reason had constructed in church and state, as means to discover and apply the will of God to human affairs."¹⁵ Hooker's task was to correct this "epistemological lapse"—in his own words to "soundlie and wisely" instruct "till men by instruction come to see wherein they erre and what it is that did deceive them" {*Causes*; FLE 3:456.1-2, 28).

It might, thus, appear that Hooker's purpose is essentially instructional, yet we ought to see that in a Renaissance model instruction is an act of power. Some authority— Hooker or the established church — is set apart and above by its power to instruct those in need of instruction— the ignorant and the deceived. In the

first part of *Causes*, Hooker is very much interested in emphasizing the church's responsibility to bring peace through instruction. And he is quite blunt about the church's failure to deal effectively with the opponents: "Want of sound proceeding in Church controversies hath made manie more stiffe in error now then before." And again: "Want of wise and discreet dealing, hath much hindered the peace of the Church" (3:457.8-11). What he calls for is a paternalistic model; the church must have "reverend care" (3:457.20-21) for those below, and it must proceed "soundly and wisely ... to reclaime the ignorant from their error, and to make peace" (3:457.5-7). And there is hope suggested by

¹⁶ Peter Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 147. ¹⁷ Lake, 212-13.

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that word "reclaim." Opponents can be brought from their error to a proper state of knowledge and obedience, regardless of their inferior relationship to the teacher, a relationship which will always condemn them to a lower rung on the hierarchical ladder. Perhaps not exactly where a "brother" would like to be! I might also suggest that words like "reclaime" and "deceive" suggest— at least to me— that the presbyterians are victims of satanic forces and that it is the church's paternalistic responsibility to rescue or deliver them. And in such a linguistic use as this, another voice— a specifically religious voice— destabilizes the disputational arena, for the presbyterians are defined here, not as brothers or intellectual equals, but as children seduced by the devil.

We could take the first part of *Causes* as a model for how Hooker himself proceeded with his explication in the *Lawes*, the "sound proceeding in Church controversies" which would not make men "more stiffe in error," rather a "wise and discreet dealing" (*Causes*; 3:457.8-10), a way to instruct capable presbyterians who are, nonetheless, not quite equal to the reverend teachers, leading them either intellectually to embrace the position of the established church or merely to submit. To illustrate: Hooker singles out one characteristic of "sound proceeding" in disputation; controversialist instruction must abandon the personal level on which it has so often

in the past proceeded. The dealings between John Whitgift and Thomas Cartwright, traces of which are found throughout Hooker's treatise, could be prime examples of what Hooker might have had in mind, in addition, of course, to the Marprelate tracts and the Temple debates with Walter Travers. As he writes, when one takes up the "causes of God," one must not "deale onlye or cheiflye against the persons of men" (3:457.24-25), this the usual way of doing business in religious polemic. Hooker criticizes the response of Elizabeth's church to the challengers, a personal, vicious, and uncharitable response in a disputational arena which "doth exclude mature and ripe advise without which the truth cannot soundly and thoroughly be demonstrated" (3:459.11-12). This criticism may have inspired Hooker to do what he did— on the surface being less personal and including "mature and ripe advise" as he explained the philosophical, theological, and political basis of the established church. Having said this, however, we need to add that Hooker was so controlled from the beginning of his treatise by the traditional way of doing business that significant portions of his treatise are, in fact, attacks on Cartwright's unanswered Second replie. And here is a prime example of what I mean by "contestation" and the polyvalence of voices in the

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Lawes: we discover one voice that calls for controversy to rise above the personal and yet hear that voice collide with another that speaks a different language.

At any rate, the first part of *Causes* reflects Hooker's rationalist position. The scheme to bring peace to the church is straightforward. The truth is demonstrated for those who need such demonstration and who are capable of understanding it. There is, of course, only one truth, and the established church possesses it — "a trueth, which on the one side being unknown hath caused contention" (3:457.28-29). The contentions do not result from differences of opinion. They arise because one group, in this case the presbyterians, will not submit to the judgment of power. Thus, if we begin where Hooker began, that is, with the notion that "contention doth grow by error in judgement," and even if we accept Hooker's criticism of the church's performance in demonstrating the truth, the fundamental discursive strategy Hooker employs demands less that a group of people change their mind about their beliefs and more that the group surrender to the voice of authority— whether it is the voice of the brother, the schoolmaster, the judge, or the bishop. Such surrender, says Hooker, is

a matter of self-knowledge. Those who cannot surrender, in the linguistic scheme Hooker uses here, simply have less self-knowledge than those who do surrender. It should not surprise us that Hooker's judicial language often defines the presbyterians as on some path to self-knowledge. Through instruction they "come to see wherein they erre." They "enter into a staied consideration with themselves what they doe" (3:458.24-25). In a sense, they are asked to enter, intellectually and emotionally, into the disputational arena as brethrenly participants.

Yet even this exercise in self-enlightenment proves a political act of submission, for at this point in the notes Hooker illustrates his model of self-knowledge through a revealing scriptural citation (also used in the last chapter of the Preface) from the book of Job, chapter 40.¹⁶ The scene in Job is one of contention; there are two parties: the God of power and wisdom confronting one without power, Job, who must learn to humble himself. The passage suggests that proper self-knowledge — which, significantly, comes out of a confrontation with authority — leads to submission.

¹⁶ The citation in *Causes* is to Job 40:4-5, an insert by Ussher who was probably using the King James version. The citation in the Preface to the same scriptural passage is to Job 39:37, the location in the Geneva Bible and the Vulgate. In both places in the *Lawes*, the Job citation underscores Hooker's call for the presbyterians to examine themselves.

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to shutting one's mouth. As he did at the beginning of the treatise, Hooker urges the presbyterians to speak as Job spoke: "Behold I am vile ... I will lay my hand upon my mouth. If I have spoken once amisse I will speake noe more" (*Causes*; 3:458.26-27). But the church's adversaries had not shut their mouths. They were either not interested in, or they were incapable of, submission. For as the second part of *Causes* directly states, the opponents were controlled by "unrulie affections" (3:459.3)— not able to become informed, educated, submissive.¹⁷

As Hooker's language defines and redefines the presbyterians, we hear a multiplicity of voices, and this polyvalence is one of the keys to reading this great apologetic work. We see how Hooker places his

opponents in different positions within the disputational arena, how he expects various, perhaps contradictory, actions from them, how his expectations repeatedly shift. The rationalist's scheme, as I have said, assumes a rational presbyterian capable of intellectual affirmation, willing and able psychologically to submit to the truth which is demonstrated and declared by the source of power. Sometimes the presbyterians are equal brethren; sometimes not so equal. Sometimes they are embraced as children, ignorant children in need of the parent's reverend — and we should stress, charitable — care, so different is Hooker from other controversialists. But as soon as we begin to observe that Hooker's voice is a charitable one, another voice is heard. Ecclesiastical opponents, "frill gorged ... with virulent, slanderous and immodest speeches" {Causes; 3:458.11-12}, are called "enemies," and not merely enemies but "great enemies" (3:458.9).¹⁶

¹⁶ There is no doubt that Hooker is attacking his opponents for "their unmlie affections" in the second part of Causes, which begins: "But how sober and how sound soever our proceedings be in these causes; all is in vaine which wee doe to abate the errors of men, except their unrulie affections be bridled" (3:459.1-3). Save for an echo of Job 13:17 in the first part ("Will you speak wickedly for Godes defense? saith Job. Will you dipp your tongues in gall and your peruiers in blood, when you write and speak in his cause?"), Hooker uses the third person ("they") to label the opponents in Causes, and only here — as he is concluding his statement — does he slip into a direct address to the presbyterians: "whether it be because wee doe speak and write with too little advise, or because you doe heare and reade with too much prejudice" (3:459.14-16; italics mine).

¹⁷ In his analysis of Causes as a document which reflects Hooker's stance in the 1580s, Stanwood argues that the "great enemies" in this section of Causes are actually the papist challengers to Elizabeth's church. Hooker is scolding both sides for their intemperate language, denouncing the papists for their "more foule deformities" (3:458.6) and condemning the disciplinarians for their own "contumelies and criminations" (3:458.22). Stanwood's reading is supported by his tracing of Hooker's references to "DemauTuies, Motives, Censures, Apologies, Defences" to specific papist writings and, on

As Hooker reviews the opponents' writings, his language takes on the characteristic language of the partisan polemicist. "Full gorged ... with virulent, slanderous and immodest speeches," these creatures desire to "overthrow" (3:458.14) the truth— overthrow not only the judgment of power but the power that makes judgment. They have dipped their "tongues in gall and [their] pennes in blood" (3:458.15). And what Hooker chooses to isolate in their behavior is politically and rhetorically revealing. He is most troubled, at least here in *Causes*, with the attempt to seduce the common people who "are upbrayded with the miseries of their condition and estate" (3:458.17-18). Opponents of Elizabeth's church spread "suspitions and rumours" (3:457.19); their writings are "loden with contumelies and criminations" (3:458.22). Such language does not suggest that the presbyterians are merely ignorant, that they are open to instruction, that they are capable of submission. Instead, they sound like Satan's crew, not interested in peace, committed rather to war and destruction.

I am often drawn to Hooker's multiple voices— or at least the tension between and among voices — through the biblical intertexts which he uses to illustrate his points. I have already referred to the verses from Job. I turn now to the passage from Acts 13 which informs the title of this essay and which Hooker cites in the notes. It is a fascinating passage which, I believe, comments on Hooker's construction of the controversy and of the controversialists within the Elizabethan church. It may, indeed, reveal how Hooker perceived the ultimate power arrangements in the disputa- tion. And finally it reveals, in my opinion, how slippery a proposition it is to determine exactly — that is, singlemindedly — what Hooker's purpose was and what he really felt about his opponents.

Of the contemporary strife. Hooker writes: "I trust they be as the strife of Paul with Barnabas and not with Elymas" (*Causes*; 3:457.27-28). Contemporary religious strife is prefigured by New Testament strife, where the three players— Paul with Barnabas and Paul with Elymas— figure the

the other hand, tracing of Hooker's references to "Invectives, Epigrammes, Dialogues, Epistles, Lihells" to specific reformist tracts. If *Causes* is, indeed, a product of the '80s, it is interesting to see Hooker's construction of himself as a type of judicial figure in the middle of two opposing and self-destructive forces, a construction deliberately carried over to the *Lawes*. The question still needs to be raised

(although it may not be answered to everyone's satisfaction) of why Hooker would proceed with the mammoth task of composing the Lawes if his conclusion in the '80s was that "contending with men" was useless in the cause of truth and all that remained was prayer.

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players in the Elizabethan arena. The relationship between Paul and Barnabas is a brethrenly relationship; both were not original disciples but appointed by the apostles, and both were called "apostles." On the other hand, Elymas is a true enemy, a "great" enemy.

First to Barnabas. As brethren, Paul and Barnabas worked together on the first great missionary journey. They had a falling out, however, which is recorded in Acts 15. In preparing for a second journey, Barnabas wanted to take John Mark along, but Paul said no. And so the two argued, disputed. According to the Bishops' Bible (Acts 15:39): "The contention was so sharpe betwene them, that they departed a sunder, one from the other." Paul went off to Syria, and Barnabas went off to Cyprus— and Barnabas is not heard of again in Acts. Hooker may have felt some impxjrtant affinities between this contention of two brothers and the contention between the established church and the presbyterians. In fact he would like to see the strife in these terms, he says charitably. The established church (and perhaps Hooker himself) is figured by Paul, the famous and successful Paul, the powerful Paul. The presbyterians are figured by Barnabas, whose error in judgment could not be corrected by the mighty Paul, who would not submit to Paul, who had no choice but to separate from Paul. It may even have been the case that Hooker preferred this option for the presbyterians. Would they but depart, go to Geneva, and never be heard from again. But the presbyterians might also be seen as Elymas.

The story of Elymas is recorded in the thirteenth chapter of Acts. The scene is the island of Cyprus where Elymas is connected with the source of power on Cyprus, Deputy Sergius Paulus. Paul (and he is still with Barnabas at this point in the narrative) arrives to evangelize the island, especially its deputy, but he must first contend with the sorcerer Elymas. The writer of Acts records that Elymas contends with Paul. The verb used in the Geneva Bible (Acts 13:8)— and it is a word Hooker often uses to describe the presbyterians — is "withstode." Elymas withstood Paul and "foght to tume away the Deputie from the faith." Paul denounces Elymas as full of all subtilty and all mischief, a child of the devil, an enemy of all righteousness, in love with deceit

and villainy. Paul wins the struggle — that moment of power and contention— by making Elymas blind.

The point I wish to make is that Hooker's language throughout the Lawes often enough suggests that the presbyterian opponent is a modern-day Elymas — he withstands the spirit of the Lxxrd, he is blind, he tries to seduce those in power, his works are all mischief, he uses deceit and

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villainy, he is a child of the devil. His true brothers are the fallen angels of Book I, who fell through pride and by all means now labor "to effect an universall rebellion against the lawes [of God], and, as farre as in them lyeth, utter destruction of the workes of God" {Lawes 1.4.3; 1:72.15-17).

What hope is there for the established church as it pits itself against the sorcerer Elymas and the fallen angels, creatures whose disease is not error in judgment but rather "disorder in their affections"? Hooker, in the short second part of Causes — a mere paragraph on the affections — laments that there is nothing humanly that can be done. Although the first part of the notes sets forth a scheme that appears to be hopeful in offering a solution to the contentions, a scheme Hooker himself may have tried in eight books, the second part overthrows that scheme entirely by insisting that "unrulie affections" condemn the presbyterians. The causes of "unrulie affections," so Hooker lists, describe the fallen angels, Elymas, and the presbyterians as they are constructed in polemical texts by Hooker and his predecessors: creatures of "self-love, vaine glorie, impatience, pride, pertinacie." Yes, "these are the bane of our peace" {Causes-, 3:459. 3-4). Hooker laments that the church has used every rational device at its disposal to correct the error in judgment which led to the contentions the presbyterians have caused, and he admits failure: "Wee have used all other meanes, and behold wee are frustrate, wee have laboured in vaine" (3:459.8-9). It was, after all, an unreasonable aim to try conversion of the opponents by means of rational discourse. And I believe this sentiment is Hooker's conclusion after ten years of controversialist engagement. It seems doubtful that he would have articulated this position in the mid '80s and then gone on to the project that became the Lawes, in whatever form it might have been first imagined.

So Hooker seems to conclude by suggesting that the presbyterians are ruled by their affections — they are "ashamed to acknowledge their errors"; "the fervor of contention [has] soe disturb [ed their] understanding, that they cannot sincerely and effectually judge" —and note that important word "judge." Their minds are "too too implacable," and they "doe heare and reade with too much prejudice" or blindness {Causes; 3:459.9-19). Only one alternative remains— unruly affections "are not conquered or cast out, but by prayer" (3:459.4-5). Here is Hooker's conclusion to the Causes notes: "6 that wee would now hold our tongues, leave contending with men and have our talk and treatie of peace with God. Wee have spoaken and written enough for peace: there is now no way left butt this one; Pray for the peace of Jerusalem" (3:459.21-25; italics mine on "now"). And in

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both cases, the "now" may be the moment at the end of the Lawes.

If Hooker did indeed compose these notes near the end of his journey with the Lawes, then he arrived at a certain position — having carefully reviewed what Cartwright had said, having come face to face with his vision of the presbyterian mind, having considered the responsibility of those in power to lead the challengers to submission — a position which gave the lie to the hopeful scheme sketched in the first part of Causes, the instructional scheme which would correct the judgment of the opponents, would heal their "epistemological lapse," bring them, through knowledge, to obedience, and bless the church with a newfound peace. Perhaps Hooker began his writing with this goal in mind and continued with this goal as he wrote and revised. But the scheme had not worked. It was no longer to be pursued as it had been for a decade. What remained was prayer. "Pray for the peace of Jerusalem." Yet even here readers experience a moment of destabilization: is the reference to this Psalm of praise and thanksgiving from the Elizabethan liturgy a cry of despair or a word of hope?

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Richard Hooker: Counter-Reformation Political Thinker

A BROAD CONTINUUM OF BASIC CONCEPTS EXISTS across the all-too-often asserted gap between medieval and modern thought. In particular, the assumed or alleged modernity of Renaissance and Reformation political thinking, with its stress on individual freedom and rejection of absolutism, is more fiction than fact. We come closer to fact when we read texts in the context of their contemporary and earlier background rather than as containing twentieth-century political concepts read back into them; history, that is, should be read forward rather than backward. Many others have insisted on this same methodological point, of course, although too often such advice has not been followed.'

' The most thoroughgoing advocate of this contextually linguistic approach to the history of political thought in recent years has been Quentin Skinner. See his "Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts," *Philosophical Quarterly* 20 (1970): 118-38; "The Limits of Historical Explanation," *Philosophy* 41 (1966): 199-215; "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory* 8 (1969): 3-53; "Social Meaning and the Explanation of Social Actions," in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., *Philosophy. Politics and Society*, ser. 4 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1972) 136-77.

His application of this method can be seen in Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978). The Skinnerian method has come under criticism in some quarters, however, especially for its author's universalizing claims on its behalf and for the adequacy of Skinner's own application of it in *Foundations*. See James Tully, ed., *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989) and Arthur P. Monahan, *From Personal Duties towards Personal Rights: Late Medieval and Early Modern Political Thought, 1300-1600* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1994), xxii-xxiv, 5, 129.

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In referring to Richard Hooker as a Counter-Reformation thinker, what I have in mind is that his thought shows a striking retention of basic concepts from medieval political thinkers which sets it apart from that of other authoritative Reformation thinkers such as Luther and Calvin. What I propose to do, briefly, is contrast the views of

Hooker with those of Luther and Calvin on a number of key issues to show how Hooker's position differs from that of the continental reformers in their rejection of certain basic medieval conceptions of polity.

The first thing to be said about the concept of a Reformation theory of polity is that the great continental reformers were not interested in formulating political doctrine as such. They were religious reformers in full scale revolt against what they perceived as longstanding distortions, in both doctrine and practice, of the religion founded by Jesus Christ, distortions introduced by the Church of Rome. Yet because their revolt entailed the wholesale rejection of a centuries-old institution that itself had developed an image of a Christian community both temporal and spiritual, along with an elaborate conception of its own role in the world and its relationship to temporal powers, it was practically unavoidable that the reformers would offer reformist views on how Christians should live in society and how a "reformed" church should relate to political authorities.

These views, moreover, were in many ways specifically determined by the reformers' interest in throwing off the shackles of the Romish "whore of Babylon." This meant, among other things, a rejection of the self-declared status accorded the institutional church and its clergy as a separate sphere with its own laws, rights, and privileges, as well as claims to political authority on its own and superiority over temporal rulers in matters determined by the ecclesiastical rulers themselves.

For purposes of this paper, then, I construe "Reformation political thought" quite narrowly. Specifically, it is the initial position adopted by Luther and Calvin and their followers concerning the nature of political authority and the obligations of a Christian toward it. In the latter connection I shall also comment on what has come to be called Protestant or Reformation resistance theory, attempting to locate it within the conception of Reformation political thought just defined.

Rejecting vehemently the medieval church's conception of itself as a spiritual polity superior to and capable of exercising authority over temporal rulers, who were often said to receive their legitimate power from the church, both Luther and Calvin maintained that political authority comes

directly from God, citing Paul's Romans 13:1.[^] A direct entailment from this basic principle was that Christians had a seemingly unqualified obligation of obedience to their temporal rulers, even to tyrants, whose depredations were construed in Augustinian terms as punishment imposed on sinful subjects.[^] Naturally enough, however, even though the internal logic of this qualification might not be very clear. Christians were not obliged to obey temporal masters when this would violate a higher obligation to obey the laws of God or nature, but in no circumstances was disobedience to be expressed through any effort to subvert established political authority. Punishment for disobeying temporal law was to be accepted, even to the extreme of martyrdom.[^]

Despite the scriptural authority alleged for this simple position, however, it could not and did not stand for long in the face of political realities that saw Lutheran reformers in Germany facing suppression by the Catholic Holy Roman Emperor and Calvinists in France experiencing harassment and massacre by their Catholic rulers. Accordingly, both Lutheran and Calvinist political thought was soon expanded to legitimize resistance to efforts at suppression of the "true" religion. Two arguments came into use by Protestant writers and legal authorities to justify active armed resistance to such repression, both based on the classical and medieval notion that the legitimacy of political power depended in the final analysis on the purpose for which it was being used: use of power outside the limits

[^] "[The people must willingly] suffer everything that can happen [rather than] fight against your lord and tyrant . . . [established political authority rests] in the will and hand of God [hence] those who resist their rulers resist the ordinance of God." Martin Luther, "Whether Soldiers also can be Saved," trans. Charles M. Jacobs, in Luther's Works, ed. Helmut Lehmann and Jaroslav Pelikan, 55 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press and Fortress Press, 1953-65), 46:112-13, 126; John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. J. T. McNeill and trans. F. L. Battles, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), 4.20.25-31, pp. 1512-19; Robert Barnes, "That Men's Constitutions which are not grounded in Scripture bind not the conscience of Man," in The Reformation Essays of Dr Robert Barnes, ed. Neelak S. Tjemagel (London: Concordia Publishing House, 1963), 81; William Tyndale, The Obedience of a Christian Man (Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1970), 173-78; Philipp Melancthon, Melancthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes: 1555, trans. and ed. Claude L.

Manschreck (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), 334. Cf. Monahan, *From Duties towards Rights*, 195-206; 217-18.

^ St. Augustine, *The City of God*, trans. Demetrius B. Zema and Gerald G. Walsh, 3 vols. (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1950-54), 19.14-15, 12.27.

* Martin Luther, "Temporal Authority: to what Extent it Should be Obeyed," trans. J. J. Schindel, in *Luther's Works*, ed. Walter I. Brandt (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1962), 45:75-129; Calvin. *Insu*, 4.20.32, 1520.

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of its purpose was illegitimate and warranted action either to restrain the ruler within the limits of this legitimacy or to remove him from office. The better known of these two arguments is the Calvinist thesis, invoking the Spartan ephors as a historical example, that lesser magistrates also enjoy a measure of legitimate political authority given them directly by God and thereby have the right, even the duty, to defend the citizenry against a ruler who would tyrannize them by suppressing the "true" religion.^ In fact, this lesser magistrate argument was urged by Luther in the early 1530s and does not appear in Calvin's *Institution of the Christian Religion* until its 1559 edition.^ As well, Lutheran legal advisors also developed in the early 1530s a justification for resistance based on the notion that the limits of legitimate political authority were established by some form of agreement between the people to be ruled and their ruler; hence, failure on the ruler's part to restrain his power within these limits gave the people through their representatives the right to act against him. A clear and ringing expression of this position can be found in the widely circulated Magdeburg Confession of 1550.^ As we shall see, there is an irony involved in calling this resistance theory in either of its forms an integral part of Reformation political thought, since the essentials of both arguments derive from medieval theories of polity rather than being explicitly and exclusively Protestant. This is a good example of the continuum of political thought from the medieval to the Reformation era. The political and ecclesiastical conditions in which Richard Hooker wrote his *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* in late sixteenth-century England were markedly different from those in which the continental reformers had written some decades earlier. The purpose of Hooker's work was also different, requiring a much fuller expression of political thought, even though, as with Luther and

Calvin, it was not Hooker's intention to formulate a fully comprehensive political doctrine. In a word. Hooker was an intelligent and remarkably well-read apologist for the institutional status

¹ Calvin, *Inst.*, 4.20.31, p. 1519. Skinner considered the standard Battles translation here "misleading" and offered his own with references to the 1559 Latin edition of the *Institutes*; John Calvin, *Institutio christianae religionis*, 1559, in Joannis Calvini opera omnia, ed. L. Baum et al., 59 vols. (Brunswick, 1863-1900), 2:1116; Skinner, *Foundations*, 2:232.

[^] See Monahan, *From Duties towards Rights*, 206-13, 229-30.

[^] A greatly condensed version of the Magdeburg Confession is in Roland Bainton, ed., *The Age of Reformation* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1956), 172-73. The original is in *Bekenntnis Unterricht und Vermanang der Pfarrhem und Prediger der chrisdichen Kirchen zu Magdeburgh, Anno 1550 den 13 Aprilis* (Magdeburg, 1550).

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quo of the reformed church in England as established by the political authorities of his country. His purpose was to persuade radical English reforming elements that something more closely approximating continen- tal Calvinism was not appropriate to the contemporary English scene.[^]

The English church as established in the sixteenth century was, arguably, that church as it might have been perceived across the medieval continuum of many centuries, with a single though momentous and striking exception: the English monarch had replaced the Roman pontiff as apex ecclesiae and ultimate authority in both church and state. The magnitude of this change as regards both ecclesiology and political theory should not be underestimated, of course, but it is not my intention to develop this point. Rather, I want to stress that Hooker's political thought involves a reaffirmation of the medieval scholastic and Counter-Reforma- tion corporation theory of politics totally different from the originally expressed theory of the continental reformers. At the same time and in ways quite unlike other medieval and reformed theologians and legists, Hooker advanced a theory of politics that made temporal authority eo ipso the

ultimate authority even in the church, a kind of Marsilianism in reverse. For where Marsilius of Padua's *Defensor pacis* depicted the institutional church as a department of state in order to relegate things ecclesiastical to their proper level in political society and thereby eliminate clerical claims to political authority,¹ Hooker's intent was to attribute at least some of the spiritual functions of religion to the temporal ruler in order to guarantee them the highest level of importance.

The general structure and style of the *Lawes* show that Hooker was thoroughly familiar with the scholasticism of his day. His use of this intellectual frame of reference was not accidental.²⁰ It is not my intention to attempt a general summary of Hooker's theory of polity, however, but only to indicate a number of points in which it is both medieval and "Counter-Reformation," the latter insofar as the views in question are

¹ For a fine account of the general purpose and contemporary background of Hooker's publication of the *Lawes*, see William P. Haugaard's Intro, to the Pref. in FLE 6:1-80. Cf. Monahan, *From Duties towards Rights*, 273-93.

² Marsilius of Padua, *The Defender of Peace*, trans. Alan Gewirth (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1956), 2.30.45; 1.15.8; 2.4 and 8.

²⁰ A careful and authoritative assessment of Hooker's use of sources in the *Lawes* can be found in Haugaard, Intro, to Pref., FLE 6:63-72: see especially the notes for bibliographical data here. See also Lee W. Gibbs's Intro, to *Lawes* I, 6:81-96 and notes, especially pp. 91-96.

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found in Counter-Reformation thinkers but not in the early examples of writings by continental reformers like Luther and Calvin. I want to stress three aspects of Hooker's position: (1) his emphasis on popular consent as the basis for political authority grounded in some form of social contract that brings a polity into being; (2) the element of limit as the essential qualifier of legitimate authority; (3) his use of medieval corporation theory, especially as elaborated in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century conciliarist thought.

Taking an essentially juridical approach, Hooker begins the *Laives* by

defining law and its several forms in a fashion quite familiar to any reader of Thomas Aquinas's treatise on law in the *Summa theologiae*.¹⁶ With Aquinas, he stressed the fundamentally rational character of law in all its forms and made rationality the characteristic par excellence of human nature as well as the touchstone of moral and legal behavior. The element of consent, moreover, is closely associated with rationality as its measure in human dealings with one another. Humans are rational, equal, and free by nature; accordingly, no individual can exercise authority over any other except by agreement or consent (1.10.8; 1:102.21-31).

Here Hooker was much more closely aligned with the scholastic conception of humans as Aristotelian rational animals than with reformist views. For him reason was God's greatest gift to humans, enabling them to understand God's plan for reality as a whole, situate themselves within it, and specify the proper (moral) forms of human activity. Law, then, was essentially a kind of reinforcement for this basic rational insight, a guide and assistance. Hooker thus was much more in tune with the Aristotelian/Thomistic conception of human reason and law than with St Augustine, even though he acknowledged that humans were far from perfect and subscribed to the orthodox doctrine of original sin. His position and general attitude toward the fallen human condition were much less dramatically expressed, however, than those of the Lutheran and Calvinist reformers, who tended to picture humans as wallowing in sin and perverted in their natural judgments;¹⁷ or of Hobbes, for whom law and the

¹⁶ Thomas Aquinas, S.T. Ia2ae. 90-96. For a summary of Hooker's dependence on and use of Thomas Aquinas in the *Lawes* see Peter Munz, *The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971; original ed. 1952), 49-67. See also W. David Neelands, "Hooker on Scripture, Reason, and 'Tradition,'" above, pp. 75-94.

¹⁷ For Luther human reasoning powers were "carnal" and "absurd"; "P[er] humans have all] fallen from God and been deserted by God; [we are completely] bound, wretched,

structures of governmental coercion were necessary to correct the strife- torn conditions of the state of nature."

As just noted, consent was a fundamental feature of Hooker's theory of law, and on this score he proceeded well beyond, but in the same direction as, the explicit political doctrine of Aquinas. For Hooker, positive laws derive their authority from the consent of the people to be governed by them (1.10.8; 1:102.21-31). This idea was not new or unique to him, to be sure. It was indeed a fundamental feature of much of the then-current Protestant resistance thought and had been formulated centuries earlier by canonists and via modern theologians attempting to place limits on papal authority in the conciliar period."[^] Its most recent advocate in the kingdoms of England and Scotland was George Buchanan, whose corporation thought can be traced back through Jacques Almain and John Major to the conciliarists of the fifteenth century, such as d'Ailly, Gerson, Zabarella and Nicholas of Cusa."[^] Hooker was familiar with Buchanan's work, which had been published in the 1570s. "[^] Though himself expressing no position on resistance theory, then. Hooker was familiar with its general arguments, as well as with the constitutionalist ideas on which it was based. Further, the notion of popular consent as a basis for political

captive, sick, dead [we are all so] corrupt and averse from God [that we have no hope of being able to will] things which please God or which God wills; [our actions proceed from our] averse and evil natures [completely enslaved to the Devil so that we can] do nothing but averse and evil things . . . through the one transgression of the one man, Adam, we are all under sin and damnation [with] no capacity to do anything but sin and be damned." This compendium of brief citations was collected from Martin Luther, "The Bondage of the Will," trans. Philip S. Watson and Benjamin Drewery, in *Luther's Works*, vol. 33, ed. Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972) in Skinner, *Foundations*, 2:5.

[^] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, in *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, ed. Sir William Molesworth, 11 vols. (London: 1839-45; repr. Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1962), 1.13; 3:113-16.

[^]* For a discussion of the views on resistance of Beza, Vermigli, Hotman and Momay see Monahan, *From Duties towards Rights*, 239-72, *passim*.

[^]* Monahan, *From Duties towards Rights*, 121-26.

^ Cargill Thompson has pointed out that while Hooker never referred specifically to Buchanan's *De jure regni apud Scotos*, "many of the distinctive features of Hooker's theory are also to be found in Buchanan's dialogue, and the argument of Lawes 1.10.1-5 in particular appears at times to follow Buchanan very closely." W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society': Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker," in *S.R.H.*, 44-45; repr. in C. W. Dugmore, ed., *Studies in the Reformation* (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 169, 170.

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authority and law had been part of English legal and political traditions for centuries."

This emphasis on consent was an integral and critical feature of Hooker's theory, as it had been in the Huguenot resistance tracts of Hotman and Mornay and in earlier formulations by Cajetan and Spanish neo-Thomists like Mariana and Suarez, the last almost contemporaneous with Hooker.^ This certainly carried Hooker and these others beyond the literal Aristotelian text. The point I want to stress, however, is that Hooker was expressing here an essentially medieval and Counter-Reformation (as opposed to the original Reformation protestant) view. What, for Hooker, took humans out of their original condition of individual liberty and into membership in a political society was an application of rationality which brought them to see that the conditions of strife caused by the Fall could be remedied to some extent by forming a political society or polity (1.10.3-4; 1:98.16-99.15).

Hooker's views on popular consent as the basis for political authority are first put forward in Book I of the *Lawes*, where he examines the nature of political society and its origins. He returns to the same subject in Book VIII. His theory is in line with Aquinas's efforts to reconcile the Aristotelian conception of society as natural with the Augustinian view that coercive temporal authority was providential compensation for the negative effects of the Fall. The same general problem of reconciling these two disparate, if not incompatible, accounts of political society had been faced by Christian political thinkers since Aristotle's *Politics* came into western intellectual circles in the mid-thirteenth century, and the late medieval Spanish neo-scholastic tradition had continued to grapple with it in the

¹⁰ The standard reference for medieval England in this connection is to the thirteenth-century Henry de Bracton's *On the Laws and Customs of England*, ed. George E. Woodbine, trans. and revised Samuel E. Thome, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1968-77); cf. Arthur P. Monahan, *Consent, Coercion and Limit: the Medieval Origins of Parliamentary Democracy* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1987), 97-111. Hooker cited Bracton in the *Lawes*: see below, n. 33.

¹¹ See Francois Hotman, *Francogallia*, ed. Ralph E. Giesey, trans. J. H. M. Salmon (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972), chap. 6, p. 221; Philippe du Plessis Mornay, "Vindiciae contra tyrannos," in Julian H. Franklin, ed. *Constitutionalism and Resistance in the sixteenth Century* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), 160, 161, 183; Juan de Mariana, *De rege et regis institutione* Ubri III (Toledo, 1599), 1.1, 2; pp. 112, 115; Thomas de Vio (Cardinal Cajetan), *In summm theohgiae sancti. Thomae Aquinatis* (Rome: 1571), 2a2ae.50.1 od 5; cf. *De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii*, ed. V. M. Pollet (Rome: Institutum Angelicum, 1936), tr. 2 par. 2 c. 9; Francesco Suarez, *Defensio fidei catholicae et apostolicae adversus anglicanae sectae errores*, 1 vols. (Naples, 1872), 3.2.5 and 3.2 passim.

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sixteenth. What makes Hooker's efforts of particular interest here is his attempt at reconciliation from the reformed side of the Reformation divide, after earlier Protestant political thinkers like Luther and Calvin had virtually renounced the Aristotelian position in favor of political Augustinianism.

According to Hooker, society and government are required for two reasons. First, humans have a natural need to live in society; and secondly, government is a practically necessary consequence of fallen human nature, as individuals realize the advantages of coming together to best guarantee their own good. In making the latter point, Hooker obviously placed some strain on the naturalness of the Aristotelian notion of polity, even though the Philosopher also emphasized a "need" aspect to human sociability. In this connection it might be noted that Hooker, presumably consciously, employed a distinction developed by the Spanish neo-scholastics precisely to blend the Aristotelian doctrine of humans as naturally social with the Augustinian explanation of coercive political authority as a consequence of original sin: the distinction between the social and the

political.”

Hooker offered a slightly different approach to the same position in his account in Book VIII of the three ways humans can be brought under subjection to political authority, an account which can be correlated with Book I, insofar as he had offered there a general and at least quasi-historical treatment of the origins of political society, while in Book VIII he gave a more systematic account of the possible ways in which this can occur. The details of Hooker's position here illustrate again the medieval and Counter-Reformation aspects of his doctrine. Hooker identified three ways in which political authority comes about, all legitimate in the eyes of God

19 "Two foundations there are which beare up publique societies, the one, a naturall inclination, wherby all men desire sociable life and fellowship, the other an order expresly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union in living together. The later is that which we call the law of a common weale, the very soule of a politique body, the parts wherof are by law animated, held together, and set on worke in such actions as the common good requireth" {Lawes 1.10.1; 1:96.17-23}.

The verbal distinction between "social" and "political" was made by Thomas Aquinas but not explicated: *On Kingship to the King of Cyprus*, trans. Gerald B. Phelan, revised 1. Th. Eschmann (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), 1.1.4; cf. Aquinas, *S.T. Ia2ae*, 72.4. It was developed by Spanish neo-Thomist political thinkers in order to emphasize the consensual or conventional origin of the political order: humans, they contended, are social by nature but not political by nature in the sense of being necessarily determined to live together under some form of polity. The latter condition comes about as a result of agreement and consent among free individuals. See Monahan, *From Duties towards Rights*, 136-37.

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because all divinely sanctioned. He began by distinguishing between rulers who receive their authority directly from God and those who receive it from the people, and he makes a sub-division within the former. The basic distinction itself is a traditional medieval one which is found in Aquinas, but which goes back at least to John of Salisbury

.^° Hooker probably employed it in direct response to the Reformation view that all rulers held their authority directly from God.

The first way a ruler holds power directly from God is by force: groups of individuals can be brought under political subjection through conquest, divine providence so disposing. It is God who gives victory in war, Hooker asserted, and he referred to the law of nations {jus gentium) as validating this mode of subjection (VIII.3.1 [Keble 2.5]; 3:334.13-22). Secondly, God can establish authority in a ruler by directly designating the person who is to rule: Hooker instanced here the traditional example of the Israelite monarchy, whose rulers held power "immediatelie from God by meer divine right" (ibid.; 3:334.22-26). Thirdly, rulers can have authority bestowed on them by the people, individuals having been left free by God to make their own choice of who shall govern them: England was an example of such a polity (VIII.3.2 [Keble 2.7]; 3:336.17-337.1). Hooker went on to accept hereditary succession as located in this category of consent-based legitimacy, rejecting categorically the requirement of Mornay in the *Vindiciae* and Hotman in the *Francogallia* of recurrent electoral acts:

Which strange untrue and unnaturall conceites sett abroad by seedsmen of rebellion, only to animate unquiet spirites, and to feed them with a possibilitie of aspiring unto thrones and scepters if they can win the hartes of the people, what hereditarie title soever any other before them may have, I say, these unjust and insolent positions I would not mention were it not thereby to make the countenance of truth more orient.^ ^

Hooker would surely have known the various Calvinist, Knoxian, presby- terian, and puritan views being rejected here.

^° John of Salisbury, *PoUcratikus, Of the Frivolities of Courtiers and the Footprints of Philosophers*, ed. and trans. Gary J. Nederman (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), 4.1, 5.6; pp. 28-29, 69-70. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *On Kingship*, chap. 6, pp. 49-50.

^~ Lawes VIII.3.2 (Keble 2.8); 3:338.2-9. Cf. 1.10.3-4; 1:98.16-99.15.

monarchy can vary from that of another, since its character and extent are affected by how the ruler came into office: "In power of dominion all kinges have not an equall latitude." Kings by lawful conquest set their own terms; kings appointed directly by God have the power God assigns.

Touching Kings which were first instituted by agreement and composition made with them over whom they raigned.^l how farr their power may lawfully extende, the articles of compact between them must shewehl not the articles only of compact at the first begining which for the most part are either cleane wome out of knowledge, or else knowne unto very fewe, but whatsoever hath been after in free and voluntarie manner condescended unto whither by expresse consent, whereof positive lawes are witnesses, or else by silent allowance famously notified through custome reaching beyonde the memorie of man. (VnL3.3 IKeble 2.111; 3:340.2-17)

Hooker was reasonably relaxed about the form as well as the content of the consent which "naturally" or normally authorizes government. Not only could limitations on a king's power vary according to the conditions in which — and on which — it came into being, but the nature of the consent itself could vary from express to tacit, both in the beginning and through- out the life of a polity. The terms of agreement may change over time, and hence the character of laws in a polity will differ, both those of a positive form which result from explicit legislation and those of custom which bind "by silent allowance."^^ It seems, further, that Hooker's picture of the original compact between people and ruler may have been of the ruler negotiating the terms of his authority rather than simply accepting conditions dictated by the community as a whole.^ If so, this shows a more benevolent attitude toward the sovereign than that favored by the resistance theory pamphleteers Hotman and Momay. It was also more consistent with actual practice in England and the continental monarchies of the day.

" VIII.3.3 (Keble 2.11); 3:340.2-17. Cf. "an order expresly or secretly agreed upon" {Lawes I.lO.l; 1:96.19). Cf. VIII.3.2 (Keble 2.10); 3:339.20-27.

^ "Composition made [by the rulers themselves?] with them over whom they raigne, how farr their power may lawfully extende, the articles of compact between them must shewe" (Uwes VIII.3.3 [Keble 2.11]; 3:340.9-11).

Accepting, then, that the specifics of limited political authority are normally a matter of agreement among human individuals and not something derived deductively from the natural law or any other such source. Hooker proceeded to deal with the situation in England as an instant case of historical fact. The power of the English monarch, he maintained, was limited by law, the law of the land, in both its statutory and customary forms. Hooker implied, moreover, that limitations on royal power were involved in the positive legal authorizations of royal actions more than in express prohibitions, while the crown's own legislative power is mainly negative, one of veto.⁴⁶

Consistent with the foregoing, he was prepared to consider the possibility of even an absolute monarchy: whatever was agreed to would stand. And with Molina and Suarez and later English political thinkers like Selden, he expressed a straightforward natural rights position: free agents can willingly give up whatever they choose.⁴⁷ (Although Hooker does not say so, however, limitations from the higher law presumably could be invoked to rule out tyranny.) Also, power handed over by the people to the ruler has been alienated: government once established was to all intents and purposes irrevocably conveyed to the ruler (VIII. 3. 2 *Keble* 2.101; 3:339.20-29). This would have been an essential element in Hooker's case against the puritan position, given that his aim was to show that all forms of the law applied to all citizens without qualification. His brief would have been weakened by conceding any possibility of revoking the original compact.

Though perfectly intelligible in terms of the work's purpose, the absence in the *Laws* of any theory of deposition or resistance has been used to dissociate Hooker's position in general from social contract theory. It has been suggested that his doctrine of consent was always stated tentatively because his requirement for consent was tacit rather than active, and that his overall position lacked the theological overtones of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century social contract statements advocating the rights of resistance and popular sovereignty: in a word, that

⁴⁶* Cargill Thompson, "Philosopher of the 'Politic Society,'" 39.

" Lawes 1.10.5; 1:100.19-28. Cf. Luis de Molina, *De justitia et jure*, 2 vols. (Mainz: 1859), 1705; Francesco Suarez, *De legibus*, ed. Luciano Perena et al, 8 vols. (Madrid: Consejo Superiore de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1971-81), 3.4.6; John Selden, *Opera*, ed. D. Wilkins, 3 vols. (London: 1726), 3:2024, 2041. On Selden cf. Richard Tuck, *Natural Rights Theories, Their Origins and Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979), 96-100.

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Hooker's interest in the social compact was philosophical, not political. Leaving aside the possibility that Hooker might have had both philosophical and political interests in view, however, it seems unlikely that he was urging only the former. And this for two reasons: (1) other, undeniably political sixteenth-century social contract theories concerning the origin of political society did not insist on a positive act of consent as a necessary condition for founding a polity, nor did either Hobbes or Locke later; and (2) Hooker's purpose in publishing the *Lawes* was just as "political" as that of other Reformation era political writers.

Hooker's political theory, on the other hand, should not be confused with the more liberal social contractarianism of John Locke, an error made often enough as a result of taking at face value Locke's careful references to Hooker for the purpose of providing respectability to his own otherwise quite antithetical views. Locke and Hooker differed on two essential points: (1) Hooker's view, taken from the late scholastic tradition found, for example, in Suarez and argued by him more deductively than by any of its earlier Spanish neo-scholastic proponents, was that the original condition of individuals in the state of nature permitted them to opt even for absolute monarchy as not in itself contrary to the natural law. This was not Locke's position. And (2) Hooker did not articulate a theory of inalienable individual rights in the state of nature, as did Locke.

It has been suggested, too, that, in contrast with Buchanan's position, from which he seems to have taken his views on the origins of political society, Hooker's conception of the original compact between ruler and

* Cargill Thompson, 'Philosopher of the Political Society,' 40. Cargill

Thompson argues that Hooker's position stresses compact rather than contract, the latter designating the efficient causal origin of an actual polity, in order to distinguish Hooker's view from later seventeenth-century social contract thinkers like Hobbes and Locke. It does not seem to me, however, that this distinction is well grounded; Locke employed the term "compact" interchangeably with "contract": Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967), 2.8.97 ("original compact"); 2.8.99 ("And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact, that is, or needs, be").

" Cf. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 2.20; p. 186. Cf. Deborah Baumgold, *Hobbes's Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988), 94-97; John Locke, *Two Treatises*, 2.8, pp. 119-22.

^* Cf. Locke, *Two Treatises*, 2.2, p.15.

" Lawes 1.10.5; 1:100.19-29; cf. Cargill Thompson, "Philosopher of the Political Society," 40-43.

^° Locke. *Two Treatises*, 2.7, pp. 90-94.

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ruled was less legalistic and not, strictly speaking, enforceable: he would have been repeating here a standard but not universally held medieval view of the compact between ruler and ruled.^ I find this contrast a bit forced; but there is a difference between Hooker and Buchanan concerning whether the king was above the law. Buchanan was explicitly negative on this point while Hooker was not. Hooker said that the king should rule consistently with the laws of his own jurisdiction but that in the final analysis only moral suasion could be brought to bear.^ Hooker did insist, of course, that a monarch was bound by the terms of his own agreement with his subjects, and the traditional coronation oath included a promise to rule by laws chosen by the people.

Ultimately, Hooker held the conventional Tudor conception of the authority and role of the monarchy and an equally orthodox view on the inadmissibility of rebellion, but without giving great attention to this issue. One unorthodox feature of his political thought vis a vis the contemporary English scene, however, was his insistence that the royal "power of dominion" derived originally from popular consent, "conveyance" from the people (Vni.3.2 IKeble 2.91; 3.338.21-339.4).

Here Hooker sounds like Buchanan again and like Mornay; but in practice he elided popular consent with the orthodox view of monarchy accepted in English common law, and, unlike Buchanan and Mornay, he accepted hereditary succession, although he did mention popular acclamation as a feature of the royal coronation.[^]

The long held conventional view of Richard Hooker as a sixteenth-century English proponent of medieval scholastic views is correct, then, at least as regards his view of the origins and character of political authority

[^] See Cargill Thompson, "Philosopher of the 'Politic Society,'" 41-43. See above, n. 26.

^{^^} Ibid.

^{^^} For the views of Buchanan and Mornay, see Monahan, *From Duties towards Rights*, 124-25, 268-69. This comment applies only to Hooker's view on the ruler's exercise of temporal authority. McGrade has shown that Hooker insisted that the crown's exercise of spiritual authority was subordinate to church law as well as to God and the "body politic," and that he specifically invoked Bracton's formula that "the king can do nothing except what he can do by law," rendering it in terms of the ruler's discretionary authority to mean, "the King's graunt of any favour made contrary to the law is voyd." See Intro, to Lawes VIII, FLE 6:359-60 and 364-69 and Commentary notes on VIII. 9 and 3:332.19-24; also McGrade, "Richard Hooker on the Lawful Ministry of Bishops and Kings" in W. J. Shells, ed., *The Ministry, Clerical and Lay, Studies in Church History*, 26 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell for the Ecclesiastical History Society, 1989), 177-84.

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and his use of the notions of popular consent, social contract, representation for the people through members of parliament, and limitation of legitimacy construed in terms of the general purpose of authority as promoting the common good. On these counts, his views are antithetical to those of the great continental reformers such as Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, and Beza, who at least in their early writings rejected the natural law and corporatist constitutionalist notions of the medieval theologians and canonists.

That this is so should not be surprising, given the distinctive character of the religion established in England in the sixteenth century that Hooker defended in the *Lawes*. While every instance of the reformed religion portrayed itself as, and sought validation in, the claim to represent, a return to the true religion of the early Christian church, Anglicanism retained the greatest resemblance in theology, ecclesiology, and institutional structure to the medieval church of Rome from which it was separating. In this sense Hooker's position, particularly his theory of polity, is "Counter-Reformation" in that it rejects the early Lutheran and Calvinist reaffirmation of the simple Augustinian view of political authority as directly God-given for the purpose of controlling and, where necessary, punishing the citizenry. Of course Hooker did not, nor could he, simply parrot Roman Catholic theory of polity, especially as regards church-state relations. But in terms of his general theory of the nature and origins of temporal polity, he was more "Counter-Reformation" than protestant reformer in his political thinking.

W. J. TORRANCE KIRBY

Richard Hooker as an Apologist of the Magisterial Reformation in England

EVER SINCE THE PUBLICATION IN 1599 OF A Christian Letter¹ there has been some controversy over Richard Hooker's commitment to the fundamental tenets of Reformation theology, especially as defined by the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England.² The anonymous authors of this letter, who declared themselves to be "certaine English Protestantes, unfayned favourers of the present state of religion, authorized and professed in England" sought to impugn Hooker's doctrinal assumptions as incompatible with the Thirty-nine Articles and thus at odds with reformed orthodoxy itself.³ Referring to Hooker's Preface to the *Lawes*, they charged that,

you did bende all your skill and force against the present state of our English church: and by colour of defending the discipline and government thereof, to make questionable and bring in contempt the doctrine and faith it selfe. (FLE 4:7.11-12, 19-20)

¹ I The complete text of A.C.L is included in the Folger edition of

^ The Thirty-nine Articles bear the full title of Articles agreed upon by the Archbishops and Bishops of both Provinces ar\nd the whole clergy, in the Convocation holden at London in the year 1562, for the avoiding of diversities ofopiniors, arui for the establishing of consent touching true religion.

^ John Booty discusses the question of authorship of A.C.L. in his introduction, FLE 4:xvii-xxv.

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The Letter goes on to demand that Hooker justify his meaning on some of the more substantial points of basic doctrine such as Christology, the authority of Scripture, the nature of the will, faith, and works, the sacra- ments, as well as the doctrine of the church. There can hardly be any doubt that these contemporary critics of Hooker regarded the great contro- versy over the "rites, customes, and orders of Ecclesiasticall governement" {Lawes 1.1.3; 1:58.1) as much more than a dispute over mere externals; rather, it was ultimately a dispute over theological principles of the highest order.* In the argument of A Christian Letter the theological stakes are very high indeed. Hooker is accused not only of deviation from certain accepted norms of reformed doctrinal orthodoxy but also of the active promotion of "Romish doctrine" and "scholastic error." "Good Mai[ster] Hoo[ker] helpe us heere, and shewe us howe we may thinke, that you incline not to the errour of poperie touching workes forseene, and that you favour our churches beleefe" (4:28.14-17). There can be no doubt that the aim of A Christian Letter is to drive a wedge between Hooker's theology as articulated in the first five books of the Lawes, on the one side, and the reformed doctrine of the Church of England as the authors of the Letter understood it to be expressed in the Articles of Religion on the other.

It would seem that numerous modern scholars and commentators on Hooker's thought are in fairly substantial agreement with the general view of Hooker's theology expressed in A Christian Letter. It has long been a commonplace to regard Hooker's doctrinal intent as tending toward some "middle way" between Rome and the protestant reformers. Most recently, in his introduction to the Preface of the Lawes, William Haugaard discuss- es the church in the reign of Elizabeth as the "crucible for an emerging Anglicanism" (FLE 6:2). In

this account there is reference to

a recognition among some contemporaries that the English church represented a kind of Protestant *tertium quid* among established European churches, whose character suggested the possibility of rapprochement with Roman Catholic as well as with fellow Protestant churches. (6:5-6)

* See the conclusion of A.C.L. where the authors ask "(is it not a great matter when you seeme to us to make a wide open breach in the church, and to stayne the pure doctrine of faith?) wee seeke that the trueth bee not darkened or defaced" (4:77.28, 78.13-15).

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As the preeminent defender of the Elizabethan Settlement, Hooker is held up as the theologian of this incipient middle way. In such emphasis upon the peculiarity of the "Anglican" theological stance, attention to Hooker's adherence to the theological assumptions of the mainstream of reformed orthodoxy has been significantly downplayed. Peter Lake, for example, has stressed the apparent departure of the Elizabethan establishment divines, including Hooker, from the accepted measures of reformed doctrinal orthodoxy. Disciplinary Calvinists are, on this view, much more in tune with continental Protestantism. The *via media* is usually represented as definitive of the peculiar character of the Church of England and as the mark of a distinctively "Anglican" theology. It has been argued that the doctrinal implications of this so-called middle way were precisely what the authors of *A Christian Letter* feared and opposed in the writings of Hooker. Such a view bears the imprimatur of the great nineteenth-century editor of Hooker's Works, John Keble (Keble, hxcix). Such a reading of the Elizabethan theological climate tends to perpetuate the anachronism of an Anglican *via media*, with Hooker as its chief apologist, and leads to an inevitable distortion of the doctrinal assumptions which underpin the argument of the *Lawes*.

According to Cardinal Newman's classic formulation of the concept of an Anglican *via media*, "a number of distinct doctrines are included in the notion of Protestantism: and as to all these, our Church [i.e., the Church of England] has taken the *via media* between it and Popery." Much of the literature on Hooker since the mid-nineteenth century,

both hagiographical and critical, proceeds on the assumption that Hooker, as an Anglican, is a proponent of some such doctrinal middle way which sets his theology fundamentally apart from the doctrinal assumptions of the magisterial reformers.[®] The resilience of the application of this anachro-

[^] Peter Lake, *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982); see esp. the Introduction, 1-15.

* W. Speed Hill, "Doctrine and Polity in Hooker's Laws," *English Literary Renaissance* 2 (1972): 175.

[^] J. H. Newman, *The Via Media of the Anglican Church Illustrated in Letters, Lectures and Tracts* (London, 1885), 41.

* See Alfred Barry, "Richard Hooker," in *Masters in English Theology: Being the King's College Lectures for 1877* (London, 1877), 1-60; Edward Dowden, "Richard Hooker," in *Anglican and Puritan: Studies in Literature* (London, 1900), 69-96; Lionel S. Thornton, *Richard Hooker: A Study of His Theology* (London, 1924), 28, 33, 74, and 77; F. J. Shirley, *Richard Hooker and Contemporary Political Ideas* (London: S.P.C.K. for the Church Historical Society, 1949), 91; J. S. Marshall, *Hooker and the Anglican Tradition: An*

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nistic label to Hooker is truly a marvel. More recently, scholars of the Elizabethan and Jacobean Church have noted the anachronism of applying the concept of "Anglicanism" in general to this period.[^] The current assumption of Hooker's commitment to a peculiarly Anglican *via media* is theologically imprecise and is ultimately misleading with regard to the central purpose underlying the composition of the *Lawes*. Such anachronism has been largely abandoned in the wider realm of Elizabethan ecclesiastical historiography. ^{^^} Is it not time that this dark varnish be stripped from Hooker's portrait as well? Such a reading of Hooker's theology misconstrues Hooker's own avowed apologetic intent in a fundamental way.

Hooker takes great pains in his Preface and elsewhere in the *Lawes* to make clear the nature of his purpose in writing the treatise. The

Preface itself is addressed directly to "them that seeke (as they tearme it) [my emphasis] the reformation of Lawes, and orders Ecclesiasticall, in the Church of ENGLAND" {Lawes Pref., title; 1:1.2-5). From the very outset the whole issue between the Elizabethan establishment and its disciplinarian critics turns upon the precise manner of understanding "Reformation" itself. This issue is clearly manifest in the rhetoric of the Admonition Controversy, which stands as the polemical backdrop to the Lawes. For Hooker the fundamental issue underlying every stage of his argument in the Lawes is formulated succinctly in his patron Archbishop John Whitgift's question, "Hath there been no reformation in this Church of England sithence the queen's majesty's reign?" "Tfin/ce not" Hooker writes later on in his Preface,

Historical and Theological Study of Hooker's Ecclesiastical PoUty (Sewanee, Tenn.: Univ. Press of the University of the South, 1963), 10, 38; John Booty, "Hooker and Anglicanism," in S.R.H., 207-11; H. C. Porter, "Hooker, the Tudor Constitution, and the Via Media," in S.R.H., 77-116; and W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the Tolitic Society': Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker," in S.R.H., 4, 5.

' Patrick Collinson, *The Religion of Protestants: The Church in English Society 1559- 1625* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), ix; see also CoUinson's E.P.M., 108; Nicholas Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism c. 1590-1640* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), viii.

'° For a more detailed discussion of the anachronism of applying the label "Anglican" to Hooker, see my monograph *Richard Hooker's Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 33-41.

" *The Works of John Whitgift, D.D., Archbishop of Canterbury*, ed. J. Ayre for the Parker Society, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1851-53), 3:314, 315.

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that ye reade the words of one, who bendeth him selfe as an adversarie against the truth which ye have alreadie embraced; but the words of one, who desireth even to embrace together with you the selfe same truth, if it be the truth [my emphasis], ar\d for that cause (for no other God he knoweth) hath undertaken the burthensome labour of this painefuU kinde of conference. (Pref. 1.3; 1:3.1-6)

He states, furthermore, that his chief purpose in composing the treatise is to address the consciences of those disgruntled with the Elizabethan Settlement and who seek "further reformation:"¹⁶

My whole endeavor is to resolve the conscience, and to shewe as neere as I can what in this controversie the hart is to thinke, if it will follow the light of sound and sincere judgement, without either clowd of prejudice, or mist of passionate affection (Pref. 7.1; 1:34.20-23).

The argument of the Lawes is thus cast as an irenic appeal to the hearts and minds of the opponents of the Elizabethan establishment, especially to those of the moderate disciplinarian party of churchmen. Hooker deliberately abandons recourse to the ridicule and personal abuse which had become so characteristic of ecclesiastical polemics on all sides during the 1570s and '80s.¹⁷ He chooses rather to speak directly to the theological assumptions of the disciplinarians through a close examination of the arguments of Thomas Cartwright, their acknowledged champion.¹⁸ Throughout the argument of the Lawes, Hooker's express purpose is to secure conscientious obedience to the "lawes ... rites, customes, and orders" of the Church of England by means of an appeal to doctrine and theological assumptions agreed upon by both parties to the dispute on the grounds that "no lawe of God, nor reason of man hath hitherto bene alleaged of force sufficient to prove they do ill, who to the uttermost of their power withstand the alteration thereof" (1.1.3, 1:57.33-58.5. Pref. 1.2, 1:2.18-21). Only through an appeal to a common set of first princi-

¹⁶ See John Field and Thomas Wilcox, *An Admonition to the Parliament* (1572), printed in *Puritan Manifestoes: A Study of the Origin of the Puritan Revolt*, ed. W. H. Frere and C. E. Douglas (London, 1907), 19.

¹⁷ For the contrary view see W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society,'" 13-15.

¹⁸ Rudolph Almasj argues that the Lawes should be read as a polemically inspired response to Thomas Cartwright's *Second Replie* (1575) to Whitgift's *Defense of the Answer to the Admonition* (1574); see R. Almasj, "The Purpose of Richard Hooker's Polemic," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 39 (1978): 251-70.

pies is there any hope that the two parties to the dispute could even approach the possibility of embracing together "the selfe same truth."¹⁶ In short, it is the apologetic intent of the Lawes to demonstrate beyond doubt that the entire edifice of the Elizabethan Settlement is grounded upon the mutually acknowledged principles of reformed doctrinal orthodoxy. Without such a demonstration, the irenic appeal will inevitably collapse, and the entire argument of the Lawes, on Hooker's own account of his purpose, must be regarded as a failure. It is precisely Hooker's irenic purpose which has been so radically misconstrued both by the authors of *A Christian Letter* and subsequently, although perhaps somewhat ironically, by so many later commentators who have read into Hooker's thought an Anglicanism which had yet to be invented, to borrow a phrase of Professor Collinson's.¹⁷ With respect to this avowed purpose, it does not appear possible to reconcile Hooker's apologetic aim with a deliberate attempt to define a middle way that bears any resemblance whatsoever to Newman's definition.

Perhaps it will be objected here that Hooker relied upon the authority and arguments of pagan philosophers, the early church fathers and such "schoolmen" as Thomas Aquinas in the formulation of his theological position. Certainly the authors of *A Christian Letter* were concerned on this point.¹⁸ Yet Hooker is unmistakably allied with his fellow magisterial reformers on the continent in holding the fathers, especially Augustine, in the highest regard, especially with respect to the fundamental tenets of Trinitarian and Christological doctrine. His appeals to the "Schoolmen" and "Philosophie" are also consistent with the practice of the magisterial reformers. In his marginal comments on *A Christian Letter*, Hooker invokes "Calvins judgment of philosophie" in a letter to Martin Bucer.

As truth is most precious, so all men confess it to be so. And yet, since God alone is the source of all good, you must not doubt, that whatever truth you anywhere meet with, proceeds from Him, unless you would be doubly ungrateful to Him; it is in this way you

¹⁶ Cargill Thompson rejected Hooker's irenicism and regarded the moderate tone of the Lawes as merely "a conscious literary device" employed toward a purely partisan polemical end. See "The Philosopher of the 'Politick Society,'" 13-15. For Olivier Loyer, on the other hand, "L'irenisme est reel chez Hooker." *L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker* (Lille: Atelier des theses, 1979), 678.

^ CoUnson, The Religion of Protestants, ix.

'M.C.L., 20:4:64.25-71.7.

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have received the word descended from heaven. For it is sinfril to treat God's gifts with contempt; and to ascribe to man what is peculiarly God's is a still greater impiety. Philosophy is, consequently, the noble gift of God, and those learned men who have striven hard after it in all ages have been incited thereto by God himself, that they might enlighten the world in the knowledge of the truth. ^^

Hooker and Calvin both repudiate the vilification of reason and philosophy on the part of the radical, biblicizing reformers. As Hooker notes in the margin of A Christian Letter, "Anabaptists, Familists, Libertines, Arrians and other like extreme reformers of popery [are] grown by that very meanes hatefull to the whole world" (A.C.L., 20; FLE 4:67.7-9). Hooker adheres firmly to the right use of "the law of nature in handling matters of religion" (A.C.L., 3; 4:13.14-15) and in this he follows the lead of the magisterial reformers."

In Hooker's view, appeals to the authority of philosophers and schoolmen must be entirely consistent with reformed orthodoxy. Such appeals are necessarily restricted according to the matter in hand. It is generally accepted that Hooker's generic division of the various laws in Book I owes a good deal to scholastic models. Yet, when Hooker quotes Aquinas in A Learned Discourse of Justification, for example, it is with a view to refuting the scholastic conception of grace as a habitus, which is contrary to the received doctrine of imputed righteousness as formulated by the magisterial reformers. Hooker quotes the doctrine of Aquinas in the Summa theologiae as representative of "the Romish doctrine" which he himself opposes. Aquinas regards "gratia justificans" as a "qualitas qucedam supematuralis" (Just., 5; FLE 5:110.13.^ which is the root and principle of good works. Hooker objects to the Thomist soteriology, as formulated in the decrees of the Council of Trent, on the grounds that it confuses the active and passive modes of grace:

This grace [i.e. justification] they will have to be applied by infu- sion, to thende that as the bodye is warme by the heate which is

* This passage of the letter is quoted by John Booty in his commentary on A.C.L. 20; 4:65.11-12. Calvin, *Lettres*, ed. J. Bonnet, 2 vols. (Paris, 1854), 2:198, 199; *Epistole* (Geneva, 1576), 179, 180; *Opera omnia*, ed. L. Baum et al., 59 vols. (Brynswick, 1863- 1900), 20:530.

" Compare Calvin, *Inst.*, 2.2.22,24; 4.20.16.

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in the bodye, so the soule mighte be rightuous by inherente grace, which grace they make capable of increase: as the body maie be more and more warme, so the soule more and more justefied, accordinge as grace shalbe augmented, the augmentacion whereof is merited by good workes, as good workes are made meritorious by it, wherefore the firste receipte of grace is in their divinitye the firste justification, the increase thereof the seconde justification. (*Just.*, 5; *FLE* 5:110.24-111.7)

Against this Tridentine view that justifying righteousness is infused as a habit of the soul, Hooker upholds the standard view of the magisterial reformers. For him, total depravity of man's natural will deprives the soul of capacity to receive the righteousness of justification as a quality or habitus. Thus for Hooker,

The rightuousnes wherein we muste be found if we wilbe justefied, is not our owne, therefore we cannott be justefied by any inherente qualitie. Christe hath merited rightuousnes for asmany as are found in hym. (*Just.* 6; 5:112.22-25)

Hooker's formulation of the doctrine of justification is essentially that of Article 9 of the Articles of Religion. There is no discernible difference between both these accounts and Calvin's distillation of the reformed view in his chapter on justification in the *Institutes of the Christian Religion*.^^

The critical question remains whether Hooker actually succeeds in realizing his stated apologetic intent in the discourse of the *Lawes*. It is impossible in the course of this brief essay adequately to make the case for his success. Nevertheless, it is possible to offer a preliminary sketch of what might be involved in such a demonstration in the case of the particular issue of the doctrine of the church. "We are

accused," Hooker writes in Book I, "as men that will not have Christ Jesus to rule over them, but have wilfully cast his statutes behinde their backs, hating to be reformed, and made subject unto the scepter of his discipline" (1.1.3; 1:58.2-5). Hooker reiterates the argument of his patron, Archbishop John Whitgift, to the effect that Thomas Cartwright and those sympathetic to the presbyterian disciplina were mistaken in their view that ecclesiastical polity

~ Calvin, Inst., 3.11.1-23. Compare Hooker's and Calvin's virtually identical treatment of the distinction between the principal modes of grace in Just. 3-6 and Inst., 3.16.1.

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was a matter prescribed by the authority of Holy Scripture. At issue here is the extent to which the revealed word of Scripture may determine the structures of church government; the positions taken on this question become a test of reformed orthodoxy. For the disciplinarians, the lack of a scripturally prescribed form of church polity is considered grounds for "further reformation." For Whitgift, Hooker, and the other defenders of the Elizabethan Settlement, a full reformation had already been accomplished. This ecclesiological dispute may thus serve as a useful paradigm for the larger question raised in A Christian Letter with respect to what actually constitutes adherence to reformed orthodoxy and what it is to be "fully reformed."

Hooker never questions the premise of the disciplinarians, that the polity of the Church of England must be consistent with the doctrinal principles and pastoral aspirations of the Reformation. Rather he seeks to show that the Reformation principle of sola scriptura, namely, the doctrine that Scripture contains all things necessary to salvation, is mistakenly applied to the determination of the external, visible government of the church, for such matters cannot by nature belong to the realm of "things necessary to salvation." For Hooker the scriptural disciplina was "only by error and misconception named the ordinance of Jesus Christ" (Lawes Pref. 1.2; 1:2.22-23) and was emphatically not a measure of true reformation, nor was its lack any cause for Cartwright's "further reformation." On the contrary, the ecclesiological justification offered by the disciplinarians on behalf of their proposed polity was, in Hooker's estimation, inconsistent with the most fundamental principles of reformed orthodoxy itself. In his

defense of the ecclesiology of the Elizabethan Settlement Hooker stands firmly in the tradition of such magisterial reformers as Calvin, who held that scriptural authority cannot be the same in foro externa as it is in foro conscientiae.⁶ In holding to this distinction as Whitgift had done before him,⁷ Hooker adheres to the doctrine enunciated by Calvin over against the more radical ecclesiology of Martin Bucer, for whom a scripturally prescribed disciplina constitutes one of the essential "marks" of the true visible church. Bucer's ecclesiology provided inspiration to the radical reformers on the continent and was even promoted in Geneva after Calvin's death by Theodore Beza.⁸ In this matter of the notae ecclesiae

⁶ Calvin. Inst., 3.19.15 and 4.10.3-6.

⁷ Whitgift, Works, 1:6.

⁸ P. D. L. Avis, The Church in the Theology of the Reformers (London, 1980), 79. See

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Beza departs from Calvin and the classical teaching of the magisterial reformers.

Among others profoundly influenced by the more radical ecclesiology were the Heidelberg Calvinists, John Knox, and Hooker's two great adversaries, Walter Travers and Thomas Cartwright.⁹ Helmut Kressner has demonstrated that John Whitgift assumed the role of defender of the magisterial reformers' ecclesiology in the Admonition Controversy of the 1570s, while Cartwright adopted the radical teaching of Bucer.¹⁰ Hooker follows Whitgift's lead and aligns himself with Calvin's position against the radical ecclesiology of the disciplinarians. Thus Whitgift's exchange with Cartwright in the Admonition Controversy and Hooker's own further contribution to the debate can quite plausibly be viewed as a continuation in England of the continental debate between the proponents of magisterial and radical Reformation. In taking up the ecclesiological thread of the Admonition Controversy in Book III of the Lawes, Hooker presents a classic statement of the magisterial reformers' response to the radical reformers' doctrine of the church, the latter represented by the English disciplinarian Puritans under the leadership of Cartwright. The ultimate issue for both parties is the formulation of a doctrine of the

church consistent with the basic precepts of Reformation doctrine rightly understood. The heatedness of the debate stems from the disagreement over the manner in which commonly agreed first principles are to be applied in the realm of practical and political concerns.

The question of the *notae ecclesiae* is of crucial significance in this theological debate insofar as these marks are understood to be the meeting point of the mystical and external aspects of the church. According to the Articles of Religion, "the visible Church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men, in which the pure word of God is preached, and the Sacraments be duly administered according to Christ's ordinance."^^ Further-

also W. Nijenhuis, *Ecclesia Reformata: Studies in the Reformation* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), 130-38.

^^ For a discussion of the differences between the magisterial and radical reformers on the question of the *notae ecclesiae* see my discussion of the question in *Hooker's Doctrine of the Supremacy*, 80-86.

^^ Helmut Kressner, *Schweizer Ursprünge des Anglikanischen Staatskirchentums* (Gutersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1953), chap. 4.

^* Article 19. Whitgift quotes Calvin's teaching on the "essential notes of the church" in *Works*, 1:185 and further invokes the "judgement of the reformed churches" as expressed, for example, in the Helvetic Confession.

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more, these two marks, Word and Sacraments, link the doctrine of the church to the even more fundamental theological principle of the "two realms" of active and passive righteousness and thus of the critical, underlying doctrine of grace and salvation. As such, the marks issue provides what might be regarded as an acid test for distinguishing the magisterial reformers from the radicals. Francois Wendel considers Bucer as the source of the view that "ecclesiastical organisations are not subject to human arbitrament; that they are of Divine right because they are dictated by the Holy Spirit."^^ Calvin, on the other hand, while incorporating the scripturally based "fourfold ministry"

of pastors, doctors, elders, and deacons into the Genevan Ordonnances Ecclesiastiques, nevertheless rejects altogether the view that any form of government could be a mark and therefore belong to the esse or essential being of the visible church.^{^*} Church government for Calvin properly belongs in the forum externum. Thus to insist upon any particular form of ecclesiastical polity as scriptural- ly prescribed and as necessary to salvation, which it must be if it is a "mark" of the true, visible church, violates the fundamental tenet of Reformation theology respecting Christian liberty.^{^^} Calvin castigates both the papal and the radical Bucerian ecclesiologies in one breath when he states that his intention is to impugn "constitutions enacted for the purpose of binding the conscience inwardly before God, and imposing religious duties, as if they enjoined things necessary to salvation." ^{^^^}

Few Calvin, the fourfold ministry of Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians^{^^} is to be adopted by Geneva for the sake of the bene esse, the well-being of the church.^{^^} On identical ecclesiological grounds Hooker upholds the institu- tion of episcopacy for England. Neither Hooker nor Calvin was willing to al- low that either form of government could be taken as divinely prescribed nor that such forms in any way constituted "marks" of the true church. It is per- haps more than a little ironic that supporters of jure divine episcopacy and the disciplinarian Puritans actually hold more in common with the ecclesiological

^{^^} Francois Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of his Religious Thought, trans. Philip Mairet (London: William Collins, Sons and Co., 1963), 142. " See Wendel, Calvm, 301-3. " Calvin, Inst., 4.10.27-32. [^] Ibid., 4.10.2. [^] Ephes. 4:11. " Calvin, InsL, 4.10.5.

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first principles of one another than they do with either Hooker or Calvin.^{^^} The disciphnarian appeal to the Reformation principle of sola, scriptura in the external realm of polity entails also, for Hooker, a confusion of the received, orthodox distinction of the realms of discourse. "The absolute perfection of scripture is seene by relation unto that end wherto it ten- deth" {Lawes IL8.5; 1:189.10-11).

Unto the word of God being in respect of that end, for which God ordeined it, perfect, exact, and absolute in it selfe, we do not add reason as a supplement of any maime or defect therin, but as a

necessary instrument, without which we could not reape by the scriptures perfection, that fruite and benefit which it yeeldeth. (III.8.10; 1:227.2-6)

Sola scriptura, as a soteriological principle, does not, indeed cannot, abrogate the authority of reason in the external realm. This distinction concerning the extent of the authority of Scripture is typical of the magisterial reformers. In the Institutes Calvin distinguishes "matters of policy and economy" from the "knowledge of God and his will"; in regard to the constitution of the former the "light of reason" holds principal sway, while the corruption of the intellect is with respect to man's supernatural end.^

For Hooker, the disciplinarian insistence upon a "further reformation" of the Church of England through the establishment of a scripturally prescribed polity is grounded upon a theological "misconceit" {Lawes Pref. 1.2; 1:2.22). The error threatens to undermine the doctrine of salvation itself on account of its implied confusion of the so-called "two realms" of reformed soteriology. For Luther the confusion of das geistliche Reich and das weltliche Reich was the work of the devil and was tantamount to overthrowing the doctrine of justification by faith, the very keystone of orthodox reformed theology:

This is our divinity, whereby we teach how to put a difference between these two kinds of righteousness, active and passive: to the end that manners and faith, works and grace, policy and religion should not be confounded, or taken the one for the other.

^^ For a more extended discussion of these ecclesiological issues see the third chapter of my Hooker's Doctrine of the Suprerruxcy , 59-91.

^* Calvin, Inst., 2.2.13.

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Both are necessary, but both must be kept within their bounds . . . we imagine as it were two worlds, the one heavenly and the other earthly. In these we place these two kinds of righteousness, being separate the one far from the other.^

As we have observed already, Calvin likewise sees the smallest hint of confusion between the two realms as a threat to the Christian liberty founded upon that same doctrine. Hooker too falls into step with these

magisterial reformers in resisting "the mixture of those things by speech which by nature are divided" {Lawes III.3.1; 1:209.24-25}, for this very doctrine of the two kinds of righteousness is the foundation of his own divinity. In a virtual paraphrase of Luther, Hooker affirms in *A Learned Discourse of Justification*

that there are two kindes of christian rightuousnes the one without us which we have by imputacion, the other in us which consisteth of faith hope charitie and other christian virtues . . . God gyveth us both the one Justice and the other, the one by accepting us for rightuous in Christe, the other by workinge christian rightuousnes in us. {Just., 21; 5:129.2-10)

As in the argument of Whitgift[^] before him. Hooker takes this crucial distinction from the soteriology of the magisterial Reformation and erects upon it the ecclesiology of the Lawes. The right distinction of the "two kindes of rightuousnes" provides the doctrinal basis for Hooker's insistence upon the need for a clear and precise distinction between "matters of fayth and salvation" and "matters of discipline." The reluctance of the disciplinarian Puritans to allow such a clear distinction^{^^} is precisely the theological "misconcepte" which, in Hooker's view, separates their cause from that of the magisterial reformers. In Book III Hooker restates the apologetic intention of the Lawes:

To take away therefore that error which confrision breedeth, distinction is requisite. Rightly to distinguish is by concept of minde to sever thinges different in nature, and to disceme wherein

^{^^} Luther summarizes his position in his *Commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Galatians*, ed. Philip S. Watson (London: James Clarke and Co., 1953), 24, 25; Martin Luther, *Werke* (Weimar. 1883-), 40:45.

[^] Whitgift, *Works*, 1:6, 2:83, 84.

^{^^} See, for example, Thomas Cartwright, *The Second RepUe against Master Whitfftes Second Answer*, 409, 410, 414.

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they differ I somewhat marvayle that they [i.e. the disciplinari-

ans] especially should thinke it absurde to oppose Church-goveme' merit a plaine matter of action unto matters of fayth, who know that themselves devide the Gospell into Doctrine and Discipline. {Lawes III.3.1, 2; 1:209.25-28, 210.10-13}

In upholding such a clear distinction between matters of faith and matters of action, Hooker is making an unmistakable appeal to the magisterial reformers' critical distinction between the two realms of active and passive righteousness. We can see in this single issue the working out of Hooker's irenic purpose which is nothing less than the demonstration that the established order of the Elizabethan church is already fully reformed, that it is not in need of any "further reformation," and that the platform for its reform along disciplinarian lines would, in fact, be a departure from the basic principles of reformed orthodoxy as understood by such magisterial reformers as Calvin and Luther and would, in fact, lead in the heterodox direction of the ecclesiology of the radical reformation.

What then are we to say of the middle way and the appropriateness of its application to the thought of Richard Hooker? If Hooker is to be regarded as a traveler on a *via media*, it would seem that there is at least some need to redefine the extremes. It no longer appears plausible to assume, along with the authors of *A Christian Letter*, that Hooker's disciplinarian critics represent the mainstream of Protestant orthodoxy and that Hooker is somehow steering a middle course between their position and popery. Such a view fails to give due credit to Hooker's apologetic intent as well as to the consequent subtlety of his theological position. The modern critical acceptance of Hooker's adherence to an Anglican *via media* is grounded upon an anachronism and inevitably results in a failure to give due acknowledgement to the common theological assumptions shared by him with the leading representatives of reformed orthodoxy both in England and on the continent. On the contrary, our brief consideration of the ecclesiology of the Lawes suggests that it may be more plausible to include Hooker among the ranks of the magisterial reformers, and thus alongside Calvin, Luther, and, of course, Hooker's own patron, John Whitgift. All of these theologians of the magisterial Reformation seek to tread a middle way between the Scylla of Rome and the Charybdis of a radical biblicizing Protestantism. Like Odysseus, they too suffered the loss of a number of their fellows in that difficult passage. A great deal of work remains to be done in stripping away the distortion of Hooker's thought through the lens of an Anglicanism not yet invented. Such distortion,

initiated in large part by Hooker's romantic hagiographers, continues to exert a remarkably resilient influence on the critical reading of Hooker to this day. The foregoing argument is only a very small step in the direction of the necessary revision of the received interpretation of Hooker's theological orientation. Let Richard Hooker himself have the last word with his description of this middle way of the magisterial reformers in a discussion of the authority of Scripture in the second book of the Lawes:

Two opinions therefore there are concerning sufficiencie of holy scripture, each extremely opposite unto the other, and both repugnant unto truth. The schooles of Rome teach scripture to be so unsufficient, as if, except traditions were added, it did not conteine all revealed and supematurall truth, which absolutely is necessarie for the children of men in this life to know that they may in the next be saved. Others justly condemning this opinion growe likewise unto a daungerous extremitie, as if scripture did not onely containe all thinges in that kinde necessary, but al thinges simply, and in such sorte that to doe any thing according to any other lawe were not onely unnecessary, but even opposite unto salvation, unlawfull and sinfull. {Lawes II.8.7; 1:191.14-25}

CONFIDENCE, AUTHORITY,

AND THE

CONSTRUCTION OF

CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY

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ALL CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY HAS DEVOTED SOME ATTENTION to assurance in the context of faith. However, beginning with the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century there occurred a notable change. Where previously the security of faith was safeguarded by the medieval church, significantly if not totally unified in administration, theology, and devotional life under papal authority, now the focus in at least some way shifted to the individual. The believer's personal understanding of the Bible and response of faith became ultimately decisive. Accordingly, the key formula of Protestantism was "justification by grace through faith." On the one hand it proclaimed the exclusively divine initiative in the proffer of salvation (hence *solus Christus* and *sola gratia*), and on the other hand insisted on a personal acceptance in faith (therefore *sola fides*). The latter included an explicit decision; Protestantism generally regarded "implicit faith" as inadequate. Consequently, the quest for assurance in making this necessary "leap of faith" became central, and shaped the larger theological structures of otherwise variegated Protestantism.'

Unlike puritan theology, in which assurance became a major motif. Hooker did not develop an explicit systematic statement. Yet by occasion-

' Cf. Joel R. Beeke, *Assurance of Faith: Calvin, English Puritanism, and the Dutch Second Reformation* (New York: Peter Lang, 1991); R. T. Kendall, *Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979); Randall Zachman, *The Assurance of Faith: Conscience in the Theology of Martin Luther and John Calvin* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993).

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al comment and general implication he formed a thoroughly coherent perspective. Basically Hooker was concerned with two distinct although not separate aspects of assurance. In the *Tractates and Sermons* he reflected on basic theological categories with a soteriological orientation.[^] This was appropriate when speaking to those afflicted by uncertainty, doubt, and even fear as they were being challenged to risk a faith commitment. Subsequently in the *Lawes* Hooker carried on a debate which went far beyond the concerns with

inwardness. Here he reinterpreted assurance in terms of the reasonableness of the Anglican ecclesiology and political order. Appeals to reason, tradition, and the creative role of consensus were now employed to highlight the truth as Hooker saw it — and thereby to offer a reasonable assurance.

While the motif of assurance has received extended attention in numerous studies on both continental and puritan religious thought, Hooker's contributions to assurance have been noted mostly in passing and then rather briefly — and deserve a closer look.

I

In the Tractates and Sermons Hooker's attention was directed to the key soteriological concepts of biblical theology. He regarded them as true, and therefore as supplying assurance. Here, and subsequently in the Lawes, Hooker's statements had a clear center. He identified it as a "foundacion" and initially explored it in terms of faith. In the Lawes this exploration will shift significantly to reason. Now in terms of faith and therefore soteriologically Hooker defined "foundacion" as "the principall thing which is beleaved" {Just, 16; FLE 5:123.3-4) and regarded it as sufficient¹ ly assuring even for those who "hold it but weakly" (14; 5:122.17). Here Hooker employed the vivid analogy of a "materiall buyldinge" (23; 5:132.3). As the law² was the foundation of "civill polecye," faith in matters of religion had a similar position. Elaborating, Hooker pointed to

¹ Soteriology, of course, had also a personal and inward dimension. W. Speed Hill has clarified its role as follows: "It may be argued, then, that in his effort to reconcile the disaffected to the laws of the English church, Hooker's most effective weapon was not his philosophical acumen or his logical rigor, but his capacity to speak to the Puritan as a man who appreciated the essential inwardness of his religious experience." "The Evolution of Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity," in S.R.H., 149.

² Cf. Paul E. Forte, "Richard Hooker's Theory of Law," *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 12 (1982): 133-57.

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two distinctive levels. On the deepest level, in the invisible or

"mistical" church, Christ was the "hed"; more to the surface, in the visible church, the foundation consisted of "the doctryne of t/ie prophettes and Apostles" (Just., 23; 5:132.13-16). Now since Christ provided the basic and central foundation, ultimate assurance was obtained in reference to Christ. As Hooker put it, it was only by a direct denial of Christ — rather than by the rejection of some particular doctrine — that one was outside the boundaries of faith, salvation, and therefore assurance. Only stark "infidelitie" was beyond hope.

1. As Hooker reflected on the working of this "foundation," he initially thought in theological categories which were Calvinist in origin.* For assurance, the various distinctive ways of interpreting predestination were particularly useful. Most notably, assurance was gained by the so-called perseverance of saints, namely, the belief that those who have gained authentic faith will be forever sustained by God in this faith. Hooker, quite similarly, affirmed that the individual Christian is "forever" protect- ed from infidelity "by speciall providence."[^] Here again Hooker looked deeply and meditated on the very center of providence, which he located in the atonement, namely the historic event that Christ has "paide a ransom for all" Qust., 2; 5:106.16; cf. Latues V.45.1-2). In view of this all-decisive act of divine love, God continued to show His unmerited compassion {Just., 12; cf. 9; 5:117.17-24). At the same time Hooker

* Clearly, Hooker opposed the kind of church polity which in England had been derived from the Calvinist heritage, e.g., Lauis, ed. McGrade (1989), xvi. Moreover, in regard to some specific doctrines, notably double predestination, Hooker explicitly disagreed with doctrinaire Calvinists. (Cf. the debate between Paul Avis, "Richard Hooker and John Calvin," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 32.1 [January, 1981]: 19-28 and Anglicanism and the Christian Church [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989]; and Richard Bauckham, "Richard Hooker and John Calvin: A Comment," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 32.1 [January, 1981]: 29-33.) When reflecting on participation in distinctive patterns of theologizing — as one may distinguish between followers of St. TTiomas, Duns Scotus, Martin Luther, and Desiderius Erasmus, to name but a few — Hooker and the English Reformation in general stand out with their reliance on the Calvinist or Reformed wing of Protestantism.

[^] Just., 26; 5:142.7. Cf. Hooker's Notes toward a Fragment on Predestination and the Dublin Fragments, FLE 4:83-97 and 4:102.

Debora Kuller Shuger formulates succinctly: "Hooker argues that reprobation results from God's foresight of sin but salvation does not result from foresight of faith but is an act of gratuitous mercy — an Augustinian, if slightly inconsistent, position," in *Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1990), 75, n. 21.

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believed that this proffer of divine mercy was not a matter of an automatic transfer of forgiveness but required as a necessary precondition both belief and repentance (13; 5:121.22-122.13). Yet these were not merely autonomous human decisions; election served as both their ultimate source and as the guarantee of continuous security and therefore assurance {Jude 2, 2; FLE 5:36.24-37.9}. Repeatedly Hooker connected Christian life, election, and the very being of God, thereby producing remarkably sensitive statements of assurance:

Fools care not, where they hide their heads. But where shal a wise man hide himselfe when he feareth a plague comming? Where should the frighted childe hide his head, but in the bosome of his loving father? Where a Christian, but under the shadow of the wings of Christ his Saviour? . . . But because wee are in danger like chased birds, like Doves that seeke and cannot see the resting holes, that are right before them, therefore our Savior giveth his Disciples these encouragements before hand, that feare might never so amaze them, but that alwaies they might remember, that whatsoever evils at any time did beset them, to him they should still repaire, for comfort, counsell and succour. {Remedie; FLE 5:377.5-16}

God sitteth not in heaven carelesse and unmindfull of our estate. Can a mother forget her child? (Jude 2, 3; 5:37.27-28)

Having stressed the significance of faith in obtaining assurance, Hooker made it very clear that faith was only the means and not the ultimate source of assurance. On one occasion he put it this way: "No, it is not the worthinesse of our beleeving, it is the vertue of him in whom we beleeve, by which we stand sure as houses that are builded upon a rocke" (Jude 2, 16; 5:45.16-18).

2. Yet while objectively founded, assurance according to Hooker also had a very personal dimension. Hooker turned attention to it when he

elucidated who God is and how the being of God redemptively affects the human person. Namely, the elect are protected from committing "any such sinne as doth quit extinguish grace," and "clean cut them of from Christ Jesus." This is possible only "because the seed of god abideth in them and doth shield them from receyving any irremediable wound" (Cert., 1; FLE 5:74.4-7; cf. 1; 5:73.24-25). Or again Hooker can speak of a "spark of faith hope love or sanctitie" which is in principle imperishable (Just., 26; 5:141.2-3). In this way the life of faith is seen as a dynamic and

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ongoing relationship with God. Assurance therefore surrounds and embraces one's total existence: "If therefore the man which is once juste by faith shall lyve by faith and lyve forever: It followeth that he which once doth beleve the foundation muste needes beleve the foundation forever" {Just., 26; 5:139.16-19}.

The point can be most vividly made in reference to the paradigm of a "deadly twayne": although the believer will encounter suffering and temptations, he will nevertheless be saved "from receyving any deadly wound" (Just., 27; 5:147.19). Therefore the believer will remain "invincible" in his faith (Cert., 1; 5:76.19).

3. Yet this new mode of being "effectually called" {Just., 26; 5:140.10} is not forced on the believer. Hooker sought to leave some room for human freedom and authentic decision making. Here he made creative use of two traditional concepts in the larger context of divine revelation as having been bestowed on humanity through the Bible. *^ On one level. Hooker understood the dynamic of the Bible in terms of the power of language to transmit insights of ultimate significance. He then pointed to "the naked promise of god his bare word" (Cert., 3; 5:77.16-17). On another level Hooker acknowledged the redemptively decisive activity of grace, given as an undeserved "gyfte" {Just., 34; 5:160.28} and supplied more broadly through the working of the Holy Spirit. This interplay between "word" and "grace," familiar to us from the Tractates and Sermons, Hooker continued to affirm in the Lawes as well, e.g.: "It is on both sides confest that the worde of God outwardlie administred (his spirit inwardlie concur- ringe therewith) converteth, edifieth, and saveth soules" (V.21.5; 2:87.10- 12). Yet the measure of freedom which Hooker was to affirm did not, so he believed, undermine the authenticity of the assurance. That was to remain firm:

For God is not at that point with us, that hee careth not whether wee sinke or swimme. No, he hath written our ruimes in the palme of his hand, in the signet upon his finger are we graven, in sentences not onely of mercy, but of judgement also we are remembred. {Jude 2, 2; 5:36.24-37.2)

The contemporary puritan criticism of Hooker's predestinarian insights

* Cf. Egil Grislis, "The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker," in S.R.HT, 159- 206.

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highlight the fact that there was a conditional dimension to Hooker's formulations {Cert, 3; 5:77.16-24). Namely, specifically in regard to reprobation, Hooker acknowledged that he "had termed god a permissive and no posityve cawse" and had explicitly subordinated predestination to providence — "though not in tyme yett in order" {Ansiver, 22; 5:253.9). Hooker continued to hold such a persuasion in the Lawes as well. Aware of the ramifications. Hooker was willing to acknowledge the limits of the soteriological dimension of assurance. In his Answer tx) Travers Hooker returned to his earlier distinction between the "certaintie of evidence" and the "certaintie of adherence" (Cert., 1; 5:69.26-70.1). His point continued to be that in matters of faith human assurance could not be absolute:

The trueth of somethinges is so evident, that no man which heareth them can doubt of them: As when we heare, that a part of anything is lesse then the whole, the mind is constrayned to say this is true. If it were so in matters of fayth then as all men have equall certaintie of this, so no beleever should be more scripulous and doubtfull then another. But wee find the contrarie. (Cert., 1; 5:70.9-14)

We should note that the contrast here is not simply between evidence and belief. Only evidence of first principles is indubitable. Other data gathered by reason will be open to inquiry and doubt. At the same time. Hooker's understanding of belief was not as of an irrational leap of faith. Rather, here was a situation in which "wee have lesse certaintie of evidence concerning thinges beleeved then concerning thinges sensibly or naturally perceyved" (1; 5:70.24-25). And just how much "less" Hooker sought to spell out in the following way:

The other which we call the certaintie of adherence is when the hart doth cleave and stick unto that which it doth beleeve. This certaintie is greater in us then the other. The reason is this: the fayth of a christian man doth apprehend the wordes of the law, the

^ Answer, 22; FLE 5:253.1. Cf. Hill, "Evolution," 124.

* Hill, "Evolution," 124. Michael T. Malone puts it this way: "Thus it is: all men are sinners, equally unworthy of any beneficent heavenly consideration, yet somehow, some are more sinners than others. When God foresees that the proffer of grace would be rejected, by predestination that proffer is never truly and effectively offered." "The Doctrine of Predestination in the Thought of William Perkins and Richard Hooker," *Anglican Theological Review* 52 (1970): 112.

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promises of god, not only as true but also as good. (1; 5:70.31- 71.4)

In other words, according to Hooker there was an existential verifiability which was applicable both to the eternal standards of existence (or the "law") and the redemptive good-will (the "promises" or the gospel) of God. Hence the experience of being drawn to belief is not an arbitrary venture insofar as truth is therein recognized as both theoretical and practical. Theology and ethical life are correlative!

At the same time, Hooker was aware that such believing as he had outlined did contain an element of risk. We become aware of it as we reflect on the limits of faith:

Even then when the evidence which he hath of the trueth is so small that it greaveth him to feele his weaknes in assenting there- unto, yea there is in him such a sure adharence unto that which he doth but faintly and fearfully beleeve that his spirit having once truly tasted the heavenly sweetnes thereof all the world is not able quite and cleane to remove him from it. (Cert., 1; 5:71.5-10)

Confessionally and personally, here the accent on assurance was intense. Hooker was convinced that the believer "striveth with him selfe to hope even against hope to beleeve even against all reason of beleeving" (1; 5:71.10-11). Yet however intense, the assurance was not without doubt and struggle — and hence contrary to his puritan critic

Walter Travers's claim that the "assurance of faith" is "greater" {Supplication, FLE 5:200.8). Indeed, to Travers's statement Hooker responded with a question:

Howe is it that if tenne men do all looke upon the moone, every one of them knoweth it as certainly to be the moone as another: But many beleevinge one and the same promis all have not one and the same fulnesse of perswasion? Howe falleth it out that men beinge assured of any thinge by sense can be no surer of it then they are, whereas the strongest in faith that lyveth upon the earth hath alwaies neede to labor and stryve, and praie that his assurance concerninge heavenly and spirituall thinges maie growe increase and be augmented? (Amifer, 9; 5:236.30-237.7)

As is well known, Hooker's argument did not settle the debate. The various soteriological insights which Hooker and Travers shared had collided at the doctrine of predestination. Both had appealed to Scripture

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texts. Yet where one had found assurance, the other discerned inadequacy and therefore a threat to assurance. Hooker soon enough came to realize that it was not very useful to appeal to personal conviction and religious experience, since such subjective appeals offered no objective standard. In the last analysis, sincerity could not be measured!

At the same time the concern with assurance could not be avoided unless one was prepared to disconnect personal faith from objective truth. Hooker's solution was a return to the "foundation," and this time by reflection upon it in terms of $ki < w$. Here Hooker's statement became complex and lengthy, in numerous ways reverberating throughout his *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*. Without attempting to summarize the *Latues*, I shall nevertheless seek to interpret some of Hooker's key insights.

II

Having disconnected assurance from double predestination, Hooker's theological system faced a two-fold task. On the one hand. Hooker needed to challenge the puritan appeal to election on the grounds that it supplied a false assurance, based on arrogant opinion. On the other hand, he had to show that the truth which he had reached offered

genuine assurance, and although not devoid of all risk, nevertheless rested on as high a probability as was humanly possible.

1. Accordingly, Hooker called attention to the universal presence of sin, clearly and memorably attested by Scripture and human experience. This, of course, was not denied by the Puritans. But what was overlooked by them was the fact that sin affected all dimensions of human existence, including theology. "Nature worketh in us all a love to our owne counsels" (Pref. 2.7; 1:10.10). And this Hooker recognized not to be a mild inclination, which could be readily corrected. Rather, self-love was stubborn and active: "Our love set on fire to maintaine that ivhich once vue have done, sharpneth the wit to dispute, to argue, and by all meanes to reason for it" (1:10.11-13). Human nature is "full of wilfulnes and selfeliking" (Pref. 6.3; 1:32.11). This general tendency can be most vividly seen in the fanatics: "Let any man of contrarie opinion open his mouth to perswade them, they close up their eares, his reasons they waigh not, all is answered with rehear sail of the words of John, We are of God, he that knoweth God, heareth us." (Pref. 3.14; 1:19.23-26). Now turning his attention to the zealots with whom he was debating at the present, namely the Puritans, Hooker charged that,

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"they oppose their Me thinketh unto the orders of the Church of England" (IV.4.2; 1:286.4-5). And continuing in these controversial tones, Hooker charged without mercy: "The common conceipt of the vulgar sort is, whensoever they see any thing which they mislike and are angry at, to thinke that every such thing is scandalous." On occasion Hooker even concretized his generalizations with specific examples. Accordingly, William Hackett and other "poore seduced creatures" were by the judgment of God given "over to their owne inventions" (V .Dedication. 6; 1A.1 and 20) and thus, of course, perished in their errors. Moreover, Hooker also mentioned those "wise malignantes" (and among them Niccolo Machiavelli): "They loose them selves in the verie maze of theire owne discourses, as if reason did even purposelie forsake them, who of purpose forsake God the author thereof" (V.2.4; 2:26.8, 23-25). In short, whenever the reality of sin is not somehow taken into account, subjectivity is inevitably destructive:

If . . . the Church did give everie man license to foUowe what him selfe imagineth that Gods Spirit doth reveale unto him, or what he

supposeth that God is likelie to have revealed to some speciall person whose virtues deserve to be highlie esteemed, what other effect could hereupon ensewe, but the utter confusion of his Church under pretense of beinge taught, led, and guided by his spirit? (V.10.1; 2:46.16 and 22-28)

2, Nevertheless, authentic assurance is possible through a critical sharing of wisdom. This, of course, cannot be an arbitrary venture. Hooker explained: "God hath not moved theire hartes to thinke such thinges, as he hath not inabled them to prove" (V.10.1; 2:47.7-9). Now, by proving. Hooker meant a complex intellectual venture which was to be undertaken with great care. He assumed that there would be risks and that even at the best there would remain a margin of error. Hence the assurance thus gained, while authentic, would not be absolute.

As Hooker began this process, he did not examine each term which he employed, but generally accepted those insights which had been widely

' Lawes IV. 12. 2; 1:320.6-8. Basil Willey has suggested that Puritans are in this way representative of Protestantism: "Here Hooker puts his finger on the great weakness of Protestantism. Taking Scripture as the only rule, it had no means of deciding whose interpretation of Scripture was the correct one; and the result was disintegration and chaos." *The English Moralists* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967), 104.

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shared without controversy. Thus he noted that the human mind is "by nature speculative and delighted with contemplation in it selfe" (1.8.5; 1:86.15-16). And although he acknowledged the effects of original sin ("the minds of all men being so darkned as they are with the foggie damp of originall corruption" [Cert., 1; 5:71.16-17]), he nevertheless believed that even "meere naturall men" have recognized the existence and the basic characteristics of God along with the general moral standards for humanity (Lawes 1.8.7; 1:87.14). Nor did he question the revelatory nature of the Bible; he stated: "We all beleeve that the Scriptures of God are sacred, and that they have proceeded from God" (II.4.2; 1:153.14-15). Such belief, claimed Hooker, rested on the

general experience of the Bible as the Word of God, powerfully persuasive and redemptive (11.4.2; 1:153.17-25).

At the same time Hooker noted that judicious use of human reason was indispensable for the interpretation of Scripture:

Exclude the use of naturall reasoning about the sense of holy scripture concerning the articles of our faith, and then that the scripture doth concerne the articles of our faith who can assure us? That which by right exposition buildeth up Christian faith, being misconstrued breedeth error: betweene true and false construction, the difference reason must shew.¹⁰

Here two additional observations are in order. First, in accord with his general theological perspective. Hooker freely acknowledged the redemptive role of grace. ¹¹ Since humankind had fallen and human reason become disoriented in self-love, "right" reason is no longer a natural possession but a supernatural gift. This insight, vigorously stated by St. Augustine over against Pelagius, had been variously restated by such major theologians as St. Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and John Calvin. Second, Hooker was well aware that such a restoration of reason, ¹² in

¹⁰ Laxves III.8.16; 1:233.15-20. Even Martin Luther had eventually recognized that "we must use our reason or else give way to the fanatics." Confession Concerning Christ's Supper, 1528, D. Martin Luthers Werke: kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1909), 26:337:14-15; Luther's Works ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut Lehmann, 55 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press and Fortress Press, 1953-65), 37:224.

¹¹ Lawes V.66.9; 2:330.9-12. V.22.13; 2:101.7-12. Cf. Egil Grislis, "Richard Hooker's Image of Man," Renaissance Papers 1963 (Durham, N.C.: Southeastern Renaissance Conference, 1964), 73-84.

¹² Egil Grislis, "The Role of Consensus in Richard Hooker's Method of Theological

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principle indeed enabling the work of theology, did not in practice

neces- sitate it. Or, to put it another way, the very fact that wise reasoning had at times occurred (e.g., "all good lawes are the voyces of right reason" [Lawes V.9.3; 2:45.2-3]) did not assure that all laws will be written in accord with right reason. Similarly, a blanket appeal to the statements of reputedly wise men did not necessarily assure that truth has been obtained in a particular case. Yet precisely such had been the simplistic approach of the Puritans. Hooker charged:

The evidence therefore of antiquitie failing you, yee flie to the judge-ments of such learned men, as seeme by their writings to be of opinion that all Christian Churches should receyve your discipline, and abandon ours. (Pref. 4.6; 1:25.2-5)

Instead, Hooker proposed a distinction between "public consent" and "private" judgment — and challenged his opponents to observe the divergent steps in reaching them. Hooker then claimed that "public consent" is superior to "private" judgment and has these notable effects: "of peace and quietnes there is not any way possible, unlesse the probable voice of everie member [entire] societie or bodie politique overrule all private of like nature in the same bodie" (Pref. 6.6; 1:34.4-9). Of course, Hooker was not advocating a modern majority rule but pointed to a qualitative difference:

The general] and perpetual] voyce of men is as the sentence of God himselfe. For that which all men have at all times learned, nature herselfe must needs have taught; and God being the author of nature, her voyce is but his instrument. (1.8.3; 1:83.33-84.4)

Of course, this knowledge has not been gained directly but rather dialectically, by searching and evaluating, through intellectual reflection and practical observation (1.8.9-11). In this way Hooker is not proposing a static account of truth. He knew very well that changing situations will require new interpretations and applications, and at times even the discarding of what at one time was believed to be wisdom. "The wisdom which is learned by tract of time, findeth the lawes that have bene in former ages established, needfull in later to be abrogated."* In contrast,

Inquiry," in Robert E. Cushman and Egil Grislis, eds., *The Heritage of Christian Thought: Essays in Honor of Robert Lowry Calhoun* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 64-88.

* Lawes rV.14.1; 1:336.27-29. For a brilliant analysis of the dynamic

context of the process of authorship, cf. Richard Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992), especially 12-13.

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where "the law of private reason" is being followed in preference to "the law of publique," the only likely result will be stark disorder (1.16.6; 1:140.21-22). Obviously, in such a situation the truth had not been reached. And where the truth is not at the foundation of human existence, there authentic wisdom is lacking, since a genuine assurance had not been forthcoming.

Now it is such a perspective which enabled Hooker to look critically at all tradition. For example, according to Hooker, even if a "definitive sentence" had been affirmed by "ten thousand generall Councils ... yet one demonstrative reason alleaged, or one manifest testimony cited from the mouth of God himself to the contrary," is sufficient for a valid refutation (11.7.5; 1:180.23-26). Yet where no such critical rejection has taken place, a statement would be valid even without a formal proof as long as "a number of the learnedest divines" have taught it (II. 7.5; 1:180.34-35). Of course, this would hold true only in the situation where these divines have not been proven wrong by "reasons demonstrative"— which Hooker defined: "An argument necessary and demonstrative is such, as being proposed unto any man and understood, the mind cannot choose but inwardly assent." And when this is the case, then conscience has been set "at full libertie" (Pref. 6.6; 1:33.19-22).

At the same time Hooker also suggested definite guidelines for the use of such liberty. They were also intended to serve as standards in the search for truth, outlined in three consecutive steps:

[1] What scripture doth plainlie deliver, to that the first place both of credit and obedience is due; [2] the next whereunto is whatsoever any man can necessarily conclude by force of reason; [3] after these the voice of the Church succeedeth. (V.8.2; 2:39.8- 11)

Of course, even the authority of the church was not arbitrary. Hooker defined it as follows: "That which the Church by her ecclesiastical authority shall probably thinke and define to be true or good, must in congruence of reason overrule all other inferior judgments whatsoever" (V.8.2; 2:39.11-14). In other words, what Hooker suggested was such a statement by the church which had been

reasonable. And where the church proceeded in this manner, it was not even necessary to explain each of its steps. Hooker thought that "the bare consent of the whole Church" would suffice (V.8.3; 2:39.22).

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3. Of course, all the while Hooker had assumed that there will be truly judicious church leaders and theologians who will offer thoughtful counsel. In the broadest sense, this was a celebration of the significance of experience. Now what Hooker meant by experience was not a momentary occurrence, but rather the gathered and evaluated sum total of theologically significant and insight-yielding events. Such an approach did not invalidate the need for scriptural exegesis and sound reasoning, but it cautioned that these will inevitably neglect some significant factors. Therefore Hooker warned and noted: "The things which so long experience of all ages hath confirmed and made profitable, let not us presume to condemne as follies and toys, because wee sometimes knowe not the cause and reason of them" (Lawes rV.1.3; 1:274.27-30). And similarly, where actual experience is lacking, mere theoretical argumentation will not provide certainty and assurance. To puritan proposals which had come from just such a context Hooker responded: "Thus they say: but because they say it only, and the world hath not as yet had so great experience of their arte in curing the diseases of the Church," it is unreasonable to assume that they are necessarily correct (TV. 10.2; 1:306.27-30). In truth, there is no way to replace "the waight of that long experience" (TV.H.I; 1:337.18).

In conclusion we note that as Hooker composed his *Lawes* he had not forsaken his earlier theological insights. The "foundation" of all truth was ultimately still Christ and its working center Christian theology. But for such theology to be reliable it needed to be seasoned and wise. Here there was no simplistic way to gain assurance. The trust of faith was not to be replaced, but it needed to be informed by cogent reasoning. Thus care was taken that this trust of faith — inevitably, as in all leaps, filled with risk — would not be arbitrary or irrational but in accord with the best of evidence.^{1*}

^{1*} While Peter Munz has charged that "Hooker had thus at last established the complete autonomy of human reason over the whole of life," in *The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought* (London:

Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), 62, A. P. d'Entreves already noted that Hooker had been aware of the necessary "qualifications," *The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought: Thomas Aquinas, Marsilius of Padua, Richard Hooker* (New York: Humanities Press, 1959), 120. I have noted that in the final analysis Hooker appealed to a grace-redeemed reason, cf. n. 12 above.

¹⁶ For contemporary ecumenical relevance, cf. William P. Haugaard, "Richard Hooker: Evidences of Ecumenical Vision from a Twentieth Century Perspective," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 24.3 (Summer, 1987): 427-39.

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Hooker on the Authority of Scripture in Matters of Morality

IN RECENT DECADES THE EMERGENCE OF ALTERNATIVE CODES OF SEXUAL conduct has led to considerable conflict in the United States. As traditional purveyors of moral vision, church leaders have taken stances on questions such as divorce, homosexuality, and abortion. While the "Religious Right" has championed what it considers a biblically-based set of "traditional family values," the "mainline" denominations have been rent by internal disagreements. At present the Episcopal Church, for instance, is embroiled in controversy about the blessing of same-sex unions and the ordination of openly gay and lesbian persons.

The Episcopalian "conservatives" tend to conflate issues of faith and morals and to include them both under the key Anglican stance on the sufficiency of Scripture. As one recent article phrases this position: "Anglicans appeal to Scripture as the only fundamental authority for any matter touching salvation, including moral conduct (e.g., sexual conduct)." Attempts to rethink the church's teaching on moral issues in the light of

¹⁷ Helen Hardacre, "The Impact of Fundamentalism on Women, the Family, and Interpersonal Relations," in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalism and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences,*

riefe Family, and Edxication, vol. 2 of The Fundamental' ism Project, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1993), 129-50; and Clyde Wilcox, God's Wavriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1992).

^ Ephraim Radner and George Sumner, Jr., "Waiting on the Spirit: Episcopalians and Homosexuality," *Christian Century*, 9 Oct. 1991, 911.

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extra-biblical insights, or even reinterpretations of the biblical texts themselves, are construed as an effort to change doctrines fundamental to Christian faith. Rather than subjecting such basic matters (labeled "mere Christianity")^ to critical scrutiny, one faces the choice of either accept- ing them obediently or rejecting God's Word.^^

Episcopalian "Liberals," on the other hand, insist that Anglicans have always defended conscience as the final arbiter in moral affairs. Construing the rational faculty of discernment and decision in individualistic terms and employing historical criticism to relativize Biblical authority, "liber- als" are willing to revise or even jettison not only traditional moral codes but the very notion of church-sponsored ethical standards.^

The fact that conservatives appeal to Richard Hooker's thought testifies to his "classical" standing in the Anglican Communion.^ Since

^ This phrase, borrowed from C. S. Lewis, is employed by Robert W. Prichard, "The Place of Doctrine in the Episcopal Church," in Ephraim Radner and George R. Sumner, eds., *Reclaiming Faith: Essays on Orthodoxy in the Episcopal Church and the Baltimore Declaration* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1993), 14.

* This logic is repeated time and again in *United Voice*, the newsletter produced by Episcopalians United, a "conservative" lobby group. See, for instance, the "Pass it On" section of Sept. 1992, which denounces the " 'Yes, but' . . . strategies of those who really do not honor Scripture as primary," or the same section in the Nov. 1992 issue, which declares: "The time has come for those who insist on Homosexual Ordination to reconcile themselves with the real issue at hand — the inspiration and authority of Scripture. The difficulty

stands or falls on this."

^ Joseph Fletcher's *Situation Ethics: The New Morality* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966) has become the classical statement of the "liberal" position. For an example of "liberal" method applied to sexual morality, see John Selby Spong, *Living in Sin? A Bishop Rethinks Human Sexuality* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988).

* Thus two of the essays in *Reclaiming Faith* offer interpretations of Hooker's doctrine of scriptural authority. Robert W. Prichard claims that Hooker believed that the basics of Christian faith ("divine law") "were unchangeable." The adiaphora were the "only area in which church government could exercise real discretion" (20). This is true as far as it goes but skirts the key question; what was "basic" and what adiaphora in Hooker's view? Similarly, Prichard's statement that for Hooker Scripture came first in the hierarchy of authority (39) needs serious qualification. Christopher R. Seitz's essay ("Repugnance and the Three-Legged Stool: Modern Use of Scripture and the Baltimore Declaration") reveals similar incompleteness. He rightly notes that the triad of Scripture, tradition, and reason appears only rarely in the *Lawes* and seems to establish only a general rule, so that it points to something rather different than modern "liberal" method (90, 92). But the fact that this tripartite formulation cannot be projected back onto Hooker does not mean that his use of Scripture in moral reasoning corresponds to that of the "conservatives." Seitz's unqualified opposition to the historical criticism of the Bible, for instance, overlooks Hooker's humanist historical consciousness, which certainly anticipates more recent critical attitudes (cf. William P. Haugaard's remarks in his introduction to Books II, III, and IV; *FLE* 6:154-61). And Seitz commits an

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both sides wish to claim continuity with the past, it is indeed important to determine what Hooker thought about the use of the Bible in resolving moral matters. That is my goal in this essay. My purpose, however, is certainly not to settle the debate about the specific issues surrounding homosexuality. To my knowledge Hooker did not address this concrete topic. I am far more interested in arguing that Hooker offers an ethical method which can help persons reason together about any number of moral themes. It would be entirely contrary to Hooker's own principles, however, to suggest that anyone should accept an approach simply because it was propounded by an

authoritative figure from the past. By giving reasons for my belief that Hooker's position stands on its own merits today, I hope to attract the interest not only of Anglicans but of anyone concerned about creating a basis for moral consensus building in our divisive era.

Hooker's position emerges most clearly in the second book of the *Lawes*, the title of which challenges the Puritan idea that "Scripture is the onely rule of all things which in this life rmy be done by men" (FLE 1:143.6- 8). He considers this "error" a "desire to enlarge the necessarie use of the word of God." Scripture does frequently offer "generall axiomes, rules, and principles" of the "lawe of reason," but by deduction from them persons are free to draw consequences not explicitly spelled out in Holy Writ. Moreover, Hooker maintains that no one is obliged to "deduce all his actions out of scripture" (II. 1.2; 1:145.7-9 and 25-30).

Hooker demonstrates the use of reason in exegesis by refuting the Puritans' appeal to several proof texts which allegedly support their ethical methodology. His scrutiny reveals that the texts in question do not in fact support their "head theoreme" (II. 1.3; 1:146.23). Commenting on Prov- erbs 2:9, for instance. Hooker grants that wisdom is our teacher. But his opponents "restraine the manifold wayes which wisdom hath to teach men by, unto one only way of teaching, which is by scripture" (II. 1.4; 1:147.3-5). He invites them to consider also the lessons of nature and of "worldly experience and practise" (1:148.3-4). Moreover, even precepts clearly laid down by God in the Bible's pages may not necessarily apply to our age, for "truthes there are, the veritie whereof time doth alter" (II.4.6; 1:156.5). As Hooker says in Book III, "some new growne occasion"

egregious factual error when he refers to "Hooker's appreciative dedication of *Lau/s of Ecclesiastical Polity* to John Calvin" (96, n. 15).

On the notion of the religious classic, see David Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 99-229.

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(III. 10.5; 1:243.29) always emerges, particularly in regard to doing, as opposed to believing: "every man knoweth that the matter of faith is constant, the matter contrariwise of action daily changeable" (III.

10.7; 1:244.23-24). In summary. Hooker wishes to know "how it can stand with reason to make the bare mandate of sacred scripture the onely rule of all good and evill in the actions of mortall men" (II.8.5; 1:188.32-189.2). We must not despise the God-given law of nature, "imprinted in the mindes of all the children of men," which gives both general principles and guidance for "the choise of good and evill in the daylie affaires of this life" (II.8.6; 1:190.12-16). Hooker strongly implies that refusing this gift constitutes an act of "presumptuous boldnes" (III.8.3; 1:221.16), bordering on blasphemy against the generous creator (cf. III.8.9; 1:226.11-15).

It seems abundantly clear, then, that for Hooker moral argumentation must involve more than quoting verses from Scripture. And one cannot very well argue that Hooker's methodology is idiosyncratic. On the specific question of the role of Scripture in moral reasoning, the same conclusion is reached by Bishop Robert Sanderson some fifty years later. In his 1647 Oxford lectures, *De obligatione conscientiae*, Sanderson baldly states that "Sacred Scripture is not the adequate Rule of Conscience."[^] Kevin Kelly notes that this is so because reason is needed "to make scripture an adequate rule."[^]

But Hooker himself denounces as "brutish" any attempt to secure loyalty on the basis of naked appeals to human authorities, "be they never so great and reverend." He declares: "that authority of men should prevaile with men either against or above reason, is no part of our beliefe" (II. 7.6; 1:181.13-15). What reasons does he give his readers, then, to induce them to prefer his stance to that of the disciplinarians? Hooker contends that the adoption of the opposite view will entail at least four negative consequences.

First, Hooker suggests that the exclusive appeal to Scripture to resolve moral quandaries can in fact legitimate the private judgments of individuals who twist the Bible to support their questionable views. In the preface

[^] "Sacra Scriptura . . . non est Conscientiae Regula adaequata." *De obligatione conscientiae* 14.4, in William Jacobson, ed., *The Works of Robert Sanderson*, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1854), 4:73.

® Conscience: Dictator or Guide? A Study of Seventeenth-Century English Protestant Moral Theology (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1967), 65. Hooker's influence on Anglican moral theology in the seventeenth century has been stressed by H. R. McAdoo, *The Structure*

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to the Lawes Hooker already calls attention to the way a "mis fashioned preconcept" can color one's perception of the biblical message (Pref. 3.9; 1:16.17-18). In Book III he points to a specific exegetical practice which will yield conclusions already formulated in an a priori fashion. His opponents, he says, commonly "quote by speeches in some historicall narration or other" as law. By so doing they "adde to the lawe of God." Hooker harshly condemns those who "shall presume thus to use the scripture" (1:5.1; 1:215.10-12 and 18-19).

It would be legitimate to ask how Hooker's own use of Scripture can be free of an opposite but just as human "preconcept." Hooker is aware of the problem, and declines to give absolute guarantees. As Egil Grislis describes his position: "There is simply no theological method, however correct, that can itself ensure its own infallibility."⁶ But Hooker believes our best hope lies in consensus reached after broad dialogue. As he put it, the way to "peace and quietnes" was to permit "the probable voice of everie intier societie or bodie politique [to] overrule all private of like nature in the same bodie" (Pref. 6.6; 1:34.6-9).

Second, Hooker worries that the puritan approach to Holy Scripture will inevitably lead to sectarian and indeed schismatic exclusivism. In the Preface his description of Anabaptism is designed to warn his readers concerning the descent into fanaticism which results once persons "image" in that Scripture every where favoureth that discipline" designed to cure the alleged evils of society. In Hooker's mind the idea of a group enjoying a special illumination of the Spirit and withdrawing from all contaminating influences is inextricably bound up with this mode of moral reasoning (Pref. 3.16; 1:21.3-4).

Indeed no other issue at the Temple had inflamed Travers's opposition to Hooker more than the latter's charitable attitude toward Roman Catholics.⁶⁷ In like manner Hooker's criticism of the puritan position on polity in Book III begins with an employment of the traditional distinction between the visible and the invisible church to insist that all who outwardly profess "One Lord, one faith, one baptisme" (III. 1.7; 1:198.9) are to be included in the present company of the church

militant. Hooker specifically declines to mention "those vertues that belong unto morall righteousness and honestie of life," for these are "not proper unto Christian men" (1:198.1-3) but concern all persons. Using Jesus's parable of the

' "The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker," in S.R.H., 179. " See Travers's Supplication, FLE 5:189-210.

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wheat and the tares, he insists that it is not the business of Christ's representatives to root out even persons guilty of "notorious improbitie" (1:198.21).^

Hooker describes a third consequence as follows:

Whatsoever is spoken of God or things appertaining to God otherwise then as the truth is; though it seeme an honour, it is an injurie. And as incredible praises geven unto men do often abate and impair the credit of their deserved commendation; so we must likewise take great heede, lest in attributing unto scripture more then it can have, the incredibillitie of that do cause even those things which indeed it hath most abundantly to be lesse rever- endly esteemed. (11.8.7; 1:191.25-192.1)

Elsewhere he thus insists that "it is no ... disgrace for scripture to have left a number of . . . things free to be ordered at the discretion of the Church" (III.4.1; 1:213.4-6).

Hooker's presentation of this third argument demonstrates considerable sensitivity to the issues surrounding effective and ineffective persuasion in public, practical affairs. In premodern times such communicative concerns generally fell within the purview of the art of rhetoric.¹⁶ Moreover, Hooker sometimes employs technical rhetorical terms. In describing how he will counter the puritan arguments. Hooker commits himself to "fol- lowing . . . the conduct of that judicill method which serveth best for invention of truth" (II. 1.3; 1:146.21-23). "Judicill" refers to the type of rhetoric appropriate to the sifting of evidence in law courts. And "inven- tion" refers to the first stage of rhetorical composition, when the orator determines what type of material (logical arguments, evidence, proverbs, etc.) will be needed to make one's case.¹⁷ Hooker clearly demonstrates that he

received rhetorical training, as our knowledge of his university studies confirms."*

'' Hooker's statements make an interesting contrast to certain declarations made by contemporary Episcopalian "conservatives." A piece entitled "How to Cure Schism" in *United Voice*, Sept. 1992, advocates the severance of eucharistic communion with persons, including bishops, who have adopted "heretical" stances on moral issues. The "Pass it On" section of the same issue alleges that " 'inclusivism' ... is a code word for accepting the homosexual lifestyle."

^ See the comments by W. Speed Hill in his introduction to *S.R.H.*, xiii.

^ Cicero, *De inventione*, trans. H. M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960).

* Lee W. Gibbs, "Theology, Logic, and Rhetoric in the Temple Controversy

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Other essays in this volume describe the rhetorical tradition and how our understanding of Hooker is affected when we place him within this stream.^ But a fourth consequence suggested by Hooker may cast further light on his approach as a whole, for it highlights the practicality and reserve of rhetorical epistemology. He says that if "God in delivering scripture to his Church should cleane have abrogated amongst them the lawe of nature," Holy Writ could only become "a snare and a torment to weake consciences, filling them with infinite perplexities" (II. 8.6; 1:190. 10-11 and 17-18). For in daily life it is simply impossible to find a scripture applicable to every situation, offering clear and infallible guidance in all moral dilemmas. Hooker seems to imply that once reason's competence is denied in one large area, it will be difficult for it to recover its self-confidence in other gray zones which persons will surely encounter in life's course. Thus a method which promised its adherents much certainty in the end leaves them chronically insecure, trapped in a state of permanent dependency on external authority.

For Hooker such a result is clean contrary to the fi-uit God intended the Bible to bear, namely "resolute assurance" (II.8.6; 1:190.21). As W.

Speed Hill and William Bouwsma have argued,¹⁶ Hooker understood the anxiety characteristic of his age and offered his own solution: his understanding of the nature of Christian faith. In terms strikingly reminiscent of Calvin, Hooker defines faith rhetorically as "a full persuasion that that which we do is well done" (L.A.I.; 1:152.17-18).¹⁷ "Full persuasion," of course, is not equivalent to absolute scientific demonstrability. Hooker understands that "the mind of man desireth evermore to knowe the truth according to the most infallible certainty which the nature of thinges can yeeld." But in the realm of religious truth "intuitive beholding" or "invincible demonstration" (II. 7.5; 1:179.8-10 and 12-14) are generally

Between Richard Hooker and Walter Travers, "Anglican Theological Review/ 65 (1983): 177-88, and W. Speed Hill, "The Authority of Hooker's Style," *Studies in Philosophy* 67 (1970): 328-38. The broader intellectual background is described in Wilbur Samuel Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961). See the essays by William J. Bouwsma, R. J. Schoeck, and Brian Vickers in this volume.

¹⁶ Hill, "The Evolution of Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity," in *S.R.H.*, 117- 58; and the essay by Professor Bouwsma in this volume.

¹⁷ Cf. Calvin, *Inst.* 3.2.16: "he alone is truly a believer who, convinced by a firm conviction [so *Uda* persuasione] that God is a kindly and well-disposed Father toward him . . . lays hold on an undoubted expectation of salvation" (Battles trans.).

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unavailable, so that we must rely on probability as the safest guide. Following it, "in all things then are our consciences best resolved ... when they are so farre perswaded as those grounds of persuasion which are to be had will beare" (1:180.5-8). Rather than despising that which God has offered by way of assurance, we should accept our creaturely limitations and proceed by the best light available to mortal beings. By spurning this sparse but sufficient fare, the Puritans set up the unattainable standard of "great certaintie." And by thus removing the only support available, they only plunge persons into "anguish and perplexitie," berating themselves for lacking the strong faith which could surely remove all doubts (1:180.12 and 15-16). I

have already referred to another corollary of this standard, namely the god-like self-assurance of its bearers which gives way to harsh judgment of those deemed unrighteous.

Robert Sanderson would sound the same theme in these words:

Although we may desire *ex abundanti*, a full assurance of faith in every weighty action we shall enterprise, yet, ordinarily and in most things, we must content ourselves to take up with a conjec- tural, probable, and moral certainty, or else we shall find very few things left for us to do. *Fides Logica* is not to be expected in all cases: in some, and those the most, *Fides Ethica* must serve the turn.¹⁸

Confined as we are to the realm of the probable, then,¹⁹ we can hardly afford to dispense with reason. But we miss Hooker's meaning if we understand reason in a post-Cartesian fashion, construing it as the faculty for precise logical demonstration. Instead this product of humanist rhetori- cal training is pointing to a discursive trait which permits human beings to reach a consensus which can provide sufficient assurance for the business of living.

It comes as no surprise, then, that Hooker believes that this process of dialogue must also shape our encounter with the Bible itself. Doesn't the "scripture of God" teach theology, "the science of thinges divine? What science can be attained unto without the help of natural discourse and reason?" (III.8.11; 230.1-3). And no science establishes its own first principles. Therefore, it is not true that "scripture can teach us the sacred

¹⁸ Robert Sanderson, *Ad Ckrum*, 4.21, in *Works*, 2:125.

¹⁹ Which has always been the forte of rhetoric. See Ch. Perelman, *The Realm of Rhetoric*, trans. William Kluback (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1982).

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authoritie of the scripture" (III.8.13; 1:230.28); for that we are at first dependent on the authority of the church, until our reason finds that "the thing it selfe doth answer our received opinion concerning it" (III.8.14; 1:231.27-28). And even when the authority of God's Word has been thus confirmed, any actual use of Scripture will require us to

exercise hermeneutical discernment, for "between true and false construction, the difference reason must shew" (III. 8. 16; 1:233.20). In ever changing circumstances, the church's fidelity to Scripture is demonstrated precisely by its willingness to time and again use its best insights in the never ending task of interpretation and reinterpretation. And in that process the written Word cannot stand alone. Hooker boldly declares that regarding "any publique action of the Church . . . that which the scripture teacheth is not alwayes needfuU; and much the Church of God shall alwayes need which the scripture teacheth not" (111.11.20; 1:268.25-26 and 28-30).

There are, to be sure, many differences between Hooker's era and our own. And yet perhaps he continues to challenge us to prevent our anxiety about sexual morality and other pressing issues of right and wrong from driving us into a vain search for absolute verities. Following Hooker's example, we would do well to avoid modes of moral persuasion which either consist of the bare quotation of chapters and verses from Scripture, or of appeals to the inviolable authority of private conscience. Recognizing the inescapably social nature of questions surrounding human sexuality, persons in community are challenged to engage in the difficult human labor of dialogue, with Scripture and with one another, in search of that communal consensus (ever revisable in new circumstances), which alone can offer a reliable enough basis for action on behalf of the common good.

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Richard Hooker and Lancelot Andrewes On Priestly Absolution

RICHARD HOOKER (1554-1600) AND LANCELOT ANDREWES (1555-1629) were friends, related spirits in theology, and played interrelated roles of utmost importance in the formation of the Church of England.¹ Hooker gave classic expression to the broad unity achieved in the religious settlement which emerged during the reign of Elizabeth I in his monumental treatise *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*, while Andrewes, honored as one of the greatest preachers of his age, gave expression to this new spirit in theology in sermons which have been said to rank with the finest English prose of

their time, of any time.^

' See, for example, Nicholas Lossky: "In all study of Anglicanism, one inevitably encounters the names, generally mentioned together, of two men considered as the initiators of a way of thinking that represents the intellectual basis of the church of Eng- land These two men . . . are Richard Hooker and Lancelot Andrewes, the real

founders of the celebrated Via Media." Lancelot Andreujes *The Preacher* (1555-1626): *The Origins of Mystical Theohgy of the Church of England*, trans. Andrew Louth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 1; see also Dehora Kuller Shuger, *Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance: Religion, Politics, and the Dominant Culture* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1990), 17.

^ T. S. Eliot, "Lancelot Andrewes" in *Selected Essays* (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1932; repr. 1950), 299. In this essay, first published in 1928 in a volume dedicated to Andrewes, Eliot designates Andrewes as "the first great preacher of the English Catholic Church" (*ibid.*) and goes on to claim that "the intellectual achievement and prose style of Hooker and Andrewes came to complete the structure of the English Church as the philosophy of the thirteenth century crowns the Catholic Church" (301). For further analysis of the historical and literary significance of Andrewes's sermons, see Maurice F.

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A good example of the theological kinship between Hooker and Andrewes may be found in their respective teaching about priestly absolu- tion. In accord with Hooker's reputation as the author of the *Lawes*, his primary treatment of priestly absolution is to be found in chapter 6 of Book VI of that work, while Andrewes characteristically addressed the subject in a sermon, "Of the Power of Absolution."[^] Andrewes delivered this sermon on 30 March 1600 in the presence of Queen Elizabeth and her court at Whitehall, just a few months before Hooker's death the following 2 November.

Since Andrewes played an important role in the belated publication of Hooker's posthumous works (including Book VI of the *Lawes*), a brief account of the historical and bibliographical details will help to clarify and reinforce the overlapping teachings and concerns of these two "Fathers of the English Church" with regard to priestly absolution.

Book VI of the Lawes, which contains Hooker's fullest exposition of absolution, is the first of the notorious "three last books";^{1*} it was first published with Book VIII in 1648, some fifty years after Hooker's death.

Reidy, Bishop Lancelot Andrewes, Jacobean Court Preacher: A Study in Early Seventeenth-Century Religious Thought (Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1955); J. W. Blench, Preaching in England in the Late Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries: A Study of English Sermons 1450-1600 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1964), 205, 319-20, 349; Mitchell W. Fraser, English Pulpit Oratory from Andrewes to Tuckotson: A Study of Its Literary Aspects (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1962), 5-7; and Trevor A. Owen, Lancelot Andrewes (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1981), 17, 60, 71, 87.

[^] I note the intimate relationship of these two works in the Intro, to Lawes VI; FLE 6:290, n. 62, and 308, n. 81. The nineteenth-century editors of the Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology published this sermon of Andrewes "On Absolution" as the fourth of twelve "Occasional Sermons" in The Works of Lancelot Andrewes, ed. J. P. Wilson and James Bliss (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1854), 5:82-103. The sermon created a stir in the court because of its "very traditional tone," that is, because of its "Romanist" tendency; the "scandal" is mentioned in the extract from a letter of Rowland White to Sir Robert Sydney, quoted in Andrewes, Works, 1:1:lxii.

[^] W. Speed Hill stated in 1971 that the controverted authenticity of the "three last books" of the Lawes has been the central problem of Hooker scholarship "since Izaak Walton's Life of Mr. Rich. Hooker first appeared in 1665"; "Hooker's Polity: The Problem of the Three Last Books," Huntington Library Quarterly 34 (1971): 317. After more than twenty years of editing the Folger edition. Hill still holds that Walton's attack on the authenticity of the three last books is crucial to defining Hooker's character as an author (above, 4).

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Hooker was probably revising the book at the time of his death.[^]

Andrewes, upon being informed of Hooker's death, was immediately

concerned with the security and disposition of his unpublished manuscripts. He expressed this concern in a letter addressed on 7 November 1600 to Henry Parry, Hooker's former colleague at Corpus Christi College, Oxford.[^] John Keble, the nineteenth-century editor of Hooker's Works (1836), followed the lead of Hooker's sixteenth-century biographer, Izaak Walton, in arguing that Andrewes's warning either came too late or went unheeded. Walton claimed that the last three books of Hooker's *Lawes* were stolen, destroyed, or interpolated by a small band of fanatical Puritans who were given access to the manuscripts in Hooker's study by his widow.'

However, C. J. Sisson's discovery of a series of lawsuits brought to the Court of Chancery by Hooker's daughters between 1610 and 1624 has made more accurately known the details of what happened to Hooker's manuscripts after his death,[^] including the ambiguous role played by Andrewes.[^] These legal depositions make it clear over against Walton and Keble that Andrewes's concern for Hooker's manuscripts, described in the letter to Parry mentioned above, was in fact heeded and rewarded. An-

' It is not known whether Hooker had completed his revision of Book VI of the *Lawes* or whether he was still engaged in doing so at the time of his death. For the argument that the traditional Book VI, first published in 1648, is part of a much enlarged revision of an earlier and now lost draft, see Lee W. Gibbs, Intro, to *Lawes VI*, FLE 6:255-61.

[^] Bodleian MS. Rawlinson D. 404, fol. 112'; quoted by P. G. Stanwood, Textual Introduction: The Three Last Books, FLE 3:xiii-xiv. The letter is also published in Andrewes's Works (1854), ll:xl-xli.

[^] See the Editor's Preface in Keble (1888), 1 :xxviii-xxxii. For Walton's account, see the Appendix to his *The Life of Mr. Richard Hooker* in Keble, 1:91-99. David Novarr challenged Walton's account of the destruction or puritan interpolation of the last three books in *The Making of Walton's "Lives"* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1958), chaps 7-9. Nevertheless, Georges Edelen is prepared to argue in his forthcoming biography of Hooker that Walton's account must once again be taken seriously (personal communication).

* These depositions and supporting documents are reprinted in Sisson, *The Judicial Marriage of Mr Hooker and the Birth of "The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity"* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1940), 113-87; see also 15, 82, 92-94.

' For recent summaries of the events immediately after Hooker's death and of the ambiguous role played by Andrewes in the delay and final publication of the last three books, see Stanwood, *Textual Introduction*, FLE 3:xiii-xliv; Laetitia Yeandle, *Textual Introduction: The Tractates and Sermons*, FLE 5:xiii-xix; and Gibbs, *Intro, to Lawes VI*, FLE 6:249-55.

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Andrewes was included in a small group of literary executors who became involved in the disposition of Hooker's posthumous papers with a view to preparing them for publication. All of the material relating to the last three books of the Lawes was handed over to John Spenser (a former fellow, like Hooker, of Corpus Christi College), while the shorter works (including Hooker's sermons) were allocated to Parry and Andrewes.

This is all that is known of Hooker's papers from contemporary sources. However, the printer's notice to the reader in the 1648 edition of Hooker's Works relates that James Ussher (1581-1656), archbishop of Armagh, and Andrewes were responsible for the publication of Books VI and VIII. "Ussher most likely obtained his manuscript of Hooker's Book VI from Andrewes, who had in turn probably obtained his own copy either at the first division of the papers recovered at Bishopsbourne or at some later time from one of the other literary executors. Sisson is therefore on relatively safe ground when he concludes that "what survives of Book VI was saved by the pious zeal of Andrewes."

A debate which arose between Edwin Sandys and Andrewes over inserting what was described as "a tracte of confession" into the Lawes as Book VI has now been identified as the most likely cause for the failure of Hooker's editors to see the last three books into print. Hill has neatly summarized the situation: "Andrewes had argued for insertion, Sandys had refused, Spenser was caught in the middle, and the project fell through

As a consequence of this rivalry, the books that Spenser had edited were never printed."

In a sense both Sandys and Andrewes were correct in their respective stances. On the one side, Sandys had collaborated with Hooker for years

^o The manuscript copies of Books VI and VIII that were published in 1648 and serve as copy texts for the Folger edition are in the Ussher Collection at Trinity College, Dublin.

" For an account of the provenance of the 1648 manuscript of Book VI, see the Introduction to Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*: Book VIII, ed. Raymond Aaron Houk (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1931), 108-15, 118-21. Stanwood, while observing that Ussher did not inherit Andrewes's library, acknowledges that Ussher did acquire "a number of volumes from, him which probably included some of Hooker's autograph materials"; Textual Introduction, FLE 3:xxv and n.l9. Andrewes's possession of unpublished Hooker manuscripts is further corroborated by the title page of a sermon on petitionary prayer (based on Matthew 7 :7) that was not published until the latter part of the seventeenth century: "A Sermon of Richard Hooker Found in the Study of the late Learned Bishop Andrewes"; see Yeandle, Textual Introduction, FLE 5:379-83.

• Sisson, 107.

^ Hill, "The Problem of the Last Three Books," 322, 325.

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in writing, revising, and subsidizing the publication of earlier books of the Lawes] he and George Cranmer (another of Hooker's former students at Oxford) had carefully scrutinized and annotated an earlier draft of Book VI that had in fact dealt almost exclusively with the designated refutation of the arguments made by the English presbyterians for their office of lay elders. Apart from the general introduction in chapters 1 and 2, the material published as Book VI in 1648 was certainly not what Sandys had seen and commented upon in the early 1590s. On the other side, Andrewes was probably right in holding that chapters 3 through 6 (the "treatise" on repentance and confession) were fully intended by Hooker to be an essential part of a revised and expanded version of the book.^

Keeping these complex biographical and bibliographical details in mind (including also the tenuous and uncertain relation that exists between Hooker's unpublished manuscripts and Andrewes's thought and writings), we turn to a reading of Andrewes's sermon over against

the 1648 version of Hooker's Book VI to bring to light just how similar the two theologians were in their teaching about priestly absolution — and how they differed.

II

Andrewes's sermon "Of the Power of Absolution" is an explication of John 20:23: "Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosoever ye retain, they are retained."**^ The initial exegesis of this

* Olivier Loyer clearly discerned the organic relation between the earlier draft of Book VI reflatting the office of lay elders and the later "tracte of confession": "Andrewes avait parfaitement vu le rapport organique qui existait entre les pages sur la confession et

le ms. sur la juridiction des anciens On voit combien les deux theologiens suivaient

des chemins paralleles." *L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker* (Lille: Atelier des theses, 1979), 1:66, 76.

" John 20:23 is also the central text in Andrewes's and Hooker's teaching elsewhere about the power of the Holy Spirit transmitted in the rite of holy orders: see Andrewes's 1606 Pentecost Sermon on holy orders in *Works*, 3:261-62, and Hooker's discussion of the jurisdiction of order at the end of Book V of the *Lauies*, especially V. 77. 1-8. The teaching of both theologians is in this regard heavily influenced by and in conformity with the "Form of Ordering Priests" in the *Book of Coirunon Prayer* (1559), where the prayer of the bishop places absolution side by side with preaching the Word and administering the sacraments: "Receive the Holy Ghost: whose sins thou dost forgive, they are forgiven; and whose sins thou dost retain, they are retained; and be thou a faithful dispenser of the word of God, and of his holy Sacraments"; *Liturgies and Occasional Forms of Prayer Set Forth in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth*, ed. William Keatinge Clay for The Parker Society (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1847), 292.

passage by Andrewes in the exordium to his sermon bears striking similarity to passages found in Book VI of Hooker's Lawes:

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Furthermore least their [the Apostles'] acts should be slenderly accounted of, or had in contempt, whether they admitt to the fellowship of Saints, or seclude from it, whether they binde offenders or sett them againe att libertie, whether they remitt, or retheyne sinnes, whatsoever is done, by way of orderly and lawfull proceeding, the Lord himselfe hath promised to ratify e. This [Hooker notes here John 20:23] is that grand original] warrant, by force whereof the guides and Prelates in Gods Church, first his Apostles, and afterwards others following them successively, did both use and uphold that discipline, the end whereof is to heale mens consciences, to cure theyr sinnes, to reclaime offenders from iniquity, and to make them by repentance just. {Lawes VL4.1; 3:15.1- 11; compare VL6.3; 3:71. 25-72.5)

They be words of our Saviour Christ to his Apostles — And they contain a commission by Him granted to the Apostles, which is ... a part of that commission which the sinfull world most of all stood in need of, for the remission of sins

A commission is nothing else but the imparting of a power which before they had not. First therefore He imparteth them a power, a power over sins; over sins, either for the remitting or the retaining of them, as the persons shall be qualified.

And to this power he addeth a promise (as the lawyers term it) of ratification, that He will ratify and make it good that His power shall accompany this power, and the lawful use of it in His Church for ever. (Works, 5:82-83)

Andrewes interprets John 20:23 in terms of its traditional companion text, Matthew 16:19, "the power of the keys"; Hooker also interprets John 20:23 in terms of Matthew 16:19, but further includes a third traditional text, Matthew 18:16-19, "Tell the Church": ^

^ These three texts (namely, John 20:23, Matthew 16:19, and Matthew 18:18) have a long and controversial history of interpretation; see Brian Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1955; repr. 1968), 15-36.

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HOOKE

ANDREWES

Our Lord and Saviour in the 16th of St. Matthewes Gospell giveth his Apostles regiment in generall, over Gods Church. For they that have the keyes of the Kingdome of heaven are thereby signified to be stewards of the house of God, under whome they guide, command, judge and correct his family And because their office

herein consisteth of sundry functions, some belonging to doctrine, some to discipline, all conteyned in the name of the keyes: they have for matters of discipline as well litigious as criminall, their Courts and Consistories erected by the heavenly authority of his most sacred voyce, whoe hath said. Die Ecclesie: Tell the Church. Against rebellious and contumacious persons, which refuse to obey their sentence, armed they are with power to eject such out of the Church, to deprive them of the honors, rights and priviledges of Christian men,

to make them as heathen and publicans, with whome society was hatefiill. {Laxves VI.4.1; 3:14.8-27)

... it was some new power that here was conferred, and not those which before had been ... I take it to be a power distinct from the former [preaching the Word and administering the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist, as well as the power in the prayer of priests] and, not to hold you long, to be the accomplishment of the promise made, of the power of "the keys" ... Whereunto our Saviour Christ, by His sending them, doth institute them and *give them the key of authority; and by breathing on them and inspiring them doth enable them, and give them the knowledge to do it well.... (Works, 5:96-97)

Andrewes does not mention Matthew 16:19 and therefore does not deal in this sermon with the negative side of the power of "binding" the sins of the obstinate and impenitent. As in his preaching in general, he aims to guide his congregation on their way to salvation; his emphasis thereby clearly falls upon the positive and "comforting" aspects of the power of priestly absolution:

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And as Himself [God] doth use this power, so giveth He it to them, "to edification and not to destruction." I say, not first or principally "to destruction," nor of any, save only of the wilful impenitent sinner. (Works, 5:89)

Hooker, however, since he is writing a brief against the disciplinarian office of lay elders as well as a refutation of the Roman teaching that penance is a sacrament, specifically denies that the laity has any role whatsoever in exercising the penitentiary discipline of the church, whether that jurisdiction be negative — admonition, minor excommunication (exclusion from participation in the eucharist), or major excommunication (exclusion from church membership) —or positive (the declaration of absolution).¹⁶

With regard to this particular issue, Andrewes is no less definite than Hooker in holding that the power of declaring absolution is restricted to those who have been commissioned by taking holy orders:

Now all Christians are not so sent, nor are all Christians inspired with the grace or gift of the Spirit that they were here. Consequently, it was not intended to the whole society of Christians. ... But speaking of that which is proper and ordinary in the course by Him [God] established, this is an Ecclesiastical act committed, as the residue of the ministry of reconciliation, to Ecclesiastical persons. {Works, 5:92}

Andrewes, having affirmed that the spiritual power of absolution (that is, exercising "the power of the keys" to bind or loose sins) is restricted to ordained clergy, then moves directly to the argument that there is a prerequisite if the remission of sins is to become actualized, namely, repentance:

Yes indeed, there is yet another condition requisite And that

is, as our Saviour Christ Himself setteth it down, repentance. For He willeth "repentance and remission of sins to be preached in His

^ Although Hooker is definite in the 1648 version of Book VI in his refutation of the Roman Catholic teaching that private confession is a sacrament, his primary concern in both versions of the book, as well as in his working Autograph Notes, is the refutation of the exercise of spiritual jurisdiction by disciplinarian lay elders. See Lee W. Gibbs, "Richard Hooker's Via Media Doctrine of Repentance," *Harvard Theob^{al} Revieti*; 84 (1991): 59-74; and Intro, to Lawes VI, 6:81-124.

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name;" both these, but repentance first, and then remission of sins to follow after. (Works, 5:96)

He then somewhat cryptically adds:

To repentance there go two things, as heretofore hath been en- treated more at large. To insist upon the resemblance here made. First, that he feel his chains and imprisonment, and be grieved with them, and therefore would gladly be let loose, and discharged from them Sense and sorrow is required of their restraint, (ibid.)

"Sense" and "sorrow" in this context are the closest Andrewes comes in this sermon to talking about "fear" {attritio} and contrition (contritio).

Although repentance (or penitence) is mentioned only briefly in Andrewes's sermon, it constitutes a major theme of the 1648 version of Book VI of Hooker's *Lawes*, as is reflected in the title of chapter 3, "O/ poenitence, the chief est end propounded by spirituall jurisdiction" (Lawes VI. 3; 3:6.5-6). In this chapter, Hooker insists that "fear" (*atritio*) is not sufficient in itself for the forgiveness of sins; it must rather be transformed by divine love into genuine "sorrow" (*contritio*), which is the first part of the "duty" of repentance (Lawes VI. 3. 2-6).

"Contrition" was traditionally treated by the scholastics as the first major part of the sacrament of penance, the second part being confession. Andrewes does not discuss confession in this sermon,¹ but Hooker does so at great length in chapter 4 of Book VI, the title of which gives a full outline of the topics dealt with: "O/t/ie discipline of repentance instituted by Christ; practised by the Fathers: converted by the Schoolemen into a Sacrament, and of confession that which belongeth to the vertue of repentance, that which was used among the Jewes, that which the Papacie imagineth a Sacrament, and that which ancient discipline practised" (Lawes VI.4.1; 3:14.1-7).²

¹* Andrewes elsewhere discusses confession as one of the three traditional parts of penance required by the schoolmen; see, for example, Gowry Sermon 7, *Works*, 4:164. The third part of *poenitentia* (penance, repentance) in scholastic doctrine was satisfaction. These three (material) "parts" were held not to complete the sacrament without the priest's absolution, which was thought of as the sacrament's form. See Thomas Aquinas, *ST.*, 3, qq. 84, art. 3, and 90, art. 2.

² On the moral revolution introduced into later Anglican theology by the rejection of sacramental confession, see John Booty, "The English Reformation: A Lively Faith and Sacramental Confession," in *The Anglican Moral Choice*, ed. Paul Elmen (Wilton, Conn.: Morehouse-Barlow, 1983), 15-32, 251-53.

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In his brief summary of the position of the Church of England concerning the role of the priest with regard to the confession of sins by penitents, Hooker agrees with his former patron John Jewel in leaving

private confession "at liberty" ;[^] nevertheless, he characteristically emphasizes the common public acknowledgment of sins as an essential part of the corporate worship of the church, along with the public declaration of absolution:

And for private Confession, and absolution, it standeth thus with us. The Ministers power to absolve is publicly taught and pro- fessed, the Church not denied to have authoritie eyther of abridg- ing, or enlarging the use and exercise of that power; upon the people noe such necessity imposed of opening their transgressions unto men, as if remission of sinnes otherwyse were impossible, neyther any such opinion had of the thing itselfe, as though it were eyther unlawfuU, or unprofitable, saving only for these incon- veniences, which the world hath by experience observed in it heretofore: and in regard thereof the Church of England hitherto hath thought it the safer way, to referre mens hidden crimes unto God and themselves only, howbeit not without speciall caution, for the admonition of such as come to the holy Sacrament, and for the comfort of such as are readie to depart the World. {Lawes VI.4.15; 3:47.27-48.8)

Andrewes, however, having only briefly mentioned "feeling and sorrow" for sin, and having omitted any reference whatsoever to confes- sion, moves directly in his sermon to the issue of satisfaction, that is, to doing works "worthy of repentance." He affirms that "the key of knowl- edge" is given to priests in their ordination so that they might be enabled to see that the demands of retributive justice are met by the contrite sinners as a fruit of sincere repentance. Hooker concurs, asserting that justice requires that restitution be made to God, to injured human beings, and to the Church:^{^ ^}

[^] Andrewes also approved, indeed commended, the practice of private auricular confession; see Reidy, Bishop Lancelot Andrewes, 2-3 and n. 8.

[^] This teaching that the penitent not only must be contrite in confessing his or her sins before God, but also must be committed to giving up those sins, is a basic theme of the Prayer of Confession in the Book of Common Prayer: "Spare thou them, O God, which confess their faults. Restore thou them that be penitent, according to thy promises declared unto mankind, in Christ Jesu our Lord. And grant, O most merciful Father, for

HOOKEE Now in a penitents or converts dutie, there are included, first the aversion of the will from sinne [that is, contrition], secondly the submission of ourselves to God, by supplication and prayer, thirdly the purpose of a new life, testified with

present workes of amendment

the cheifest thing in contrition, is that alteration, whereby the will which was before delighted with sinne, doth now abhorre and shunne nothing more. {Lawes VI.3.5; 3:12.8-11, 25-27; compare VI.3.6; 3:13.17-21)

ANDREWES ... to advise both what works are meet and also what measure is to be kept, "the key of knowledge" will help to direct, and we may have use of it if we mean to use it to that end. The other condition which must be joined to the former is an unfeigned purpose and endeavour ourselves to remit or let go those sins which we would have by God remitted. For it is not enough to be sorry for sin past, or to seek repentance, no though it be "with tears...." (Works, 5:100)

Andrewes and Hooker further agree in holding that the Incarnation and Atonement constitute the basis for the remission of sins and for subsequently doing works of satisfaction which may indeed be regarded as "worthy of repentance." Andrewes's understanding of the Atonement, like Hooker's, is essentially the Latin objective or satisfaction theory, as formulated in the eleventh century by St. Anselm of Canterbury:^^

The remission of sins, as it is from God only, so is it by the death and blood-shedding of Christ alone; but for the applying of this

unto us, there are diverse means established Now all and every

of these means working to the remission of sins which is the first and greatest benefit our Saviour Christ hath obtained for us, it resteth that we further enquire what that means is in particular which is here imparted. (Works, 5:94)

In explicating the divinely appointed "means" for the remission of sins obtained by "the death and blood-shedding of Christ," Andrewes specifies

his sake, that we may hereafter live a godly, righteous, and sober life, to the glory of thy holy name" {B.C.P., 1559, 51, 259}.

^ For a brief summary of the objective Latin view of the Atonement as explicated by Anselm in his *Cur Deus homo?* see Gustav Aulen, *Christus Victor: A Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Atonement*, trans. A. G. Herbert (London: S.P.C.K., 1961), 100-9.

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the preaching of the Word, the administration of the Sacraments (Baptism and the Eucharist), and the prayers of priests.

When Hooker explicates satisfaction as the traditional third part of the scholastic discussion of repentance, he observes that satisfaction has a double aspect, for sin is both an offence against God and also against the neighbor. Every sin demands that satisfaction be made to God. It is in dealing with satisfaction against the offended God that Hooker sets forth his Anselmian doctrine of the atonement as the divine basis for the human satisfaction of God (Laives VI.5.2-6). Sin against the infinite God, Hooker argues, is an infinite wrong. Human beings can offer no satisfaction for sin, yet justice demands that God be satisfied. God, therefore, out of his unspeakable love, ordained on human behalf a Mediator whose sacrificial death accomplished what for any other would have been impossible. The Incarnation, culminating in the death of the God-man, has made forgiveness not only possible but just. The satisfaction which Christ has accomplished is appropriated through the divinely infused virtue of faith (which is simultaneously infused along with the other virtues of love, hope, repentance, and righteousness), thereby making imperfect human works of repentance satisfactory to God.

In the penultimate section of his sermon, Andrewes turns to the

practical, moral, pastoral problem of dealing with the under- or overscrupulous conscience:^^

In which point no less than the former there may be use of "the key of knowledge" to advise and direct ourselves, no less in the

cure of sin than in the sorrow for it Sometimes men have good

minds, but know not which way to turn them or set themselves about it. Sometimes they are scrupulous and doubtful whether they do as they should, because one may . . . favour himself too much, and be over partial in his own case, neither so careful to use the means to good, nor to avoid the occasions of evil, as he ought. Wherein it were good for men to make sure work and to be fully resolved. For most usual it is for men at their ends to doubt, not of the power of remitting of sins, but of their own disposition to receive it; and whether they have ordered the matter so that they be within the compass of God's effectual calling (^orks, 5:101)

^^ On the problems created by penitential discipline for English clergy, see John E. Booty, "Preparation for the Lord's Supper in Elizabethan England," *Anglican Theological Review* 49 (1967): 145.

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The corresponding passages in Hooker's Book VI also identify two primary trends among penitents:^^ (1) most people have great difficulty in rightly censuring their own doings and need consecrated persons for spiritual guidance and comfort {Lawes VI.6.16; 3:98.25-101.2}; (2) others, not doubting God's mercy toward sinners in general, perceive their own sin to be so great that their repentance is not sufficient to deserve forgiveness (VI.6.17; 3:101.3-102.13). Hooker sees the latter of these two situations as a, if not the, sin against the Holy Spirit, for in his view the infinite worth of Christ's atoning death is more than sufficient to offer satisfaction for all particular sins.

III

In spite of the striking parallels and similarities of language and teaching set forth in this comparison of Andrewes's sermon on absolution with Book VI of Hooker's Lawes, and even though

Andrewes played a crucial role in the posthumous publication of the 1648 version of that book, no definitive conclusion may be drawn at present concerning the literary influence or dependence of one of these upon the other.[^] Hooker had been writing his revision of Book VI, and he may even have completed the task, long before Andrewes drafted and delivered his sermon before the Court on 30 March 1600. As a friend and colleague, Andrewes may or may not have seen or been familiar with Hooker's revision of Book VI; however that may have been. Hooker's death on 2 November 1600, several months after the preaching of Andrewes's sermon, prohibits any conclusive argument that Andrewes knew or was directly influenced by Hooker's work.

^{^*} The whole of Hooker's *A Learned Sermon of the Certaintie and Perpetuitie of Faith in the Elect* addresses this issue of reassuring the scrupulous conscience; see FLE 5:69-82; see also section 18 of *A Learned Discourse of Justification, Workes, and How the Foundation of Faith is Overthrowne*, FLE 5:125.12-126.6.

^{^^} The case is quite different with regard to Andrewes's "A Sermon Preached Before the Kings majestie . . . Concerning the Right and Power of calling Assemblies," which was delivered at Hampton Court on 28 September 1606, almost six years after Hooker's death. By citing parallel passages, Houk was able to demonstrate that in this sermon Andrewes, without acknowledging his source, quoted freely from chap. 5 of Book VIII of the *Lawes* (Vin.5.12; 3:381.21-385.2); see his *Introduction to Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity: Book VIII*, 109-13. Agreeing with Houk, Stanwood further asserts that "Andrewes must also have possessed a copy of Book VIII" (Textual Introduction, FLE 3:xix, n. 10).

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Nevertheless, on the positive side, our comparison has revealed that both of these formative theologians of the English church shared a pastoral concern for the practical guidance and care of souls that overrides any exercise of theoretical speculation as an end in itself. Both theologians are also seen to have set forth a distinctively Anglican via media doctrine of absolution: on the one hand, both agree in holding that the Roman Catholic teaching concerning Penance or Confession as a sacrament must be rejected; on the other

hand, both remain in consensus with the Catholic position that the declaration of the divine forgiveness of sins, or absolution, is a ritual action restricted to ordained clergy — a position explicitly taken up against the teaching of John Calvin and the English Presbyterians concerning the power of jurisdiction assigned to their office of ruling lay elders in the "discipline" of the church.

If there are similarities, however, there are also differences. These differences are very much in accord with current scholarly opinion that Hooker's basic theological principles are primarily to be sought in the magnum opus for which he is most remembered, the *Lawes*, while those of Andrewes are to be found primarily in his sermons.^{^^} In short, Hooker is far more systematic and thorough in his dealing with absolution than is Andrewes, for he is not preaching a sermon but writing within the architectonic structure of the *Lawes* as a whole. The identity of the opponents, Roman Catholics as well as Puritans, is clearer in Hooker than in Andrewes, again in this particular instance because of the more openly polemical nature of Hooker's undertaking. And finally, again because of the larger systematic and polemical concerns, Hooker proves himself to be more concerned than Andrewes with the elaboration and application of censures in the church (including minor and major excommunication) as a necessary part of penitentiary discipline.

^{^^} Recent scholars who have argued that Andrewes's theology must be derived primarily from his sermons and prayers — as opposed to his more specifically controversial, catechetical, or liturgical works — include Reidy, *Bishop Lancelot Andreuies*, 18; Owen, *Lancelot Andreuies*, 139; Lossky, *Lancelot Andrewes: The Preacher*, 3; John Booty, "Standard Divines," in *The Study of Anglicanism*, ed. Stephen Sykes and John Booty (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 166; and A. M. AUCHIN, "Lancelot Andrewes" in *The English Religious Tradition and the Genius of Anglicanism*, ed. Geoffrey Rowell (Oxford: IKON Productions, 1992), 146.

RAMIE TARGOFF

Performing Prayer in Hooker's *Lawes*: The Efficacy of Set Forms

RICHARD HOOKER'S DEFENSE OF THE Book of Common Prayer against the charges of its puritan detractor, Thomas Cartwright, relies upon his establishing the superiority of public over private, and of set forms over extempore prayer. This late sixteenth-century debate over prayer is not waged so much with charges of good or bad faith, but rather concerns itself with superior and inferior methods of practice. Against Cartwright's accusations that it encourages blind and unthinking devotion. Hooker argues that common prayer—the use, that is, of a common text by a common people on a regular basis—nearly guarantees a successful devotion- al practice unimaginable in individual, private worship. Hooker explains the appeal of common prayer to the congregation as follows:

A great parte of the cause, wherefore religious mindes are so inflamed with the love of publike devotion, is that vertue, force and efficacie, which by experience they finde that the verie forme and reverende solemnitie of common prayer dulle ordered hath, to help that imbecillitie and weakenes in us, by meanes whereof we are otherwise of our selves the lesse apt to performe unto God so heavenlie a service, with such affection of harte, and disposition in the powers of our soules as is requisite. (V.25.1; 2:113.19-26)

This passage sets out most of the terms crucial to Hooker's representation of common prayer: "love of publike devotion," "vertue, force and efficacie," "form and solemnitie," "perform[ing] unto God." The very

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text of common prayer compensates for what Hooker calls our "imbecil- litie and weakenes" and provides us with the capacity to perform a "heavenlie service."

My purpose in this paper is to demonstrate how Hooker's defense of common prayer as the most efficacious form of worship relies upon two seemingly very different arguments: first, in response to the puritan prefer- ence for extempore and spontaneous prayer, Hooker argues for the effec- tiveness of the forms or texts of the Prayer Book themselves; secondly, in response to the puritan preference for private prayer. Hooker argues for the power of the collective utterance achieved only through public worship. The traditional Pauline dilemma over man's agency in prayer, that "we do not know how to pray as we ought,"[^] is resolved for Hooker in the prac- tice of

common prayer, which redresses man's own incapacities by providing him with both the right words and the right context for worship. After outlining these two strains of Hooker's position on common prayer, I will consider how they come together to contribute to the project of nationalism in sixteenth-century England. I hope to demonstrate the way in which Hooker shapes the challenge of how man can best communicate with God, the challenge that in fact lies behind the entire polemic over prayer, into a newly conceived model of nationalism built out of the active participation of the Anglican community in a uniform devotional practice.

I begin with a brief consideration of the texts and legislation surrounding the initial publication of the Book of Common Prayer, in an effort to uncover the purpose of common prayer as it was initially conceived. As articulated by Archbishop Cranmer in the preface to its 1549 edition, the Book of Common Prayer is intended above all to standardize the services performed throughout the nation, so that "where heretofore, there hath been great diversitie in saying and synging in churches within this realm,

some following Salisbury use, some Hereford, etc now from henceforth

all the whole realm shal have but one use." The First Edwardian Act of Uniformity in 1549 accordingly prescribes severe punishments for ministers who refuse to use the Book of Common Prayer, underscoring the importance of performing the prayer book texts publicly and collectively throughout the English nation.[^]

['] New Oxford Annotated Bible, Revised Standard Edition, Romans 8:26. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1973).

[^] Henry Gee and William John Hardy, eds., *Documents Illustrative of the History of the English Church* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1896), 361-62.

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With the Second Act of Uniformity in 1552, we move away from these predominantly Erastian preoccupations to find the first clear concern for the forms of the prayers themselves. The alterations made from the 1549 to the 1552 text are explained in terms of seemingly aesthetic

improvements. The law concludes:

For the more perfection of the said order of common service, in some places where it is necessary to make the same prayers and fashion of service more earnest and fit to stir Christian people to the true honouring of Almighty God, the king's most excellent majesty, with the assent of the Lords and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, has caused the aforesaid order of common service, entitled, the Book of Common Prayer, to be faithfully and godly perused, explained, and made fully perfect.⁶

In its repeated concern for the prayer book's "perfectness," the act suggests a one-to-one correspondence between the congregation's forms of prayer and its capacity to worship. The burden of responsibility for successful prayer is implicitly transferred from the individual to the text itself.

The two predominant concerns I have highlighted in these early Reformation texts—on one hand, the importance of uniformity in prayer throughout the state of England, and on the other hand, the necessity of aestheticizing prayer through the perfection of its forms—represent the two strains of Hooker's consideration of common prayer as a safeguard against the potential failure of human worship. Hooker writes:

But of all helps for due performance of this service, the greatest is that verie sett and standinge order it selfe, which framed with common advise hath both for matter and forme prescribed whatsoever is herein publicquely don. No doubt from God it hath proceeded and by us it must be acknowledged a worke of his singular care and providence. (V.25.4; 2:116.10-15)

While the act of worship is represented here as a human performance scripted by the Book of Common Prayer, this seemingly anti-Pauline empowerment of man's own capacity to pray is tempered by Hooker's ascription of the prayer book to a divine authorship: "no doubt from God it hath proceeded and by us it must be acknowledged a worke of his

Gee and Hardy, 371.

singular care and providence." To imitate heavenly practice is in fact the essential goal of prayer: "prayer beinge a worke common to the Church as well triumphant as militant, a worke common unto men with Angels, what should we thinke but that so much of our lives is coelestiall and divine as we spend in the exercise of prayer" {Lawes V.23.1; 2:111.16-19). The "commonness" of prayer, here referring to its status as an act performed by both men and angels, elevates man's practices from the realm of the merely human, allowing him to worship in the manner of heaven. It comes as no surprise, then, to find that for Hooker the ideal relationship between the church in heaven and on earth is one of mimetic correspondence :

Duties of religion performed by whole societies of men, ought to have in them accordinge to our power a sensible excellencie, correspondent to the majestie of him whome we worship. Yea then are the publike duties of religion best ordered, when the militant Church doth resemble . . . that hidden dignitie and glorie where- with the Church triumphant in heaven is bewtified. (V.6.2; 2:33. 32-34.6)

It is in man's public religious practice that he is afforded the possibility of realizing the otherwise invisible glory of God. Thus it is precisely the lack of correspondence between the language of man and the divine that Hooker finds most blameworthy in the puritan practice of spontaneous and original prayer, an issue that becomes particularly apparent in his debate with Cartwright over the Lord's Prayer. Hooker responds to Cartwright's contention that the Lord's Prayer is overused in the Anglican service by arguing that, because this prayer is actually delivered to us by Christ for our own use, it ought to serve as a master code for all of our worship:

as if our Lord, even of purpose to prevent this phancie of extemporal and voluntarie prayers, had not left us of his owne framinge one, which might both remaine as a parte of the Church-liturgie, and serve as a patern whereby to frame all other prayers, with efficacie. (V.26.2; 2:117.18-22)

"Though men should speake with the tungues of Angels," he continues, "yeat wordes so pleasinge to the eares of God as those which the Sonne of God him selfe hath composed were not possible for men to frame" (V.35.3; 2:146.30-147.1). Again we return to the Pauline dilemma, well articulated by Lancelot Andrewes in a sermon on 2 Corinthians where he

remarks: "the power of thinking the thing that is pleasing to God is not in us";^ and again we find the only solution to lie in our use of prescribed forms of prayer. As Montaigne says in a similar spirit in his essay "Of Prayer": "I may be wrong, I don't know; but since by a particular favor of divine goodness a certain form of prayer has been prescribed and dictated to us word for word by the mouth of God, it has always seemed to me that its use should be more ordinary than it is with us."^

I have so far focused on Hooker's defense of common prayer as a formal solution to the problem articulated by St. Paul, "that we do not know how to pray as we ought," or as formulated by Hooker himself, of our being overcome with "imbecillitie and weaknes" in the face of praying unto God (V.25.1; 2:113.23). I will now consider what I set out as the second strain of his defense, the power common prayer has in its common-ness, in the sheer fact of its being performed by an entire community in a public place of worship. Thus, if one of Hooker's charges against the Puritans concerns their reliance upon extempore and spontaneous forms of prayer, his other equally compelling complaint addresses their privileging of private over public worship. The advantages Hooker ascribes to the publicness of communion prayer begin with the most basic: that the mere presence of multiple bodies participating in a single act of prayer heightens each individual's capacity to devote himself to God. In public prayer. Hooker claims, "much helpe and furtherance is more yeilded, in that if so be our zeale and devotion to Godward be slack, the alacritie and fervor of others serveth as a present spurre" (V.24.2; 2:112.19-21). John Donne expands on this phenomenon in a 1622 sermon in which he asks:

Where shall I find the Holy Ghost? I lock my doore to my selfe, and I throw my selfe downe in the presence of my God, I divest my selfe of all worldly thoughts, and I bend all my powers, and faculties upon God as I think, and suddenly I finde my selfe scattered, melted, fallen into vaine thoughts, into no thoughtes I

believe in the Holy Ghost, but doe not finde him, if I seek him only in private prayer; but in Ecclesia, when I goe to meet him in the Church, when I seeke him where hee hath promised to bee

* The Works of Lancelot Andrewes, 11 vols., ed. J. P. Wilson and

James Bliss, (Oxford, 1841-54; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1967), 5:304.

' Michel de Montaigne, *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958.), 229-30.

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found . . . instantly the savour of this myrrhe is exalted, and multiplied to me; not a dew, but a shower is poured out upon me.^

The disjunction Donne describes between the state of distraction, of "scattered, melted, vain thoughts," that characterizes his private prayer, and the near ecstatic satisfaction of his public prayer — "not a dew, but a shower, is poured out upon me"— underscores the qualitative distinction between the two methods of devotional practice that Hooker seeks to establish.

The company of fellow worshippers in the space of the church not only excites our devotional zeal, but actually checks any inclination we might have to deviate from prescribed forms. "When we publicly make our prayers," Hooker explains, "it cannot be but that we do it with much more comforte then in privat, for that the thinges we aske publicly are approved as needfull and good in the judgment of all, we heare them sought for and desired with common consent " {Lawes V.24.2; 2:112.14- 18). The "comforte" of public prayer lies precisely in its confirmation of the "commonness" of what we "seek for and desire." However, this formulation suggests that if the set forms themselves determine for us what we "seek for and desire," that which is not "approved as needful and good in the judgment of all" is excluded from our petitions. A type of censorship mechanism is thus built into the structure of public prayer, something Montaigne describes in terms less ambiguous: "there are few men who would dare place in evidence the secret requests they make of God . . . that is why the Pythagoreans wanted them to be public and heard by everyone, so that God should not be asked for anything indecent or unjust."^

Having established Hooker's commitment to the efficacy of common prayer, an efficacy due both to the strength of the prayer book as a text and to its power as a vehicle for collective and public acts of worship, I venture now to make good on the claim with which I began, by considering how these two components together exercise a formative influence on the construction of an English national

identity. If we return to Hooker's discussion of the Lord's Prayer, we realize that the power of this prayer resides not only in its capacity to move God, but in its instrumentality in forging a community of worshippers. Hooker writes:

* The Sermons of John Donne, 10 vols., ed. George R. Potter and Evelyn M. Simpson (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1953-62), 5:13. ^ Montaigne, Complete Essays, 235.

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If the Church did ever devise a thinge fitt and convenient, what more then this, that when together we have all receyved those heavenlie mysteries . . . wee should in hatred of all heresies factions and schismes, the pastor as a leader, the people as willinge followers of him step by step declare openlie our selves united as brethren in one, by offeringe up with all our harts and tungues that most effectuall supplication. (V.36.3; 148.14-22)

The act of speaking our prayers together thus becomes a moment of intense communion. "In hatred of all heresies factions and schismes," the congregation forms an undivided corporatio, effected or even realized in the very act of uttering the Lord's Prayer. What makes the Lord's Prayer "that most effectual supplication" is precisely its capacity to "unite the brethren in one."

While this description might seem to subordinate the private subject to the public body of the church, Hooker imagines it, rather, as a weaving, or intermeshing, of individual and collective agency. The power of common prayer lies not in a Hobbesian act of delegation, but rather in its incorporation of multiple voices within a single utterance: "All which are present," Hooker asserts, are "made earewitnesses even of everie mans distinct and deliberate assent unto each particular branch of a common inditement" (V.36.2; 2:148.7-10). The rhetorical balance between the single and the corporate subject within this passage — "all," "every," "common," versus "distinct," "deliberate," "particular"— displays Hooker's effort to merge these two poles of identity within the "common inditement" of prayer.

Moreover, that each member of the congregation has a responsibility to practice common prayer, to be an "earewitness" to his fellow worshippers' performance, indicates the church's actual dependence

on its constituents' participation for a successful liturgy. Thus Hooker writes:

The good which we doe by publike prayer is more then in privat can be don, for that besides the benefit which heere is no lesse procured to our selves, the whole Church is much bettered by our good example, and consequentlie whereas secret neglect of our dutie in this kinde is but onlie our own hurte, one mans contempt of the common prayer of the Church of God may be and often- times is most hurtefuU unto many. (V.24.2; 2:113.1-7)

The practice of common prayer by the entire community not only contributes to the development of a national identity, but actually determines

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this nation's devotional status: "one mans contempt of the common prayer of the Church of God may be and oftentimes is most hurtefuU unto many."

If we look ahead from the establishment of the Elizabethan church to the chaos of the church during the Civil War, we find with no surprise that Anglicans equated the collapse of the nation with the abandonment of common prayer. In his 1646 treatise *A Discourse Concerning Prayer Ex Tempore*. In *Justification of Authorized and Set Forms of Liturgie*, the royalist Jeremy Taylor imagines the consequences of Parliament's banning of the prayer book in the following terms:

there must needs be infinite difformity in the publike worship, and all the benefits which were before the consequents of conformity and unity will be lost, and if they be not valuable, I leave it to all them to consider, who know the inconveniences of publik dis- union, and the publike disunion that is certainly consequent to them who doe not communicate in any common formes of wor- ship.

For the Church of England, "to communicate in common formes of worship" has become synonymous with what it means to be a nation.

Hooker on Ecumenical Relations: Conciliarism in the English Reformation

IN A STRIKING PASSAGE WHICH HAS NOT RECEIVED the attention it deserves, Richard Hooker called in 1593 for the revival of general or ecumenical councils. Nations, he observed in his *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie*, have developed laws to regulate relations among themselves and thereby to promote international peace and stability, or what Hooker called "communion" (1.10.14; FLE 1:109.2-3). These laws, he said, constituted a "Lawe of Nations," which "toucheth all such severall bodies politique, so far forth as one of them hath publique commerce with another" (1.10.12; 1:106.33-107.1). Hooker saw general councils, like the law of nations, as a means of promoting communion. Christian nations, he contended, needed to promote communion within the framework of the religion they had in common. "And in this kinde of correspondence amongst nations," he wrote, "the force of generall counsels doth stand" (1.10.14; 1:109.5-7). All churches, he observed, make up one church in that they have "but One Lord, one faith, and one baptisme." They therefore needed a way to preserve their "unitie in these thinges, as also for order in some other things convenient to be every where uniformlie kept" (1:109.11-13). This, he said in language at once measured and urgent, "maketh it requisit that the Church of God here on earth have her lawes of spiritual commerce betweene Christian nations, lawes by vertue whereof all Churches may enjoy freelie the use of those reverend religious and

¹ 1:109.10. The scriptural reference is to Ephesians 4:5.

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sacred consultations which are termed counsels generall." The ideas expressed in this passage are, historically and theologically, of considerable significance. They are also provocative with reference to ecumenical relations among the churches four centuries later.

Hooker insisted that councils in the church are of divine origin. Referring to the account of the gathering of the apostles at Jerusalem

described in Acts, chapter 15, he said that councils were instituted by "Gods owne blessed spirit" and held "by the holy Apostles them selves" (1:109.18-19). They were "afterwardes kept and observed throughout the world" and were "never otherwise then most highly esteemed of, til pride ambition and tyrannic began by factious and vile endeavors to abuse that divine invention unto the furtherance of wicked purposes" (1:109.19-23). Hooker's reference to "pride ambition and tyrannic" was presumably to the medieval councils held by the papacy and to the Council of Trent held in the mid-sixteenth century. But just as civil courts and parliaments ought not to be abolished because they were sometimes abused, he observed, so councils ought not to be abandoned or considered discredited. Rather, Christians should "studie how so gracious a thing may againe be reduced to that first perfection" (1:109.27-28). In Book V, he related how the four components of the doctrine of Christ — "his deitie, his manhood, the conjunction of both, and the distinction of the one from the other beinge joyned in one"— were defined by the "fower most famous ancient generall Councils," at Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon (V.54.10; 2:226.25-26, 227.1-2). Hooker reminded his readers in Book VIII that the first four general councils had been specifically recognized in

^ 1:109.13-17. See also, for commentary by Lee W. Gibbs, FLE 6:116-17. Hooker's views on general councils are discussed briefly in Peter Munz, *The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), 95-99, 106-10; Gunnar Hillerdal, *Reason and Revelation in Richard Hooker* (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1962), 53-55; Egil Grislis, "The Role of Consensus in Richard Hooker's Method of Theological Inquiry," in Robert E. Cushman and Egil Grislis, eds., *The Heritage of Christian Thought: Essays in Honor of Robert Lowry Calhoun* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 83-85; and, more fully, in Paul Avis, *Anglicanism and the Christian Church: Theological Resources in Historical Perspective* (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1989), 23-24, 32-33, 42-44, 47-67. Ecumenical aspects and implications of Hooker's theology are treated in Olivier Loyer, *L'Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker* (Lille: Atelier des theses, 1979), 524-26, 581-85; Lee W. Gibbs, "Richard Hooker's Via Media Doctrine of Justification," *Harvard Theological Review* 74.2 (1981): 211-20; Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Richard Hooker and the Church of England," in his *Renaissance Essays* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1985), 103-20; and William P. Haugaard, "Richard Hooker: Evidences of an Ecumenical Vision from a Twentieth Century Perspective," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 24.3 (1987): 427-39.

the Act of Supremacy at the beginning of Queen Elizabeth I's reign for the purpose of distinguishing orthodoxy from heresy in the Church of England (VIII 3.3 [Keble 2.17]; 3:348.10-14 and n).

In Book I, in the passage in which Hooker stressed the need for the churches to maintain "spiritual commerce" by means of general councils, he spelled out the purposes which such councils could serve:

the finding out of any thing whereunto divine lawe bindeth us, but yeat in such sorte that men are not thereof on all sides resolved; or for the setting downe of some uniforme judgement to stand touching such thinges, as being neither way matters of necessitie, are notwithstanding offensive and scandalous when there is open opposition about them; be it for the ending of strifes touching matters of Christian belief, wherein the one part may seeme to have probable cause of dissenting from the other; or be it concerning matters of politic, order, and regiment in the Church. (1.10.14; 1:110.1-9)

Hooker was deeply conscious of the dangers of not resolving conflicts and healing rifts and schisms in this way. It would be far preferable, he said, "if we did all concur in desire to have the use of auncient counsels againe renewed, rather then these proceedinges continued which either make all contentions endlesse, or bring them to one onely determination and that of all other the worst, which is by sword" (1:110.12-16). The power of calling councils. Hooker noted in Book VIII, had devolved from the clergy to the emperors in the ancient period, the Emperor Constantine having called the first general council at Nicaea, as the Roman Catholic theologian Albertus Pighius had acknowledged.[^] The general councils of antiquity had all, he added, been called by Roman emperors, as specified by imperial law (VIII.5.2; 3:382.15-384.22).

Hooker's stress on the need for general councils to resolve theological disputes and questions of polity and practice was not based on the idea that general councils were infallible. The first four general councils, which provided a definitive statement of the doctrine of Christ, formulated their decisions on the basis of key texts in Holy Scripture.[^] The authority of a

[^] Lawes VIII.5.2; 3:382.24-383.2. Hooker cites Albertus Pighius's

principal work, *Hierarchiae ecclesiasticae assertio* (1538), a defense of Christian tradition as a source of religious truth. Pighius insisted, in fact, that general councils owed their start to the Emperor Constantine's pious zeal. See n to 3:382.24-383.2.

* Though not stated explicitly, this seems a reasonable conclusion from Hooker's

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general council was derived from its divine guidance and from its representative character. But what the church decided in one set of circumstances should not bind it when changes needed to be made, as Hooker pointed out in Book IV:

neither counsels nor customes, be they never so auncient and so generall, can let [hinder] the Church from taking away that thing which is hurtefull to be retained. Where thinges have beene instituted which being convenient and good at the first, do afterwards in processe of time waxe otherwise; we make no doubt but they may be altered, yea, though counsells or customes generall have received them. (IV. 14.5; 1:340.9-14)

The roots of Hooker's conciliar thought lay in the conciliarism of the late middle ages and in the theology which emerged in the early years of the English Reformation. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a succession of thinkers, including Dietrich of Niem, Pierre d'Ailly, Jean Gerson, Francesco Zabarella, and Nicholas of Cusa, whose teachings helped to provide the basis for the Councils of Constance and Basel, argued that in certain circumstances a general council, understood as representing the whole body of Christians, was superior to the pope and had the authority to deal with problems of heresy and schism which threatened the church's unity.[^] In the early fifteenth century the general council became, for a time, a central part of the governmental structure of the western church. The Council of Constance of 1414-1417, which resolved the problem of the Great Schism, revolving about three rival popes, called for a reform of the church "in head and members" and prescribed a mechanism for convening general councils at regular intervals.[^]

discussion of Christology and the work of the four councils in Lau/es V.51-54.

^ E. F. Jacob, *Essays in the Conciliar Epoch*, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1963), 1-43; Francis Oakley, *The Political Thought of Pierre d'Ailly: The Voluntarist Tradition* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1964); Louis B. Pascoe, *Jean Gerson: Principles of Church Reform* (Leiden: Brill, 1973); Thomas E. Morrissey, "Franciscus Zabarella (1360- 1417): Papacy, Community and Limitations upon Authority," in Guy Fitch Lytle, ed., *Reform and Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church* (Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1981), 37-54; Mirimichi Watanabe, *The Political Ideas of Nicholas of Cusa with Special Reference to His "De Concordantia Catholica"* (Geneva: Droz, 1963).

^ Brian Tierney, "Hermeneutics and History: The Problem of *Haec Sancta*," in T. A. Sandquist and M. R. Powicke, eds., *Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1969), 354-70; Thomas E. Morrissey, "The Decree '*Haec Sancta*' and Cardinal Zabarella: His Role in Its Formulation and Interpretation,"

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Despite the dissension which marked the various stages of the Council of Basel in 1431-1449, and despite the bull of Pope Pius II in 1460 which forbade appeals from the pope to a future council, conciliar theory lived on. It significantly influenced both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism in the sixteenth century, as well as the development of western political theory.® At various times both Martin Luther and John Calvin urged the convening of a general council to reform the church and put an end to the divisions within Christendom. Luther, in his celebrated letter To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation in 1520, addressed to the Emperor Charles V and the princes of Germany, set forth some of the abuses he believed a general council should deal with, along with his own proposals for reform. His treatise *On the Councils and the Church* of 1539

Annuaire Historiae Conciliarum 10 (1978): 145-76; C. M. D. Crowder, ed., *Unity, Heresy and Reform, 1378-1460: The Conciliar Response to the Great Schism* (London: Edward Arnold, 1977), 11-24, 82-83, 128-29. For a vigorous assertion of the legitimacy of the council's actions and the validity of the decree *Haec sancta*, which defined the council's authority, see Paul De Vooght, *Les pouvoirs du*

concile et l'autorité du pape au concile de Constance: le décret *Haec Sancta Synodus* du 6 avril 1415 (Paris: Cerf, 1965), 185-89, and *passim*.

¹ Antony Black, *Monarchy and Community: Political Ideas in the Later Conciliar Controversy, 1430-1450* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970) and *Council and Commune: The Conciliar Movement and the Fifteenth Century Heritage* (London: Bums and Oates, 1979); Hubert Jedin, *A History of the Council of Trent*, trans. Ernest Graf, 2 vols. (London: Nelson, 1957-61), 1:32-138, and *passim*; Heiko A. Oberman, Daniel E. Zerfoss, and William J. Courtenay, "The Twilight of the Conciliar Era," introduction to their edition of Gabriel Biel, *Defensorium obedientia apostolica et alia documenta* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), 3-59; Walter Ullmann, "Julius 11 and the Schismatic Cardinals" in Derek Baker, ed., *Schism, Heresy and Religious Protest*, *Studies in Church History*, 9 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972), 177-93; Thomas F. Mayer, "Marco Mantova: A Bronze Age Conciliarist," *Annuario historiae conciliorum* 16 (1984): 385-408; W. B. Patterson, "The Idea of Renewal in Girolamo Aleander's Conciliar Thought" in Derek Baker, ed., *Renaissance and Renewal in Christian History*, *Studies in Church History*, 14 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), 175-86.

* Francis Oakley, "On the Road from Constance to 1688: The Political Thought of John Major and George Buchanan," *Journal of British Studies* 1.2 (May, 1962): 1-31; "Almain and Major: Conciliar Theory on the Eve of the Reformation," *American Historical Review* 70.3 (April 1965): 673-90; and "Conciliarism in the Sixteenth Century: Jacques Almain Again," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 68 (1977): 111-31. Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 1 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978), 1:65, 2:24, 44-47, 65.n, 320-21, 340-48. J. H. Burns, "Scholasticism: Survival and Revival" in J. H. Burns, ed., *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991), 132-55, esp. 146-55.

¹ Martin Luther, *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the Reform of the Christian Estate* (1520) in Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann, eds., *Luther's*

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discussed the possibility that a reforming council might be convened

by the emperor, though he did not find the situation encouraging.¹⁰ In 1560, before the final sessions of the Council of Trent were held, Calvin wrote a *Memoire sur le concile*, calling for a free and universal council, composed of representatives of the reformed churches as well as Rome, to put an end to Christian divisions. At such a council, he argued, the pope should have "first place," but he, like the other participants, would have to agree to be bound by the council's decisions.¹¹ The theory which undergirded the Council of Trent of 1545-1563 stressed that a general council must be called by the pope, presided over by his legates, and have its decrees confirmed by the papacy. This theory, as enunciated by Cardinal Cajetan, for example, was not an expression of conciliarism but a reaction to it.¹² Conciliarism, though it left its mark on the leading reformers and on Rome, took root in the theology of the English church to a much greater extent than in that of Lutheranism or Calvinism— or of Counter-Reformation Catholicism,

Conciliar ideas were much discussed in England at the court of Henry VIII in the 1530s. In the early part of the decade the issue was whether the king might appeal his "great matter," the matrimonial suit aimed at securing an annulment of his marriage to Catherine of Aragon, to a general council. The discussions of this issue brought to the fore questions about the nature of the church and the exercise of authority within the

Works, 55 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959-86), 44:123-217.

• Luther, *On the Councils and the Church* (1539), in Works, 41:9-178; Jaroslav Pelikan, *Obedient Rebels: Catholic Substance and Protestant Principle in Luther's Reformation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 54-76; Friedrich Wilhelm Kantzenbach, "The Call for a Council in the 16th Century —The Protestant View of Councils," in *Councils and the Ecumenical Movement*, *World Council of Churches Studies*, 5 (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1968), 99-109.

" Theodore W. Casteel, "Calvin and Trent: Calvin's Reaction to the Council of Trent in the Context of His Conciliar Thought," *Harvard Theological Review* 63 (1970): 91-117.

¹¹ Jedin, *History of the Council of Trent*, 1:5-6, 66-67, 114, 128-33. A vigorous attack on the theory that a general council was superior to the pope was made by Thomas de Vio, later Cardinal Cajetan, in his

De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii (1511), modern edition, ed. Vincent J. Pollet (Rome: Institutum Angelicum, 1936). For a recent statement of the Roman Catholic view of general councils, see L. M. Orsy, "Councils, General (Ecumenical), Theology of" in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 18 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-89), 4:377-80.

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church.¹⁶ Conciliar ideas were advanced by those on both sides of what was becoming an ecclesiological divide. Sir Thomas More, formerly Lord Chancellor, responded to the discussions at court in a letter to Thomas Cromwell, the king's secretary, written virtually on the eve of his confinement in the Tower of London. In a letter from his home in Chelsea on 5 March 1534, More wrote Cromwell that "all Christendom is one corps" and that from "general councils assembled lawfully" came the declaration of truths "to be believed and to be standen to."¹⁷ General councils, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, he said, acted also to keep the body of the catholic church from continual confusion. In the same letter More affirmed his belief in the spiritual supremacy of the pope, but he added: "yet never thought I the pope above the general council."¹⁸ A year after More's execution for treason on a charge of having opposed the Act of Supremacy, which declared the king supreme head on earth of the Church of England, Thomas Starkey, a reforming Roman Catholic who served as an adviser to Cromwell, urged the king to support a general council. In a letter to Henry VIII in July 1536, Starkey argued that a general council could curb the excesses of the papacy and restore the peace and unity of the Church.¹⁹

By 1536, Pope Paul III was making strenuous efforts to prepare the way for a general council which would, he hoped, reform and reunite the western church, now torn by division almost everywhere north of the Alps and the Pyrenees.²⁰ But in England, where parliamentary legislation in 1533-1536 denied the papacy any jurisdiction within the kingdom, Henry VIII, Archbishop Thomas Cranmer, and many other bishops were appre-

¹⁶ J. J. Scarisbrick, *Henry VIII* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1968), 262-63, 286, 291, 293-94, 319, 323, 335-36, 358, 360, 387-88, 397-98.

[^] Elizabeth Frances Rogers, ed., *St. Thomas More: Selected Letters* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961), 213.

[^] *Ibid.*, 214. See also Denys Hay, "Note on More and the General Council," *Morearm* 15-16 (1967): 249-51; Brian Gogan, *The Common Corps of Christendom: Ecclesiobgical Themes in the Writings of Sir Thomas More* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), 289- 93, 347-48, and *passim*.

^{*} Thomas F. Mayer, "Tliomas Starkey, an Unknown Conciliarist at the Court of Henry VIII," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49.2 (April-June 1988): 207-27, esp. p. 217. On Starkey's conciliar views and the Italian conciliar thinkers who influenced him, see Mayer, *Thomas Starkey and the Commonwealth: Humanist Politics and Religion in the Re(gn of Henry VIII* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1989), 79-86, 181, 186, 209-10, 224-26, 240, 253, 270-71, 280-81.

[^] Jedin, *History of the Council of Trent*, 1:288-312.

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hensive about any council which was under papal control. Such a gather- ing would pose an immediate threat to the religious settlement still in progress in England, perhaps provoking a war against or within the king- dom. In a Protestation of 1537, the king and his council spoke disparaging- ly of the council called by the pope for Mantua, but they did not disavow the project of convening a council. Indeed, they called for a council that was "franke and free" to be held at a more convenient time and place. [^] In the same year, Cranmer and eight other bishops signed a statement which, with evident reference to the council summoned by Paul III, asserted that the papacy had usurped the right to summon general coun- cils, a right which had been exercised in Christian antiquity by the emperors. Since, they said, the Holy Roman Emperor lacked "such general dominion" as in ancient times, and "many princes have absolute power in their own realms," no one ruler had the sole responsibility of calling a general council. [^] Nevertheless, if "any one or mo of these princes, for the establishing of the faith, land] for the extirpation of schisms" did call upon the other princes to agree to the summoning of a general council, the other princes were bound "by order of charity" to support it.[^] In

^{*} Henry VIII, *A Protestation Made for the Mighty and Moste*

Redoubted Kynge of Englande, etc. and His Hole Counsell and Clergie (London: Thomas Berthelet, 1537), Sig. Aii[^]-Aiii[^] Av[^]. This argument was reiterated in the following year, when the site of the proposed council had been moved to Vicenza. See Henry VIII, *An Epistie of the Moste Myghty and Redouted Prince Henry the VIII by the Grace of God Kyng of England and of Fraunce, Lord of Irelande, Defender of the Faithe, and Supreme Heed of the Churche of England, Next under Christe, Written to the Emperours Majestic, to All Christen Princes, and to All Those That Treuily and Sincerely Professe Christes Religion* (London: Thomas Berthelet, 1538), Sigs. Aii[^]-Aiii[^] Av[^]. For the parliamentary legislation in 1533-36 which separated the English church from the jurisdiction of the See of Rome, see G. R. Elton, ed., *The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), 353-67.

[^] Thomas Cranmer, "Tor the General Council" (c.1537), in John Edmund Cox, ed., *Miscellaneous Writings and Letters of Thomas Cranmer* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1846), 467.

[^] Ibid. For another assertion that general councils were to be called by kings and princes for the maintenance of "unitie of faithe in Christis Churche," see *A Treatise Concemynge Generall Councilies, the Byshoppes of Rome, and the Clergy, probably by the Scottish theologian Alexander Alesius* (London: Thomas Berthelet, 1538), Sig. Diii[^]". The Convocation of Canterbury had already asserted in 1536 that the Bishop of Rome could not convoke a general council without the consent of the Christian princes. See Stanford E. Lehmborg, *The Later Pariiaments of Henry VIII, 1536-1547* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), 39. For further evidence of conciliar discussions at court, see P. A. Sawada, "Two Anonymous Tudor Treatises on the General Council," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 12.2 (October 1961): 197-214, and "The Abortive Council of

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The Institution of a Christian Man (1537), usually known as *The Bishops' Book*, Cranmer and "all other the bishops, prelates, and archdeacons" of the realm defined the catholic church in such a way that the Church of England, like the French and Spanish and other "particular churches," was a member. The See of Rome, too, was a member: "The said church of Rome, with all the other particular churches in the world, compacted and united together, do make and constitute but one catholic church or body."[^]

For England and for the English church, the 1530s were crisis-ridden years, in which political, constitutional, and administrative changes came rapidly. The English church's doctrinal standards evolved more slowly. Yet as early as 1537, a conciliar theory had developed which had three major components. The first was that the general council was the appropriate body to resolve doctrinal disputes and heal rifts within Christendom. The second was that the temporal rulers of Christendom had the responsibility of convening general councils as the emperors had done in Christian antiquity. The third was that the Church of Rome was not the catholic church but a member of the catholic church. Particular churches, including the Church of England, made up the catholic or universal church which a general council would represent. The ancient general council thus had an important place in the theology of the English church as models for what a general council should be, as well as sources for key doctrinal formulations.[^] This view of the ancient councils and of a

Mantua and Henry VIII's *Sententia de concilio* 1537," *Akademia* (Nansan GakkcU) 87 (1960): 1-15; Franklin Le Van Baumer, *The Early Tudor Theory of Kingship* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1940), 49-56; W. Gordon Zeeveld, *Foundations of Tudor Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1948), 87-89, 130-35, 150-53.

[^] Charles Lloyd, ed., *Formularies of Faith, Set Forth by Authority during the Reign of Henry VIII* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1856), 23, 55.

^{^^} On the importance of the general council in the development of the theology of the Church of England in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, see Franklin Le Van Baumer, "The Church of England and the Common Corps of Christendom," *Journal of Modern History* 16 (1944): 1-21; Kenneth J. Wootcombe, "The Authority of the First Four General Councils in the Anglican Communion," *Anglican Theological Review* 44 (April 1962): 155-81; Stephen Neill, "The Anglican Communion and the Ecumenical Council," in Hans Jochen Margu, ed., *The Councils of the Church: History and Analysis* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 370-90; Stanley Lawrence Greenslade, "The English Reformers and the Councils of the Church," in *Oecumenica: Annales de Recherche Oecuménique* 1967, ed. F. W. Kantzenbach and V. Vajta (Neuchâtel: Delachaux and Niestlé, 1967), 95-114; Henry Chadwick, "The Status of Ecumenical Councils in Anglican Thought," in David Neiman and Margaret Schatkin, eds., *The*

future council lay at the heart of Hooker's conciliar thought.

Another burst of discussion over conciliar ideas came at the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth I. The context of these discussions by civil and religious leaders was the enactment by parliament in 1559 of legislation reasserting the Royal Supremacy over the English church and reauthorizing the Book of Common Prayer after the short-lived restoration of Roman Catholicism under Philip and Mary.[^] A resumption of the Council of Trent, which had begun its sessions in Paul III's pontificate but had suffered two interruptions, was called by Pope Pius IV for 1562. As early as 1560, the pope planned to send an emissary to Elizabeth to invite her to send English representatives to the council, and in 1561 he actually sent a nuncio to Flanders to await the queen's permission to enter England. On the advice of the Privy Council, which held that such a visit would violate the recently passed Act of Supremacy, she refused the permission.^{^*} The Church of England was in these years struggling to define its doctrinal position on a range of issues raised by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. In the Convocation of Canterbury in 1563, when the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion were drawn up, the nature and authority of general councils was one of the contemporary issues discussed.^{^^}

The ideas on councils advanced in the early '60s were shaped in large part by opposition to the Council of Trent. John Jewel, in his *Apologie* of 1562, objected to the organization, direction, composition, and meeting place of the council about to be reconvened at Trent. Because it was

Heritage of the Early Church: Essays in Honor of the Very Reverend Georges Vasilievich Fhrovsky (Rome: Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1973), 393-408; Charles John Fenner, "The Concept and Theological Significance of Ecumenical Councils in the Anglican Tradition" (Ph.D. thesis, Catholic Univ. of America, 1974); J. Robert Wright, "The Authority of Chalcedon for Anglicans," in G. R. Evans, ed., *Christian Authority: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 224-50; and Frederick H. Shriver, "Councils, Conferences and Synods," in Stephen Sykes and John Booty, eds., *The Study of Anglicanism* (London: S.P.C.K., 1988), 188-99.

~ Elton, *The Tudor Constitution*, 312-11 , 410-13. For the tortuous course of this legislation through parliament, see Norman L. Jones, *Faith by Statute: Parliament and the Settlement of Religion, 1559* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1982).

~ C. G. Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations, 1558-1565* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 77-78, 96-99, 270-71. For Elizabeth's view, expressed to Catherine de Medici in France, that no good was to be expected from a council under papal control and that only a council in which Protestants were full members could reunite the divided church, see 108-16, 145-48, 228-29.

~ William P. Haugaard, *Elizabeth and the English Reformatbn* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968), 233-72.

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called by the pope, was almost certain to be under papal control, and indeed was likely to be made up exclusively of bishops committed to Rome, it lacked "that olde and Christian liberty, which in all Christian Councils ought chiefly to be maintained." ~ He also pointed out that Christian kings and princes had been excluded from its proceedings, whereas, he asserted, the calling of general councils was "the common right of all princes." ~ Article 21 of the Thirty-nine Articles reflected the hostility to Trent stated by Jewel, as well as by the earlier Forty-two Articles of 1553. The article expressed conciliar theory in largely negative terms:

General Councils may not be gathered without the commandment

and will of Princes they may erre, and sometimes have

erred Wherefore things ordained by them as necessary to salva- tion have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of Holy Scripture. ~

The Thirty-nine Articles became the official standard of belief in the Church of England when they were authorized by the queen in 1571. The English church was thereby committed to the propositions that no general council could be convened unless by the civil authority, that councils were not infallible, and that the basis of any doctrinal decision made in a general council must be Holy Scripture. Article 21 affirmed the Protestant principle of sola scriptura in vigorous and explicit language. The phrase "taken out of Holy Scripture" implies

that any theological statement set forward on a matter "necessary to salvation" must be as close as possible

^* John Jewel, *An Apologie, or Answer in Defence of the Church of England, Concerning the State of Religion Used in the Same* (London: Reginalde Wolfe, 1562), Sig. Oiiii'; for the whole section on councils see Sigs. Niii'-Riir. This was the first translation of Jewel's *Apologia Ecclesiae AngUcaruie* (1562); the second translation, by Lady Ann Bacon, published in 1564, was regarded as the official one. See John Jewel, *An Apology of the Church of England*, ed. J. E. Booty (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press for the Folger Shakespeare Library, 1963), xlv-xlvi; for Part VI, on councils, see 103-33. For discussions of this and other expressions of Jewel's conciliar thought, see W. M. Southgate, *John Jewel and the Problem of Doctrinal Authority* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962), 57-60, 128-34; John E. Booty, *John Jewel as Apologist of the Church of England* (London: S.P.C.K., 1963), 137-41.

^^ Jewel, *An Apologie*, Sig. Pii'.

^* E. J. Bicknell, *A Theobgical Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England*, 3rd ed., ed. H. J. Carpenter (London: Longmans, Green, 1955), 267-68; for commentary, see pp. 268-72.

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to the scriptural text or texts on which it is based. The proposition in the articles was also, in effect, retroactive. No doctrinal definition which had already been promulgated by conciliar authority could be accepted unless it met this scriptural test; there was no conciliar authority in the defini- tion of essential doctrines independent of the authority of Scripture itself."

Hooker's treatment of general councils in the *Ijuves*, especially in 1.10.14, constitutes a summary statement of the conciliar theory developed in the Church of England following its separation from Rome in 1533- 1536.^° Despite the comparative brevity of Hooker's discussion, his is the most coherent treatment of this subject by any theologian in the Church of England in the sixteenth century. Moreover, Hooker's discussion has a distinctive quality. Hooker was more hopeful that general councils on the ancient model could be revived than either Cranmer or Jewel. He also seemed more apprehensive about the likely results if the institution were not

revived. What moved him to write as he did?

Hooker's concern may have been largely with the increasingly bitter conflict between Puritans and the authorities of the Church of England in the era of the Marprelate tracts and the attempted repression of religious nonconformity by Archbishop John Whitgift and the Court of High Commission. He would also have been very much aware of the government's rigorous campaign against Jesuits and secular Roman Catholic priests embarked on a mission to sustain and revive Roman Catholicism in England.[^] But it is also possible that he was equally concerned with the state of affairs across the English Channel, the North Sea, and the Bay of Biscay. France had been gripped by a series of civil wars over religion for a generation. Following the accession of the Huguenot leader Henry of Navarre as Henry IV in 1589, England provided him with troops and money while Spain continued to support the French Catholic League. The northern provinces of the Netherlands were fighting with English help for their political and religious freedom from Spain. Spain had sent one armada in 1588 to conquer England and restore Roman Catholicism and

[^] Compare Bicknell, *A Theological Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles*, 271-72.

3° Also Lawes IV.14.5; V.54.10; VIII.5.2.

[^] E.P.M., 385-431; Patrick McGrath, *Papists and Puritans under Elizabeth I* (London: Blandford Press, 1967), 161-271; John Bossy, *The English Catholic Community, 1570-1850* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1975), 11-34; Martin J. Havran, *The Catholics in Caroline England* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1962), 1-12.

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was preparing others. ^ Truly, as Hooker said, it would be far better "if we did all concur in desire to have the use of ancient councils againe renewed, rather then these proceedings continued which either make all contentions endlesse, or bring them to one onely determination and that of all other the worst, which is by sword" (1.10.14; 1:110.12-16). But there was reason to hope that a new day had dawned. Henry of Navarre, when he succeeded the murdered Henry III of France in August 1589, at once announced his intention to help to convene a national or general council in order to resolve the

nation's religious problems.^^ Hooker may have seen this as a moment to be seized upon to resolve the fratricidal religious conflicts on the continent as well as in England. Puritans, after all, like recusants, drew much of their inspiration and received a good deal of moral support from abroad.

Apart from the immediate problems which a general council on the ancient model could alleviate or resolve, there was a continuing problem of how to maintain "spiritual commerce" among the separated churches of Europe. Hooker was not content to have an international law for relations among states without parallel laws for relations among churches. Like the late medieval conciliarists and the early sixteenth century philosophers and theologians Jacques Almain and John Major,^^ Hooker saw the church as the whole body of believers and the general council as the only institution adequately representative of that church. As Hooker's own reference to parliaments suggests, his conciliarism must also have been deeply influenced by the English traditions of parliamentary government and the common law.^^ The general council was the parliament of the church;

^^ J. H. Elliott, *Europe Divided, 1559-1598* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 301- 50; Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt* (London: Allen Lane, 1977), 199-224; R. B. Wemham, *After the Armada: Elizabethan England and the Struggle for Western Europe, 1588-1595* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 1-91, 131-233, 262-334; Mark Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV: The Struggle for Stability* (London: Longman, 1984), 39-67.

^^ W. B. Patterson, "Henry IV and the Huguenot Appeal for a Return to Poissy," in Derek Baker, ed., *Schism, Heresy and Religious Protest, Studies in Church History*, 9 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972), 247-57, esp. pp. 251-53; Mark Greengrass, "The Public Context of the Abjuration of Henri IV," in Keith Cameron, ed., *From Valois to Bourbon: Dynasty, State and Society in Early Modern France* (Exeter: Univ. of Exeter Press, 1989), 107-26, esp. pp. 121-22; Raoul Patry, *Philippe du Plessis-Momay: un huguenot homme (1549-1623)* (Paris: Fischbacher, 1933). 176-77.

^^ Gogan, *The Common Corps of Christendom*, 36-43, 47-49, 60-61.

^^ W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Politick Society': Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker," in S.R.H., 3-76, esp. 34, 46-47,

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decisions adopted there were laws of the church. Like other laws, conciliar decrees could be modified by appropriate constitutional means. Without such a framework of laws, relations among the nations which professed "One Lord, one faith, and one baptism" were likely to be stormy or worse. Unless the ancient institution of the general council were revived, endemic warfare over religious issues was likely to be the result.

"It is surely more than a coincidence that in the decade following Hooker's death in 1600 a series of English writers took up the conciliar theme. Hooker's defender William Covel recalled in 1603 that Hooker acknowledged Roman Catholics as members "of the familie of Jesus Christ," though Rome was defiled with corruptions and errors. "But shee may when it pleaseth God recover her former soundnesse againe," he added, if "all sides peaceably with indifferencie, would admit the true use of a generall Council."⁶⁶ Hooker's former student Edwin Sandys travelled on the continent in the 1590s with his friend George Cranmer to survey the prospects for a broad religious accord. He wrote in his *Relation of the State of Religion*, published in 1605, that his "greatest desire" was "to see Christendome reconciled in the badge of their profession and that without the ruine or subversion of eyther part."⁶⁷ This could be effected.

Lawes I by Lee W. Gibbs in FLE 6:95-96, 108-17, and Intro, to Uwes VIII by Arthur Stephen McGrade, 6:339-43, 353-54, 364-83.

⁶⁶ William Covel, *A Just and Temperate Defence of the Five Books of Ecclesiastical Policie* Written by M. Hooker (London: Clement Knight, 1603), 68. Covel's book answered the anonymous *A Christian Letter* (1599), which sharply criticized Hooker for making the Church of Rome a member of "the familie of Jesus Christ." See A.C.L., 11 and 21; FLE 4:30.9 and 77.5.

⁶⁷ Covel, *A Just and Temperate Defence*, 77.

⁶⁸ Edwin Sandys, *A Relation of the State of Religion: with What Hopes and Policies It Hath Beene Framed, and Is Maintained in the Severall*

States of These Westeme Parts of the World (London: Simon Waterson, 1605), Sig. T3^ Sandys's book was completed in 1599; the Court of High Commission condeirmed it to be burned soon after its publication in 1605. Nevertheless, there were editions in English, Italian, French, and Dutch in the seventeenth century. See Theodore K. Rabb, "The Editions of Sir Edwin Sandys's Relation of the State of Religion," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 26.4 (1963): 323-36. On the content of Sandys's book see Gaetano Cozzi, "Sir Edwin Sandys e la Relazione dello stato della reUgione," *Rivista Storica Italianarux* 19 (1967): 1096-1121; and Theodore Rabb, "A Contribution to the Toleration Controversy of the Sixteenth Century: Sandys's 'A Relation of the State of Religion,' " in Anthony Molho and John A. Tedeschi, eds., *Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hans Baron* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois Univ. Press, 1971), 831-47. For Sandys's and George Cranmer's relations with Hooker and the significance of their journey abroad, see Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Richard Hooker and the Church of England," 110-12.

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he believed, "by some generall council assembled and composed indiffer- ently out of both sides, mens mindes being before hand prepared and directed to this issue and conclusion.""" Canons for the Church of Eng- land on relations between church and state were drawn up by Convoca- tion in 1606, one of which defined the "one Catholick Church of Christ" as visible on earth "by the several, and particular Churches in it, and sometimes by general and free councils lawfully assembled. ""^ Lancelot Andrewes, who helped to preserve some of Hooker's unpublished writings, devoted a 1606 sermon before the king— and a group of visiting Scottish ministers— to the right of calling ecclesiastical assemblies. He accorded councils immense significance in the life of the church. Heresies, he noted, "have ever bin best put to flight by the Churches Assemblies, (that is) councils, as it were by the armies of Gods angels (as Eusebius calleth them)."" Likewise, abuses had been redressed by canons made by the church in councils "and not elsewhere.""*^ In the same year the historian John Hayward wrote a book about "supreme power in affairs of religion" in which he noted that whenever "any great schisme or disturbance was maintained in the church," the ancient emperors would "assemble their Bishops in common councill" to resolve them.'*'

Hooker commented on the subject of the general council: "to speake of this matter as the cause requireth woulde require very long discourse"

(1.10.14; 1:109.30-31). A discourse of such length was in fact produced by

" Sandys, A RelatUm of the State of Religion, Sig. T2'. For discussion of the role of a general council in reuniting the churches, see Sigs. G4', R3', 52", TZ'*, V4'.

*° John Overall, Bishop Overall's Convocation'Book, MDCVI., Concerning the Govern- ment of God's Catholick Church and the Kingdoms of the Whole World (London: Walter Keffillby, 1690), 273. For King James's reasons for rejecting the canons, see Edward Cardwell, ed., SynodaUa: A Collection of Articles of Religion, Canons, and Proceedings of Convocations in the Province of Canterbury , from the Year 1547 to the Year 1717, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1842), 1:330-34.

^ Lancelot Andrewes, A Sermon Preached before the Kings Majestie at Hampton Court Concerning the R^ght and Power of Calling Assemblies, on Suruiay the 28 of September, Anno 1606 (London: Robert Barker, 1606), 11. Andrewes said of his treatment of the seven general councils of Christian antiquity that it was based on "the very actes of the counsels themselves" (p. 33). For Andrewes's relations with John Churchman, Hooker's father-in-law and custodian of Hooker's unpublished writings, and for Andrewes's own part in the preservation of Books VI- VIII of the Lawes, see Sisson, 33, 81, 87, 92, 94, 96, 99-107.

*^ Andrewes, A Sermon Preached before the Kings Majestie, 1 1 .

*^ John Hayward, A Reporte of a Discourse Concerning Supreme Power in Affaires of Religion: That This Power Is a Right of Regalitie, Inseparably Annexed to the Sovereignty of Every State (London: John Hardie, 1606), 30.

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his friend and disciple Richard Field in his *Of the Church*, published in two volumes in 1606 and 1610. Field described the general council as the highest level of jurisdiction in the church, where disputes about the interpretation of Scripture could be definitively settled. Field's concept of the membership of the church was inclusive: all whom God had called in Christ to salvation and eternal life.¹⁰⁰ The catholic or

universal church therefore included the churches of Greece, Armenia, Ethiopia, and Russia, though these churches had been condemned as heretical or schismatic by Rome. The Latin Church, despite its abuses and superstitions, was undoubtedly a member. So too were the various protestant churches. "^^ The way to settle disputes within the catholic church had long since been provided for in councils, including those at the diocesan, metropolitan, and patriarchal level. At the highest level, where cases were dealt with which could not be resolved elsewhere or which concerned fundamentals of the faith, there was the general council.^^ It would be appropriate, said Field, for such a council to be presided over by the bishop of Rome, to whom the other ancient patriarchs had customarily looked for guidance in the early Christian centuries.'*^

King James VI and I himself referred to his desire for a "general Christian union in religion" in his speech to his first parliament in England on 19 March 1604, pursuing a theme he had introduced in a proclamation of 22 February,*^ The proclamation had expressed his desire

^* Richard Field, *Of the Church, Five Books* (London: Simon Waterson, 1606), 15; *The Fifth Booke, Of the Church, Together with an Appendix, Containing a Defense of Such Partes and Passages of the Former Bookes as Have Bene Either Excepted against or Wrested to the Mainternmnce of Romish Errours* (London: Simon Waterson, 1610), Sig. A3^ For Field's relationship with Hooker, see Richard Hooper on Field in DNB; and Nathaniel Field, *Some Short Memorials Concerning the Life of That Reverend Divine, Doctor Richard Field, Prebendarie of Windsor and Dean of Gbcester*, ed. John Le Neve (London: Henry Clements, 1717), 19.

*5 Field, *Of the Church, Five Books*, 71-72; *The Fifth Booke, Of the Church*, 175, 371.

^ Field, *The Fifth Booke, Of the Church*, Sig. Br.

*7 *Ibid.*, 367, 371, 384-85.

^® James VI and I, "A Speech, as It Was Delivered in the Upper House of the Parliament to the Lords Spirituall and Temporall, and to the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses There Assembled, on Munday the XIX. Day of March 1603 [1604]. Being the First Day of the First Parliament," in Charles Howard McUwain, ed., *The Political Works of*

James I (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1918), 275; James F. Larkin and Paul L. Hughes, eds., *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973-83), 1:70-73. For James's diplomacy aimed at the convening of a general council in 1603-5, see W. B. Patterson, "King James I's Call for an Ecumenical Council" in G. J. Cuming and Derek Baker, eds., *Councils and Assemblies*, *Studies in Church History*, 7 (Cambridge:

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that by the mediation of "other Princes Christian," a "general council free and lawfully called" might be held to resolve disputes in religion which had arisen "between Princes and Princes as between them and their subjects." "In his Premonition of 1609, James called upon the Emperor Rudolf II and other temporal rulers of Europe to act in concert to effect the reform and reunion of Christendom. If this were ever to be achieved, he suggested:

it must come by meanes of a generall Councell; the place of their meeting being chosen so indifferent, as all Christian Princes, either in their owne Persons, or their Deputie Commissioners; and all Churchmen of Christian profession, that beleeeve and professe all the ancient grounds of the true, ancient, Catholike, and Aposto- like Faith, might have tutum accessum thereunto.[°]

King James, who sought to play the role of peacemaker in religious and political disputes at home and abroad, hoped thereby to achieve the same objective in religion which Hooker described — a resolution of contentions without recourse to the sword— and by the same means, namely a general council.

Hooker's prescribed way to recover, maintain, and enhance Christian unity in a broad theological sense, as well as to resolve or reach an understanding about issues of organization and practice, was, as we have noted, very much in keeping with the procedures advocated by the late medieval conciliarists. Such thinkers as d'Ailly, Gerson, Nicholas of Cusa, and Zabarella were far from radical or revolutionary. As Francis Oakley has

Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971), 267-75.

*' Larkin and Hughes, *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, 1:73.

^ James VI and I, *An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance: First Set Forth without a Name, arui Not*/ Acknowledged t > ^ the Aut/ior, the Right High and Mightie Prince, James, by the Grace of God, King of Great Britaine, France arui Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc.; Together with a Premonition of His Majesties to AU Most M`ghtie Monarches, Kings, Free Princes and States of Christendome* (London: Robert Barker, 1609), 110-11. This proposal was made during the course of the Oath of Allegiance controversy, which followed the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot and the imposition of an Oath of Allegiance on English Catholics. See McIUwain, *The Political Works of James I*, xlix-lxxx; D. Harris Willson, *King James VI and I* (New York: Henry Holt, 1956), 228-42; Johann Peter Sommerville, "Jacobean Political Thought and the Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance" (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge Univ., 1981), passim; and Glenn Burgess, *The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-1642* (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1993), 115-19, 129-38, 188.

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argued, their conciliarism can now be seen as "an essentially moderate doctrine of ecclesiastical constitutionalism with unimpeachably orthodox foundations."[^] The view that under certain conditions a general council is superior in jurisdiction to the papacy has been shown by Brian Tiemey to have had its origins in the study of canon law itself in the High Middle Ages.^{^^} Hooker's thought is particularly close to that of Nicholas of Cusa, who wrote his *De concordantia catholica* (or *Catholic Concordance*) in 1433, when the Council of Basel and Pope Eugenius IV were asserting mutually conflicting claims. ^{^^} Like the Renaissance humanists who were reviving elements of Greek and Latin culture, Nicholas aimed to revive "the learning of the ancient authors" on the subject of universal or ecumenical councils.^{^*} It is noteworthy that his models were the first eight ecumenical councils, all of which, he found, had been called by emperors. He cited the acts of the eighth council, meeting at Constantino- ple in 869-70, to the effect that a "full universal council is constituted of the five patriarchal sees": namely, Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, Constanti- nople, and Jerusalem.^{^^} On matters of faith, such a council "should always be guided by the rules that the Holy Spirit has now clearly ex- pressed in the canon of the Holy Scripture and in past councils."^{^^} The Roman pope would be expected to be present or to be represented, but the "force of canons adopted in council" came not from the pope's approval but from the general consent of those who

reached agreement there." The ancient councils, Nicholas noted, were attended not only by bishops but by laymen and princes, who were there to "advise and exhort and

" Francis Oakley, "Religious and Ecclesiastical Life on the Eve of the Reformation," in Steven Ozment, ed., *Reformation Europe: A Guide to Research* (St. Louis: Center for Reformation Research, 1982), 15-16.

^^ Brian Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1955), 11-20, 132-53, 218-19, 238-47.

^^ Nicholas of Cusa, *The Catholic Concordance*, ed. Paul E. Sigmund (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991), xiii-xvii. On the immediate circumstances, see also Paul E. Sigmund, *Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1963), 35-36, 119-36; and Black, *Monarchy and Community*, 1-4, 18-24, and *passim*.

^^ Nicholas of Cusa, *The Catholic Concordance*, 3.

*^ *Ibid.*, 54. Only the first seven ancient councils are accepted as ecumenical by the Eastern churches.

56 *Ibid.*, 59.

" *Ibid.* 79.

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direct" as the occasion required.^^ The leadership provided by the ancient emperors had been indispensable in carrying out the councils' mission. He urged the emperor and kings of his own time to follow their example.^^ Like Nicholas, Hooker looked back to the general councils of antiquity to find a means of bringing the discordant bodies of Christians of his own time back together.

As John Booty has pointed out, a vision of wholeness and of ultimate harmony pervades Hooker's *Lawes*. It is expressed in the description of a universe of laws in Book I and in the assertion in Book III that the moral law and the scriptural law are the same. One God of infinite

wisdom is revealed in nature. Scripture, history, and in the learning and wisdom of human beings in every time and place. ^ One truth must therefore complement and reinforce another. Likewise, Christians find community in their mutual participation in worship and in service. In the Holy Communion Hooker's emphasis is on Christ's ministry of reconciliation, which extends to the whole world. "Such a perspective," Booty comments:

encourages us to live together in one church although we differ radically among ourselves. We know that we can learn from one another. Such a perspective encourages us to join with others in a communion of churches that reaches around the world and includes representatives of many races and nations.^

It was just this "community of churches" which Hooker's proposal for a revival of the general councils of antiquity was aimed at achieving.

The obstacles which lay in the way of realizing such a proposal in Hooker's day proved insurmountable. They are still formidable, though relations among the churches are far closer than during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. But it is not unreasonable to ask, especially in an era in which democratic ideals have penetrated almost every region of

58 Ibid., 64.

" Ibid., 250-63.

^ John Booty, "Hooker and Anglicanism: Into the Future," *Sewanee Theological Review*). A Celebration of Richard Hooker 36.2 (1993): 215-26, esp. 216-18.

*' Booty, "Hooker and Anglicanism: Into the Future," 225. On the theme of participation in Hooker, see also John Booty, "Richard Hooker," in William J. Wolf, ed., *The Spirit of Anglicanism* (Wilton, Conn.: Morehouse-Barlow, 1979), 1-45, esp. 17- 36, and "Hooker's Understanding of the Presence of Christ in the Eucharist," in John E. Booty, ed.. *The Divine Drama in History and Liturgy: Essays Presented to Horton Davies on His Retirement from Princeton University* (Allison Park, Pa.: Pickwick, 1984), 131-48.

the globe, when coUegiaUty is a significant element in the thought and practice of the Roman Catholic Church, and when there is an ecumenical movement of considerable strength among Protestant and Orthodox churches: is Christian reconciliation and unity even conceivable on any other than a conciliar basis? To be a constructive force in bringing the churches together, conciliarism would obviously have to be reformulated in terms appropriate to the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Among the essential features of a reconceived conciliarism would probably be those discussed by Hooker and the English writers of the decade after Hooker. A truly ecumenical council would have to include the churches of the Reformation and the Church of Rome, as well as the Eastern churches, and would presumably need to base its decisions quite explicitly on Holy Scripture. Temporal authorities could not be expected to take the lead in convening such a council, though one could hardly take place without their acquiescence. The See of Rome might once again serve as a focus of unity, as it did in the ancient period. The result, if the Holy Spirit were to lead the conciliar representatives to a catholic concordance, would more likely be a communion of churches than a single monolithic structure. But the task of reconciliation would, in that case, be definitively under way.^

This look at Hooker's views on general councils throws light on two central questions for Hooker scholarship. Did Hooker's writings have any immediate influence? And is Hooker's *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie* in the final analysis a polemical or a conciliatory work?^^ On the evi-

" Compare Francis Oakley, "The 'New Conciliarism' and Its Implications: A Problem in History and Hermeneutics," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 8 (1971): 815-40, esp. 817, 825-29, 839; *Councils and the Ecumenical Movement*, *World Council of Churches Studies*, 5, pp. 9-19; Hans Kiing, *Structures of the Church*, trans. Salvator Attansio (New York: Nelson, 1964), 39-52; and Karl August Fink, "An Historical Note on the Constitution of the Church," in Teodoro Jimenez Urresti, *Structures of the Church* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 13-25.

*^ Laws, ed. McGrade, xiv, xxix-xxx. For studies which stress Hooker's polemical skills, see Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society': Richard Hooker as a Political Tliinker" and W. Speed Hill, "The Evolution of Hooker's Lauis of Ecclesiastical Polity," in *S.R.H.*, 3-76, 117-58; and John N. Wall, "Hooker's 'Faire Speeche': Rhetorical

Strategies in the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Polity," in Donald S. Armentrout, ed.. *This Sacred History: Anglican Reflections for John Booty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cowley, 1990), 125-43. For an assessment of the extent to which Hooker was read "in his own time or in the years immediately following his death," see John E. Booty, "Hooker and Anglicanism," in *S.R.H.*, 207-39, esp. 211-15.

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dence offered here, his views on general councils seem to have had a considerable immediate impact. If general councils as he described them were not revived in his time or immediately afterwards, conciliar thought certainly was, especially by Lancelot Andrewes, Richard Field, and King James VI and I. Hooker's *Lawes* is a complex work, difficult to summarize and to characterize. But its discussion of general councils was decidedly conciliatory — and not just with reference to religious dissension in England but to religious dissensions all across Europe.

INTERPRETING

THE

INTERPRETER

DEBORA SHUGER

"Societie Supernaturall":

The Imagined Community of Hooker's *Lawes*

SINCE THE 1970s, STUDIES OF RICHARD HOOKER'S *Of the Lawes of EcclesiasticaU PoUtie* have, to no one's surprise, grown suspicious of

its lofty disinterestedness. The dominant trend in recent Hooker scholarship, reacting against the hagiographic tradition established by Walton's *Lives*, has argued for Hooker's narrowly polemical aims as a propagandist for Whitgift's crackdown on dissent and pamphleteer for the anti-Puritan faction in the parliamentary debates of 1593 — as, in short, a "partisan thinker intent on window-dressing the command structure of English society." Richard Helgerson's 1992 *Forms of Nationhood*, which powerfully summarizes this interpretative paradigm, thus concludes that "Hooker's defense of the established church was part of a large and deliberate movement of reaction and repression led by Archbishop Whitgift . . . against Puritan opponents whose strongest appeal . . . was to the unreasoning and vulgar multitude. A mark of [Hooker's] success is that his own audience is of a very different sort."

Over the same two decades, however, significant new information has come to light— some of it only available in the newly-published final

' W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society': Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker," in *S.R.H.*, 14; cf. Robert Eccleshall, "Richard Hooker and the Peculiarities of the English: The Reception of the Ecclesiastical Polity in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *History of Political Thought* 2 (1981): 63, 83.

^ Richard Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of Englarui* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992), 272, 279.

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volume of the Folger Works of Richard Hooker— that complicates our picture of the motives and occasions informing the *Lawes*. First, it seems unlikely that Hooker undertook the *Lawes* at the behest of either ecclesiastical or parliamentary officials. There is no evidence that Whitgift sponsored the treatise.^ Moreover, the "Sandys" backing the anti-Puritan legislation in the Parliament of 1593 seems not to have been Edwin Sandys, Hooker's friend and patron, but his uncle Miles Sandys.* That Edwin Sandys had to pay for the publication of the *Lawes* out of his own pocket, the London publishers having uniformly rejected the manuscript, itself militates against the assumption that Hooker enjoyed high-level patronage.

Second, there is reason to believe that the *Lawes* is not exclusively, or

even primarily, anti-Presbyterian polemic. By the 1590s, Presbyterianism was no longer a burning issue — a consequence of Whitgift's successful campaign.[^] Moreover, Hooker appears not to have made any extensive study of Genevan ecclesiology; despite the voluminous literature on this topic, he regularly cites only Cartwright and Travers.[^] Compared to Richard Bancroft's massive research into the intellectual and moral contradictions of the disciplinarian platform. Hooker's scholarship on the subject seems remarkably thin. Significantly, we know that Bancroft, unlike Hooker, was Whitgift's protege and designated spokesman for "the little faction of markedly anti-puritan politicians and civilians" active during the 1593 Parliament.[^] To read the Lawes as official propaganda for

[^] William Haugaard, Intro, to Preface, FLE 6:54. Richard Bauckham, "Hooker, Travers and the Church of Rome in the 1580s," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 39 (1978): 50. W. Speed Hill hypothesizes that Hooker initially wrote the Lawes without official prompting or patronage; having subsequently failed to find a publisher, he was driven to accept Edwin Sandys's offer to print the work at his own expense, an offer apparently contingent on Hooker's recasting the work along more polemical lines ("The Evolution of Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity," in S.R.H., 130-33, 145-46).

■* Haugaard, Intro, to Pref., 6:34-35. At least in his later career, Edwin Sandys was scarcely a reactionary establishment figure; he was a leading opposition M.P. during the first half of the Jacobean regime and widely suspected of republican tendencies.

[^] In a letter probably written in 1592-93, George Cranmer thus remarks to Hooker that "of late years the heat of men towards the Discipline is greatly decayed. ... So as now the discipline which at first triumphed over all, being unmasked, beginneth to droop and hang down her head" (Hooker, Works, ed. Keble [1888], 2:599). Speed Hill discusses the dating of this letter in "Evolution," 137-38.

[^] William Haugaard, Intro, to Books II, III, and IV, FLE 6:148; John Booty, Intro, to Book V, FLE 6:220; Speed Hill, "Evolution," 130.

[^] Patrick CoUinson, "Hooker and the Elizabethan Establishment," above, 167.

the established church is to confuse Hooker with Bancroft, which no one who has ever read both is likely to do.

Current research thus indicates that Hooker's ties to the "movement of reaction and repression led by Archbishop Whitgift" were looser than one might have supposed, which may help explain why his works found such an ideologically diverse audience. Although Helgerson insinuates that the Lawes primarily attracted an elite readership of bishops, conservative academics, and other beneficiaries of the status quo, the fragmentary surviving evidence tells a somewhat different story. If Hooker's writings appealed to Bishop Andrewes and both early Stuart monarchs, their audience also included the liberal lay theologians of the Great Tew circle; Edward Coke, champion of the common law and ancient constitution; the Puritan Richard Baxter; the Cromwellian John Hall; the philosopher John Locke; and William Walwyn — a friend of Lilburne, Leveller pamphleteer, and popular agitator, whose 1649 spiritual autobiography (written, not surprisingly, in prison) recounts how he "had, as it were, without book . . . those peeces annexed to Mr. Hooker's Ecclesiasticall poUicy: hearing, and reading continually."[®]

But to claim that Hooker did not address an elite audience on behalf of a repressive establishment reopens basic questions about the purpose and context of the Lawes. In particular, it reopens the question Helgerson himself raises about its "imagined community" — about what sorts of people get included or excluded, privileged or marginalized in Hooker's text. For as Helgerson convincingly argues, debate over "the inclusion or exclusion of various social groups from privileged participation in the . . . community and its representations" dominates early modern constructions of English national identity — an identity defined as much by religious as civic commitments.[^]

It is not, however, self-evident that Hooker was much interested in community. The Lawes does not directly engage the primary modern senses of the term: whether Helgerson's loosely Marxist class-based notion or Benedict Anderson's "deep, horizontal comradeship" or the support-

* Eccleshall, "Peculiarities" 71-73, 88, 92; Thomas Fuller, *Church History of Britain*, in *Thomas Fuller: Selections*, ed. E. K. Broadus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), 126; Hugh Trevor-Roper, *Renaissance Essays* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1985), 104; William Walwyn, *The Leveller Tracts, 1647-1653*, ed. William Haller

¹ Helgerson, *Forms*, 9-10, 226.

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group model endemic to contemporary ecclesiology.¹⁰ The *Lawes* contains little on social ethics, parochial sociability, or class-tensions; while it meticulously explores issues of socio-political structure, these do not belong to what is ordinarily meant by "community."

At this point, it may be helpful to take a different tack: to attempt, before turning to the imagined community of the *Lawes*, to recover what was at issue and at stake in sixteenth-century debates over Christian community. In order to do this, however, I need to begin somewhat earlier — with the Roman polymath Varro's contrast between "physical" (that is, natural) and "civic" religion.¹¹ According to Saint Augustine, who summarizes Varro's now lost *Antiquities*, Varro held that civic religion, with its mix of fable, superstition, and ritual, was a stratagem devised by intellectuals and politicians to "bring the populace under control and keep them there."¹² Varro himself, Augustine adds, implied that he found civic theology contemptible, although he concealed his distaste in order "to encourage the common people to honour the gods."¹³ Natural theology, conversely, he considered the "special preserve of philosophers," whose truths were "too demanding for the common folk," and, in any case, "there are many truths which it is not expedient for the general public to know, and, further, many falsehoods which it is good for the people to believe true."¹⁴ For Varro there are thus two types of religion: the enlightened theology of the philosophers and the mythic/magic paganism of the civic cults.

This division, moreover, is itself simply one version of the commonplace ancient distinction between elite and popular piety. Polybius thus explains that "if it were possible to form a state wholly of philosophers" religious spectacles and superstitions would be unnecessary, "but seeing that every multitude is fickle, and full of lawless desires . . . the only resource is to keep them in check by mysterious terrors and scenic effects of this sort."¹⁵ Livy similarly describes how the early Roman king Numa

¹⁰ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the*

Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 7.

" St. Augustine, *The City of God*, ed. David Knowles, trans. Henry Bettenson (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972), 6.5. Varro actually divides religion into physical, civil, and poetic, but the latter category does not pertain to this discussion.

^ Ibid., 4.32.

^ Ibid., 4.31.

^ Ibid., 4.31, 6.5-6.

^ Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, trans. Evelyn Shuckburgh (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1962), 6.56.

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Pompilius invented "marvellous" tales to inculcate "fear of the gods," this being the only way to civilize "a mob as rough and ignorant as the Romans were in those days." Classical writers by and large simply take as self-evident that popular religion is, as Seneca puts it, a "matter of custom, having little connection with truth." ^

Much of Augustine's *City of God*, in turn, offers a massive and explicit critique of this ancient division between popular and elite piety. What Augustine says is that "any old woman, as a baptized Christian, now knew more about the true nature of the invisible world . . . [than] the most learned of ... philosophers."® Augustine tirelessly insists that Christianity is a "universal way ... by which all souls are liberated," for the "law of God" was given "not to one man, not to a few sages, but to the whole nation, an immense people." Similarly, his anti-Donatist writings argue, according to Peter Brown's eloquent surrmiary, on behalf of

the average good Catholic layman . . . who slept with his wife, faute de mieux, and often just for the pleasure of it; touchy on points of honour, given to vendettas; not a landgrabber, but capable of fighting to keep hold of his own property, though only in the bishop's court; and, for all that, a good Christian in Augustine's sense, 'looking on himself as a disgrace, and giving the glory to God.'^

Augustine's antipathy to the spiritual elitism of the ancient philosophers stands behind his definition of Christian *communitas*.

Whereas for Aristotle, true political community is based on friendship among equals (philia), for Augustine, the members of the church are "united by a common agreement on the objects of their love," a love binding those who are socially, intellectually, and even morally unequal into a single "people."

Augustine's "Christian populism" — to borrow Brown's wonderful phrase — dominates subsequent conceptions of the Church, transmitting a

¹⁶ Livy, *The Early History of Rome: Books I-V of "The History of Rome from its Foundation"* trans. Aubrey de Selincourt (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1960), 54.

¹⁷ Quoted in Augustine, *City of God*, 250-51.

¹⁸ Peter Brown, *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 73-74; cf. Augustine, *The City of God*, 10.11.

¹⁹ Augustine, *City of God*, 8.10, 10.32, 10.13.

²⁰ Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1967), 348.

²¹ Augustine, *City of God*, 19.24.

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vision of Christian community as that which overcomes the ancient opposition between the gods of the city and the god of the philosophers. But the Reformation reproblematises this ecclesiology along confessional lines. Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, that is, develop crucially different models of the relation between popular and elite religion. Significantly, a lengthy and thoughtful analysis of this difference can be found in a work Hugh Trevor-Roper terms the "political complement" to Hooker's *Laws: the Europae Speculum: Or a View or Survey of the State of Religion in the Western Parts of the World* written in 1599 by Edwin Sandys, Hooker's patron, student, friend, and editor.

Sandys's text, the product of his six-year Continental tour, presents a

sophisticated and severely demystified account of how the Roman church works, focusing on the ideological, economic, and political mechanisms sustaining the papal imperium. In particular, Sandys analyzes Roman Catholicism as a form of popular religion — like all popular religions, exploiting splendid and lavishly emotional rituals to appeal to the religious sensibilities of Helgerson's "unreasoning and vulgar multitude." Rome has, he explains, "well-nigh infinite" ways "to ravish all affections," utilizing whatever "miracles [can work] with the credulous, what visions with the fantastical]; what gorgeoussesse of shews with the vulgar and simple, what multitude of Ceremonies with the superstitious and ignorant."^^

However, the Roman Church has not, Sandys makes clear, lapsed back into the ancient dichotomy of vulgar and philosophic piety. Instead the papal version of Christian populism rests on a strikingly anti-rationalist epistemology that denies theological learning any ultimate advantage over simple faith — any privileged access to Truth— for the proofs of Christianity, according to Roman apologists, "are no other than probable, and of all probable proofes the Churches testimonie is most probable." Hence, Sandys reports, Rome teaches that

Christianitie is a doctrine of faith, a doctrine whereof all men even children are capable Meane had [God's] regard beene of the vulgar people . . . whose capacity will not suffice to sound the deepe and hidden mysteries of divinity ... if there were not other whose authority they might relye on. Blessed therefore are they

^^ Trevor-Roper, *Renaissance Essays*, 111.

^^ [Edwin Sandys], *Europae speculum: or a view or survey of the state of relⁿ in the Westeme parts of the world* (London, 1637), 34-35.

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which beleeeve and have not scene: the merit of whose religious humility and obedience, doth exceed perhaps in honour and acceptance before God, the subtill and profound knowledge of many other.^!"*

This fideism grounds the Roman Church's demand for implicit obedience, its hostility to rational inquiry, and its populist appeal to the senses and emotions. Like Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor, the papacy justifies its empire over souls as solicitude— God's solicitude—for "the vulgar people." In both cases, however, this miracle of inclusiveness has its price; Rome, Sandys concludes, lacks "nothing save onely truth and sincerity. "^^

Hence Sandys sees the Reformation as above all a violent reaction against the pious frauds employed by Rome to trick the ignorant and credulous into obedience. The Reformation, that is, resulted from the humanist discovery of papal "untruth": its "Legends of Saints and tales at which children with us would smile," its "jugling in their Images to make them weepe, sweate and bleed," its "falsifying and forgery in all matters of antiquity, thrusting in, cutting out, suppressing true, suborning feyned writings, as their tumes did require"- all of which evince "how small reckoning they make of truth. "^^ Conversely, for Sandys the religion of Protestants rests on the humanist imperative to "overbeare" the lies and forgeries of papistry with "the streames of the evidence of reason"; the Protestant, unlike his adversaries, thinks "truth the only durable armor of prooffe" and rests his case on the "unity of Verity. "^^

Sandys clearly shares this protestant humanist commitment, but he also notes that the Reformation had by and large failed because it neglected to develop religious forms capable of reaching the hearts of the people. Its leaders, he observes.

^* Sandys, *Europae speculum*, 28-32. Descartes thus explains that he decided not to waste his talents on theology since it is "a most highly assured fact that the road is not less open to the most ignorant than to the most learned" {*Discourse on Method*, trans. E. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, in *The European Philosophers from Descartes to Nietzsche*, ed. Monroe Beardsley [New York: Modern Library, 1960], 9). See also Pascal's observation: "Other religions, like those of the heathen, are more popular, for they consist in externals, but they are not for clever men. A purely intellectual religion would be more appropriate to the clever, but would be no good for the people. The Christian religion alone is appropriate for all, being a blend of external and internal" {*Pensees*, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer [Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1966], 99).

^^ Sandys, *Europae speculum*, 98.

" Ibid., 8. 27, 89-90, 99.

" Ibid., 86, 102, 211.

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did cut out in such sort their reformation of ReUgion ... in all outward Religious services and ceremonies, in government and Church discipline; to strive to bee as unlike to the Papacie as was possible . . . [lest they] seeme to any to bee imitators of their wis- dome, whose wickednesse they so much abhorred: much like to a stout hearted and stiff-witted Captaine, who scornes to imitate any stratageme before used by the enemy, though the putting it in exploit might give him assured victory.®

Protestantism persuades those who value reason and evidence, not the "simpler sort" who need "outward state and glory" to "engender, quick' en, encrease and nourish" their devotion.^^

Sandys's critique points to the central weakness of advanced ProteS' tantism in late Tudor England. Puritanism's humanist emphases on edification and reformation of manners, coupled with its predestinarian theology, encouraged an exclusive ecclesiology that tended to "identify the church militant with a select company of saints who are separated from the world by virtue of their faith and holy conduct"; church mem- bership, Walter Travers explains, should be restricted to the "lovers and professors of the truth. "^^ The stress on "truth" here is significant; like Sandys's humanistic Protestantism, Travers's scripturalism "undercut the status and the prospects of the unthinking. Good works and worship could be habitual; saving faith could not: it required understanding, decision, interior conviction; it required informed belief. "^^ This sort of ethical, inward, and informed piety made few concessions to the "simpler sort" and their need for "outward state and glory." Both in practice and in principle, Elizabethan Puritanism drove a wedge between elite and popular religion, between godly and ordinary Christians, between learned ministers and their incorrigibly superstitious congregations.

^» Ibid., 75.

^9 Ibid., 9-10.

^ Stephen Brachlow, *The Communion of Saints: Radical Puritan and Separatist Ecclesiology, 1570-1625* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), 116, 119; cf. Catharine Davies, "'Poor Persecuted Little Flock' or 'Commonwealth of Christians': Edwardian Protestant Concepts of the Church," in *Protestantism and the National Church in Sixteenth-Century England*, ed. Peter Lake and Maria Dowling (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 80.

^ Christopher Haigh, *English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society under the Tudors* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 286.

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While men like Cartwright and Travers "labor amongst the people to divide the worde," Hooker remarks, "they make the worde a meane to divide and distract the people" (V.81.11; 2:488.27-489.1). Throughout the *Lawes*, he is clearly troubled by the exclusivity of the Puritan platform, worrying that it "hath bred /lig/i tearmes of separation betweene sych and the rest of the world, whereby the one sort are named The brethren, The godlie, and so forth, the other worldlings, timeservers, pkasers of men not of God, with such like" (Pref. 3.11; 1:18.14-17). In this sense, the *Lawes* is haunted by the problem of community— by the need to overcome the tension between popular and elite religion. Hooker's own position with respect to the competing Reformed and Counter-Reformation models of Christian community, however, seems confusing, if not confused.

Particularly in Book V, the *Lawes* supports what Sandys would have considered Romanist populism. Hooker thus insists that "the tender kindnes of the Church of God" reaches out "to help the weaker sorte which are by so greate oddes mo in number, although some fewe of the perfecter and stronger may be therewith for a tyme displeased" (V.35.2; 2:144.18-22). He thus defends the sign of the cross on the grounds that "the rare perfection of a fewe" must "condescend unto common imbecil- litie" (V.65.10; 2:310.15-16) and praises church music for its ability to rouse "grosser and heavier mindes whome bare wordes doe not easily move" (V.38.3; 2:153.12-13). External ceremonies and signs are legitimate because the church ought not "despise no not the meanest helpes that serve though it be but in the verie lowest degree of furtherance towards the highest services that God doth require at our handes" (V.65.10; 2:310.8-11). Hooker

likewise movingly celebrates the holiness of beauty and of an intensely emotional piety, whose "inflamed motions of delight" and "teares of devout joy" he evidently prefers to "curious and intricate speculations" (V.25.2; 2:114.25-26. V.67.3; 2:332.20-21).^{^^}

This defense of popular religion is of a piece with Hooker's unusually inclusive view of church membership; as Anthony Milton has pointed out. Hooker defines the church "merely in terms of the outward (rather than the true, or pure) profession of Christianity."[^] If, according to Hooker,

^{^^} See Peter Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whit[^] to Hooker* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 165.

[^] Anthony Milton, "The Church of England, Rome, and the Tme Church: TTie

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the Elizabethan Settlement assumes that every member of the English nation also belongs to the English church, Christian charity further assumes that "all men with whome wee live" either are or may become children of God (V.49.2; 2:203.15-22. VIII. 1.2). As a consequence or corollary of this permissive ecclesiology, Hooker displays striking uncon- cern for a general reformation of manners — the crackdown on drunkards, beggars, blasphemers, loiterers, fornicators, and "contemners of true religion" central to the disciplinary agenda.^{^^} Although the Lawes does not discuss remedies (or punishments) for the weaknesses of the flesh, Hooker's approach to such frailties is implicit in his defense of church music. Since mankind finds virtue difficult and unpleasant, he observes,

it pleased the wisdom of the same spirite to borrowe from melodie that pleasure, which mingled ivith heavenly mysteries, causeth the smoothnes ar\ d softnes of that which toucheth the eare, to conveye as it were by stelth the treasure of good things into mans minde. (V.38.3; 2:153.19- 23, translating Basil the Great)

Rather than purify the church of suspect pleasures by prohibiting them, Hooker endeavors, as it were, to appropriate them — a strategy with marked affinities to Herbert's attempt to wash, dress, and bring

to church the "lovely enchanting language" of the stewes. ^^ Hooker's defense of the sensible and external beauty of holiness rests on Augustinian rather than aesthetic bases; the Lawes counters the exclusionary rigor of Puritan ecclesiology by justifying the sensuous and ceremonial worship of Christian populism.

The Lawes, unlike Sandys's Roman church, also defends a form of political populism. Hooker not only asserts that all persons have the capacity to discern "things absolutely unto all mens salvation necessarie" (Pref. 3.2; 1:13.8) but also that all persons, or at least all Englishpersons, "are in no subjection but such as willingly themselves have condescended unto for their own most behoof and securitie" (VIII. 3. 2 IKeble 2.71; 3:336.23-25). Hooker's claim that laws derive their authority from consent of the whole political community — and hence not from any divine right

Demise of a Jacobean Consensus," in *The Early Stuart Church, 1603-1642*, ed. Kenneth Fincham (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1993), 206.

^^ See David Little, *Religion, Order, and Law. A Study in Fre'Revolutionarj England* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 100, 77 n. 175.

^^ Herbert, "The Forerunners," in *Major Foets of the Earlier Seventeenth Century*, ed. Barbara Lewalski and Andrew Sabol (Indianapolis: Odyssey Press, 1973), 366.

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vested in kings— has often been remarked upon (1.10.8, VIII.6.11). Like the Levellers half a century later, Hooker rests his case on the "vulgar axi' ome" of canon law: "Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet" (Vni.6.7 IKeble 6.81; 3:393.20-21). Moreover, Hooker applies this consensual theory of law to ecclesiastical polity, insisting that the power "to make church lawes" belongs to "the whole intire body of that church for which they are made" (VIII.6.1; 3:386.4-6).

Hooker is not, however, a leveller; nor is he a crypto-fideist, crypto-Catholic populist. Unlike Sandys's papal theologians with their piaie fraudes, childish fables, and general disregard for reason, evidence,

and truth. Hooker rests his case on humanist erudition and Thomist rational-ism. Whatever its concessions to the "simpler sort," the whole point of the Lawes — governing its argument and implicit in its method and style — is that philological training, extensive familiarity with sacred and profane learning, and solid grounding in logic are requisite for framing or judging ecclesiastical polities. The Lawes, that is, assumes the same elitist human-ism that Sandys considers the distinctive feature of Protestantism.

The Lawes makes no attempt to conceal the political corollaries of this position. Although even "grosse and popular capacities" can grasp basic moral truths— love thy neighbor, honor thy parents, refrain from murder, and so forth— those whom Hooker terms the "vulgar sort" or "common multitude" have neither the knowledge nor the deliberative skill to adapt such general principles to specific cases and historical contexts; hence since "men of common capacity . . . are not able (for how should they?) to disceme what things are fittest for each kind and state of regiment," it follows that "none but wise men be admitted ... to devise lawes. "" Nor are ordinary Christians competent judges in ecclesiastical matters; in an unusually harsh and anxious passage. Hooker remarks that the Puritan contempt for merely human authority has produced a situation where

a man whose capacitie will scarce serve him to utter five wordes in sensible maner, blusheth not in any doubt concerning matter of scripture to thinke his own bare Yea, as good as the Nay of all the wise, grave, and learned judgements that are in the whole world. Which insolency must be repress, or it will be the verie bane of Christian religion. aL7.6; 1:183.14-19)

^* V.9.2-3, 1.10.7, Pref. 3.2, Pref. 4.4-6; cf. Helgerson, *Forms*, 273.

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The Lawes thus offers two seemingly antithetic versions of community. On the one hand, Hooker argues for a liturgical and political populism; that is, he defends both the affective ritualism of popular piety and derivation of all legitimate authority from popular consent. On the other, he rejects the fideistic valorization of implicit faith over learning and logic, disallows the political capacities of the "common multitude," and restricts active participation in the

government of either church or state to the well-born and the wise. Although Hooker consistently avoids the sort of spiritual elitism he associated with Puritanism, he defends the humanist elitism that, a few years later, Sandys would associate with Protestantism.

Put this way, the Lawes betrays what William Bouwsma has called a "promiscuous mixture of incompatible impulses."^^ Some of the contradictions, however, are merely apparent. In Aristotelian political theory, whose general outlines Hooker borrows, rule by elites and consensual government are not mutually exclusive alternatives; rather the type of regime that Aristotle calls polity or constitutional government— and which he considers best among existing regimes— combines aristocratic and democratic/populist elements along lines similar to those Hooker sketches in the Lawes.^ In a constitutional government, according to Aristotle, an elite of birth and ability alone hold office in the polls, although the whole body of citizens participates in electing them. Hooker speaks of popular consent rather than popular elections, but in general he preserves the Aristotelian division of labor between an elite, who frame the laws, and the people, whose assent is required to give such proposed legislation its constraining force:

The most naturall and religious course in making of lawes is that the matter of them be taken from the judgment of the wisest in those thinges which they are to concerne — Howbeit when all which the wisdom of all sortes can doe is done for devising of lawes in the Church it is the generall consent of all that giveth them the forme and vigor of lawes without which they could be no more unto us then the Counseles of Physitions to the sick. (VIII.6. 11; 3:403.10-22)

^^ William Bouwsma, "Richard Hooker in the Context of European Cultural History," above, 43.

^^ Aristotle, *Politics*, 3.11, 4.8, trans. B. Jowett, in vol. 2 of *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).

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Hooker's model of both secular and ecclesiastical polity derives from this Aristotelian republicanism, which attempts to steer a middle course between mob-rule and oligarchic tyranny by combining

democratic and aristocratic elements into a single "mixed constitution."[^] Calvinist ecclesiology, oddly enough, derives from the same tradition. History has many ironies, not the least of which is that Cartwright and Hooker share the same basic Aristotelian paradigm. Cartwright himself points out this lineage, noting that the Presbyterian discipline "in respect of the ancients and pastors that govern ... is an aristocracy, or the rule of the best men; and, in respect that the people are not secluded, but have their interest in church matters, it is a democracy, or a popular estate."^{^^} Hooker, in turn, objects to the Genevan model on the ground that it is excessively aristocratic; he thus comments that despite its republican pretensions, Calvinist ecclesiology actually gives all real power to a clerical elite, whereas in the Church of England "the people have commonly far more sway and force then with them" (VII.14.10; 3:225.30-32).!^{^*}

But neither Hooker's state nor his state-church can be termed a "community." For Cartwright, and for English Puritanism in general, the true church must be a voluntary society; however exclusive or stiff its criteria for admission, its members are "the brethren," a freely chosen association of kindred spirits. The true church is thus a community in the full Aristotelian sense: a population united by the bonds of *homonoia* and *philia*., of likemindedness and friendship.^{!*} Although Hooker's church is inclusive — or rather, precisely because it is inclusive — it is also fundamental- ly and essentially a coercive institution, employing the "rodd of corporall punishment" to repress schism, dissidence, heresy, and all other such outbursts of individual dissent and ambition (VIII. 3. 5 [Keble 3.4];

" Hooker is, of course, not a republican; rather, like many medieval and Renaissance political theorists, he combines the Aristotelian analyses of polity and constitutional monarchy {Politics 3.16}; the result closely resembles Polybius's account of the Roman constitution in Book 6 of *The Histories*.

[^] Quoted in Little, *Religion*, 94; cf. Peter Lake, *Anglicans*, 212; "Presbyterianism, the Ideal of a National Church and the Argument from Divine Right," in *Protestantism and the National Church in Sixteenth-Century England*, ed. Peter Lake and Maria Dowling (London: Croon Helm, 1987), 202.

^{!*} Lake thus cormnents that "any English monarch thinking of endorsing Hooker's opinions needed to read the small print rather carefully" (*Anglicans*, 225). On the "aristocratic" clericalism of

Calvinist ecclesiology, see Little, *Religion*, 71-73, 77n., 88, 93.

*^ Aristotle, *Politics*, 2.4-5, 4.11. Cf. Little, *Religion*, 88, 91.

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3:354.25).^ Societies, whether civil or ecclesiastical, are maintained by power, not philia. Hooker makes the point quite explicitly: "Jurisdiction," he remarks, "is a yoke which lawe hath imposed on the neckes of men, in such sorte that they must indure it for the good of others, how contrarie soever it be to theire owne particular appetites and inclynations" — or more succinctly, "jurisdiction bridleth men against theire willes" (V.62.16; 2:282.33-283.4). The church is not a community but a polity.

For Hooker, the members of the Church of England apparently need not be likeminded nor view themselves as brethren. The Lawes differs from both classical republicanism and Protestant ecclesiology precisely insofar as it ignores the fraternal, gemeinschaftliche aspects of collective existence. So does Hooker have a notion of community?

In one way, this question seems rather easy to answer, since Hooker's defense of the Church of England's liturgy, sacraments, ritual, and ceremonies is, as we have seen, suffused by concern for Christian community. What remains unclear, however, is the connection between this Prayer Book piety and Hooker's ecclesiastical polity. One need not, moreover, be Machiavelli to suspect that the former serves primarily as an instrument of the latter.

To see how these devotional practices might have aims beyond "window dressing the command structure of English society" requires looking at Hooker's theory of the church. Book VIII of the Lawes makes a fairly traditional distinction between the visible, institutional state-church and the invisible church or mystical body of Christ, administered by "the secret inward influence" of divine grace (VIII.4.5; 2:362.21).'^* Book V, however, defines the church as a "visible mysticall bodie" (V.24.1; 2:111.26). This unusual definition, which identifies "the church" neither with Elizabeth's ecclesiastical polity nor with the invisible and inward operations of grace, posits an empirical association (a "visible bodie") structured by non-empirical ("mysticall") relations.

Book V can be viewed as an extended gloss on this unfamiliar entity. For Hooker, the visible, public worship of the church — its liturgy,

prayers, and sacraments — creates a "societie supernaturall" (1.15.2; 1:131.11) structured along a vertical axis and mediated by "Angels of enter corse and

*^ See also Lawes Pref. 6.3, VII.3.1, VII.5.2-4, VII.13.4, VII.18.5.

** Lake dius notes that late sixteenth-century confomist theologians typically "maintain the crucial gap between the external government of the church and Christ's spiritual body or kingdom" ("Presbyterianism," 217).

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comerce betwene God and us" (V.23.1; 2:110.14).^^ In the sacraments, Christ "imparteth him selfe even his whole intire person . . . unto everie soule that receiveth him" (V.67.7; 2:335.34-35); the "power of the ministerie of God . . . rayseth men from the earth and bringeth God him selfe down from heaven" (V.77.1; 2:425.4-6). The visible mystical body is a "societie of soules" bound not by Anderson's "horizontal comradeship" but by vertical communion (V.77.2; 2:425.15). And these vertical tela- tions make possible the incorporation of the simpler sort and their betters into a single community, one unified by something more than the yoke and bridle of jurisdiction.

This relation of mystical body to Christian community discloses itself in the moving prosopopoeia that climaxes Hooker's discussion of the Eucharist. On the face of it, this seems a paradoxical claim; whereas for Bishop Jewel, the Eucharist is "the sacrament of christian society, whereby we understand what sincere love ought to be betwixt the true communi- cants" and for Cartwright "a declaration . . . that we are at one with our brethren,"*^ Hooker conspicuously avoids describing the sacrament as creating or signifying mutual friendship among the congregants. Yet community figures crucially in Hooker's account of the Eucharist. The speaker of the magnificent concluding passages is, Hooker notes, "that minde which . . . hath not perhapes the leasure, perhapes not the witt nor capacitie to tread out so endles mazes, as the intricate disputes of this cause have led men into" (V.67.12; 2:340.15-19). The speaker, that is, belongs among the simpler sort; as Brian Vickers has observed, Hooker here describes "the needs of the ordinary Christian."^^ In this passage, however, the voice of popular

piety expresses an intense spiritual interi- ority and passionate intuition of divine presence; it expresses the highest capacities of heart and mind.

"Let curious and sharp witted men beat their heades about what questions them selves will, the verie letter of the worde of Christ giveth plaine securitie that these mysteries doe as nailes fasten us to his verie crosse, that by them wee draw out . . . even the blood of his goared side, in the woundes of our redemer wee there dip our

*^ I have been unable to persuade myself that "intercourse" and "commerce" here have their modern\ sexual/economic connotations.

^ Jewel, *Certain Sermons or Homilies* (London, 1864), 481-83; quoted in Booty's *Intro to Lau/es V*; FLE 6:201. See also Little, *Religion*, 69, 91; Lake, *Anglicans*, 181.

^^ Brian Vickers, "Public and Private Rhetoric in Hooker's *Lauies*," above, 121, 144.

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tongues, wee are died redd both within and without, our hunger is satisfied and our thirst for ever quenched this bread hath in it

more then the substance which our eyes behold, this cup hallowed with soUemne benediction availeth to the endles life and wellfare both of soule and bodie , . . with touching it sanctifieth, it enlightneth with beliefe, it trulie conformeth us unto the image of Jesus Christ." (V.67.12; 2:343.5-21; 145n., above, for source)

This passage, moreover, does not merely register the popular voice. As Vickers has likewise observed, it articulates Hooker's own response to the holy. In this imagined moment of sacramental participation the difference between the inner voice of Augustine's old woman and the judicious humanist theologian vanishes. One cannot distinguish the language of popular and elite devotion — a rhetorical *trompe l'oeil* that enacts the community it images. Hooker's prose here belongs to the Augustinian *sermo humilis* with its unclassical synthesis of low and high styles that adumbrates both theological and congregational at-one-ment. For the utterly private experience of transcendent communion that Hooker records is the basis of community. George Herbert's "Faith" makes the same point:

A peasant may beleive, as much As a great Cleark, and reach the highest stature. Thus dost thou make proud knowledge bend and crouch,

While grace fills up uneven Nature.^®

Peasants and philosophers share the same access to Truth, the same object of love, the same inwardness; the interior reciprocities of faith

and grace, which level (as Herbert's metaphor implies) the "natural" hierarchies of estate and education, triangulate a "societie of soules" as radii link different points on a circumference via a common center.

Hence in the Lawes, ritual acts do not "declare" (i.e., signify) *gemeinschaft* but create it. Compassion, fellowship, and mutual love seem possible only when relations among persons are mediated by a "ghostly fellowship with God and Christ and Saints" (VIII.4.6; 3:365.19, quoting 1 John 1:3); conversely, the text consistently politicizes and demystifies horizontal relationships. But the chapters on public worship celebrate the liturgical exfoliation of inwardness into community. Thus antiphonal psalmody —

** George Herbert, "Faith" 11. 29-32, in *Major Poets*, 230.

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where the minister "joyfullie beginneth" and the congregation "with like alacritie followe, dividinge betwene them the sentences wherewith they strive which shall most showe his own and stirre up others zeale to the glorie of that God whose name they magnifie" — itself creates bonds of "love insoluble, and . . . inviolable amitie ... in each of the people to- wardes other, [and] in them all towards their pastor, and in their pastor towards everie of them" (V.39.1; 2:154.30-155.4, 154.20-24). The encomiastic warmth with which Hooker draws this scene recurs in subsequent evocations of the visible mystical body. The most striking (because least sacerdotal) of these occurs in Book 6, where Hooker is defending the early Christian practice of allowing any Christian to act as confessor for any other; although people usually are loathe to "sound the trumpett of their owne disgrace," in such lay confessionals

when thou doest . . . putt forth thy hands to the knees of thy brethren, thou touchest Christ, it is Christ unto whome thou art a suppliant: soe when they poxvre out their teares over them, it is even Christ that taketh compassion. (VI.4.7; 3:32.16-17, 24-27, quoting Tertullian)

As in the passage on Holy Communion, egalitarian community forms at the sites of transcendence. Or in Tyndale's beautiful formulation: "as a man feeleth God in himself, so is he to his neighbour."^{*}

Hooker's analysis of community evidently responds to the same

tenden- cy that troubled Sandys: the post-Reformation fissure of Augustinian ecclesiology into either the popular piety of fable and spectacle or the purified devotions of a moral, spiritual, and intellectual elite. Hooker pointedly opposes any tendency to define the true church in terms of freedom from superstition and Romish ceremony— or in terms of its mem- bers' godliness.^ At the same time, one could scarcely enlist Hooker on the side of pious fictions. As Helgerson notes, the Lawes relies on a rationalist and "aggressively demystifying" historicism that calls attention to the contingent origins and coercive mechanisms of ecclesiastical polity. But within, alongside, or athwart (Hooker never explains the exact

^ William Tyndale, *The Parable of Oxe Wicked Mammon* (1527) in *Doctrinal Treatises and Introductions to Different Portions of The Holy Scripture*, 2 vols., ed., Henry Walter, The Parker Society (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1848), 1:58.

Hooker does not, of course, favor superstition, whose causes and dangers he analyzes in Lawes V.3, but neither does he claim, as Calvin does (*Instit.* 1.4), that superstitious devotion per se "mocks God" or cuts one off from the true church.

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relationship) the church's "external regiment," the Lawes posits a visible mystical body of persons united by common agreement on the objects of their love: a community realized in antiphonal chant, sacramental partici- pation, and pastoral care. Hooker views the church as primarily a house of prayer and sacramental worship; he is, moreover, the first Elizabethan Protestant to define the church in this way.^ This vision is central to the Lawes because the love and longing for God that these acts embody constitutes the common bond linking vulgar and learned, rich and poor, Whitgift and Walwyn, into the mystical body of Christ; without this bond, the church would be simply a politique institution for insuring conformity to state-ideology: Varro's *reli'o civilis*.

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The discussion thus far suggests two more general observations on the Tudor church and its historians. The first concerns the current identifica- tion of popular culture with resistance to hegemonic power,

the second pertains to the role played by religion in early modern constructions of nationhood and national identity.

The confrontational model of class relations informing recent work on popular culture goes back to classical political thought — to writers like Aristotle and Livy who focus explicitly and intently on the struggles between rich and poor, patrician and plebeian. But a second representational paradigm, one likewise traceable to classical sources, does not associate popular culture with opposition to the dominant structures of power and privilege but with the affective, tangible, ritualized, and customary; "the people," in this sense, are defined by their lack of abstract, critical rationality. Furthermore, since, as Hooker points out, the emotions fall under the "inferior powers of the soule" (V.34.1; 2:140.18), on this model, "subjectivity" or affective inwardness belongs within the popular domain — a categorization that seems more historically defensible than the "Marxist" association of interiority with bourgeois individualism.

These two versions of the elite/popular dichotomy are not mutually exclusive; Hooker employs both, as do Plato and Livy. But they do pick out different problems. Narratives of class-tension and popular resistance primarily concern access to goods and power. The contrast between high and demotic culture concerns access to truth. From the perspective of

^ Collinson, "Hooker and the Elizabethan Establishment," 175.

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those who have escaped the shadowy cave into the sunlight, "popular" (i.e., base, demotic, vulgar, rude, clownish, common) does not refer to peasants hurling pitchforks but to the region of lies, blind custom, and false-consciousness. Classical writers assume this invidious contrast. But Augustine clearly rejects it and makes the rejection a fundamental characteristic of the church. For Augustine, as for Herbert, the doctrine of justification by faith, rather than works or gnosis, "fills up uneven Nature," so that those who cannot read may still know the Truth.

Even at its most pejorative, this version of the popular/elite antithesis presupposes that "the people" develop traditions, rituals, myths, and other symbolic forms. It represents the lower orders in terms of their

styles of knowing and feeling, their modes of apprehending the divine, their beliefs, desires, and practices. It portrays them as capable of emotions other than resentment, skepticism, and hostility. Although men like Varro consider demotic beliefs and practices invalid, they nevertheless consider them.

Conversely, the modern obsession with subversive and revolutionary change has discouraged inquiry into popular beliefs, unless, like witchcraft or presbyterianism, they seem to threaten the established order. But this tendency to resolve Tudor/Stuart religion into the dialectic of popular resistance and government repression renders invisible what it purports to illuminate: the role played by religion in early modern state formation. That the Crown attempted to reinforce political unification by imposing religious uniformity is evident. It is equally evident that this project met with opposition. The hagiographies, autobiographies, parish records, devotional manuals, theological polemics, and pastoral handbooks written between the late Middle Ages and the Restoration document the ensuing conflicts. But they primarily document something else: the proliferation of local experiments in sacred community, experiments sometimes at odds with the laws of ecclesiastical polity, sometimes not. Book V of Hooker's *Lawes* is itself one such experiment, as is the imagined community of his presbyterian antagonists.

The parochial landscape of early modern England is strewn with imagined and improvised communities. Eamon Duffy's *The Stripping of the Altars* profusely details the ways in which late medieval lay persons "appropriate, develop, and use the repertoire of inherited ritual to articulate their experience of community and their sense of the larger order and meaning of the world in which they lived": the lay-sponsored Corpus Christi processions lavishly adorned with banners, garlands, and lights; the bonfire on Saint Thomas eve with "long pies of mutton, and Pease Cods

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set out upon boards' "for the poor; and other such para-liturgical rites "of non auctorite, but of custom of folke."^^

The post-Reformation church was, of necessity, improvisational, although Protestant experiments in sacred community were distinctly less spectacular. But one can view the Reformation as a series of (often incompatible) attempts to evolve new forms of "holy

neighbourliness." Hooker, Cartwright, Ferrar, Herbert, Andrewes, Wren, Baxter all lovingly (and sometimes ruthlessly) endeavor to fashion visible mystical bodies. The domesticized monastery at Little Gidding is an experiment in sacred community, as is Baxter's Kidderminster parish, where on the Lord's days "you might hear an hundred families singing psalms and repeating sermons," where for a few years Baxter could hope that his successes might presage the transformation of England into "a land of saints and a pattern of holiness . . . and the unmatched paradise of the earth." Puritans and high-churchmen were notorious improvisors. Under Elizabeth and James, nonconformist parishes substitute Sabbatarianism and sermons for the calendar and liturgy of the Prayer Book, shielded from ecclesiastical authority by sympathetic Puritan aristocrats. Andrewes at Ely, Wren at Peterhouse, and Cosin at Durham experiment with incense, images, chasubles, chalices—rites and ornaments to elicit Hooker's "societie supernaturall."

In the localities — in parishes, prophesyings, homes, and chapels—early modern English Christians extemporize symbolic and social forms of sacred community designed to express their beliefs, ideals, and solidarities. These are varieties of popular religious experience: not because they have an exclusively lower class origin (although since the Tudor clergy came by

Eamon Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England c.1400- C.1580* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1992), 7, 18, 20, 44, 101, 138, 142.

The phrase is Duffy's, *Stripping*, 138.

* Richard Baxter, *The Autobiography of Richard Baxter, being the Reliquiae Baxterianae*, abridged from the folio (1696), ed. J. M. Lloyd Thomas (London: Dent, 1925), 77-79, 84; Lake thus remarks that "inscribed at the heart of the presbyterian project lay a moment of transcendence when the division between the internal and the external government of the church was dissolved and Christ's spiritual body became visible, embodied in the community of the godly" (*Tresbyterianism*, 200).

^ Ecclesiastical biographies and autobiographies supply the bulk of our information about the local forms of Tudor/Stuart religion, producing a somewhat misleadingly clericocentric picture. What material concerning lay piety (or impiety) exists, usually derives from

court records and therefore may give an equally misleading impression of rampant discontent and dissension.

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and large from the third estate, one cannot draw a hard line between clerical and demotic initiatives) but insofar as they are not imposed from above.[~] Thus in 1581, John Aylmer, bishop of London, found to his distress that only seven out of 350 Essex parishes performed their services identically.[~] While some of these experiments came in conflict with government agenda, most did not; such communities are, as it were, tangential to state-religion rather than opposed to it.^{^®}

These sacred communities are not exclusively local. Tudor/Stuart religion functions as a locus for multiple allegiances that do not coincide with national boundaries. Roman Catholicism, the Calvinist intemational, and, in a more subtle way, Hooker's patristic tradition provide authorities and identities not based in nationhood.

One can, I think, argue that early modern religion typically both creates and occupies spaces outside the jurisdiction of the state. Its various visible mystical bodies colonize the interstices of polity, erecting international, local, and vertical "societies of souls" that supplement (and potentially override) national identity. Such spaces include priest holes, conventicles, and Puritan domestic interiors, but also the apertures in public worship where one holds "g/iostl[^] fellowship with God and Christ and Saints," as well as "the soules most subtle roomes," which are not, as

^{^*} A survey of Essex parishes done in the late 1580's includes an illuminating list concerning the social origins of the Elizabethan clergy: "Mr Whiting, parson of Toppesfield, sometime a serving man; Mr Potts, parson of Tolleshunt Darcie, sometime a tailor; Mr Hickson of Munden, sometime a serving man; Mr Washer, parson of Upminster, sometime a grocer; Mr Hewet, parson of Copford, sometime an apothecary; Mr Ellis, curate of Abberton, sometime a linen draper; Mr Perkins, parson of South Hanningfield, sometime a fishmonger, now a button maker" (A. Tindal Hart, *The Country Clergy in Elizabethan and Stuart Times, 1558-1660* [London: Phoenix House, 1958], 24-25).

^{^^} All but three, however, used the Prayer Book (Hart, *Country Clergy*,

21, 23). In 1565 Grindal commented with evident frustration on the uncontrolled proliferation of liturgical experiments: "Some say the service and prayers in the chancel, others in the body of the church; some say the same in a seat made in the church, some in the pulpit with their faces to the people; some keep precisely to the order of the book, others intermeddle psalms in metre; some say in a surplice, others without a surplice; the Table standeth in the body of the church in some places, in others it standeth in the chancel . . . administration of the Communion is done by some with surplice and cap, some with surplice alone, others with none; some with chalice, some with a communion cup, others with a common cup; some with unleavened bread, some wiith leavened; some receive kneeling, others standing, others sitting . . . some with a square cap, some with a round cap, some with a button cap, some with a hat" (Hart, Country Clergy, 21).

^ Lake thus comments that English protestantism appears to have been "an ideology not well suited to produce a convincing rationale for a genuinely national church" ("Presbyterianism," 193).

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Aquinas points out, subject to state control.^ The point of intersection between the timeless and time is also the point of slippage between the domains of polity and community, subjection and subjectivity.

Hooker presents a test case for the claim that early modern English Christianity resists the hegemonic encroachments of the state. Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie defends the royal headship and argues that religion supplies the moral buttresses holding up the political order. There are passages in the Lawes, especially the sections on the "politique use of religion" (V.2.3; 2:25.24) that begin Book V, where Hooker sounds like Hobbes.^ Yet this argument for the political benefits of piety seems more a defensive maneuver than a guiding principle, since the rest of the book develops Hooker's concept of the visible mystical body, a concept pre-mised on the disjunction between "a societie and a societie supernaturall" (1.15.2; 1:131.10-11). While this imagined community emerges in the prescribed worship of the state-church, it slips away from institutional and politic structures precisely because the latter organize popular/elite relations in terms of jurisdiction, consent, law, and coercion, while the former deals with ghostly fellowships, affective interiority, sacerdotal mediation, leagues of amity created by antiphonal chant, societies of souls, the spiritual longings of ordinary Christians, and such things as are "not in the

power of man" (V.77.3; 2:426.9). If Hooker's church does not contest the Tudor status quo, neither does it reproduce it. As Peter Lake notes, Hooker invents this church.[^] It is an imagined community, and like other sacred communities imagined and improvised in early modern England, it lodges in the outskirts and interstices of the nation-state.

The state, not surprisingly, attempted to repossess these spaces. Divine right absolutism, which transforms the king's body politic into a visible corpus mysticum, and Hobbes's ultra-Erastian ecclesiology, with its call to revive the ancient *religio civilis*, locate the sacred in the sovereign in order to disallow its presence elsewhere.^{^^} Neither project, however, averted

^{^^} Herbert, "The H. Communion," I. 22, *Major Poets*, 232; Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 2a2ae, 104.5 in *St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics*, ed. and trans. Paul Sigmund (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), 75-76.

^{^^} This brief opening section has, I think, misled Booty to conclude that Hooker's defense of the Book of Common Prayer rests on the claim that "religion is necessary to the well-being of a commonwealth" (Intro, to *Lau/es V*, *FLE* 6:191). While Hooker clearly asserts this, he seems uncomfortable with its pragmatic Machiavellianism; he does not rest his case for the Elizabethan prayer book on its political utility.

^{*} Lake, *Anghcans*, 111.

^{^^} Hobbes, as befits a philosopher, is relatively consistent on this subject, but most

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the mid-century pandemic of imagined communities. Only with the Enlightenment does the existence of mystical bodies within forms of nationhood cease to raise compelling issues. Men like Spinoza, Hume, and Gibbon resurrect the ancient two-tier model of culture, with its "hard" division between the idols of the marketplace and the god of the philosophers.^{***} This division, which, as Peter Brown points out, has enjoyed a long shelf-life, relegated all manifestations of popular religion — a category now including the dissenting sects as well as papistry, Laudianism, and (at least by implication) Christianity tout a fait — to the regions of untruth as "of non auctorite, but of custom of

folke." The Enlightenment accepted the radical implications of the heresy Hooker thought he detected in Puritan thought, namely, that "the full redemption of the inward man . . . must needs belong unto knowledge onlie" (V.60.4; 2:257.2-4). Which is not to say that sacred communities withered away after the Restoration,[^] but that, shorn of epistemic validity, they no longer attracted serious attention, except of antiquarians or if armed.

Stuart absolutists were high-church clerics, who argued not only for divine right kingship but *jure divino* episcopacy, thus shifting rather than removing the point of slippage between political and sacred domains — an incoherence that Puritan critics cheerfully seized upon.

[^] Brown, *Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1982), 9-11.

[^] The 1994 Pacific Bell yellow pages for the western San Fernando Valley list seventy-four separate Christian denominations (including five types of Presbyterianism). My favorite entry is the advertisement for the Faith Baptist Church of Canoga Park, which proclaims: "We believe the KJV is the Word of God without error."

CHARLES WATTERSON DAVIS

I

"For conformities sake":

How Richard Hooker Used Fuzzy Logic

and Legal Rhetoric against Political Extremes

THE HIGH WATER MARK OF THE *Studies in Richard Hooker* volume twenty- four years ago has become a low water mark. Agreement on Hooker— like interest in him— may be at an all time low. Scholars of Hooker face a division between the old "hagiographer" and the new iconoclast. The crisis is one of belief. Do our professions honor Hooker enough to study him? Or does he represent merely a tradition of self-

satisfied authoritarian privilege?^

In a previous generation, critics had to disentangle Hooker from Locke's Enlightenment social contract and individual rights. Yet some recent critics have reshaped Hooker as a practitioner of what a post-

' Compare W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the Political Society*: Richard Hooker as a Political Thinker," in *S.R.H.*, 3-76, or Robert Eccleshall, "Richard Hooker and the Peculiarities of the English: The Reception of the Ecclesiastical Polity in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *History of Political Thought* 2.1 (Spring, 1981): 63-117, and Robert K. Faulkner, *Richard Hooker and the Politics of a Christian England* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1981), 5ff., or Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Good and Great Works of Richard Hooker," *The New York Review of Books* (24 November 1977), 50. Consider the paucity of articles on Hooker not by the editors of the Folger edition. Cf., W. Speed Hill, "Editing Richard Hooker: A Retrospective," *Sewanee Theological Review: A Celebration of Richard Hooker* 36.2 (Easter 1993): 192ff. Cargill Thompson (4-5) refers to the image from Izaak Walton of Hooker as a man raised above the political fray, the "saint" of the Anglican church. "Hagiography" has become a (derisive) refrain of the critics who dedicate themselves to shattering the hallowed figures of the (Anglo-Saxon) literary canon.

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modernist calls "Enlightenment politics," where absolutist policies are justified by appeal to universal rational principles, and the appeal to "reason" derives more from Machiavellian rhetoric than from God. Hooker then is a polemicist for the status quo — the centralized and disciplinary early modern state. Such a reading makes sense, if all individuals in the history of ideas are enmeshed in hierarchical, authoritarian institutions that define custom, law, reason, and will. The revolutionary plot of post-modern critics invalidates Hooker's apology for the Elizabethan church. Like them, Cargill Thompson twenty-four years ago ominously judged, "the nature of Hooker's achievement as a political philosopher is . . . open to question."⁶

Assumptions as to the course of politics influence political criticism. Reformation eschatology, once secularized into the notion of progress,

has mutated into Utopian visions of an end to history (e.g., Marx's ideal, where a morning doctor collects garbage after noon). The obverse of Utopian visions of the future may be a dystopian reading of the past. Hooker is then suspect because he challenges the Puritans' critique of the status quo (a critique which Hooker says conforms only to Utopian ideology instead of social practice).

Yet Hooker, too, challenges smug conformity to the politics of the status quo. As Henry Hallam reads him. Hooker helps develop constitutionally determined liberty, the very institution of freedom as we know it.[^] For Hooker "individual liberty" is not an inborn property but a social condition produced out of natural and social compulsions and constraints.[^] Thus, individual rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of

[^] Cargill Thompson, 3. See also 13-14; Brian Vickers, "Authority and Coercion in Elizabethan Thought," *Queen's Quarterly* 87.1 (Spring, 1980): 122; Anne D. Hall, "Richard Hooker and the Ceremonial Rhetoric of Silly Sooth," *Prose Studies* 11.2 (September, 1988): 25-26, 33-36. Cf. Faulkner, 2-3. The theme of the Enlightenment's deceitfulness finds an eloquent summation in Tony Smith, "Postmodernism: Theory and Practice," *Against the Current* (July/August 1993): 22. Modern readers of pre-revolutionary texts, no doubt, may fight l'ancien regime again, even in the anachronistic terms of Elizabethan drama or theology.

[^] In *The Constitutional History of England from the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of George II*, 5th London ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1867), chap. 4, 130-33. See also Faulkner, 1-2; and Trevor-Roper, "Good and Great," 48, 52-53; cf. Eccleshall, 64-65.

[^] Hooker may owe something to the influence of Cusa (the 1565 Basel edition— see Lau/es 1.8.3; l:84.m) for his notion that any "thing" or any state of being exists (has "identity," material substance, active potential, or phenomenal relation) only through contraction (that is, a constitutive delimitation of being, the finite formation of infinite

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happiness" are not "self-evident" truths that precede the state. They may be desirable ends for a well constituted society — if the people so choose. For Hooker, freedom to criticize the Elizabethan compromise

— in a constructively institutionalized way — is part both of the status quo and of the evolution of English society.

This theme of developmental political constitution adds perspective to the theme of individual rights. If one is the end desired, the other is the means toward that end. For Hooker, without social "engineering" (as he works it out in Books V-VIII), uplifting or comfortable ideals (such as the Puritans' truly Christian polity) cannot happen. The social institution is what moderates natural and social forces. Institutional compromises adapt social ideals to circumstances. No institution is identical to the ideal which first caused it. Yet even "conservative" historicism may use such an ideal to measure the quality of its institutions. To form such a critique, and to test its validity for local conditions, is the purpose of academic and parliamentary debate.

Is Richard Hooker a "political philosopher" after all? The "conservative" Hooker calls his "non-conformist" opponents to trial, saying that it is they who act "for conformities sake" {Lawes Pref. 4.4; 1:24.8-15}. He charges that they have it easy, criticizing the status quo, and praising pie-in-the-sky reform (1. 1.1). What does "conservative" mean, then, if not conformity?

Hooker's conservatism is methodological, not conventional. It serves Anglicans and Puritans both. His method assails any theological pretense to certainty, because (as in "fuzzy logic") a basic human condition is that all knowledge is conditional. All claims of truth, right, or right policy deserve critical caution. His method, deriving from common law, empha-

possibility, specific, particular, concrete conception). That notion has interesting implications for social "contract" theory, as well as for psychology, which could help explain how Hooker's approach to social contract theory differs, in underlying philosophical terms, from the Enlightenment terms (i.e., the latter's independent free agent and constrictive social institution) with which we still wrestle. For relevant aspects of Cusa's work see Ernst Cassirer, *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy*, trans. Mario Domandi (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 30 (for ecclesiastical ecumenism grounded in epistemology), and see my own chapter on Cusa in *"The Rhetoric of Romance: Poets Building 'Ethic' and 'Politic' Bridges in the Imagination, from 'Apostrophil and Stella' to 'The Winter's Tale' "* (Ph.D. diss., Duke Univ. [Ann Arbor: UMI, 1991]). See also Rowan Williams, *"Hooker: Philosopher, Anglican,*

Contemporary," in this volume.

^ See Bart Kosko, *Fuzzy Thinking: The New Science of Fuzzy Logic* (New York: Hyperion Publishing Co., 1993).

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sizes traditional means to political ends. We should reconcile existing material and efficient causes to the "groundes and first originall causes" of a law, especially when the goodness of that law is not now clear (e.g., 1.1.2; 1:57.6-20). Politically, conserving social materials and methods. Hooker favors reforming the status quo as necessary, rather than blindly "conforming" either to present power structures or to ideological convention and revolution. His argument is for the middle ground, the Golden Mean, between puritan idealist and absolutist Leviathan. Hooker uses I) prudent rhetoric, II) common law, and III) conditional epistemology to disable the ideologies of political extremism.

I. Careful Talk

Hooker's moderating "conservative" goal requires that his rhetoric be prudent. Thus, he invokes the challenging metaphor of a trial as the rhetorical context to govern both sides in the debate. He must, then, argue his own and opposing assumptions, subject to analysis and rejection. The metaphor implies that even adversarial readers serve as a jury. Such a context puts the author of the argument under special duress: as clerk of the court Hooker's duty is to record what the prosecution and defense might say, but as protagonist he must present a convincing case. In the Preface to the *Lawes* he needs to use what in court is praemonitory rhetoric, "fore-shadowing" his case against the Puritans and for the status quo, in order to predispose the reader towards him.

Any advocate has an epideictic purpose (to praise his own side and blame the other). Hooker's partisan claim is that the danger of any kind of separatist ideology is civil war (Pref. 8). To that point the Preface assails the puritan threat to Elizabeth's settlement (Pref. 1.2, 8.1-2). Critics now harp on this partisanship— without discovering its rationale. What makes Hooker castigate political extremism, however, also requires him to seek common ground with non-conformists (Pref. 2.10; 1:12.15-21. 1.1.3; 1:58.5-19). The latter had indeed desired a trial by disputation (Pref. 5.1- 2). Hooker thus recruits their own

opinion desiring a "definitive sentence" (Pref. 6.3; see Pref. 6.6) — in order to prepare them to accept it, should he win (see Pref. 1 > 3). What we need to understand is that Hooker both attacks them and invites their response, all in order to elicit a public debate, as his part in this social drama. It is the non-conformists who must respond to make the legal metaphor really work, and to avoid civil war.

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I.a) Method. Logically, Hooker's most useful legal tool is not admonitory but forensic, that is, a (philosophical) anatomy, "ripping" up the other position's roots, as well as his own (Pref. 1.3; 1:3.6-9. Pref. 3. I). The supposed rhetoric of "Enlightenment" in Book I may seem like a typical rationalist political subterfuge: Hooker describes what underlies and surpasses political disputes — "if the judgements of men doe but holde themselves in suspense" (1.1.2; 1:57.28-33). Book I does continue the political advocacy of the Preface — in the sense that Hooker identifies the common ground he shares with non-conformists (and is not merely partisan: Pref. 3.1; see 1.8.7-10). Since evidence in common law tends to be probable inference rather than certain truth (Pref. 6.3, 6.6. 1.3.1; 1:63.24- 26), judgment is based for Hooker on probable findings and social consensus, rather than truths which must simply be obeyed. Unlike most religious ideologues and advocates of the divine right of kings, he must cajole more than condemn.

Thus, in place of reformist zeal (whose invective breeds a "flaming" Europe), he offers judicious speech, based in prudent, practical judgment, aiming for peace. The rhetorical strategy of identifying extremes amongst one's opponents (e.g., separatists, Pref. 8.1-2; see Commentary for 1:36.30- -39.2) drives the reader to intuit the Golden Mean and embrace the judicious middle. If God favors peace (Pref. 1.1. Pref. 3.2; 1:14.6-7. Pref. 9.4), Hooker thinks, the religious way to win is not to fight at all.

The corollary (not stereotypical of "Enlightenment" rationalism) is that even the loser in court must understand the court's rationale (Pref. 3.1; 1:13.4-5). A psychological law explains why:

As opinions do cleave to the understanding and are in hart assented unto it is not in the power of any humane law to command them, because to prescribe what men shall think belongeth only unto God. (VIII.6.4 IKeble 6.5); 3:390.3-6)

Any trial ought to discover the truth of the charges being disputed, not further partisan ends.^ Yet Puritans, as the prosecution (Pref. 5.3; 1:28.8-

* See Faulkner, 52; cf. Vickers, "Coercion," 122— but see Paul E. Forte, "Richard Hooker's Theory of Law," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 12.2 (Fall, 1982): 135-36.

^ This legal conceit may be considered only a rhetorical instrument of Hooker's advocacy. He does establish both the rules of the game and the playing field on which to play. Hooker evokes the Puritans' "private judgement" (Pref. 6.3; see Pref. 3.1 and 8.4-5) and perfectionism (Pref. 4.4.) in order to modify them with a public trial's demand

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21), wishing to reform the English church, have the burden of proof—to gain consensus for the change of policy. Hooker's defense, then, is to show that the prosecution has not been jDersuasive. In a political cross-roads, however, both sides now must establish consensus in the Elizabethan public (Pref. 5.2-3, 6.6). Hooker's conceptual frame, at least, is rhetorically inclusive.

1.b) Politics. Hooker sets out to establish the conditions and principles by which Elizabethan customs are defensible. First, customs and rules are valid if they can be found to have reason, that is, be a local application of natural or divine law (Pref. 1.2; 1:2.17-24). Then they should appeal to those who see the light of reason (Pref. 3.4-10; Pref. 4; cf. Pref. 3.14-16). Second, if they are a social given, those customs and rules (for the time being) are politically and morally binding (Pref. 3.2, 5.2-3, 6.2-6). Orders in force are reasonable until orderly reason disbars them. Hooker addresses few invalid or unappealing customs®— except when he praises Calvin's re- formed polity, but rejects it for England (Pref. 2.7).

Hooker's vision of a prudent polity sees human reason working out the best possible invention or application of law to solve problems, in order to reach intended (happy, holy, and peacefril) ends. This is the rhetoric not of absolutism but centrism. He includes moderate Protestants (so Pref. 8.1-2; 1:39.2-8; also Pref. 3.11; 1:18.14-17. Pref. 3.16, 4.8, 5.3, 6.4-6). Elizabethans may protest, as Hooker's offer of a

public debate proves.[^] Moreover, he justifies judicial appeals: "Boldly and lawfully we may refuse to answer before any Civill judg in a matter which is not Civill" (VIII.8.9; 3:435.9-10; see VIII.8.5-9).[°] By his own fundamentally historicist principles, customs and laws must adapt to historical conditions (Pref. 4.4-5; 1:24.1-19).[^]

for a conclusion, supported by adequate precedents and proof (Pref. 6.2).

* Such as English customs to the French, or the "divine" Caesar; but see Pref. 4.2 and VIII.8.8.

' See Forte, "Hooker's Theory of Law," 154. If A. S. McGrade is correct, Hooker discussed (in the now lost parts of Book VIII) how the commonweal can correct a king: Intro, to Laudes VIII, FLE 6:369-74, 377-78; see Forte, 155-57. Hooker has extant no law of revolution (e.g., for Henry VII), political reformation (e.g., for Elizabeth), or disobedience (a big issue on the continent and for reformers— Trevor-Roper, "Good and Great," 48; see Laudes VIII.8.5-9; cf. Forte, 152-57); but he does not have laws against them either— J. P. Sommerville, "Richard Hooker, Hadrian Saravia, and the Advent of the Divine Right of Kings," *History of Political Thought* 4.2 (Summer, 1983): 232-36.

[°] Cf. Sommerville, 232-33.

" Faulkner, 3, 66. See commentary n to 1:24.6-7 .i in FLE 6 and Forte, 150n and 152n.

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I.c) Theology. Hooker manages the non-conformist controversy (when the Puritans charge sacrilege), by employing the concept of adiaphora, or "things indifferent to the truth of religion." It reduces the explosiveness of religious dispute by reducing the number of sacrosanct issues. Adiaphor-ism encourages the "knot of Christian civility," when all subjects pursue "things necessary," as defined by the creed, no matter how many "things indifferent" they may differ on. Ceremonies merely help to induce "rude and simple minds to conceive the mysteries of Christ." ^^ If Hooker can remove offending Anglican customs from the sacrosanct field in which they would offend, then the Puritans are disarmed (Pref. 6.6; 1:33.14-16). If, afterwards, the Puritans do not cease to agitate, then the established "Church is to

censure such a party who is apparently troublesome and contentious, and without REASONABLE CAUSE upon a meere will and stomacke doth vex and molest his brother and trouble the Country" (Pref. 8.4; 1:41.23-26: Hooker is expropriating church discipline from a puritan tract). The "name of divine authoritie is used to countermince these things, which are not the commaundements of God, hut your owne erroneous coUeC' tion" (Pref. 8.5; 1:42.5-6; so Pref. 8.5-12). Adiaphorism, thus, is Hooker's instrument to limit zealotry (Pref. 8.12, 1:49.2-13. Pref. 3.6-14) and to promote prudent judgment as a matter of social policy.

This ecclesiology does not serve Hooker's self-interest. Some bishops will not like it. In contrast (to put it reductively), Saravia and Laud expand the sacrosanct to incorporate high church ceremony and the ecclesiastical hierarchy, including the king.¹⁶ For Hooker, bishops and kings are also things indifferent to true religion (VII.5.8-6.9).¹⁷ There is no divine right or special providence for them. Hooker, in the midst of the religious and political struggle, thus gives Elizabeth's compromise an ideology by the end of her reign. ¹⁸

¹⁶ In the words of Thomas Starkey sixty years earlier: Faulkner, 16-17.

¹⁷ Sommerville, 231-36.

¹⁸ McGrade, Intro, to Three Last Books, FLE 6:244-46; Intro, to Lauies VII, 6:310; and Intro, to Lauies VIII, 6:361.

¹⁹ See Norman L. Jones, *Faith by Statute* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1982), 1-3. Much political rhetoric not conducive to the compromise, like Travers's attack on Hooker, the Cartwright-Whitgift exchange, and the Marprelate dispute that gives rise to the Lawes (Lee Gibbs, Intro, to Lawes VI, FLE 6:255-59), is binary in structure (a party of God vs. a party of the devil), but Hooker deliberately eschews extremes. His contemporaries notice this, especially Edwin Sandys and the group around Lord Falkland at Tew, for whom this middle ground becomes a guiding light in times of political turmoil (e.g., in supporting the Petition of Right and later constitutional experiments): Faulkner, 6,

Out modern myth, following Locke and Rousseau, is that individual freedom is a "natural" law in tension with civil laws. This myth largely explains why Hooker is not well understood today. His argument is less against Puritans than for the good in Elizabeth's system. Yet we see any argument that defends the way things are as time-serving or Machiavel- lian. Isn't Hooker doing what New Historicists say apologists for the status quo always do— serving his vested interest?^ Isn't that what the courtier rhetoric of praise and blame is all about?

The short answer is "no." Hooker is neither an absolutist nor an individualist in the "Enlightened" mold. He does not begin with natural rights or the ungrounded authority of centralized rule, but with historically conditioned, socially relevant, divinely inspired, but humanly limited law. A natural social inclination needs an agreed-upon order, the law of the commonweal, to constrain anti-social depravity (1. 10.1; 1:96.17-32). He tells how one society upholds the law of God (e.g., Pref. 4.3-5), not a tablet of abstracted rights. It could be Geneva, France, Israel, or Rome (e.g., Pref. 2.4; 1:6.24-26), but is England instead. His principles could constructively evaluate other states, not just the English status quo}^ Yet for radical idealists of any ideological stripe, grass is always greener on the other side of revolution. Hooker warns his reader that change is danger- ous: the grass may look darker because it is turning brown.

II.a) The Nature of Reason. Hooker's universal "law" applies to God and dog, thinking man and inanimate rock, Englishman and Babylonian, the monarch and the stable sweeper alike. Such abundance means that law is contextual. Man examines the elements of a given context to figure out natural laws (1.8.5-6).

18-20; Trevor-Roper, Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans: Seventeenth-Century Essays (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1987), 191, 196, and "Good and Great," 53, 50-51, 55; cf. Eccleshall, 71-74, and Sommerville, 244.

* E.g., Stephen Greenblatt on Diirer, and others, "Murdering Peasants," in Represent- ing the English Renaissance, ed. Stephen Greenblatt (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1988).

^ Cf. Vickers, "Coercion," 122-23. Compared to France, Elizabethan England may not be too bad. Hooker argues historical contingency, not idealism. His goal is a lawfully self-modifying polis, analogous to the United States, guided by a moving target of communally realizable

approximation to divine perfection.

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Reason in the first place asks the operative question, how does this thing work (1.3.2-3; i.e., by an internal organic or mechanical operation)? Second, reason asks the relational or instrumental question, how does this agent relate to or act on that one (1.3.5. 1.8.6, 1:86.23-25; i.e., in some manner, context, or state of affairs: e.g., by Providence, or phenomenal action and reaction)? Third, reason asks the productive or creative question, how can certain seminal or constitutive actions produce or maintain a particular state of affairs (1.3.4; i.e., by an architectonic foreconception: e.g., God guiding nature to its end)?

II.b) The Historical Difference. For us moderns, on the other hand, while we do have scientific laws and engineering rules and what their adherents term laws of economic or sociological production, reason first asks the question, why do or how should things work? Our laws therefore often prescribe a desired state of affairs, often accompanied by persuasive instruments and correctional disciplines. So our law is Utopian, or else dystopian. Justice is either distributive or corrective. Equity is now collapsed into distribution, and mercy (or humanitarianism) fights correction tooth and nail (cf. Pref. 8.9. Pref. 8.12; 1:49.16-30. Pref. 8.3; 1:40.21-25. 1.9.1). Modern law, from its origin in a social contract based imperfectly on abstract natural rights, is the agent and model of our impatient and conflicting "utopian" visions.

We emphasize what should work, therefore, often without sufficient understanding of what does. We solve that problem, more or less, through

* Hooker uses concepts like "fore-conception" to suggest the process of conception (e.g., "the prescript of the word of God," Pref. 2.6; 1:9.22; "foresignification," Pref. 3.9; 1:17.8; "the fore-alleged Arguments answered," VII. 13; 3:213.8). Constitutionally, there is the civil contract—based on Scripture (Pref. 2.1; 1:4.3-10); epistemologically, the process of imagination "fashions] the very notions and conceptions of men's minds" (Pref. 3.9; 1:16.9); and theologically, God is the ultimate pattern of men's concepts of law, who nonetheless exceeds

men's capacity to conceive (1.2.2). The more familiar use of the term is Philip Sidney's, in the *Defence of Poesie*. The analogy between the world-making mythopoesis of poetry and the world-making constitution of the polity is not a new idea but may have been in the linguistic currency of Elizabethan intellectuals. See as well the Hermetic metaphor of divine (or devilish) "seeds" planted in the mind, which grow into corresponding thoughts (n to 1:20.2-3.?: in FLE 6). Some of the ability of men to conceive or do the good is the influence of the Holy Ghost, interceding in the formation of knowledge and will ("God therefore is a law ... to all other things," 1.2.3; 1:60.17- 18; "The end for which we are moved to worke, is . . . the goodnes which we conceive," 1.7.1; 1:77.10-11; see all of 1.7).

" E.g., Smith, "Postmodernism," 24-25.

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legislative or executive micromanagement of the "free agents" in society. That, however, leads back to the root tension of Lockean or Rousseauan politics, between free individuals and restrictive society. In contrast, Hooker emphasizes what already works, without ignoring what should. The difference can be a problem, as the Civil War proves. This is partly solved, in Elizabeth's compromise and the 1688 revolution, by reinforcing the constitutional balance of powers, the inter-related contracted limits of individuals bound together in an organized polity.

II.c) Limitations on Reason. The law of reason directs the will to pursue the good that reason reveals (1.7.3); but just how well can reason guide the will? Reason naturally (1.6.5-7.6) needs help: "Education and instruction are the meanes, the one by use, the other by precept to make our naturall faculty of reason, both the better and the sooner able to judge rightly betweene truth and error, good and evill" (1.6.5; 1:76.20-23). Society's purpose is to help individuals thus. But social precepts are not the end-all, only the means. Positive law is at best an aid to natural and divine law (1.5.2; 1:73.17-25. 1.7.5-7). Law for Hooker is properly immanent in actions which are regular and productive, since in common law any social rule must constantly be adapted to circumstance. If operations do not work or work to an ill end, then the law imputed to them is invalid, misunderstood, or misused. In common law, judges entertain private criticism of positive laws. Equitable justice thus is at the heart of common law.⁶⁰ Yet Hooker knows that the meaning of law must move beyond social rules

and private will.

IIId) The Nature of Law. Law for Hooker is three-fold. For mechanisms (e.g., a pen) and also internal organizations (e.g., the subalternate hierarchy of the body), law is the principle of operation:

Things naturall ... do so necessarily observe their certaine lawes, that as long as they keepe those formes which give them their being, they cannot ... do otherwise then they do. (1.3.4; 1:67.21-25)

^ See Faulkner, 66. Reciprocity itself is the root of common law, as in the feudal custom called "fealty," binding vassal and lord together. Edwin Sandys, Hooker's friend, argues that a king is elected "with reciprocal Conditions betweene King and People," *Journals of the House of Commons 1547-1628*, ed. Edgar L. Erickson ([London:] by order of the House of Commons, 1803; repr. New York: Readex Microprint, nd), 1:493 (on 21 May 1614, 12 Jacob. I). For Aristotle, in contrast, equity is the abridgment of a general law to fit circumstances; such laws inevitably err in particular cases.

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So likewise another law there is, which toucheth them as they are sociable partes united into one bodie, a lawe which bindeth them each to serve unto others good, and all to preferre the good of the whole before whatsoever their owne particular. (1.3.5; 1:69.10-14)

Barring the teleological "form" of the thing G-3.4; 1:67. 20-27. :y), this is like law as used in modern "hard" and "soft" sciences. In individual and social states this means that Puritans and Catholics alike must eat, sleep, and procreate G-3.2). Adam's first duty, thus, is to maintain life — prior to God's own positive commandments, as in regard to eating the apple (1.10.2).

Law is also a principle of production (1.5.1-2; 1:73.3-17), governing instruments that serve chosen ends beyond the maintenance of the mechanism or organization (e.g., a hand using a pen to write a letter). Thus, the material and efficient elements of the English polity (i.e., its "artes Mechanical" and sociable methods) govern the development of a reformer's religious and political ideals into their final, socio-economic form. This principle ties political practices to their end-results and unites desired ends with appropriate means. Natural things

unknowingly see that "the kinds of their operations are both constantly and exactly framed according to the severall ends for which they serve . . . I byl divine effi- cie" (1.3.4; 1:67.25-68.3). Angels thus have a law of "ministerial employ- ment," though the fallen angels forgot their commitment to virtue (1.4.2- 3). So human laws should produce prudential social arrangements, to remove "impediments" to virtuous behavior and to enable true happiness: "Nature findeth out such lawes of government as serve to direct even nature depraved to a right end" (1. 10.1; 1:96.33-97.1).

Finally, law is the creative or contractual principle (a fundamentally "directive rule unto goodnes of operation" 11.8.4; 1:84.16-17. 1.3.2; 1:65.7-20. 1.10.1-2; 1:96.8-97.3: e.g., the design of a new pen or the U.S. constitution!). The first two principles apply to law as it is innate to the kind (or as it rectifies depravity), but Hooker adds a truly progressive feature: each thing aims to be more perfect than it has been (1.5.1-3, 7.1- 2). Individuals and societies thus can improve, the one by participating in a good society and becoming more virtuous, the other by improving its "artes Mechanical" and encouraging virtue (1.10.1-2, 5-12). This princi- ple answers our modern desire for abstract rights as an end, though it may imply other means or ends as well.

li.e) The Nature of Desire. Hooker's three-fold law is analogous to mankind's three-fold desire to imitate God: 1) to continue one's being.

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including propagation (a property shared by all nature, especially animal and vegetable life, but aided by human reason and the mechanical arts); 2) to excell in being, as one's nature provides (and as reason and positive law may elaborate), in civic virtue and prudent action (1.10.5-8); and 3) to transcend limitations of being, striving to know, follow, and imitate God (which implies spiritual duties, creative acts, and "greater things," faith, hope, and charity, which surpass customs or civic admonitions [Pref. 8.6; 1:43.9-111): "There is in all things an appetite or desire, whereby they inclyne to something which they may be: and when they are it, they shall be perfecter then nowe they are" (1.5.1; 1:72.30-73.2). "Goodness" is both motive and end. Desire is part of our lawful nature, not a motive opposed to law.

Continuance implies the operational principle of law. Excellence implies the productive or prudent principle. And transcending limits

implies the creative principle, such as is at work in the founding of a polity, or in any true, orderly reform: whereas ordinary freedoms are produced by civil constrictions of individual beings (1.10.4-8), Hooker also provides for some extraordinary freedom as necessary to produce civil order and individual happiness in the pursuit of virtue.

II.f) Law and Reason. The three-fold desire to imitate God is the heart of reason. By eternal law, justice is the bond of the world by which each benefits from the rest.[^] Though "wee now love the thing that is good, but good especially in respect of benefit unto us, we shall then love the thing that is good, only or principally for the goodness of beautie in it self (1.11.3; 1:113.18-20). A lesser law proper comes into existence because the situation naturally demands it, yet positive law, even when it is just, is not necessary but voluntary (1.6.3-5, 1.7.2-6). We need a general consensus, when the "judgements of all men . . . runne one and the same way," as a judicious sign, like "the sentence of God him selfe," to make positive laws necessary (1.8.3; 1:83.30-84.2). A law is rationally as well as politically valid when the governed consent to it (cf. 1.7.7; 1:80.23-81.10). Mankind's three-fold desire coincides in experience with the three-fold principles of law that function throughout creation. Human or natural agents invent all other laws in imitation of God's decision to operate according to law (1.3.1). God's will is invested in the operative and productive principles he created for himself (1.2). Natural (1.3.2; 1:64.3-8.

[^]* Faulkner, 70. See 1.3.1-4.

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1.8.4; 1:84.19-25) and human agents (1.8.4-5) likewise usually must uphold their rules of operation and production (1.9.1; 10.1; cf. 1.8.11). Add to this existential pattern (the second eternal law), also, Hooker's provocative theological aside, "those naturall, necessary, and intemall operations of God, the generation of the Sonne, the proceeding of the Spirit" (1.2.2; 1:59.6-8), and we find a parallel between the first and second eternal laws, and between the divine actors and their human likeness (1.3.1).

II.g) How Reason Operates through Laws. All true reason, the spirit of the law, is "ingrafted in us by the power of the holy Ghost opening the eyes of our understanding, and so revealing the mysteries of God. . . , I

will put my law in their inward partes, and I wil write it in their harts" (Pref. 8.7; 1:44.13- 17.1, quoting Jeremiah 31:33). Reason naturally then speculates as to what laws govern any given operation, including custom or positive law. Hooker adduces the principle for evaluating particular customs and laws: barring a convincing critique of custom from first principles with appropriate evidence of wrong-doing (Pref. 8.4; 1:41.19-26. 1.8.11), one's private judgment should assume that custom has reason. "Equitie and reason, the law of nature, God and man, do all favour that which is in being, till orderlie judgement of decision be given against it" (Pref. 6.5; 1:33.9-10). Rational discourse will disclose, if possible, the reason why custom works and the benefits it brings.

Insofar as an operation imitates the eternal law, it must be godly. As God is good, insofar as natural or human law participates in God's goodness, it is good also. Given a divine source of natural and rational law, even in a post-lapsarian world (1.3.1-2. 1.7.2; 1:77.20-21; cf. 1.3.3-4), Hooker assumes a core of good will and performability in the law governing every operation — insofar as it imitates the original institution of divine law (1.3.1; 1:63.20-64.3.5. 1.5.1-2, 6.1-5, 7.2). One reforms one's course of action in order to imitate God the better or sooner. Imitating God is, of course, an unending goal involving an infinite number of more or less lawful steps. Perfection, therefore, is not immediately available, no matter how ideal one's motives.

A "lesse good" may be willfully "preferred before a greater," to "the singular disgrace of nature," and "the utter disturbance of that divine order," but "the preeminence of chiefest acceptation is by the best things worthely chalenged": not only do the best things worthily claim chief (i.e., divine) acceptance, but they also properly challenge improperly valued lesser goods (1.7.7; 1:80.24-29. 1.8.5; 1:85.14-15). Hooker authoriz-

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es conscientious dissent in most conflicts of goods pursued (if adiaphorism applies), especially through elevated argument. Speculative projects to supplant antiquated custom are suspect, when they do not fit local conditions (Pref. 8.1; 1:36.18-30; Pref. 8.13-14). A community must have reason to expect its positive law to be a prudent guide to social action, Hooker argues, or both law and society will lose general approbation.

This expectation is merely the counsel of reason, until joined with the ends of the divine law (i.e., loving God and neighbor) in particular circumstances (1.7.1-5, 1.7.11-15, 8.5-10). Only then does respect for custom become binding (1.9.1, 10.4-5). Political problems come when the laws of reason and man prescribe different things. Divine law transumes mere positive law, but human laws properly legislated and in force hold authority. As Hooker explains, using the subordination of Christians to the Council of Jerusalem for example, Christians need political patience (Pref. 6.3; 1:31.18-32.14). Hubris demands that one's private ethics be transplanted immediately to the whole polity (e.g., Calvin, Pref. 2.6; 1:9.1-12; the Barrowists, Pref. 8.1). Instead, Christians must work within the system, not forcing reform but helping the reformed polity evolve (Pref. 5.2).

Hooker thus (paradoxically?) trusts the role of providence in historical change far more than he does the efficacy of human political projection. Indeed, history conditions law and polity in Hooker's philosophy.^{^^} He knows that kings and bishops are not permanent, either personally or institutionally. Unlike Essex or Machiavelli, Hooker does not stress how kings gain or lose their crowns. Perhaps for rhetorical purposes (or due to the vandalism wreaked on his work by an Elizabethan critic). Hooker spells out no law of political revolution, nor does he explain how the people manage to establish a polity and transfer executive authority to a monarch (if they choose one at all)— with or "without lawful process."

II.h) The Purpose of the Lawes, Fear of unlawful behavior may motivate the Lawes, but Hooker's desire for a better relationship between citizen and state is the main engine (Pref. 9.4): to answer the Puritans is to work out the (constitutional) rationale of Elizabeth's polity. He is not only preventing a revolution when Elizabeth dies but also preempting it. The Lawes is both conservative and reformatory (e.g., improving the dismal quality of the clergy, VII.24.1-15).^{^^} Hooker refashions his church— from within the law.

^{^^} See Cargill Thompson, 58-63.

^{^^} See McGrade, Intro, to Lawes VIII, FLE 6:366-69; Cargill Thompson, 58-63;

III. Conditional Hooker

Hcx)ker "serves the times" in a philosophical as well as political manner. Aristotle and Machiavelli would submerge the identity of a church in the interests of the state, and some Puritans (after Geneva) would submerge the state in the church, to form in either case a "perfect" polity, but Hooker does not. His state manifestly participates in his church, with the Act of Supremacy, but it is not "all or nothing." Neither is the church the same as the state (Pref. 8.6-12). Moderate or loyal Puritans must wrestle with a Calvinist reliance on private judgment carried to political extremes. Hooker's answer to the separatists and the absolutists is the same: no human judgment can be "all or nothing." Even Anglican law is debatable.

III.a) The Social Individual. Let us examine, finally, then, the (un-Enlightened) epistemology which is at the heart of Hooker's political philosophy. Private judgment on public matters is insufficient, because it is not itself public (Pref. 5.3; 1:29.15-20. Pref. 6.3-6). Reason thus does not have unmediated access to the Truth (1.8.4-8), as in some uses of Aristotelian dialectic. Individual knowledge generally is only probable (Pref. 6.1-6; 1.8.2-5): Hooker's model is Aristotelian rhetoric (e.g., 1.8.3; 1:83.26-33.0- Yet engrafted desire leads us to desire to know what should be done. Charitable conduct is deducible (1.8.9) from true desire, which demands reflection on what is truly desirable (1.8.10; cf. 1.8.11).^*

Compare this limited individual with the individual agents of Machiavelli, Hobbes, or Lxx)ke. Hooker's individual is not naturally free but is interdependent both in knowledge and action, and thus "subalter-nate."" Individual freedom is not an a priori natural right which civil

Faulkner, 6, 13-15; McGrade, Intro, to Lawes VII, 6:333-34.

^* See Faulkner, 73-76; cf. deductive scholasticism after Aquinas.

^^ Cf. Vickers, "Coercion," 121. TTie principle of subalternation, like feudalism, protects all members of the body politic even as it subordinates individual interests to that of the whole. The tricky part comes when some members determine the interests of the whole, or when they inadequately try to accomplish those ends. Different members of the body have complementary functions (OED, "subalternity": Granger) which lead them to concur (OED, "subalternation," 1: Hooker), which is a sign that the body is in a state

of health. "Subalternation" in logic is one of four possible relations between the two parts of a proposition ("Conversion, Equipollence, Subalternation, and Opposition," OED, "subalternation," 3: Gale) and means X and Y together. The political relationship so designated is cooperative rather than equal. Equal rights, for example, however

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laws constrain: instead, it is the (by-)product of the legal constitution of the polity (1.10.1-8; also, 1.11.1-3). For Hobbes, man is naturally driven by appetite or fear to attack his neighbor. For Hooker, reason tells man to do unto others as he would have them do unto him (1.8.7; 1:88.6-24). Individual interests become social; social demands can be worked out in parliament.

III.b) Participatory Identity. Hooker's society is an integrated whole, not a monolith. The difference lies in how the political institution is defined, which depends in turn on how one defines the nature of identity itself. For Hooker, all identity is conditional, not monadic. "Civill society doth more content the nature of man then any private kind of solitarie living, because in societie this good of mutuall participation is so

instituted, or evident, or desirable, must exist through the natural hierarchical order of politic bodies, which Hooker calls "subalternation" — implying inequality but not contradiction (OED, "subalternation," 3: Elderfield). As Hooker explains, with regard to the "having and the bringing up of children," it is "not possible [that men and women] should concurre unlesse there were subalternation betweene them . . . naturalie grounded upon inequality, because thinges equall in everie respect are never willinglie directed one by another" (V.73.2; 2:402.8-13). Both men and women "subalternately" are "linked with some straight and insoluble knot" to the long process of raising children (V.73.3; 2:402.19-24). Also, the individual becomes newly, physically subalternate with the terms of the marriage vow: "With my bodie I thee worship" (V.73.7; 2:404.28). In Christological terms, members of the church ponder "the mysterie of our coherence with Jesus Christ. The Church is in Christ as Eve was in Adam" (V.56.7; 2:239.19-20). This metaphysical union is not of one individual subsumed by another but of subordinate members united in the greater social body, which establishes their subalternate functions

and thus justifies them.

^^ See McGrade, Intro, to Lawes VIII, 6:348-49; and Lawes 1.10.5-6.

^^ Terms of logic share common epistemological roots with terms of identity, and the latter with those of relation. A logical method affects how one can describe one's own identity, or the identity of any one else. How one determines separate identities determines the relations that define those "individuals." We use the word "individual," for instance, as a common noun, whereas Hooker's contemporaries use it as an adjective — to describe indivisible attributes of one member of the Trinity (OED A 1; Found. St. Bartholomeuj's, and Whitboume; see A 1: Fotherby [the Greek atom], and Milton [the indivisible church]; also, A 2: Timon [inseparable mating]; contrast A 3 [singular entities], A 4 [one as distinguished from others], and B [the substantive], especially B 3: J. Jackson [an individual, as opposed to society or family, etc.]). Hooker's metaphor of identity and relation is not independent individuals but subalternate members of the body politic. This is especially clear when he describes the composite relations of even natural agents by means of the metaphor of "sociable partes united into one bodie" (e.g., 1.3.5; 1:69.10- 20). Existentially, natural agents are not isolated atoms or billiard balls bouncing off each other but complementary members of a larger, perhaps "organic" unity.

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much larger" (1.10.12; 1:107.15-17). Consider the Elizabethan metaphor of marriage for the co-participation of church and state: two are no longer two, but one by way of marriage. The relation may be understood in diverse ways, including one where the wife becomes chattel (or the church an instrument of the state), but technically (in the spirit of the metaphor) neither party is absolute. They are joined by the sociable institution of marriage, with its usually implicit qualifiers and warrants (e.g., "love and honor," or an adequate economic standing). When marriage is transcribed into civil law (or performed on impulse), those saving qualifiers and warrants may remain unwritten, to unwarranted ends. Hooker does not foresee (or prevent) seventeenth-century constitutional squabbles and divorces involving church and state, but he does prescribe the ideal of constitutional balances between those institutions.^* By the nature of participatory identity, as well as by historical necessity, the constitution remains a work in progress.

III.c) The Conditional Psyche. We moderns may have trouble not collapsing church and state into one identity, because we tend too much to believe in abstract absolutes (like individual or institutional identity). Our persistent Romantic myth pits an individual's freedom against the tyranny of any religious or political institution. Hooker does not start with individuals who must be disciplined into society. Moreover, one "party" can participate in another without having its identity absorbed. An individual's given natural state is perfected through participation in and delimitation by "other things" (1.11.1-2). Civil laws thus safeguard citizens from tyranny (1.10.5). Also, "heavenly preceptes" of conscientious peace and civic unity would "better frame" Christian men (1.10.14; 1:110.10-11). Multiple participations are likely, even inescapable: man participates in nature (animal, vegetable, mineral, and rational), in several polities (not just church and state), in a religion or ideology, and in God. In fact, this logic informs the conceit by which Hooker hopes to win the controversy with the loyal opposition. A Puritan can participate at the same time in Calvin's private judgment. Hooker's public debate, and Elizabeth's authorized service.

Hooker attacks attempts to absolutize individual opinion and ignore established social media for formulating policy. Opinion, like any social

^* I.e., the developing Anglican polity. McGrade, *Intro to Lawes VII*, FLE 6:309-10; Lau > es 1.10.8; cf. Eccleshall, 116-17.

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institution, is subject to the limits of mind and place. This logic psychologically contrasts with literally endless words of zealots who wish Christ "plainly" present in words and society (Pref. 4.4; 1:23.10-18).¹⁰⁰ It is not wise to desire perfection in one's own lifetime: "Happines ... is that estate wherby we attaine, so far as possiblilie may be attained, the full possession of that which simply for it selfe is to be desired, and . . . the contentation of our desires, the highest degree of all our perfection. Of such perfection capable we are not in this life" (1.11.3; 1:112.21-25). The political corollary is clear: though the idealistic projects of political ideologues may be eu-topian (i.e., good), they are also ou-topian (i.e., unreal).

IIIId) Conditional Politics. In his approach to mixing the elements of politic societies together. Hooker anticipates the fundamental assumption of fiizzly logic: any description of the way things are is at best conditionally true (Pref. 6.2-6; 1.8.1-10; cf. divine and natural laws, which would have necessary deductions, if we were not blind to them, 1.8.11).[^] Calvin tellingly sought (Hooker says) "absolute approbation of the discipline of Geneva as consonant unto the word of God without any cautions, qualifications, ifs or ands" (Pref. 2.6; 1:9,9-11): this is not prudent speech or moderate politics. Hooker finesses the conflict of individual and society— which also lies behind our modern suspicions — since in the common law, his original model, one law can transume another, given the right circumstance. That may satisfy the critic of social customs. Further, if it is possible to recog- nize an overriding law, the same critic can in good conscience modify his or her own beliefs.

A shorthand form of fuzzy logic qualifies a categorical statement with the conditional preposition "insofar as": human laws are godly, insofar as they conform to or enable divine law (see 1.10.2-3). This conditional logic is how Hooker can say that the queen is the head of the church but does not control ceremonies and orders. Insofar as a man and woman are identified socially and legally with the marital unit, the marriage limits his and her social or legal independence by constructing their interdepend- ence. This is true for a marriage of church and state as well. Church is

[^] Hooker describes separatists as psychologically and socially insatiable (Pref. 4.3-8, 5.2, 6.6). For a deconstmctive critique, see Pref. 8.12; 1:49.1-13; viz. Faulkner, 67.

[^] Statements of truth and value become valid according to truth-conditions declared by prepositional phrases or dependent clauses (e.g., "ifs or ands") contained in the same syntactic unit: "it is cold— outside, for this time of year, for a young child who has a cold, like you, if you do not have your winter coat zipped shut."

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married to Kingdom (their populations being identical), and the monarch is married to the church, as the ecclesiastical "head" (though subject to the laws of the whole, the marriage's implicit qualifiers and

restraints).^{1*}

III.e) Conditional Logic. To conclude, let me recall that critics often say that Hooker resembles Aquinas, in applying general principles deductively to particular laws. Thus, Hooker would proceed from eternal and natural law right down to English positive law (see 1.16.7). That is more or less the plot of Book 1,[^] (but cf. 1.16.7; 1:142.3-7), and Hooker says it is the most reliable form of reasoning (1.8.2). Yet he also says it often cannot be done: we must rely on "signs and tokens" instead (e.g., general approbation, 1.8.3; cf. Pref. 4.7-8, when followers approve the "judgements of a few").

What takes deduction's place, for Hooker or us? Stephen Toulmin explains a method of inductive logic significantly similar to Hooker's: begin with a claim, find the supporting evidence, discover the warrants, and add the necessary qualifiers.[^] That is the common law method of reasoning out the force of law in particular cases. You examine a custom, research its history and use, isolate the sometimes contradictory principles at work in that custom, and identify some of the historical conditions that affect the custom, especially over time and from place to place (e.g., the agape feast, Pref. 4.4-5; 1:24.1-16).

Such an approach to law is fundamentally conditional, yet not confined to one particular set of conditions. Hooker's law, in other words, is not the Enlightenment practice of making particular reasons absolute and local politics global (thus 1.16.7; 1:142.3-7). It is contrary to post-Enlightenment civil law (e.g., the Napoleonic code) or the domestic political machinery which that kind of prescriptive legal reasoning implies. Since Hooker is opposed to the modernist qualities which so many post-modernist critics today do not like, perhaps our critical "low tide" in Hooker studies is about to turn.

¹ McGrade, Intro, to *Lawes* VIII, 6:375-78, 357-59, 362-65.

[^] See Cargill Thompson, 26-27.

[^] See Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958).

Eric Voegelin's Two Portraits of Hooker and their Relation to the Modern Crisis

ERIC VOEGELIN (1901-85) IS ONE OF THE LEADING FIGURES in the revival of political theory in our time. His magnum opus is *Order and History*.¹ In all his works Voegelin sought to join a philosophy of history to a theory of the person and of the good society in a way which would both recover the insights of classical and Christian wisdom and build on them to create a "new science of politics," using the term "science" in the Platonic- Aristotelian sense as critical reflection, as opposed to received "opinion." A leading critic of the claims of modern civilization to be "progressive," Voegelin judged modernity to be contradictory in nature, producing advances in the sciences of phenomena but neglecting or almost entirely destroying the sciences of substance. "The death of the spirit is the price of progress," he wrote— by which he meant the disappearance of spiritual concerns as a public force in modern society. He particularly held the assault on classical and Christian philosophy (especially on Aristotle and Aquinas) beginning with Luther to have been a disaster of incalculable magnitude. Voegelin also concluded that Calvin, far from mitigating Luther's assault on a millennium of philosophical and theological reflection, only added to the damage. Given these views of its principal founders, one cannot say that Voegelin held the Protestant Reformation in high regard.

¹ Eric Voegelin, *Order and History*, 5 vols. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1956-84).

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Voegelin's attitude toward Richard Hooker proved to be ambivalent. Insofar as Hooker helped to preserve a philosophically informed faith, Voegelin was an admirer. To the extent that Hooker appeared to serve as an "apologist" for the destruction of the universality of the visible church Voegelin was highly critical. He judged Hooker to be deficient in the capability to consistently resist the "age of confusion" in which he lived, and never appears to have taken seriously Hooker's attempt to craft a *via media* between Roman Catholic and continental Evangelical positions. As will be apparent, Voegelin was clearly not

impressed with English claims to have a gift for muddling through or even deliberately covering over sharp intellectual divergences. He appears to have been genuinely shocked at the way the Church of England was officially established. Yet in the end, Voegelin gives the impression of having had immense respect for the man whom he in at least one place refers to as "the great Hooker."

What I have called Voegelin's first portrait of Hooker is found in an as yet unpublished section of his gigantic "History of Political Ideas" entitled "The English Commonwealth— Hooker." ^ Voegelin's second portrait of Hooker is found in *The New Science of Politics*, ^ delivered as the Walgreen

^ Unless otherwise designated, quotations from Eric Voegelin in the text are from "The History of Political Ideas," a multivolume typescript written during the 1940s but not published at that time. A small part of the "History" has now been published under the title *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, ed. John H. Hallowell (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1975). An editorial committee chaired by Paul Caringella, Voegelin's long time Research Associate, is engaged in preparing the entire "History" for publication by Louisiana State University Press. Permission to quote here from the chapter entitled "The English Commonwealth — Hooker," comprising pp. 73-124 of the section entitled "The Great Confusion," covering Luther, Calvin, and the Protestant Reformation, has been graciously granted by Voegelin's widow, Mrs. Lissy Voegelin.

^ Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952 and 1987, with Foreword by Dante Germino), 133-44 and 169. — On the controversial description of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English Puritanism as "gnostic," Voegelin offers a defense against the reasonable objection that not all of the movement can fairly be so characterized:

The selection of materials which are meant to illustrate . . . the Gnostic revolution may seem unfair. A critic might object that Puritanism as a whole cannot be identified with its left wing. Such criticism would be justified if it had been the intention to give an historical account of Puritanism. The present analysis, however, is concerned with the structure of Gnostic experiences and ideas; and this structure is also to be found where the consequences are toned down to the respectability of

Calvin's Institutes or of Presbyterian covenantism Gnostic revolutionaries must

inevitably institutionalize their partial or total success in the existential struggle by

a compromise with reality The compromise [can never be] taken for the essence,

[however]. {New Science, 151-52)

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Lectures at the University of Chicago in 1951 and published in 1952.

Why the difference between the two portraits? I think I answer the question in what follows. Why should we even care what Voegelin said about Hooker? Here are three of the many reasons that occur to me:

(1) Voegelin is a figure of the first rank in contemporary political theory and the philosophy of history.

(2) It is healthy to counteract any tendency toward hagiography to which some of the contributors to this volume, including myself, may be inclined with regard to Hooker.

(3) It is important to note how much Voegelin had to say about Hooker. Many historians of political thought have treated Hooker only en passant or only with reference to whether Locke got him right in the Second Treatise. Voegelin's extensive treatment helps confirm Hooker's intrinsic importance as part of the Western intellectual legacy.

A final introductory remark: It might well be the case that had Voegelin lived until the publication of the Folger edition of Hooker's works, and in particular had had the opportunity to read the commentaries by A. S. McGrade on Books VII and VIII of the Lawes, he might well have revised substantially his harsh conclusions about Hooker's alleged role as a mere "apologist" for the Elizabethan Settlement. As McGrade has so well said, Hooker possessed "a logically and morally coherent intention to transform the Elizabethan political establishment in the course of justifying it."⁵

Voegelin goes so far as to claim that it may be doubted whether Puritanism may properly be described as a Christian movement at all:

Against the usual treatment of Puritanism as a Christian movement must be held the fact that there is no passage in the New Testament from which advice for revolutionary political action could be extracted; and even the Revelation of St. John . . . does not put the establishment of the [new] realm into the hands of a Puritan aimy. (Ibid., 145) Voegelin proceeds to analyze the Puritan pamphlet *A Glimpse of Sion's Glory* (1641) attributed to Hanserd Knollys in A. S. P. Woodhouse, ed., *Puritanism and Liberty* (London, 1938), 233-41. Whether Voegelin meant to imply that Richard Hooker himself eventually came to the same conclusion, I leave to the reader.

* A. S. McGrade, *Intros. to Lawes VII and VIII*, FLE 6:309-83. References to Hooker in this paper are to FLE, but quotations follow Keble (1888), as used by Voegelin.

5 McGrade, *Intro, to Lawes VIII*, 6:378.

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Portrait I : Hooker the Confused Islander

Voegelin opens his account of Hooker in the "History of Political Ideas" with the surprising observation that in view of the "high price" Hooker had paid in defending the civil government's supremacy over the church, an historian "would be justified in rejecting him as one more of the grave diggers of spiritual life in Western Civilization" as well as "one more of the abettors of national parochialism." Voegelin refused to go down this road, however, he said, because, although viewed "from the larger Western scene," Hooker helped cause "one of the fatal cracks in our civilization," viewed from "the island" he helped produce "a nation that keeps faith with its Christian conscience." (This is not to deny, Voegelin added sharply, that "the English historical record is only less solidly atrocious than that of other nations; nor do we deny that the English Christian conscience shows itself most splendidly after the plunder is out of the bag.")

Hooker is worthy to be studied, Voegelin asserts, because "nationalized Christianity has become a permanent and strong factor in English politics" and because Hooker gave that idea "its first

systematic exposition." "When we approach Hooker's idea," Voegelin continues, "we must realize that we are not moving in a realm of philosophical discourse but in the realm of England." Hooker "blandly ignored" the larger spiritual breakdown of Western civilization in the wake of the Reformation. As far as Hooker was concerned, "as long as the English polity holds together, and as long as the government is strong enough to decapitate the worst trouble-makers, the main problem is mastered."

Leaving aside the purely expository parts of Voegelin's treatment of Hooker in his "History," let us continue to listen to Voegelin's criticisms. Noting that "even Hooker with his English insularity could not pass over in silence" the problem of the relationship of the Church of England to the rest of Christianity, Voegelin discusses Hooker's treatment of Roman Catholicism. He could not deny existence to the catholic church as Calvin had done, "because the Puritans were ready to do the same to him." "What would Hooker do? Apparently he had no sensitivity for institutional universality ... in the Augustinian sense. He solved his problem . . . with a cheap trick. He simply called the universal church the 'Church of Rome,' pretending that it was a local, particular church like the Church of England."

After quoting Hooker's analogy of the Church of England to a "pre-

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cinct" of the "main body of the sea" (the sea representing the catholic church) (III. 1.14; 1:205.23-27), Voegelin explodes with indignation: "Self-respect makes it impossible to enter into discussion" with such an idea, for "the representative universalism of the Church becomes, under his hands, something like an oversized collective, and sacramental visibility is translated into optical visibility." "We have warned the reader that with Hooker we are not moving in a universe of philosophical discourse but in the realm of England; and the idea, so quaint and charmingly English, of improving on the visibility of the Catholic Church by cutting it up into handy chunks for closer inspection reminds us that from the Realm of England has flowered the Wonderland of Alice."

"Nevertheless," concludes Voegelin, "even delightful nonsense can go too far." Hooker "knows" that the Puritans might play the same "trick" on him by cutting the visible church "into still smaller pieces." They might label the Church of England the "Church of Westminster" and in

opposition then organize, say, a "Church of Southampton." To avoid this danger. Hooker limited the smallest chunks of the universal church to national "societies." He specifically excluded Presbyterian-style "assemblies."

The justification Hooker provides for declaring that both the age of assemblies (free congregations) and that of the universal catholic church were past was quite simply "the mysticism of history." History for Hooker has taken such a turn that the Church of England has become established; "Puritans and Catholics may say what they want, there lies no appeal from the fact of history (as long as it is English) to any argument of principle." Christian history for Hooker (VIII.1.7; 3:329.19-330.8) "consists of three parts: the Church in pagan antiquity, universal Christianity, and the Church of England. You may as well argue with a stone wall."

As one might imagine, Voegelin's posture of occasionally amused but more often astonished indignation does not change as he gets further into Book VIII on church government. Hooker's entire construction is described as a form of "decisionist hardening." The conflicts of the sixteenth century required a "concentration of ordering power" in the nation-state. Voegelin finds Hooker's notion of the "supremacy of Kings" (VIII. 2.1 [Keble 2.31; 3:332.9-333.12) to have been probably influenced by Bodin.

Hooker sought to endow the "closed, autonomous polity" with the "qualities of a Church." First, the polity becomes an autonomous church under Christ; second the temporal government becomes a spiritual government. The monarch is head of the church. The king in parliament legis-

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lates for the church with the advice of the bishops, who are put forward as "experts" on laws pertaining to articles of faith, rites, and ceremonies. Parliamentary enactment of the church regulations is essential because the king in parliament represents the whole realm and declares "the consent of the whole Church" (VIII.6.11).

"Hooker escapes the problem of secularization by making the polity itself the church, and the temporal government its spiritual government. The boldest stroke in the construction is Hooker's alleged denial of an episcopal government of the Church of England. In his

fight against Puri- tanism, Hooker does not oppose 'prelacy'; but the bishops are only 'ex- perts' "; the government of the church is parliamentary, resting on the consent of the people.

"There remained only one big question: Would the Puritans believe the story?"

Having analyzed the deficiencies of "Hooker's Christian Commonwealth," Voegelin turns to Hooker's "Portrait of the Puritan." After an account of the intellectual, spiritual, economic, and political devastation of what he calls the age of pleonexia in England, in which different social elements competed to "impose their mode of existence ... on everybody else," Voegelin credits Hooker with single-handedly resisting one of the "incidental consequences" of said pleonexia: "the anti-philosophism of the Puritans":

To be philosophically ignorant was the mark of the rightminded citizen in the puritan worldview; to be philosophically educated was not only heretical, but bordered on treason and called for governmental action. This interesting trend . . . was checked [in England] due to the resistance of Hooker; but it has remained a powerful component nevertheless in English, and even more so in American life. Philosophical illiteracy is still considered something of a civic duty even in broad sectors of the academic world, and concern with philosophical problems still makes a man suspect of Catholic inclinations ["I am speaking from experience" says Voegelin, who was raised as a Lutheran.]— with all the latent implications of organizing the Spanish Armada for an attack on Anglo-Saxony. (Emphasis added)

Hooker was "motivated" to write his Ecclesiastical Polity by "the anti-philosophical, and generally anti-civilizational, aggressiveness of his Puritan contemporaries." "While we must entertain the previously ex-

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pressed misgivings" about Hooker's "achievements as a systematic philosopher of politics, we are in heartfelt sympathy with his defense of learning against viciously ignorant louts," or so Voegelin emphatically declares.

After noting how Hooker's resistance gained in "inner firmness" after his "tiff" with Travers in 1585, Voegelin quotes at length from Hooker's marginal notes on A Christian Letter (1599), relishing especially Hooker's notation that, "If Aristotle and the schoolmen be

such perilous creatures, you must needs think yourself an happy man, whom God hath so fairely blest from too much knowledge in them" (Hooker on A.C.L., 20; FLE 4:65.6-8).

"Hooker's problem," Voegelin concludes, "is shifting, slowly but unmistakably, from a religious controversy between Anglicanism and Puritanism to the much more formidable issue of whether we can preserve a civilized society in which there is room for the life of the intellect, or whether we are heading toward a reign of terror by the rabble that will make the good life in the classic sense impossible. The Puritans represented the anti-civilizational revolt of the rabble — and they found their match in Hooker's gifts of observation and characterization."

There follows a section devoted to the Preface to the *Lauies*, which Voegelin describes as a study in "the psychological mechanism that is put into operation in the creation of mass movements." Hooker makes six points. First, there must be somebody who advances a "cause." Second, the multitude upon hearing the propagators of the cause castigate the upper classes for their social evils become persuaded that such persons must be singularly good people to be so much offended by such evil. Third, the followers of the cause are persuaded that the government is the source of all fault and corruption in the world. "Such imputation of evil to a specific institution" (rather than to human frailty) proves the wisdom of the leaders of the cause to the multitude "who never would have thought of the connection." Fourth, a new form of government is recommended as, in Hooker's words, the "sovereign remedy of all evils." The people, having become crazed enough to imagine that anything would help them, but "that most, which they have least tried" (Hooker IPref. 3.8; 1:16.3-81), accept the recommendation. Fifth, the minds of the followers "must be indoctrinated," so that "they will automatically associate scriptural passages and terms with the doctrine I'discipline'j of the movement," no matter how far-fetched the association may be. "With equal automatism, they will be blind" to passages in Scripture incompatible with the new doctrine. Sixth, they will be psychologically conditioned

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to think of themselves as "the elect"; mankind is divided into the "brethren" and "worldlings."

Recognizing that he cannot reach the followers who "close up their

ears" to any argument from such a "worldling" as he, Hooker, "hoping against hope," tries to persuade the leaders to "desist from their propaganda and organizational activity, which ... is nothing less than the preparation of a revolution," Voegelin declares. The "decisive phase" of Hooker's argument concerns the proper relationship between "public and private opinion." He asks his puritan opponents to accept the principle that "of peace and quietness there is not any way possible, unless the probable voice of every entire society or body politic overrule all private of like nature in the same body" (Pref. 6.6; 1:34.6-9).

Hooker proposes to the Puritans that the "constitutional authorities" pronounce a sentence on which of their views are allowable as public doctrine. After the sentence the controversy will be at an end; both sides will henceforth be "silent." Hooker decisively rejects the Puritans' claim that "conscience" or "sincere conviction" is sufficient to "overthrow the established ecclesiastical order."

Hooker could make such an offer, writes Voegelin, in the secure conviction that his side of the controversy would be upheld. In fact he advises the Puritans to give up in advance. Can they really believe that the English nobility would submit

to a project that erects every parish and congregation into a spiritual supremacy and that peers would agree to "stand to the sentence of a number of mean persons assisted with the presence of their poor teacher?" Or that the universities would peacefully agree to their abolition? Or that lawyers would consent to abrogate the civil law in favor of Scripture? The Puritan leaders must understand that their fundamental error is their belief that their Discipline, being "the absolute commandment of Almighty God . . . must be received although the world . . . should be clean turned upside down."

"It is hardly necessary to elaborate," writes Voegelin, "on Hooker's analysis. In his description of the Puritan followers we recognize the pathological type that fills the ranks of the modern politico-religious mass movements down to Communism and National Socialism. And in the

In this passage Voegelin quotes Lawes Pref. 8.2 and 8.5; 1:39.14-15 and 42.1-4.

description of the leader we recognize the vicious egomaniac who will not rest until his private will has become the public will, even though the achievement of this aim will destroy the civilization of his country."

The final section of Voegelin's unpublished analysis of Richard Hooker is entitled "Philosophy of Law"—perhaps a surprising title given his earlier denigration of Hooker's systematic philosophical abilities.[^] According to Voegelin, Hooker's decision to begin his major work with a general philosophy of law in Book I was motivated by the desire "to restrain the Scriptural fanaticism of divine law" as used by the Puritans. To accomplish such restraint it was necessary for Hooker to "restore a philosophy of law in which divine law received its proper place by the side of several other laws. Hence 'the laws' of ecclesiastical polity became the object of Hooker's investigation."

The philosophy of law, writes Voegelin, was essentially a form of damage control by Hooker; if the Puritans themselves could not be persuaded, at least "potential victims" could be "fortified . . . against the contagion." "While the Puritan perhaps will not be persuaded to mend his ways, it will be possible to discredit him socially as an illiterate enemy of civilization. In order to achieve this indirect therapy of society, the anti-philosophism of the reformers must be reversed."

Omitting Voegelin's exposition of Hooker's types of law (to which he does not take exception), let us move on to Voegelin's discussion of "a few points" at which Hooker allegedly "bends" the medieval tradition (above all, Aquinas) "to fit the exigencies of his own age." Inevitably, Voegelin takes up the problem of whether and to what extent Locke "misused" Hooker in the Second Treatise. His conclusion is that, while strictly speaking there is no theory of natural rights or of the social contract in Hooker's work, it nonetheless "contains reformulations of Scholastic doctrine which lend themselves to the tendentious interpretation put upon them by Locke."

Although the term "state of nature" does not occur in the Lawes, "Hooker has its meaning" (i.e., one can find its equivalent). "He assumes, indeed, a historical state in which families coexisted without government, inevitably involved in strife; and the inconveniences of this state induced the creation of political order." Voegelin's comment on several passages

' See Alessandro Passerin d'Entreves, *The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1939), 89 for praise of Hooker as "one of the greatest systematic thinkers of his age." Voegelin himself praises this book.

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from Book I, chapter 10, about the origin of government (1.10.1-14) is close to being contemptuous; "the debate about the precise character of Hooker's theory of political order is futile." Hooker's account is hopelessly garbled, and one can detect several "competing theoretical intentions" at work denying all intellectual coherence to it.

"We can only analyze the motives" that caused his "confusion." First, with regard to the state of nature. Hooker "obviously needed some natural basis of government to get away from the Puritan Kingdom of God." If, however, government is based only on "nature" and convenience. Hooker is in danger of losing his argument against the anarchic tendencies represented by the left wing of the Puritans and by the Anabaptists. Guarding against the anarchists, who could throw us back into man's wretched pre-political condition. Hooker invokes original sin to show the need for government. "But then again, though human nature is corrupt, government is not inflicted on man by God as a punitive measure" but serves an affirmative civilizational purpose. The ruler represents the "law," i.e., a body of rules to which men can reasonably consent. (Here he draws on Marsilius of Padua as well as traditional English ideas of representative government.) "This line of argument, however, if pursued consistently, might lead to the idea of the autonomous individual, equipped with natural rights, giving consent to government that might also be withdrawn. Hence, no such notion of natural right can be admitted." Instead, when Hooker does use the term natural right it is in Aristotle's sense that the "noble, wise, and virtuous" have a natural right to govern. Hierarchy, not equality, is reflective of the natural order. Rather than jettison the idea of consent altogether, however, Hooker makes vague reference to a kind of natural right in the form of assent of the governed "to be ruled by their natural rulers in the Aristotelian sense."

From this "maze of motivations" skillful interpreters can extract whatever meaning they want: Hooker can be invoked as a follower of Aquinas, or Marsilius, or the church fathers, or as a precursor of Locke

or Burke, declares Voegelin in near exasperation.

Voegelin next turns his attention to Book VIII, chapters 5-7, and finds a similar "seesaw of doctrines, qualifications, and further qualifications of the exceptions." Hooker is indicted for having created "a style of cautious rambling that will take up a doctrine for a while, and drop it when the results would hurt an inarticulate but sensitive realism. Hooker has influenced Locke . . . more by the model of his gentlemanly irresponsible style than by any specific doctrines." The connecting thread is English insulari-

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ty; in the end Hooker always lands "safely back on the island" with the "beauties of the English constitution."

Despite Hooker's penchant for "obsolete doctrinal clichés" which land him in logical difficulties he should never have had to face in the first place, Voegelin ends his discussion by crediting Hooker with having arrived in the end through his "theoretical groping" at "something like a philosophy of historical existence." He is saved from offering up "a justification of brute power" precisely by his invocation of "all the structural and dynamic elements of politics: consent of the people, force or conquest (described by Hooker as the 'immediate appointment of God'), the natural differences between men, and economic, utilitarian, aesthetic, intellectual, and spiritual factors in human nature." Thus, despite the "impertinence" of Hooker's "manners in logic," in the end he comes out with an account of political reality roughly equivalent to Plato's spiritual realism!

Portrait 2: Hooker the Opponent of Gnosticism

Now let us turn to Voegelin's only portrait of Hooker to appear in print, found in his Walgreen Lectures delivered at the University of Chicago in 1951 and published in 1952 under the title *The New Science of Politics*. First, a word about the book's thesis, which can best be understood under Voegelin's original title of the Walgreen lectures: *Truth and Representation*. Theory is concerned with the self-consciously critical attempt adequately to symbolize the human experience of participating in reality. Theory originated in the Hellenic world as a result of a "break" with the "compactness" of mythical symbolization of life in the cosmos. After this "cosmological" style of symbolization through myth, there emerged the

"anthropological" style through philosophy, which was based on the "discovery" (Bruno Snell) of the psyche and its experience of attempted attunement with the transcendent ground of the cosmos and all that is in it, including man. Next, from the side of Jerusalem, so to speak, came the "soteriological" style of symbolization based on the experience of human beings who open their psyches to the unveiling of the "unseen measure" through Israelite and Christian revelation. Finally, co-extensively with Christianity there emerges the "gnostic" style of symbolization, based on the revolt against the life of the spirit that seeks attunement with the transcendental ground. Gnosticism existed for the most part as an under- ground movement in the West, erupting into visibility from time to time,

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most notably in the ninth and twelfth centuries, until with the Reformation the eruption became so massive as to threaten the order of Western civilization itself. Modernity represents the partial triumph of the gnostic creed movements that attempt fallaciously to immanentize the world-transcendent eschaton. Gradually the objective of the gnostic creed movements became apparent: the attempt to overcome the unavoidable anxieties and uncertainties of human existence by building a terrestrial paradise. Via a process of secularization, the Joachitic division of history into the three stages of the Age of the Father, the Age of the Son, and the Age of the Holy Ghost is transformed into Flavio Biondo's periodization into ancient, medieval, and modern, and finally into the Third Realm construction of Condorcet, Comte, Marx, Lenin, and Hitler.

Now back to Hooker. Hooker first appears on the frontispiece of Voegelin's *New Science*, with a fragment from the opening sentence of the Lawes: "Posterity may know we have not loosely through silence permitted things to pass away as in a dream" (Pref. 1.1; 1:1.9-10). We do not hear of Hooker again, however, until the beginning of the penultimate chapter of the book, entitled "Gnostic Revolution— the Puritan Case."

According to Voegelin, the Reformation, "understood as the successful invasion of Western institutions by Gnostic movements," properly marks the beginning of the modern age. These movements, "which hitherto existed in a socially marginal position . . . erupted in the Reformation with unexpected strength . . . with the result of splitting the universal church and embarking on their gradual conquest of the

political institutions in the national states." Considering how vast were the dimensions of the sixteenth-century gnostic revolution known as the Reformation, Voegelin chose in the *New Science* to concentrate on "the Puritan impact on the English public order" as "the most suitable subject for a brief study." This selection suggested itself, Voegelin writes, "because the English sixteenth century had the rare good fortune of a brilliant observer of the Gnostic movement in the person of the 'judicious Hooker.' " He continues: "In the Preface of his *Ecclesiastical Polity* Hooker gave an astute type study of the Puritan, as well as of the psychological mechanisms by which Gnostic mass movements operate. These pages are an invaluable asset for the student of the Gnostic revolution; the present analysis will, therefore, properly begin with a summary of Hooker's portrait of the Puritan."

There follows a section on "Hooker's Portrait of the Puritan," adapted with a few embellishments from the previously discussed "History of Political Ideas." One addition is perhaps noteworthy: "In order to start a

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movement moving, there must in the first place be somebody who has a 'cause' " (135). Voegelin also elaborates somewhat on Hooker's description of the techniques used by the puritan leaders to insulate their followers from outside influences, to indoctrinate them in the party line, and to get them to neglect their own affairs and "devote excessive time to the cause." Voegelin notes with some emphasis Hooker's disparaging remarks about the crucial role of women ("because they are weak in judgment, emotionally more accessible, tactically well placed to . . . serve as intelligence officers, and more liberal in financial aid") in the new movement

(137).

Once a social environment of this type is organized, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to break it up by persuasion.

Let any man of contrary opinion open his mouth to persuade them, they close up their ears, his reasons they weigh not, all is answered with rehearsal of the words of John: "We are of God; he that knoweth God heareth us": as for the rest ye are of the world: for this world's pomp and vanity it is that ye speak, and the world, whose ye are, heareth you. (Pref. 3.14; 1:19.23-27)

They are impermeable to argument and have their answers well drilled. Suggest to them that they are unable to judge in such matters and they will answer, "God hath chosen the simple." Show them convincingly that they are talking nonsense and you will hear "Christ's own apostle was accounted mad." Try the meekest warning of discipline, and they will be profuse on "the cruelty of bloodthirsty men" and cast themselves in the role of "innocency persecuted for the truth." In brief: the attitude is psychologically iron-clad and beyond shaking by argument.

Hooker's analysis, Voegelin continues, "resulted from a clash between Gnosticism, on the one side, and the classic and Christian tradition represented by Hooker, on the other side." Hooker is further described as "a thinker of considerable intellectual qualities and erudition."

Voegelin credits Hooker with two further discoveries of importance: recognizing that "the Puritan position was not based on Scripture" but on a "cause" of "vastly different origin," Hooker perceived that its leaders had developed two further techniques to keep the masses in line: the "standardization" of scriptural interpretation through Calvin's Institutes and the "taboo" on "the instruments of critique" (138). The standardiza-

Voegelin quotes from Lawes Pref. 3.14-15; 1:19.30-20.8.

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tion mechanism is referred to by Voegelin — admittedly with some apparent misgivings — as the koran. "The work of Calvin . . . may be called the first deliberately created Gnostic koran" (139). To quote Voegelin:

a man who can write such a koran, a man who can break with the intellectual tradition of mankind because he lives in the faith that a new truth and a new world begin with him, must be in a peculiar pneumopathological state In his cautiously subdued characterization of Calvin [Hooker] opened with the sober statement: "His bringing up was in the study of civil law"; he then built up with some malice: "Divine knowledge he gathered, not by hearing or reading so much, as by teaching others"; and he concluded on the devastating sentence: "For, though thousands were debtors to him, as touching knowledge in that kind; yet he [was debtor] to none but only to God, the author of

the most blessed fountain, the Book of Life, and of the admirable dexterity of wit."^

With regard to "the second device for preventing embarrassing criticism"— i.e., the "taboo" on independent thought— Hooker had with great sensitivity figured out that the Puritans' fierce opposition to his references to Aristotle, "the patriarch of philosophers ... and the ingenuous school- men" {Christian Letter, 1599) "was motivated by their desire to control their followers. As the movement expanded, not all the followers could be expected to be well informed in Calvin's Institutes; to keep them from arriving at their own judgments, rational thought had to be suppressed" (pp. 140-41).

Voegelin's final praise of Hooker in the *New Science* has to do with his understanding that meaningful public debate with the Puritans and those like them being unlikely if not impossible, the government should be prepared if necessary to step in and solve the matter with a judicious use of force.

[Hooker's] Puritan opponents were not partners in a theoretical debate; they were Gnostic revolutionaries, engaged in a struggle . . . that would have resulted in the overthrow of the English social order, the control of the universities by the Puritans, and the replacement of the common law by scriptural law — Hooker perfectly understood, what today is so little understood, that Gnostic

See Laujes Pref. 2.1; 1:3.15-19.

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propaganda is political action and not ... a search for truth in the theoretical sense. With his unerring sensitiveness he even diagnosed the nihilistic component of gnosticism in the Puritan belief that their discipline, being "the absolute command of Almighty God, it must be received although the world by receiving it should be clean turned upside down; herein lieth the greatest danger of all." (*New Science*, 143-44; my emphasis)^

Richard Hooker, declares Voegelin, understood, that "the Bill of Rights is not a suicide pact" (Justice Jackson, dissent in the *Terminiello* case). Hooker was supremely conscious of the fact that "a government has the duty to preserve the order as well as the truth which it represents."

We today need to learn from Hooker that "when a Gnostic leader appears and proclaims that God or progress, race or dialectic, has ordained him to be the existential ruler, a government is not supposed to betray its trust and abdicate." We need further to learn from him that if "through inadvertence" such a movement threatens to capture power by "the 'legality' of popular elections, a democratic government is not supposed to bow to the 'will of the people' but to put down the danger by force, and, if necessary, to break the letter of the constitution in order to save its spirit" {New Science, 144}.

There is one other reference to Hooker in the New Science. Toward the end of the book, Eric Voegelin reflects on how the study of gnostic mass movements "has become more difficult than it was at Hooker's time." This is because in Hooker's time "the dream world and the real world were still held apart terminologically through the Christian symbol-ism of the two worlds" (169). With the secularization of the modern world and the marginalization of Christianity, this distinction is no longer widely available as a standard to which the resister to modern gnosticism can appeal. The gnostics, claims Voegelin, have destroyed our public language about reality and much twentieth-century dream talk (about "outlawing war," establishing "world government," and moralistic declarations of good intentions not backed up by force) masquerades as "reality."

Voegelin's Two Portraits Compared

How is one to interpret the discrepancy between Voegelin's two portraits

For source of Hooker quote see n. 6 above.

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of Hooker? The easy way out would be to say simply that he changed his mind — that deeper study convinced him that there were not nearly so many blemishes on Hooker's visage as captured in his first portrait. There being no evidence for this easy conclusion, however, one must look elsewhere.

A partial explanation can be deduced from the different temporal perspectives of the two accounts. In his "History of Political Ideas," Voegelin is looking forward to view Hooker from the vantage point of

the disintegrating medieval order with its two spheres, temporal and spiritual, headed by the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope respectively. Hooker cannot but seem a "wrecker" of Western civilization if this Gelasian dualism be conceived as its foundation. In the *New Science of Politics*, however, Voegelin looks backward at Hooker from the perspective of twentieth-century totalitarian movements. Viewed in this light, Hooker stands out as one of the arch-resisters to the gnostic creed movements. If gnosticism as Voegelin understood it be the main problem, then Hooker's defects — his allegedly "rambling, gentlemanly style," "cheap tricks" as a logician, and "quaint" English insularity fade into insignificance.

There is, however, a deeper reason for Voegelin's change of tone and emphasis regarding Hooker, which has to do with a transformation in Voegelin's entire approach to political theory. In his intellectual autobiography dictated late in his life to Ellis Sandoz, Voegelin explains why he left his "History of Political Ideas" to gather dust on his shelves. Put quite simply, around 1950, a year or so before writing the *New Science* and shortly after more or less completing the *History*, Voegelin decided that philosophically it was a mistake to write a history of ideas in the first place, because ideas can be understood only in relation to the experiences of order or disorder from which they spring. Hence, Voegelin insists that ideas and symbols may only properly be interpreted in relation to the experiences to which they give assuaging expression. The eventual upshot in this fundamental turn in Voegelin's thought was his multi-volumed *Order and History*.

Thanks to his epistemological (and experiential) turn, then, Voegelin was able more fully to appreciate Richard Hooker as the sixteenth century's leading spokesman for what in the *New Science* is termed "the Mediterranean tradition." While the core of this tradition (derived from Greek philosophy, Judaism, and Christianity) acknowledges the ineluctable limitations of the human condition as well as the irremediable "uncertainty" of the human being's knowledge of the transcendental ground of all that exists, modern gnosticism, represented by the Puritans in Hooker's

Voegelin's Two Portraits of Hooker 367 England, has been engaged in the fallacious attempt through spiritual hubris to overcome these limitations. Hooker's spiritual sensitivity allowed him to grasp the enormous significance of what was at stake. In the end, Voegelin was better able to evaluate Hooker's alleged technical and logical deficiencies as a philosopher because he came better to understand Hooker's

overriding intention of preserving the Mediterranean tradition by all appropriate means, including the shifting rhetoric of the lawyer's brief and even if necessary the ultimate appeal to raw existential power, as well as logic and scriptural exegesis informed by reason. Clearly, Eric Voegelin came to see Richard Hooker as a significant building block in "the new science of politics," a science based on the recovery of the old and forgotten science, in the sense of T. S. Eliot's lines in "East Coker": . . . And what there is to conquer By strength and submission, has already been discovered Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope To emulate— but there is no competition — There is only the fight to recover what has been lost And found and lost again and again, and now, under conditions That seem unpropitious . . .[^] In the less frequently quoted lines immediately preceding the above lines, Eliot refers to "the general mess of imprecision of feeling" and to the "undisciplined squads of emotion" so characteristic of modernity. It is to Hooker's masterful analysis of this "general mess" that Voegelin looks in his own effort to "recover what has been lost." " T. S. Eliot, *Four Quartets*, "East Coker," 5 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 31, 11. 182-89.

ROWAN WILLIAMS Hooker: Philosopher, Anglican, Contemporary ONE OF THE PREVAILING INTELLECTUAL FASHIONS OF THE DAY in theology is the drawing up of taxonomies, ways of categorizing the diverse styles and methods of doing theology, or of assigning various writers to different "types";[^] and a recent example of this is Wesley Kort's essay of 1992, *Bound to Differ: The Dynamics of Theological Discourse*. Kort's typology offers (not surprisingly: there is a compulsive fascination about triadic structures) three categories: theological discourses are predominantly "prophetic," predominantly "priestly," or predominantly "sapiential." This third discourse is defined by Kort as "starting with the needs and potentials of the human world," rather than with the critical irruption of the transcendent or the mediation of divine presence in specific privileged aspects of or moments in the world. "Sapiential" theology worries about the ways in which the other two theological discourses are liable to become privatized; and so it turns to one or more of (again) three options. It may develop a concern with the "natural," in the widest sense— the outer or inner ecology of human awareness, cosmology or psychology or phenomenology; it may focus on "the problems and possibilities of human " See, e.g., W. P. Jones, *Theological Worlds: Understanding the Alternative Rhythms of Christian Belief* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989); Hans W. Frei, *Types of Christian Theology* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1992). ^ Wesley A. Kort, *Bound to Differ: The Dynamics of Theological Discussion* (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ.

societies"; or it may search for and play with metaphors and structures for imagining an all-inclusive unity and interdependence in things. We can speak of these options as "sapiential" because in Scripture it is the Wisdom books that most clearly exemplify these concerns, for right relation with a material environment, for "the resolution of social conflicts" and the proper handling of social tension and areas of uncertainty, and for the imaginative authority of an integrating symbol, divine Wisdom personified, rejoicing, alluring, reflecting God, guiding reasoning creatures.[^]

While I have a fair number of reservations about Kort's thesis overall, this characterization of one particular cluster of theological styles is good and suggestive, and its usefulness for our purposes is obvious. Hooker is, it seems, so manifestly a "sapiential" theologian, concerned with the natural, the handling of social conflict, and the sustaining of an integrative metaphor, which, in his case, is "Law" itself, evoked, at the end of Book I of the *Lawes*, in terms very close to those of the great hymns to Wisdom in the sapiential books:[^] "her seate is the bosome of God, her voyce the harmony of the world." [^] The sudden transition here to the feminine pronoun would alert any scripturally literate reader to the parallel with the divine Sophia of Proverbs, Job, and (most particularly) the Wisdom of Solomon; what is claimed here for "Law" is what the Bible claims for Wisdom. And, as Book V will remind us (V.52.3-4, 56.6; cf. 55.8 on the participation of Christ's human soul in the divine governance of the universe), Christ is scripturally and traditionally identified with God's Wisdom. The coda to Book I gives notice, indirectly but firmly, that the anchorage of church discipline in the nature and the revealing action of God is no less firm in this apologetics than in the argument from scriptural revelation and authority mounted by the opponents of the Elizabethan Settlement; indeed, it is firmer and clearer, properly understood.[^] But the working out of this is a complex story, not without paradoxical elements.

The first point worth noting is that a sapiential theology works with a clear presumption about the relation, of divine nature to divine will. "The being of God is a kinde of lawe to his working," says Hooker early in his argument (1.2.2; 1:59.5). He has just proposed that law, in its most general sense, is what makes possible the attaining of specific ends or purposes.

^ Kort, 101-4.

^ As in Proverbs 8:22ff., Job 28, Wisdom of Solomoi 6:12-9:18.

^ 1.16.8; 1:142.9. Cf. 1.2.5; 1:62.2-6 for an even more explicit allusion.

* Cf. V.8.1.

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since a world in which no regularity could be depended upon would be a world in which the very idea of an "end" would make no sense, since we could give no content to categories of cause and effect, or process and outcome. When such categories operate, the idea of law is what is presup- posed—a principle of connection between events, and therefore (very importantly for later stages in the discussion) a principle of limitation: not every possibility can be actualized in a world where we think in terms of purposive process ("unto every ende every operation will not serve" II. 2.1; 1:58.261). If we want to talk of God acting so as to bring about some end, we have to suppose that the divine activity too is "law-like"; and, since God cannot be limited or conditioned by any other agency, it is what God is that determines (limits) how God acts. At 1.2.5 and 6, Hooker under- lines the point: it will not do to say that God's will has no cause but itself: we require a principle of consistency in speaking of God's activity, even if, from our point of view, a full account of what makes God's action consis- tent is not available. To say that this diminishes the divine freedom is to misunderstand the issue: God freely consents to the limits set to divine action by divine nature.

Hooker is at his most Thomist here, carefrilly closing up the gap opened up in late medieval thought between the "absolute" power of God and the arbitrarily determined ways in which such power is concretely exercised in the universe (God promises to act in such and such a way, but to do so is a groundless decision, an act of unconstrained liberty). The point at issue is a highly significant one. In the Dublin Fragments^ Hook- er shows his anxiety over a doctrine of absolute divine decrees divorced from a theology of the "natural" will of God "to exercise his goodnes of his owne nature, by producing effects wherein the riches of the glorie thereof may appeare" (section 27; FLE 4:134.8-10); and the sermons more than once reflect the

pastoral implications of a debate over the primacy of absolute divine will. But the point could be broadened: groundless divine decrees may be obeyed or implemented, but they do not lead towards a "hinterland" of divine nature to be contemplated or enjoyed. Groundless divine will does not propose to us anything of the elusive richness of God's life as such, to be regarded with eagerness or expectation of further fulfillment: the only "mystery" is the sheerly negative awareness of the void from which divine enactment freely comes. And because it is neces-

^ Printed by Keble as an appendix to Lawes V under the title "Answer to the Letter of certain English Protestants." See especially section 28, FLE 4:135-37.

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sarily a void, it is not an object of contemplation. Yet, for Hooker, human happiness lies in "every power and facultie of our mindes" having God as object (Lawes 1.11.2-3; cf. 11.6): conformity to law never closes on itself, but disposes us for this state. And, since God as object is inexhaustible, the grounding of divine will in divine nature reinforces the awareness of the provisionality or inadequacy of what we say and do in respect of God. "Although to knowe [God] be life, and joy to make mention of his name: yet our soundest knowledge is to know that we know him not as in deed he is, neither can know him: and our safest eloquence concerning him is our silence" (1.2.2; 1:59.14-17).

Hooker's sapiential idiom, like all theologies with a strong contemplative content, especially those in the Augustinian tradition, entails both a positive and a modest valuation of the human: positive in that (1.11.3) we alone in creation have as our goal the enjoyment of "beautie in it self," the good as such, not simply the goal of an equilibrium with our circumstances which is simply good for us; modest in that there is an unbridgeable gap between our finite capacity and the object that satisfies it. Human perfection is thus something progressively realized (and always to be realized), and it cannot adequately be summed up in terms of obedience to divine commands. Our reasoning about God's nature as displayed in God's action as creator and redeemer guides our will toward those acts or policies that will intensify our vision of the divine wisdom. Part of

what sets Hooker rather at an angle to much of the debate of his day is the fact that he is less interested in how God is to be "pleased" or "satisfied" than in how human creatures are to be healed of what impedes their vision and their joy. Forensic justification will not do for him because it can of itself give no useful account of spiritual growth; his sermon on faith in the elect insists® on faith as, in effect, a virtue which does not come to fullness any more rapidly than any other aspect of our "righteousness." And this classical concept of faith as a virtue or habit instantly puts him at odds with the mainstream of Reformed thinking.

A theology resting on law, in Hooker's sense, thus presupposes a content to the divine life; and this in turn implies that neither in God nor in ourselves is the bare act of self-determination intelligible or interesting (though Hooker has plenty to say about self-determination in his own way, as we shall see). God's voluntary actions are all, fundamentally, aspects of

* Cert., 1; FLE 5:71-72 — an immensely important text in several ways in locating Hooker's doctrine of grace against its background.

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the diffusion and sharing of divine life, and our proper response is recep- tivity to this, discernment of that divine self-bestowal and enjoyment of it. Because this is not an episodic or determinate activity, the assumption is that human existence is — as for Augustine — inescapably temporal: we are best defined as learning beings. The connections are not wholly explicit in Hooker, but there is a line to be drawn from here to the pragmatic or probabilistic, historically alert accounts of human knowing characteristic of later Anglican philosophy, from Butler to Newman (if I may be allowed, mischievously, to count Newman as an Anglican for philosophical purpos- es). The contingency of human learning, its dependence on (variegated) authority, the presence of a carefully modulated element of voluntarism within the whole scheme (since knowing cannot be understood without grasping that interest and affect are always at work in knowing subjects) — all this represents a trajectory out of Hooker, a philosophical as well as theological style that might in the contemporary philosophical climate find affinities with those who have emphasized that knowing is ineradi- cably a matter of

contingent, conversational, perspectival, and narrative development. I think here of Cavell or Nussbaum¹ on the one hand, and equally of those philosophers of science or politics, like Mary Hesse for the former and Roy Bhaskar² for the latter, who have attempted to do justice to this dimension of contingency and historicity without falling into the trap of pure constructivism. Bhaskar's comment on Gramsci³ admirably sums up the central concern here: "The historicity of our knowledge . . . does not refute, but actually depends upon, the idea of the otherness of its objects (and their historicity)."

Obviously Hooker — and the whole sapiential tradition — would want to say more about the knowledge of God here, so as to avoid any misunderstanding about God being an historical object. But the force of Bhaskar's comment would have to be granted. If God's reality is not encountered simply as will and command, it is encountered in the law of things, in the

¹ Stanley Cavell, *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986).

² Mary Hesse, *Models and Analogies in Science* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1963); (with Michael A. Arbib) *The Construction of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986).

³ Roy Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism; A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979).

⁴ Bhaskar, *Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 174.

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interweaving of regularities that sustains a contingent world in intelligibility; our encounter with the nature of God as law or wisdom cannot be separated from the interpretation of this. There are, then, wide areas in which our knowledge is in fact corrigible and necessarily flexible, even when it purports to be, effectively, knowledge of a non-historical reality. If the objects of our knowing really are other, the idea of a finished identity between our

conception and their reality is problematic, not least because these objects are themselves changing and readjusting in the continuing process that is their being-what-they-are. Thus, to know God, it seems, involves elements of flexibility and corrigibility, not because of a trivial relativist view that what's true of God changes according to circumstances, but because of the opposite conviction, that God remains God, a "law unto himself," and, for precisely that reason, can only be discerned in the "following" of the divine action within the mutable world, in a process of learning, not a moment of transparent vision or of simple submission to a decree.

This is not to say that all purported knowledge is radically under question all the time. When Hooker, in Lawes 1.15 in particular, discusses the mutability of laws, the complexity and (some would say) inconclusive-ness or even incoherence of his treatment reflects very accurately the difficulty of treading a path between programmatic skepticism and a sort of historically illiterate positivism. God remains God; and therefore what constitutes human beings the kind of beings they are (mortality, freedom, reasoning capacity and so on) doesn't change. In more contemporary philosophical terms, we operate with readily accessible and epistemologically generous criteria as to what will count as human action or utterance, so that we do not waste time trying to "decide" whether a materially recognizable human in an unfamiliar time or place can be treated, heard, or engaged with as a human thinker/speaker. Skepticism about other minds raises a nest of epistemological issues that risk distracting us from the more serious and manageable matters of philosophy. Thus there are, for Hooker, some things that simply hold for human beings as such, once you have granted the kind of universe that the ideas of law or wisdom entail; and if this is so, they hold for human society, including the society we call the Church. "Laws naturall do alwayes binde" (1.15.1; 1:130.15): that is to say that some of what we know is a matter of basic and non-negotiable procedure for being human before the creator, and, in Hooker's thought, such a procedure is accessible in principle for our reason functioning as it should. However, given our corrupt condition, the realizing

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of our human happiness now depends on God's self-communication in history as well as nature— i.e., in revelation. For us now, concrete and historical subjects, not intellects in the abstract, the path to human happiness lies in following the law revealed in Christ, the supernatural

law of faith, hope, and love, which, by associating us with the eternal life of the second person of the Trinity (a theme superbly set out in the long Christological meditation of V.51-56) assures the eternal continuance of our contemplative bliss, an eternal reward which is supernatural in the sense that it is pure gift, an addition by God to the natural happiness of our fulfillment within the limits of this mortal life (1.11.5-6). Thus, although the law of faith, hope and love is not something reason can work out for itself, it has the same non-negotiable character as the basic structures of being human and being-human-in-society that we can (more or less) grasp by reason. In Hooker's terms, the law of supernatural charity is "positive" rather than natural, but nonetheless fixed and eternal for that a.15.3; 1:131.25-132.6).

To know how to be human, in short, requires us to take very seriously the fact that we are historical beings, shaped by our past: a fact that, for a classical Christian mind, has two closely related but very different sets of implications. First, we must recognize that we are never in a state of pure rationality, and therefore never able, out of our own resources, successfully to negotiate the business of being properly human. Yet we learn from historical trial and error how to limit the damage of inhuman self-regard; and here is the foundation of political society (1.10.2-4). The most basic needs of humans for welfare and survival impose a kind of oblique discovery of nature's laws, and of the consequent need for government, even though nature does not specify what kind (1.10.5-6). As far as the laws of human society go, history in some degree returns us to nature's imperatives. But the same holds true of that completest and most comprehensive political society, the Church. The history that God directs, by becoming in Jesus Christ an historical agent and by moulding the Scriptures in which the law of Christ is set forth, likewise returns us to nature, to that life in which we may actualize what we are capable of and arrive at our natural end, gratuitously and supernaturally augmented with an eternal reward. We are bound to the history of Christ and to the scriptural record as our way to become what God has created us to be, lovers of the eternal beauty of God in God's self. In contrast to the contingent and imperfect

" See. e.g., 1.7.6.

learning of political trial and error, this knowledge involves us in mystical union with Christ whereby we share the eternal relation of the Word to the Father."⁴ Thus the eternal, the non-negotiable constraint put upon us by Christ and Scripture has to do with how we are made contemplative saints, participants in Christ's everlasting filiation. This — and this a/one — is for Hooker the sense in which the givenness of revelation has the same force as the law of nature.

For the second set of implications insists that we ask of our specific institutions and conventions what end they serve: laws are changeable when "made for men or societies or Churches, in regard of their being such as they doe not alwayes continue" (1.15.3; 1:132.6-8). This is, of course, the subject matter of Book III, where the distinction between the means and the end of positive law (other than the basic and unchanging law of the new covenant) is carefully spelled out.⁵ Once we understand what a law is for, we can understand whether and how it is mutable. In cases where the purpose of a divine positive law is obscure, we need a further positive mandate to abrogate it (III. 10.1): though Hooker is not wholly consistent here, in that he assumes a general abrogation of Jewish ceremonial and dietary law after Christ, even though the precise purpose of this or that bit of the law in respect of Christ as its fulfilling and terminating end is still hidden. The reader may reasonably suspect that Hooker is extremely uneasy with the idea that the positive law of the new covenant includes specific mandates, as opposed to the fundamental doctrinal "law" of faith in Christ and consequent hope and charity,⁶ and the particular ordinances of the dominical sacraments (III. 11. 13). But understanding what a law is for means having some grasp of how historically limited cultures work: of why such and such a law is thought to produce a particular effect in these circumstances, or why what once produced that effect no longer does so (III. 10.4-5). To hold on to a specific convention when it no longer effects what it did, even if the convention is held to be a positive divine mandate, is not obedience at all: and to change what we do in such circumstances is not altering God's commands but obeying the imperative contained implicitly in the failure of the mandate now to deliver what it formerly did. "Men doe not presume to chaunge Gods ordinance, but they

⁴* See, e.g., V.51.3; cf. Aquinas, S.T. 3.3.5 ad 2, 3.7.1 ad 2, 3.7.11 ad 1, 3.23.3, etc. ⁵ See, e.g., 111.10. ⁶ See 111.10.6-7, 11.3ff.

yeelde thereunto requiring it selfe to be chaunged""— both an ingenious and a strong formulation of a delicate point.

We can begin to see now how Hooker can sustain his claim that his system is more, not less, firmly grounded in revelation than that of his disciplinarian opponents. The assumption that Scripture is a book of positive divine law in which we find specific directives for the Church's ordering requires us to ignore the whole question of the coherence of human nature and its goals, and the coherence of God's own being. God has a "character"; God is not pure groundless will. Therefore creation (including us) has a character: but because created nature realizes its goals in contingent and temporal process, being faithful to that character and so to God's law, and so to God's being, God's self, involves being wary of any kind of positivism about laws enacted or even revealed in history, since to be bound to a set of historical positive enactments may lead us to be unfaithful to the real law of God, the wisdom in which we are created, when those enactments no longer effect a path to wisdom. To act in obedience to wisdom is a matter of knowing how and when to innovate:

The Church beinge a bodie which dyeth not hath alwaies power, as occasion requireth, no lesse to ordeine that which never was, then to ratifie what hath bene before. To prescribe the order of doinge in all thinges, is a peculiar prerogative which wisdom hath, as Quene or Soveraigne commandresse over other vertues. (V.8.1; 2:38.4-8)

Thus the argument is rounded off: true conformity to unchanging divine wisdom (and, it should be added, to the doctrinal formulations that embody for us how that wisdom acts and how it makes its general claim upon us) requires a flexibility in discipline and polity that is impossible for the positivist and the primitivist.

Now the modern theological reader will no doubt admire the skill and the visionary comprehensiveness of the argument; but I suspect s/he will have some awkward questions to ask. In the remainder of this paper, I want to look at two issues in particular as they arise from this argument, and to ask whether Hooker has anything like the resource for meeting such difficulties that might commend him to a contemporary audience. Both issues are really to do with the undoubtedly odd fact that Hooker uses what is in some ways a potentially radical apologetic in defense of a

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conservative and perhaps authoritarian position. The first is this: granted the Church's power to make new ordinances of discipline, how in fact do we know when to make such changes? The disciplinarian is, in a way, too easy a target for Hooker: how would he meet the argument that the *de facto* order of the English church, monarch, and bishops as the definitive form of government, requires just the sort of adjustment in changed circumstances that he justifies against his opponents where the introduction of episcopacy is concerned? The second question is one of obvious modern import. Language just as much as other kinds of practice is judged on its aptness to circumstances: if discipline is mutable, why not doctrine? The first difficulty is, of course, the underlying agenda of the last four books of the *Lawes*. Having given substantial hostages to fortune, Hooker has to argue, point by point or case by case, the "negative" brief that, in all matters where disciplinarians express unease, there is no conclusive case for any change beyond what the Settlement itself recognizes. This is no less a *tour de force* than the earlier argument, though it has a far more ambivalent sound to the modern ear. It depends quite heavily on assuming that Church and State have an executive authority with a reasonable presumption in its favor; and, as the argument of these four books develops, that "reasonable presumption" slips closer and closer towards the sanction of divine positive law, though without ever quite getting there, in either the ecclesiastical or the wider political realm. What stops it quite getting there is the fact that Hooker holds on to his opposition to the idea that any given political discipline, including monarchy and episcopacy, derives normally from unmediated divine mandate: granting this possibility would have unravelled most of his earlier case. What we must envisage—and it is spelled out in an uncomfortably compressed way in VIII.3.1-2 (Keble 2.5-7)—is a kind of primordial self-determination by political communities seeking to follow the law of nature by finding for themselves organs of executive power. Book VII never directly claims that episcopacy is instituted by Christ: but the apostolic power is the source of the episcopal, and the episcopal represents a localizing and channelling of the more primitive power, ^ universally accepted and endorsed by the first churches. Likewise, in Book VIII, monarchy in general is not the result of divine appointment (we have already been told, remember, at 1.10.5, that "Nature tieth not to any one" form of rule); yet, once decided upon and accepted, it has a sanction beyond

that of the community's consent at any one moment, a "divine right."

See, e.g., Vn.4.

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Throughout the *Lawes*, Hooker assumes that communities of reasoning beings have the right to determine the shape of their political life; and indeed, because of our fallen state, they have a duty to find an effective form of executive power for the restraint of vice. We might have been capable in the Garden of Eden of living without executive government, but our present fallibility, idleness of mind, and corruption of habit, visible to the wisest among us, require a potentially coercive power.¹⁶ Hooker, like the good Augustinian he is (and the good patriarchalist he consequently is), has no particular optimism about the moral discernment of the mass of human beings, for all that he greatly privileges the self-determining right of any human community. Now, if these primordial self-determinations are truly for the sake of God's eternal law and our contemplative happiness, we might better understand them if perhaps we go back to some of the general observations at the very beginning of the *Lawes*. Law in a plural and contingent world is precisely the selflimitation of divine power so that specific and interdependent processes may go forward in regular fashion: if the goals are diverse, though coherent, God's power logically cannot be present in each substance or process as an infinite potentiality. Only God as God possesses infinite liberty — and even that is not a liberty of utterly arbitrary self-definition, since God is by nature thus-and-not-otherwise. So we could say that the characteristic shape of law is self-limitation. The community seeking to conserve its conformity to the law of God cannot, in the world of fallen history, remain for ever in a state of political innocence; it must decide how to enact its aims, and so must give up its indeterminate potential. Prompted by any number of varied considerations, about the specific problems it faces, the local difficulties or deficiencies it wants to remedy, it commits itself to this or that executive polity. Once that commitment has been made, observing its consequences becomes a matter of obedience to divine law, even when there is full awareness of the contingency, in a certain sense, of this polity in its origins, and the mutability of its detail in a possible future. It acquires this sanction because this is the way the community has chosen to establish its identity in a world where

limited identities (natural, personal, and political) are constantly in precarious balance. To pretend that this constructed identity is suddenly (and I think the operative word is "suddenly") a disposable fiction is not only to be blind to one's own condition— by that social history, but to ignore the ways in which this historical

" See. e.g., 1.10.2-4.

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identity has become part of a wider network, has entered into the self-definition of other communities— which is to ignore that "sociable," mutual dimension of the law-governed world that Hooker touches on in Book I (3.5, 8.6, 9.1) and in his sermon on pride, where he memorably defines justice as "the vertue wherby that good which wanteth in our selves wee receyve inoffensivelie at the handes of others" (Pride, 2; FLE 5:334.24- 26).

There is a certain *prima facie* conservative implication here, which Hooker manifestly exploits; and the emphasis on the sanction that the enforcement of such positive law possesses reminds us unambiguously that part of the polemical purpose of the Lawes was to secure a rationale for legal action against religious dissidents. Yet the discussion does not take the final step into that absolute positivism of sovereignty that has been such an incubus upon English legal theory up to the present, and Hooker is not the most comfortable of bedfellows for a purely authoritarian, uncompromisingly divine-right model of secular or ecclesiastical government. The contemporary student would probably want to say that the community's self-limitation remains rather more functional than Hooker is entirely happy to grant— just as (for us) in the natural order, the reimaginings and readjustments of the evolutionary process militate against the idea of a single primordial limitation of possibilities in fixed species, so in politics the constant question of the accountability of polity to the human ends it serves cannot be evaded. The primordial self-determining community is not now simply an etiological myth, forever separated from us by a single act of self-denuding decision. If human subjects retain the rational — and therefore risktaking — liberties with which Hooker's anthropology endows them, and if wisdom in the cosmos is itself "revisionary," the compelling obviousness of a once-for-all delegation of power is a good deal lessened.

But what Hooker's thesis also reminds us of in a contemporary context is the perennial seductiveness of a radical program uninterested in what

^° A recent British Home Secretary (Kenneth Baker) was declared by the courts to have acted in contravention of the letter of the law in a case concerned with the deportation of an illegal immigrant. He was protected by the convention that the crown's ministers are in certain senses above the law. In comparable fashion, it has been claimed that the interest of the nation and the interest of the government of the day are one in law, so that there can be no appeal to the courts against what the government does to protect its interest; this was asserted at the time of the Clive Ponting trial in Britain, when a civil servant was prosecuted for breaking governmental security because of his belief that policies were being pursued contrary to the national interest.

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has made us the subjects we now are. Changing politics is a futile exercise if we are not prepared to come to terms with the history that conditions and limits us, that gives us the very language in which to pose political questions. Ignore this, and you end up with the modern version of primitivist positivism (we can both discover and return to an age before the distortions of dualist/patriarchal/exploitative consciousness) or timeless rationalism (the principles of liberal secularist democracy are obvious, and the dissenter — the Muslim, for instance — is not really a partner in reasonable conversation). Hooker at least obliges us to think about how we came to pose our questions like this, and how, therefore, our questions and aspirations are continuous with those of our history. To ask, for instance, why monarchy ever looked like a compelling model of how to direct human beings to a goal of happiness may be of more political use than a bald dismissal of it. If we are able to "talk" with our history, assuming some common human ground about ultimate goods being sought, we should be able to see how history is both ourselves and other — rather this than that attitude which, by assuming the obvious reasonableness of where we are now and how we talk now, simply sees history as an unsuccessful approximation to the triumphant "sameness" of modernity (and so also sees the non-standardly-modern aspects of the present world as primitive or retarded). Hooker does at least insist that what we are is made, that we cannot reconstruct

"original positions," and that whatever political futures we desire have to be reworkings of what historical limitation has constructed for us, even if— as we hope— they can be more than repetitions.

What, then, of the second set of questions, about doctrinal formulations? Part of the answer has been given in what has already been said. A fortiori, we cannot pretend that we are theological innocents, timelessly confronting the mystery of God's action.[~] We are not here talking about a voluntary self-limitation, but about a call or imperative or transforming gift that "limits" us, whether we choose or no. There can be no beginning all over again here — the determinations have, in some sense, been made for us, first of all in creation, in our being the sort of beings we are, and then in a redemption whose point is to free us to be such beings. It is not up to us to "choose" our final ends, because we do not choose our nature. In this case, then, even more than with matters of polity, how we act and

[~] Cf. my paper, "Doctrinal Criticism: Some Questions," in Sarah Coakley and David Pailin, eds., *The Making and Remaking of Christian Doctrine: Essays in Honour of Maurice Wiies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 239-64, esp. pp. 252-58.

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talk is conditioned by a history— not a history, this time, of our decisions and their consequences, but a history of attempts to bring to speech that which determines us. Doctrine, in other words, is always a catching up with something prior to us: we do not (in both the technical and the colloquial senses of the words) "have priority" when we try to speak doctrinally. When we reckon with the ways in which doctrinal history, like political history, conditions the questions we ask and how we ask them, the essential difference, in Hooker's perspective, between the two kinds of conditioning is that political history is about means to the ends that doctrinal language specifies. If we treat our doctrinal language as revisable in the same sense as our talk about polity, we risk treating our human ends as negotiable, as potentially under human control or at the mercy of human circumstance; and this fragments the whole underlying sapiential model, depending as this model does on our final determination by the nature of God as the object we find our bliss in contemplating, the life we are fulfilled in sharing.

Hooker's proscription of doctrinal revision, then, has a clear logic to it. We may have more problems than he did about the historical conceptualities of doctrinal statement, we may well want to say that doctrinal utterance does involve human choices, human self-determinations, unless we believe that revelation comes in well-formed statements to start with. But the question Hooker poses for the doctrinal revisionist is a serious one, one that needs articulation in our contemporary theological debates. Doctrine is about our end (and our beginning); about what in our humanity is not negotiable, dispensable, vulnerable to revision according to political convenience or cultural chance and fashion. Deny this, and you must say that humanity or the human good is, in some significant way, within our power to determine: which may sound emancipatory for a few minutes, until you remember that, in a violent and oppressive world, it is neither good news nor good sense to propose that definitions of the human lie in human hands, when those hands are by no means guaranteed to be the instruments of a mind formed by contemplative reason — or even what passes for reason in the liberal and universalist ethos of "our" democracies. Doctrine purports to tell us what we are for, and what the shape is of a life lived in accordance with the way things are, and how such a life becomes accessible to us, even in the middle of the corruptions and unfreedom of a shadowed history. Hooker's general apologetic for revealed religion would need a fair amount of reworking in our more ironic age, but his challenge is still worth listening to. If we are not

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somehow bound by what God is and what we are, however stumblingly and inadequately we can speak of these things, what possibility is there of sustaining a belief in the common good of human creatures beyond the terms of a minimalist discourse about survival?

Hooker— like the Anglican tradition as a whole, it is tempting to add — is tantalizingly hard to pigeonhole. I have been trying to show that his schemas refuse to be classified once and for all as simply "conservative" or "radical," and that aspects of what is undeniably a local polemic, very much of its time and place, set off chains of reflection with an uncomfortable contemporary edge. But the final comment I'd want to make is to underline the significance of a "sapiential" theology in an age when the theological debate so readily polarizes between one or another variety of positivism (biblically

fundamentalist, ecclesiastically authoritarian, or whatever) and a liberalism without critical or self-critical edge. It is not a matter of interest only to theologians either: as I have hinted, the development of a proper political anthropology requires something of the balance that a sapiential scheme offers between objectivism (the otherness of what we know) and a recognition of responsive creativity in persons (the inevitability of self-determining decisions). If this is part of Hooker's legacy, part too of a distinctively Anglican legacy of "contemplative pragmatism" against the background of basic creedal and liturgical commitments, it is something worth celebrating and worth developing — in what often looks like the onset of a very unsapiential era in secular and ecclesial politics.

EGIL GRISLIS AND W. SPEED HILL

Richard Hooker:

A Selected Bibliography, 1971-1993

THIS COMPILATION LISTS PRINCIPALLY WORKS PUBLISHED SINCE THE 1972 publication of *Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of His Works*, edited by W. Speed Hill. It omits items that were included in its "Annotated Bibliography," unless these have since been reprinted. A few pre-1972 items that have since come to our attention are also included; however, when a pre-1972 item has been cited by P. G. Stanwood in his 1973 bibliography for the *Netv Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature*, vol. 1, we omit it. A few post-1993 items are also included. The listing of reviews, however, makes no pretensions to completeness.

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